INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

AND A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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International Politics and Comparative Analysis of International Relations

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Chapter 1:

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Part 1: Foreign policy of the country of the world

Part 2: Contemporary political conflicts and controversial issues

Information about the context

The new realities brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic and the post-pandemic period, which spread throughout the world by multiplying globalization and whose economic, political and social effects are still felt, had an impact on the science of international relations, like most social sciences. In its essence, the science of international relations, which arose as an adequate response to the First World War, has always chosen as its task to protect humanity from the destructive effects of new wars during its existence for a little more than a hundred years. During the Second World War and the Cold War that began after it, the system of international relations gave its bipolar nature to a monopolar system with the collapse of the USSR. It is in such a tense political environment that it is important to understand the relations between the states, propose solutions to conflicts and organize negotiations to achieve reconciliation between the parties, as well as ensure the implementation of the decisions, conventions and sanctions adopted to regulate the system of international relations in order to prevent new wars and their ongoing consequences. Have become the most important issues.

Although most authors consider the turning of the wheel of history as a stereotyped expression, if we analyze the international political situation today and the international political situation of the Middle Ages, we can find great similarities. Moreover, these similarities form an interesting and ironic identity with each other at the level of basic principles. Currently, it is possible to see that international politics is neither unipolar nor bipolar in nature. The international political system is now dominated by a multi-polar climate that has not been observed for more than a hundred years. The existing multi-polarity in international politics has somehow managed to integrate all the main principles of international relations that we have accepted to this day into the new order, to change them in line with trends and innovations.

In this study, readers can get detailed information about international politics and its related and included components, and get acquainted with the author's opinion, the theories and works of well-known political and international relations scholars, as well as the research results and political analyzes of young researchers.

In the first part of the book, they will be able to gain detailed information about the main theoretical areas of international politics and international relations, as well as an understanding of international law, which has a very indispensable role for the operation of the international system, and its role and place in international politics.

In the second part of the book, they will get acquainted with information about the states that we characterize as the main actors of international politics and their roles and functions in the system of international relations. This chapter will acquaint the readers with the foreign policy strategies of states such as the USA, Russia, China, etc., which currently occupy an important position in the international arena, and also introduce examples of the past historical and political practice of the states.

In the third part, which is the last part of the work, readers can get detailed information about the currently active world political conflict and war zones. In this part, both the current situation and future development trends of the mentioned conflicts, as well as the past political practices of the parties to the conflict, have been interrelated.

International Politics and Actor Concept in International Politics

In all existing sciences, action or activity is characterized by its essence as the mutual effect of the object and the subject, the effect directed by one of them to the other, or the process by which each of them performs work on their own. Regardless of its type and scale, it is also selective for politics and political activity. In general, when we look at the history of politics that spans thousands of years, we see that over the centuries, it has emerged from the same context as the state or the institutions that contain the characteristic elements of the state. Especially starting from the period when the first state-like institutions were formed until today, in the development of the political knowledge of mankind, the ideas and perceptions against politics and its driving forces in different periods attract attention with their colorfulness. However, if we take a broad-scale view of this entire historical development process, religion, philosophy, astronomy, mathematics and dozens of other sciences have been classified according to the periods in which states were formed and studied under these or different names. Moreover, most of these sciences had little or no role in everyday human life. The antithesis is that two centuries of the process of studying the fields as a science, such as politics or economics,

have been influential in all areas of society's life. In the 20th century, the artist who began to study politics in the context of social sciences, despite his conceptually new acquaintance with this field, developed it to the extent of evolution at the theoretical level in the span of several decades. Of course, ideas about political activity were established in Ancient Greece and Rome before Christ, and then in the exhibition. However, no thinker from Fukudit to Thomas More, from N. Machiavelli to Hegel studied politics as a whole system and a complex science.

From the point of view of the structure of the society, the division of political activity into two parts, internal political activity and external political activity, is closely related to its own working mechanism. The different scale of politics and its orientation to different areas result from the different volume and orientation of its implementing subjects and new actors. The concept of actor is an important category in international politics, and it is one of the most important issues in our research day. It is known that the main actors in the internal political activity of the state are the state, society, interest groups, and political parties. Similarly, actors in foreign political activity are states, international organizations, international public opinion, and even physical sex, according to the views of realism and liberalism theorists of international relations. However, the concept of an actor is a very detailed phenomenon in the international political context, as it includes a synthesis of broader and internal-external fields.

Although the exact characteristics of the actors of international politics cannot be determined from an overview, there are many scientific theories and hypotheses that are directed to the actors of international politics and are confirmed in practice. The fact that the independence of the actors is one of the main characteristic indicators for their activity is reflected in the common opinions of scientists conducting research in this field. For

example, James E. Doughtery in his work "The Study of the Global System" characterizes the actors of international politics as subjects with different levels of independent activity in the international arena. James. Doughter's colleague Oran Young characterizes the actors of international politics with the possibility of independent political activity and evaluates them as beings created by people and not completely subject to another actor.

Of course, the ability of independent political direction alone is not enough to achieve the status of an actor of international politics. Because, for the simplest example, even our friends that we keep in our homes, such as dogs and cats, can act freely as long as we do not limit their actions and do not impose prohibitions on them, they can eat, sleep or mess around whenever they want. They do Accordingly, independent activity alone is not enough to become an actor of international politics. The ability of independent political direction at different levels should be supported by the ability to act, which produces results in international politics as a result of political activity and cannot be accurately estimated by other actors. This activity of the subject of international politics is terminologically called autonomy. An actor with autonomous activity can act as an actor of international politics, even if he is not independent at all. This approach to the classification of actors essentially contradicts the assumptions of power-centric theories. The fact that having the ability of autonomy is specific to actors of international politics means that if we consider the ability of independent management as the main characteristic of actors, then we would have completely denied the actor theory of the dominant theory of international relations such as liberalism. Because in this field, international organizations and transnational corporations are also considered as actors of international relations. But on the contrary, if we analyze the actor training of international politics from a realist point of view, then we

can consider the main characteristic of an international political actor as the ability of independent political direction, since we only mention the state as an actor.

In general, it has never been possible to achieve unanimity in training actors of international politics, specifically in training actors of international politics. Many views that arise while analyzing the issue are united around two main lines, one with a single actor and one with many actors, based on the orientation of the theory of international relations. When we approach the actor of international politics based on the theory of single actorness, the state is mentioned here as the only actor. This approach, which is the idea of the basilica, is considered by researchers who leave the realist position to be the only actor, so it is also called state-centric and state-oriented actor theory in various scientific literatures.

The opposite of the state-centered actor theory is given by liberalist supporters of international relations. Thus, the liberalists who say the large-scale pluralism, which includes states as actors of international politics, international organizations and international public opinion, claim that the single-actor theory does not reflect the reality from a practical point of view. The researchers who support this idea characterized the views of realists as an approach covering the past era, since the state was the only actor in the international arena in the ancient history of politics. They see the emergence of international organizations as a result of the development of political relations and the fact that the spheres of activity have become so large that they cannot be ignored over time, even after the collapse of the SSRI, the collapse of the nationalistic structure and the human rights and freedoms that once belonged to the internal jurisdictions of the states, the fight against corruption, energy sharing their authority with a number of international organizations in many spheres, including politics, social welfare, economic

policy and green policy, proved that international organizations are actually the subjects of international politics.

In a certain sense, the two theories given above about the actors of international politics reflect reality. But here, the main point to be considered about the realists who defend the realist-oriented state-centered or single-actor theory of international politics is that they do not deny the existence and activities of international organizations. Proponents of this theory claim that international organizations are not able to influence international processes independently, and show that their ideas are created by giving international organizations less power and authority than the governments. The followers of realism, which is a power-centered ideology, said that the states created these organizations out of the power of their existence, and even did not rule out that they were able to hinder the activity of the organizations they created and destroy them in the event of misunderstanding or political conflict.

The theory that the state is the main actor in international politics is accepted as an actor in international organizations, etc. From a multi-centered theory. It is not a typical case that the content of the theory should remain simple. Thus, the public, which has a wide scope from the theory of politics to sociology Researches about the state and its nature in sciences retain their relevance even in our modern era. From this context, it is not an easy matter to analyze the state, which already has a lot of opinions about it, as an actor of international politics, and even as the only actor. If the international political actor of the states is the subject of research, then the concreteness of the characteristic features of the state and the exact understanding of its essence are of the first importance. Conducting research in this context makes it necessary to understand the difference between the concepts of state and nation. Unfortunately, the confusion of these two

categories turns the single-actor system into an anarchic multi-actor system.

Professor John Hibson of Cambridge University advanced valuable ideas on the analysis of single-actor theory in his scientific work entitled "The State and International Relations". In this work, he distinguished the concept of nation and independence from the concept of state and independence, and analyzed the relationship between nation and independence with the state. The scientist who gave detailed information about the concepts of nation state and dominant state in his last work played a special role in the development of the state-centered theory.

 If we look at the basis of the development of ideas about nation and state in the thousand-year development period of the history of political ideas, we will undoubtedly see that the concepts of state and nation were equated and no distinction was made between them in the long period of social development. Perhaps, the nature of social development demanded this identification. It cannot be explained concretely, but we would be mistaken if we were to say that the stages of a continuous social development were considered as a subject of scientific debate, and that the categories of nation and state were evaluated as the same category by everyone in this period. For example, Edward H. Carr in his work "Nationalism and After" claims that the concept of the nation reflects the broad political unity in Western Europe at the end of the Middle Ages and that the state as a political institution stands at the opposite pole. So, what Carr said is a very correct approach referring to the monarchical management system and the population he is facing, the nation he is managing and the mutual relationship between them. Because in countries with a monarchy structure, which was the most widespread management system in the Middle Ages, the status represented by the monarch is equated with the state in most cases, and the population is opposed to oppression and exploitation and

stands in a protesting position, so it is a kind of state because it has a contrary opinion to the dynasty at the head of the monarchy. They were in the mood.

The researchers who distinguish between the nation and the state characterize the nation as a whole and as a concept with a stronger concentration compared to the state because there are strong historical, social, cultural and genetic ties between them. The state, in a certain sense, is a more fragile concept, which depends on the behavior of the leading individuals and the relationship between the institutions created by the members of the nation and acting only in the direction of a specific goal. This is the reason why a nation can have many states throughout history. At the same time, all these characteristic features shown above indicate that states are a group that can be divided more easily than nations. One of the famous researchers of the last century, the Englishman Benjamin J. Cohen, in his scientific work called "The Question of imperialism, The Political Economy of Dominance and Defense", describes the state as an institution with a joint activity mechanism while characterizing the nation as a union with a strong sense of purpose.

After accepting that there are big differences between the nation and the state, Garcia next comes up with a problem. This problem is characterized as an identification problem by Karl.W. Deutch. The essence of the problem is the question of what criteria to apply during the process of determining the category of nation, which union is considered as a nation. "Nationalism and Social Communication" by Karl. Deutch analyzed this question in detail and identified the common culture as the main driving factor of the nation concept.

Different theorists have different approaches to the relationship between the nation and the state. In essence, these approaches claim that one of the two mentioned concepts is superior to the other, or consider them as a system. In his work "An Introduction of

Political Geography", John Rosinie advanced the idea that the nation and the state have deep relations in all spheres of public life, and that these relations are passed on to the future generations of that nation through genetic memory even during the fall of the state representing the nation. When talking about the relationship between the nation and the state, many researchers also claim that the nation has a certain goal and takes action to realize it. B. Hass defined this goal as creating a state.

B. Hassin's opinion that the main goal of the nation is to create a state does not mean that this goal of the nation is realized only for the sake of power and power. B. Hass's opinion is related to the fact that the nation tries to ensure the safety of even the most primitive biological structure in order to preserve its existence. Thus, nations need protection and regulation in order to ensure their existence and continue their activities without danger. In order to meet this need, embarking on the path to the creation of the most unique state can be evaluated as the realization of the will of the state in the long-term perspective in line with the needs of the nation. Here, the important nuance is the civilization of the nation at the level of establishing a state. If we know that in the past, a sex or a dynasty had the potential to establish a state, even if it opposed the will of the nation, when it had enough power, we must remember that this trend remains the same in many of the backward countries of the world, except for the Western civilization. However, this process has been the same as in the previous exhibition in Europe. The new administrators did not consider the interests of the nation. However, the reformation wave started by the French Revolution changed the current situation and the supremacy of the state over the nation led to the supremacy of the nation over the state.

After studying the mutual relations between the nation and the state and the historical ties created by the social development, it became possible to understand the differentiation between the state and the nation. In order to arrive at the essence of the concept of actors, especially the state-centric theory that defends the one-actor nature of the international system, the second step is to investigate the relationships that establish the relationship and mutual dependence between the concepts of state and sovereignty, where the difference between them is fully understood even by middle-level political observers. After reading the articles about the nation and the state in the previous paragraphs, the issues about the nature of the state become clear in the mind of the readers. However, we can say with certainty that the relationship between the concepts of sovereignty and state is more complex and difficult to differentiate than the relationship between the state and the nation. Sovereignty, which is used as a political and legal term in most literatures, has gone through a long-term development path and got rid of the dispositive essence in the middle works and has come to today's modern context. In the early and middle development stages of international political relations, the concept of sovereignty to a certain extent was removed from the equivalent context with the concept of independence in internal management. However, in our modern era, the category of sovereignty is one of the most complex research areas of international law.

If we look at the etymology of this term, for the first time we will see that it was used for the French political environment in the closest way to today's meaning. Jean Boden, who researched sovereignty in his work called La Republique against the background of advice to the French queen to strengthen her power during the period of feudal wars, has shown a special service to the development of this concept. After Jan Boden, in the middle of the next century, Thomas Hobbes gave full content to the concept of sovereignty with his ideas defending the granting of broad powers to the ruler. T. Hobbes's realist position and

the ideas characterizing law as a category subject to the will of the state prove that the ideas that constitute the core of the state-centered actor training have existed since the 17th century.

As a result of the First World War, the victory of the liberalist states was naturally accompanied by the dictate of the ideas of liberalist-oriented states in international politics. During the period of "hegemony" of liberalists, who consider law and international law as the most effective means to regulate international relations between states, the concept of sovereignty in international law found its opposite in a broad way. However, in the advancing periods, the increasing revanchist tendencies within the defeated states, Germany, which left the First World War as a defeated state as a result of financing the defeated states as a result of the balancing policy carried out by the liberal states against each other's strengthening, Italy, which could not take over the promised territories, and the Jinsand peninsula of the Versailles-Washington system The realization of their goals by the use of force by potential realist countries such as Japan, which took a hostile position against the liberal allies by unjustly accepting the decision regarding The difference of opinion between realists and liberalists had a small effect on the concept of sovereignty. If the liberalists recognized international law as an important regulatory method as a factor above the state, the realists disagreed with this point and rejected the supremacy of law over states. On the one hand, this made it very difficult to unanimously determine the validity of the issue of sovereignty against the background of the unnecessary and even meaningless debates, which were called the first great debate in international affairs between liberalists and realists who accepted international law as the main category, which accepted sovereignty as an important research area.

In modern international politics, sovereignty is characterized as an ability of the state and is also used as a category that determines the subjectivity of the international law of the states. Sovereignty, which has a political and legal nature as an expression of its independence within the country and outside its territorial borders, is also thought to be able to easily perform the internal and external functions of the state. Sovereign activity and sovereign activity should be carried out within the framework of the basic principles and norms accepted in international law and should not prevent people from participating in free and independent governance.

As a result of the very late start of the study of international politics and the theory of international relations at the scientific-conceptual level, the single actor theory in international politics is a theory that is not even a hundred years old. The fact that the ideas that support this theory and create the basis for its development stretch back to the 5th century BC does not change this fact. Because until the recent past century, when the nature and activity of states changed in a complex way, the realist climate in the international environment was already dominated by the dominant position. Only since the last century, the change of the nature of the international structure turned these considerations into the subject of scientific debate. James.A. Field, in his monograph "Transnationalism and New Tribe", relates the international system to the organization of diplomatic or military relations between individual states, despite the fact that the theme of unity of states as a subject has been closed in the last century and without counting some exceptions.

Kenneth Thompson is one of the scientists who made a great contribution to the development of this theory with his ideas that served the state-centric theory of international politics in the second half of the last century. He did not deny the non-state subjects of the international system by leaving the relatively interesting position. However, at

the same time, he argued that the subjects considered as actors in liberalism, such as international organizations and transnational corporations, are subject to the will of states to a certain extent, and accordingly, states have more political influence than other actors in the international sphere.

Each other by means of nuclear weapons. However, the presence of the same force on both sides was the most important factor that prevented the war between them. However, one of the most unique ways to ensure peace is to be strong, even very strong. Herz's ideas do not end there, according to him, there is no other state or organization in the world at the level of fighting this superpower. As a matter of fact, in international politics, organizations, etc., non-state entities lag behind states in every way. Herz's ideas about the middle of the last century are still valid today. The approximate power ratio between Jin and ABS keeps both countries away from war. Again, just like in the last century, both sides gather supporters around them through economic and political relations and engage in diplomatic discussions with each other, making these discussions more interesting and open to the international community with Twitter scandals. Although the relations between ABS and Jin are similar to the ABS-SSRI relations of the last century, it is a process that is being watched with interest by everyone.

While researching the state-centric theory, we observe that the states are not really the main actors of the international politics in the modern era. The technological development that has been going on for the last 50 years and will essentially shape the future of human history calls into question the future destinies of states and the future activities and even existence of national states. Especially the development of telecommunication means and social media in the last ten years, followed by the performance in the field of artificial intelligence, especially ChatGPT, and the results it brings prove that the state is not the

only actor in the sphere of international relations. If we analyze a little deeper, we can identify one of the reasons why states are not the only subjects. This is especially related to the issue of territorial borders, which were the red line of states in the last century. However, if we look at the modern period, we can find dozens of facts that break the stereotype that the activities of states within their territorial borders belong to them without exception. The issue of the inviolability of these borders leads to the emergence of certain exceptions in areas such as air and underground, and their rights become customary over time. As an example, when SSRI sent a rocket into space in 1962, we can show the unauthorized entry into the airspace of the countries that the rocket passed through. If we take into account the incredible development of science and technology since 1962, we can see how much such issues can pose a threat to the security and territorial jurisdiction of states.

Another idea that proves the practicality of the multi-centric theory is that, as expressed by J. Burton in the work "World Society", we can show that national states, which are egoistic institutions, are not at the level to ensure relations between the world society. If in the alternative reality, or in the future, the world society exists as a unity in the true sense of the word, then international politics will be a field of science that turns the politics of the world society into an object of scientific research, rather than a science dealing with politics between states.

The presence of supra-national and infra-national trends in international politics shapes its actor training in the direction of becoming more multi-centric. Conflicts between states are inevitable when they show an individualist position by leaving the national position. And conflicts are often caused by a large amount of damage. However, according to the views of liberal theorists, states that have economic relations with each other, after reaping the benefits brought by economic cooperation, will never change it to the disasters of war.

International Law and Regulation

Throughout the long-term development and economic-technical progress process of Besar history, which stretches from the caves to Mars, the problem of managing and properly directing the society has been on the agenda at various levels. The first institute we apply for is the law institute. Because the law itself protects order-discipline, unity and in a certain sense solidarity against chaos, the most unique means of sustaining the development in question is the way of law regulation. This process was realized in different ways at different stages of our long-term development history, based on a number of factors, depending on the dynamics of the society. Uniting around a goal, controlling them and resolving conflicts arising during mutual activities automatically ensured the long-term development. In the first chapter of our book, which reflects various knowledge, theories and practical examples about international politics, the purpose of our study of the basic concepts, principles and compliance with the law of international law is to ensure that the readers who analyze the analysis of the mutual activity of the actors in the international system, approach the events on the basis of law. Although there is a large section of people who say that international law does not work and has actually lost its essence, referring to the processes taking place in the modern era, it is not fair to single out international law as one of the most important institutions that regulate the international political system and determine the scope of its actors' actions and behaviors. Not

alone. Law consists of a number of rules that regulate behavior and reflect the ideas and concerns of the society in which it operates. The main aspect that distinguishes international law from law in a broad sense is precisely its subject. If the main subject of the internal law of the state is people and citizens in a certain sense (the concept of citizenship reflects the right and political relationship between a person and his state), the subject of international law is not individual citizens, but states. One of the most important reasons for the existence of international law is that the problems that exist in the international sphere cannot be regulated by the laws that are adopted voluntarily into the domestic legislation of new states. Contrary to what is imagined, international law is not a complete system. It is divided into two different parts according to the way problems are regulated. For example, what legal norms should we refer to in solving any commercial problem arising in the field of logistics between German and Japanese companies? Or should we solve the damage caused to the parties related to the problem according to the legislation of which country? The need to regulate these and similar situations, and the relationship between the guilty parties in the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, which is completely different and in a more global context, and in the end, each of the issues regarding the preparation of the peace agreement between the two states is international. Are the issues that are included in the research object of law. As can be seen, there are sharp differences in nature and scale between the first examples and the last examples. The very existence of this discrimination indicates the division of international law into two parts. International law is essentially divided into two areas: general and private. The special field of international law regulates the relations arising in connection with labor and non-labor issues with foreign elements, which occur in the transfer of property. In the new paragraph above, the methods of negotiation between German and Japanese companies are the object of investigation of the special part of international law. Starting from the research objects of the special part of international law, one can think about its subjects. Subjects in the special field of international law are physical and legal entities. The first of the nuances that should not be forgotten about the private area is the presence of a certain foreign element here. The presence of a foreign element brings these problems into the research sphere of international law. The second important issue is the presence of a certain fact, no matter how primitive it sounds. For example, you already know that the shipwreck caused by the sale of wheat between companies based in Canada and Mexico is included in the scope of private international law. Here, the external element is the organization of the sales process between the two states. The fact is that accident occurred during the economic process between the companies belonging to the respective countries. If we look at the subjects here, we will see that they are companies, new legal entities. Thus, all the terms of international private law and its essence are clear enough for us. The second part of international law is international general law, which is more closely related to international politics. When we say general international law, the law between states is emphasized. In more academic terms, general international law is a system of legal norms created on the basis of their mutual consent to regulate relations between states. The subject of general international law is not physical and legal entities, unlike private international law. , states, international organizations and statelike institutions. If we look at the issues included in the subject of this field of international law, we see that it includes issues of power between states. If the method of regulation in private international law is the elimination of conflicts in the domestic legislation of each country, if we look at general international law, here the method of regulation is that of different states. We can see a mutual agreement. Of course, the reason for all this differentiation comes from the nature of both areas of international law and their scale. Finally, readers who want to distinguish between general international law and private international law should know about the issue of the source of norms. From this aspect, in order to learn what is referred to as a source in international general law, it is necessary to refer to Article 38 of the Statute of the UN International Court of Justice. According to this article, the International Court of Justice can refer to the following when resolving the issues presented to it: 1. International contract 2. International law instrument 3. General principles of law 4. Court orders 5. Opinions of well-known scientists and doctorates in law. However, in order to regulate the issues included in the research sphere of international private law, the national legislations of the countries, international

agreements and trade customs are used as a source, along with following a simpler procedure. Undoubtedly, after realizing the international law as a complex science and institution consisting of two parts, it was very easy for each of us to understand its exceptional importance in the field of international relations. It is also necessary to know that today international law is characterized as modern international law in science and practice. The main reason for this is that international law, which originated in the Netherlands (by H. Grotsy) and does not reflect the reality of research as a category belonging to Europe and the Christian world, and, as the name suggests, international law has become a global option. Modern international law aims to ensure basic human rights and freedoms. Has accepted as an obligation. In the international system, the norms of automatic acceptance by all the members of the international community have been created. Based on all these, it is possible to define international law, especially modern international law, as an institution of international responsibility. Regardless of the type of the activity process, positive and active activity is without exception divided into two parts, the one who performs the activity and the party on which the activity is directed or on which the process is performed. If we consider such complex actions as an exceptional case, we can see that this condition is at the level of an axiom. In this case, the party performing the action is the subject of the process, and the party on whom the action is performed is the object of the process. It would not be unreasonable to say that this approach works practically in the majority of humanitarian sciences. Likewise, this mechanism works successfully in international law. If the norms and values and principles of international law were only established in legal acts or contracts and not implemented in practice, then this science would lose its global essence. The nature of international law itself requires the existence of subjects of international law who are empowered to bear and execute the rights and duties arising from it. Thus, the subject of international law is the entity that has the ability to bear the rights and duties that come from it and to execute them. One of the differential features of modern international law is the impossibility of determining specifically what rights and duties the subjects have. Another distinctive feature of modern international law is the diversity of subjects. This includes states,

international organizations, regional organizations, international public opinion, transnational corporations, as well as physical and legal entities. It should be noted that one of the most important aspects of being a subject of international law is the subject's participation in the process, or rather, the ability to participate and the status of legal activity. Subjects of international law must contain a number of basic elements for subjectivity: 1. To bear all or some of the rights and duties arising from international law. 2. Having the right to file a claim before an international or domestic court for the purpose of asserting rights arising from international law. 3. The ability to participate in the process of creating norms, the ability to create new norms. It is suitable for the purpose of reviewing the concept of subjectivity in two categories according to the procedure of obtaining subjectivity in international law. The initial subjectivity, which is included in the first category and is unique to the states, carries the "ipso facto" option. The second category includes derivative subjectivity in that the subjects included in this group have international-legal subjectivity given to them by certain institutions and states. International organizations can be shown as an example of this. International organizations are created by states, and participation in international relations, as well as international-legal subjectivity, are given to these organizations by the states themselves. It is possible to express this as if the states give their few rights and powers related to a certain field to international organizations by means of "sitting", "donating" and creating international organizations in a certain sense. However, unlike international organizations, an individual or a company is not considered a subject of international law. The most important mass share among the subjects of international law belongs to the states, of course. This can be explained by referring to the fact that international law exists to regulate the relations between the states. States are the most important subjects of international law, according to the 4th clause of the UN Charter, only states can join the UN. It can also be characterized by the article of being a member. At this time, one of the most important questions that may arise from the readers is exactly which institution is a state or what criteria should be met in order to be called a state. As an answer to this question, we can look at the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States signed in Montevideo in 1933. In the last year, the

international law of the state, such as its permanent population, specific territory, government, and the ability to interact with other states, has been established with a number of basic provisions. (Article 1 of the Convention) As can be seen from the name of state-like institutions, which are shown as subjects of international law, they have a certain number of features specific to the state. Due to the small territory and population of these type of institutions, they can participate in international agreements at the same time. The Vatican can be shown as an example of institutions similar to the state. The international law status of the Vatican, which was determined by the Lateran Treaty concluded between the Pope's representative and the Italian government in 1929 and revised in 1984, means that it has all the attributes of a state. It is the center of the Catholic Church in the whole world. International organizations, which are shown as another subject of international law, have internationallegal subjectivity by fulfilling the goals and duties of their charters. The international-legal subjectivity of international organizations is characterized by this. Their subjectivity is limited by a certain goal and duty, and has a specific character. Finally, individuals do not participate in the creation of international law norms, and their internationallegal subjectivity is determined by the consent of the states. Basically, individuals file a claim against the person who committed this violation in the manner and scope envisaged in the international agreements regarding the violation of their human rights and freedoms. They can However, in accordance with Articles 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 174 of the Statute of the European Economic Community, the right of a person to initiate a direct process before the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of the European Union and to participate in the process as an independent party has been established

The relation between politics and international law, when it comes to influence or determine a state's decision, has always been a controversial topic. The aim of this article is to talk about the nature of this relation and the changes that currently are taking place. State decisions have always been determined by national interests, even if, sometimes, abstract concepts like peace or equality were invoked. Internal decisions can be justified by the national legislation or the legitimacy of the deciding institution or individuals.

When we talk about external decision, things get a little more complicated. As explained before, every state will try to satisfy its own interests when making a decision. One state's decision can go against another and that can lead to a conflict. In order to prevent that, states are using diplomacy in order to manage international relations and to support their decision. If we talk about the image and legitimacy that a state wants to show to the international community or about the standards that the state wants to respect, then state decisions must be well justified and adequate. Nowadays, this is where International Law usually sets in. One of the main objectives of International Law is to 'mediate' and solve the disputes between the states by creating an applicable set of rules (or sometimes simply recognising customary ones). If a state decision goes against the International Law, then that state can expect a reaction from the international community and that can be very disruptive for it. In order for one state to successfully reach its goals, it must justify their realpolitik (politics based on power and practical factors) decisions using International Law. If they do not, they will risk a reaction from the international community of labeling their decisions as being illegal and as constituting a breach of international law.

The term 'international law' was first used by Jeremy Bentham in 1780 in his 'Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation'. Since about 1840, in the English and Romance languages it has replaced the older terminology 'law of nations' or 'droit de gens' which can be traced back to the Roman concept of ius gentium (law of nations), as it is observed by Malanczuk (1997). Malanczuk states in his book Akehurst's 'Modern Introduction To International Law': 'the actual role and capability of international law in governing the relations between states must not be exaggerated, in view of the decisive significance of military, economic, political and ideological factors of power. In fact, the role of international law in international relations has always been limited, but it is rarely insignificant. Its function in structuring the international system has been enhanced because of increasing global interdependence and the self-interest of states in regulating their intercourse rationally on the basis of reciprocity.

Therefore, disputes between states are usually accompanied by—in a given case naturally often conflicting—references to international law.' Unlike municipal law, there were no sanctions linked to the breach of international law. This has changed recently and we can see that states applied bilateral sanctions that were linked to the breach of international law (e.g. the sanctions applied to Russia). Therefore, the importance of international law is enhancing.

The sources of international law are vast starting with treaties, customs, principles of law, judicial decisions and finishing with soft law, equity and acts of international organisations. According to the hierarchy of the sources preemptory norms are the most important and mandatory. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 states: 'A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory

norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognised by the international

having the same character. It must find acceptance and recognition by the international community at large and cannot be imposed upon a significant minority of states'. Thus, an overwhelming majority of states is required, cutting across cultural and ideological differences. At present very few rules pass this test (Malanczuk, 1997).

What happens when international law would not justify a state's decision? We rely on interpretation and maybe in some cases one interpretation can justify the action. Context can give one norm a certain value and meaning, whereas the object and purpose of one norm if interpreted with good faith can lead you towards another result. The practice of states is very important in this aspect, as well, because it can bring the balance to one interpretation or another. The truth is that states interpret and apply international law in concordance to their interests and needs. Kosovo is a good example where a set of states do not recognize it as a new state in order to not encourage self-determination in their own countries, considering it as a dangerous precedent. In this case some of the states justify their decision by stating that Kosovo government is not effective and that it cannot bring stability to their people and region. However, South Sudan is recognised by the international community even though their government is arguably ineffective to the point of not existing. Other states say that Kosovo was created illegal, because if there is no oppression, then there is no self-determination. They continue by saying that after the reaction of UN, the problem was solved and thus Kosovo secession was not legal.

The context in which self-determination was first established as a principle in international law is important, as well. Nowadays, there are limited situations in which self- determination would be accepted. Even though it sounds simple, a lot of disputes in the international community are centered on this principle and even more are to come. At the beginning, self-determination was established so countries that in the past were colonies could freely become independent and could choose their international status with no external interference. In 1941 Allies of World War

community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law

II signed the Atlantic Charter and accepted the principle of self-determination. In January, 1942 twenty-six states signed the

Declaration by United Nations, which accepted those principles. The ratification of the United Nations Charter in 1945 at the end of World War II placed the right of self-determination into the framework of international law and diplomacy. Later on, this right was recognised to cohesive national groups that would be denied the so called internal self- determination in the countries they would reside. However, with this new application another problem arose.

Sometimes, with interpretation, states reached different results, because of the vague terms that were used when the norms were created. When we talk about self-determination, there was great ordeal to try to determine exactly what a 'cohesive national group' means. Do we lay weight on them having the same language, or religion, or background? Even today the specialists have not reach a consensus, even if even the Venice Commission tried to shed some light on the matter. Regardless of all the controversy, Kosovo is recognized today by a number of countries as an independent country. Serbia, on the other hand, still considers them as its own autonomous province. For example, one reason that burdens the possibility for Spain to recognize Kosovo is the increasing demands for an independence referendum in Spain's province of Catalonia. In the end, it is still a problem of interpretation.

What happened in Georgia is another good example. Georgia was accused by Russia that said that the Georgian government launched aggressive operations against South Ossetia. On August 8, 2008, Russia sent land, air and sea troops in order to bring back peace to the region. They called their action as being a 'peace enforcement' operation. The international community said that Russia's actions were not legal, but they could not do more as Russia invoked precedent. They said that their operation is similar to the operation that the U.S. conducted in Afghanistan. Another argument that they used was that their intervention was caused by their duty to defend their co-nationals. Russia's

actions were controversial, but according to them, they had legal basis.

I think that as international law gains more relevance, the international community would benefit from more stability. International law holds in high regard peaceful conflict solving and one of its basic principles is the equality of all states. Even if states are still far away from taking decision based only on international law, my opinion is that their recent behavior should give us hope.

In conclusion, international law is becoming significant to the states when they make their international decisions, or at least when it comes to justify them in front of the international community. National interests govern the dynamics of international relations, but globalization and the importance of the new international actors (international organisations, non-governmental organisations) made the states thorough regarding their image and status on the international scene. If one state breaks international law, the other states are ready to sanction it, and, because of the dependency that we see today between countries, it will affect that country greatly.

22

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

And comparative
analysis of International
Relations

Democracy: As the Main direction of Modern World Politics

The word 'democracy» is a term that comes from Greek and it is made up with two other words demos= People and kratein= to govern, to rule. "Democracy" can then be literally translated by the following terms: Government of the People or Government of the Majority. Democracy, as a State form, is to be distinguished from monarchy, aristocracy and dictatorship. You may have already heard about the most common definition of democracy: 'the government of the people, by the people and for the people' (Abraham Lincoln)? To put it another way we can say that a government comes from the people; it is exercised by the people, and for the purpose of the people's own interests. This description is only a very broad one, to start with, but the pages that follow will explain to you in a more concise way the different facets of democracy.

Human rights are much more than a mere component of democracy. They represent sine qua non requirements for the well performing of a democratic system. The development and evolution of human rights are only possible when humans live in a democracy, given the fact that it is only within this system that the population itself can draw up the laws that will rule and publicly control the three powers: the legislative power (power to propose and vote for laws: in Madagascar, this is the role of the Parliament), the executive power (power to enforce laws: in Madagascar, this is the role of the President of the Republic and the Government) and the judiciary power (power to make and to promulgate laws: in addition to, for example, the High Constitutional Court). Moreover, human rights are only efficient when the State power is linked to an autonomy and independence right, and when all the individuals are treated on equal terms in front of this justice. In the same way, it is essential, in any democracy, to establish a clear separation of powers, so that the judiciary can be autonomous and independent. The result will be a triangular relation between Democracy, Human Rights and Separation of Powers, which thus represent interdependent elements.

But with this, would you now be able to explain what 'Human Rights' really mean? A strict definition would describe them as rights that are inherent to the individuality of each person, in terms of protection against any inclination of the State to harm an individual; a human being is endowed with these rights the moment he/she is born and the State cannot withdraw them from him/her. They form the very foundations of the human relations that rule life in society, be it at international, national, local or family level. What follows is a brief explanation of the different fields that they cover:

- The Individual Personality Rights constitute the core of human rights, given the fact that they include, for example, the right to life and the right to free personality development. Thanks to these rights, a human being can, for instance, be protected against attacks and manifestations of violence aimed at his/her person, and preserve his/her integrity and human dignity.
- Political and Civil Rights are there to make sure that each citizen can participate without any restriction to the political life of his/her community. This means that he or she should not fear any non justified sanction. The
- most important rights, in this matter, concern not only freedom of speech and freedom of the press but also freedom to hold meetings and to set up associations.
- Thanks to Social and Economic Rights, minimum living wage for the survival of a human being must be guaranteed for him/her. This includes, among others, the right to education, because it is necessary to start from the principle that everybody has to benefit from a training so as not to be left starving and deprived of resources, later on.

Some relatively new rights have been added to this list: they are the Third generation Rights. They are there to demonstrate that human rights can evolve and that they are not fixed, stuck at their starting point. One can include in these rights, for example, the Rights to Development, which aim at reducing the gap that separates the rich and the poor. The

Rights to Environment have also been added, in order to make sure that species that are vital to human are not damaged or even destroyed.

Those are formulas that all sound very attractive, but you must be wondering what to do to make sure that all these rights are effectively enforced; since empty formulas would not be of great help for you. You are totally right and some regulations have been made for that purpose: in 1945, upon some States' instigation, the 'United Nations' were created; nowadays, almost all the States across the world are members of this institution. In 1948, it published the 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights ", which, since then, have always evolved. In order to be able to see to its actual effectiveness, some commissions, subcommissions as well as committees have been put in place, like for instance, the "Children's Rights Committee ". In a situation where one State commits infringement of human rights, there is, at The Hague- Netherland, an International Court of Justice that is entitled to deliver sanctions to any offender.

The United Nations are supported by a large number of non-governmental organizations which, through the contribution of active militants in the protection of human rights, can establish and publish reports on diverse infringements of these rights: thus, they can get governments not to continue accepting such exactions.

Elections constitute one of the most important pillars of democracy. Those are the texts of Electoral Law that rule and clearly define both the organisation of these elections, and how to undertake the deduction of the votes in order to assign them to the corresponding seats. There is an active electoral law and a passive electoral law. Citizens who can use active electoral law have the right to vote whereas those who can use passive electoral law have the right to be elected. In most cases, the whole electorate can use both types of right. This does not mean, however, that any State which opts to carry out elections can be qualified as democratic right away: there are similarly other forms of government in which elections are practised. Democratic elections, as such, must meet some requirements that you may already know a little:

- Democratic elections are free when citizens have the right to choose from several candidates or parties that can run for the election without any restriction. They must also be free to decide whether they want to use their right to vote or to abstain from doing so, if they prefer.

- Democratic elections are equitable when each citizen who can use his/her right to vote has at his/her disposal a vote and when neither his/her origin nor his/her sex, language, incomes or possessions, job or social stratus/class, sexual identity, training, religion or political convictions have an influence of whatever kind on the assessment of the value of his/her vote.

In democratic elections, there must be no way of knowing for which political party or for which particular candidate a citizen has voted. They are then secrete, when each citizen can put his ballot in an envelope, without having been either watched over or influenced, in the secrecy of the polling booth, and when he/she is also able, in the same way, to put his/her envelope inside the ballot box afterwards.

- Democratic elections are, therefore, public and transparent. Which means on the one hand, that each citizen has the right to attend the counting of the votes when the ballot box is opened; this also means on the other hand, that it is possible to completely follow the whole process of the passage of the constituents' votes: starting from the

Ballots inserted into the ballot box till the final counting undertaken to establish the calculation that will eventually share out.

- In addition to the requirements mentioned above, it is also important to institute elections on regular basis. Everybody, in that case, has the possibility to know the date of the coming elections, and to get ready for that ahead of time. It is a way to make sure that the current government is defined within a time frame and that its people have the right to remove it from office. The electorate should represent the whole population, which is to mean that apart from the underage population, no group should be excluded.

• And finally, the electorate's votes should be final, meaning that the election results should be enforced effectively, which implies that they must be accepted as legitimate.

Regarding election process, there are in fact two separate systems: the absolute majority votes and the proportional ones. Both have crucial importance, given the fact that they influence not only the political structure but also the formation process of the political will. To settle the choice on which polling system to adopt, one has to take into account not only the political traditions and historical situations but also social conditions, because those, eventually, may authorize solely one of the two possibilities. Several parameters may be subject to some variations: the internal regulations of the party, the relations between the parties, as well as the relations between the government and the Parliament, according to the enforcement of either the absolute majority election system or the proportional one. An election loses its primary function if it is manipulated through the choice of a polling system; it will then have negative impact on the so-called "elected" organs which will then lose their legitimacy.

In the absolute majority system, the polling area is divided into as many constituencies as necessary, depending on the number of seats to be assigned (at the Parliament, for example). Those candidates or lists of candidates that can gather the majority of votes from their constituents will be assigned the seats to be filled. This polling system brings about some advantages:

• With their program, the candidates are dealing with a large proportion of the population with the purpose of trying to win the majority. Therefore, the contents of their program are generally more rational, trying to avoid extreme points of views in this way.

The government must effectively take into account the presence of the other political parties, thanks to the clearly established evidence from the majorities. In this system, the voters have a significant influence on the government. Its functioning is closely linked to the bipartite system.

• In the case where there is a private candidate or a candidate who does not belong to any list, there is a very close relationship between the Parliament and the constituency. The distance between the voters and their representatives remains small.

But there are nonetheless some difficulties that go with this absolute majority system:

• Overall, it is only the candidates from an important political party that can manage to gather the majority of the constituents' votes.
• This majority principle often prevents the representation of minorities within an organ with seats to fill (at the Parliament, for example). Not to mention the fact that some groups of voters who represent a relatively important number of constituents, but who are ranked at the second place in their constituency, cannot be represented either, as only one candidate must win at the level of each constituency.
• Elections results can be rigged (by the group in power) with the purposeful manipulation of the constituencies' size, because it is within the constituencies that the majorities are formed.

In the proportional system, the Parliament seats are assigned according to the percentage obtained by the political parties over the total number of votes from the whole constituency. The assignment of seats (at the Parliament, for example) thus reflects, much more than what happens in the absolute majority system, the effective choice of the population. The candidates are elected through the lists in their constituency. Like the absolute majority system, this second polling system is characterized by some advantages:

• The proportional system allows the representation of all political trends, even that of the minorities.
• Thanks to this system, it is easy to create new political parties because all it takes is to have the capacity to obtain some percentage of votes in different constituencies to guarantee one's entry in the organ to be filled.
• At new elections, it is possible to avoid extreme political inversions, as the

government is usually composed of coalitions, particularly in the case of parliamentary political systems, in which it is the parliamentary majority which determines the making up of the government.

Likewise, the proportional system is characterized by some difficulties:

- If one has to take into consideration all the existing political trends, a large number of political parties will indeed be represented at the Parliament. In general, none of these political parties can gather a majority and, consequently, it is in fact coalitions that are set up. Very often, small political parties are used as means to get the majority and, once included within the Government, they benefit from a superior influence over the percentage effectively acquired during the elections.
- For the population, it is difficult to perceive which political party is exactly responsible for which policy; and thus, it will find it difficult to clearly target the decision to be made for the next poll.

In some countries like Germany, for example, proportional election right is submitted to a "restriction clause". The latter stipulate that a political party must obtain a certain number of votes (translated in percentages), in order to be allowed representations at the Parliament. This clause is used to avoid a profusion of small political parties at the Parliament.

In Madagascar, until now, both election systems have been combined regarding lists and candidates, during legislative elections. During the 2002 legislative election, for example, the absolute majority system was used for candidates to be elected in constituencies that presented seats to be filled; whereas in constituencies where two seats were to be filled, it was preferred to adopt the proportional system with lists of candidates. During the legislative election in September 2007, the absolute majority system was used with lists of candidates in the constituencies that had two seats available; on the other hand, in constituencies that had only one seat to be filled, the absolute majority system was used with candidates without lists. The proportional system was also used in

Madagascar during the 1993 legislative election, to promote the creation of parties in the framework of the political liberalization.

As you can see, there are different forms to be considered when you set up and implement democracy. There is no fixed recipe, valid as a rule, concerning elections and the two polling systems. Each country must take into consideration specific circumstances that define, with regards to the existing cultural, political and social fields, the best way to carry out elections.

In a Rule of Law, there are fundamental principles and procedures that guarantee the freedom of each individual and which allow participation in political life. There is, first of all, the right to a free blossoming of individual personality. To sum it up, the power of the State is linked to the laws that rule it. Thus, the notion of Rule of Law is directly opposed to that of "Police State "or "Despotic State ".

In a democratic State, all the citizens are equal in front of the law, even State employees and administration. The latter can only take action when it has been vested with the accruing responsibility by law or by the Constitution. Seen this way, a Rule of Law is then always founded on the respect of law and Constitution. This is a system that holds the State accountable for its acts in front of the citizens and it also gives the latter the opportunity to take a stand and to react according to its acts. In this State ruled order, citizens are completely free to take part in political life as well. State of Law procedures are subject to some fundamental principles. What follows will be a brief explanation of these.

In the Constitution of a Democratic State of Law, the notion of "independence of the judiciary" is well rooted. This means that the judiciary is strictly distinguished from the executive and the legislative powers. As we have already explained above, the executive power is the power that enforces laws while the legislative assigns the power to put forward bills and to turn them into laws. It is only through the separation of powers that magistrates can carry out their job, free from either pressure or influence of any kind and in an independent way. They must only use rights and laws and cannot be destitute of their function without their agreement, as long as they have not, themselves, infringed laws. Moreover, it is

necessary to make sure that the judiciary keeps the monopoly of the verdict. Indeed, what would be the use of an accused being declared not guilty by a judge, and the police still arresting him/her anyway? In a Rule of Law that works well, any intervention of the police, military or 'gendarmes' in the private life of a citizen implies that a judge has been entitled to give the order to do so.

Security Right constitutes as well another fundamental principle of Rule of Law, which means that each action of the State must be measurable and foreseeable. Citizens must be informed of what the State has the right to do, what they themselves can do and what is forbidden for them to do. Nobody must be sanctioned without legal ground and in general, laws must not be retroactive. In addition to the principle of right security, there is the fact that the administration is subject to laws. The latter has only the right to take action within a framework assigned by the parliament majority. Each action initiated by the State must then be backed by a law which, in turn, is made legitimate on the basis of democratic principle. This regulation is linked to the notion of the justifiable condition of the administration. The control initiated by the judiciary must guarantee that the administration stays within what is stipulated by laws. Any citizen who deems an administration act to be unfair has the right to call on the judiciary to protest and to demand in this way a verification of the incriminated act.

Because administration subjection to law would only be a vain formula if a judge could not freely take action, it is argued that the precedence of the Constitution in front of the law can avoid some bad will of distorting facts. Thus, a Rule of Law ties politics to law and right, submits any expression of the power under judiciary control and guarantees in this way the citizens' freedom.

You might already know that the term "separation of powers" actually means "division" of the State power into three parts: the ones that have just been cited above. In a democratic State, the power of the State can be controlled and influenced efficiently, first and foremost, by itself. The State power must then be distributed among several organs. In general, it is the Constitution of a country that settles how the State power is to be distributed among different organs and what attributions are to be assigned to them respectively.

As a general rule, there are two government systems that need to be distinguished: the "parliamentary regime" and the "presidential regime". In some countries, they are sometimes intermingled into mixed forms but the objective of this brochure is not to bring confusion to your mind, but on the contrary, to clarify notions! That is why we are going to take each system separately, to show you to what extent relations between the legislative and the executive powers can be different, according to the case.

In parliamentary regimes, the government stems from the parliament that is elected by the people. Ministers within the Government can also be vested with a double mandate. The government is put in place by the Parliament and can be destitute in the same way at any time by the latter. The Government attributions and that of the parliament interlock. In general, it is the government that deals with documents for the drawing up and proposals of law. However, it cannot decide anything on the way those bills are passed. Each bill is subject to a vote at the parliament; consequently, the government depends on the parliament for passing the bills that it puts forward. Political parties play a very important role as the majority at the parliament constitutes the necessary requirement for accession to government seats. At the parliament, the opposition plays an important role as an additional control instance of the power. To sum up, a parliamentary regime conveys the idea that the government and the parliament must act together. The government system of a parliamentary regime is put into practice in some countries such as Great Britain and Germany.

The government system of a presidential regime, on the other hand, is constituted in a different way: the United States of America represent the best known example. There, legislative and executive powers are separated, either at institutional level or in the concrete and technical exercise of the power. The President, representing the executive power, and the Congress, representing the legislative power, are vested with their office through well distinguished elections. Members of the government have no right to have a seat at the American Congress. Unlike a parliamentary regime, the Congress has no power to destitute a President, even if the latter is held guilty of an illegal action and is juridically liable to a

sanction. The President, for his part, has neither the power to dissolve the Congress, nor the right to propose laws. Political parties, in this government system, play a relatively unimportant role.

This model conveys the idea that reciprocal control can be better carried out when the two powers, the legislative and the executive, are strictly separated. There is no infallible and immutable recipe that can be directly extended to all cases, as far as the organisation of the separation of powers in a modern democracy is concerned. But the most important thing is that the State power is not in the hands of only one person or a small group of persons, because in most cases, that ends up in an abuse of power.

In Madagascar, the presidents who succeeded each other in power have each laid down in the Constitution and put into practice "their presidential regime", according to their personal profile and their interests to be protected. From 1993 to 1996, an attempt to enforce some elements of the parliamentary regime failed. The result was the destitution of the former President by the Parliament.

Even if relationship between the Parliament and the Government can be very different in democracies, parliaments fundamentally always have the same functions. They are vested with the office of proposing laws. They hold the right to put forward proposals of laws. In the systems of parliamentary governments, this right is often assigned to the government, as it represents the majority in the parliament, and the likeliness of having a bill passed is greater in this case. In a general rule, the relative majority is enough to pass a bill. On the other hand, laws that deal with essential themes such as the Constitution, for example, often need a majority of two third or a referendum, to be validated.

As it has been mentioned in the last chapter, the parliament is vested, in front of the government, with the office of controlling. In case of doubt concerning the work of the government, the parliament can create inquiry commissions or order the judiciary power to carry out investigations. In the parliamentary system, the National Assembly has also the possibility to destitute the government. In this system, control is rather between the government and the

opposition, and much less between the legislative power and the judiciary power.

Parliaments are then mostly characterized by their function of articulation and expression of political will. This means that:

- Members of Parliament articulate or express population will, because it is the population that they represent.
- Members of Parliament try to inform the population on their job, through public sessions, reports of those sessions in the media, as well as specifically targeted demonstrations; they try at the same time to support the population in expressing their political will.

A forth function, that of election office, concerns only the National Assemblies of parliamentary government systems. In this case, it is the members of parliament who elect or destitute the Head of Government, and sometimes, all the members of government. In some countries, it is also the members of parliament who elect the members of the High Court.

We have clarified in a very general way the parliament offices; but now we need to know what effectively the tasks of each of these parliamentarians are, or, in the case of a second Chamber, the tasks assigned to senators. Members of Parliament are elected to the parliament as representatives of the people by abiding to the principle: one citizen, one vote. That is why the number of Members of Parliament in the constituencies is set proportionally to the number of population.

You must have already wondered what deputies do all along the day. As a general rule, they are subject to a double pressure as they must demonstrate their attendance at the parliament, on the one hand, and at their constituency on the other hand.

In their constituency, they arrange appointments with some organizations or other institutions, grant audiences and talk directly to the citizens to try to understand issues about their place of work.

Work within the parliament is not limited to meetings in which all the deputies participate. There are, in addition to that, several circles and

working groups, special committees and commissions that make up an important part of the daily job of a deputy. In general, it is experts that are invited in the special committees, to exhibit their knowledge on a specific theme. Then follows some discussion on the different points of view and joint work is done in order to find out some common grounds. There are also talks about bills/drafts, prior to bringing them to the Assembly. In most countries, deputies are vested with parliamentary immunity to protect them against the arbitrariness of the executive. Immunity implies that deputies are not exposed to lawsuits and judicial sanctions all along the duration of their parliamentary mandate.

Two political principles emerge within a democracy and play a crucial role in the way a deputy works; those are: the majority principle or the competition principle and the consensus principle.

The majority principle or competition principle is founded on the principle of majority, which means that decisions are made on the majority basis. As a general rule, there is in this system, a great number of political parties which compete with each other. In this case, the advantage is that decisions can be made rapidly, and that the government can work in an efficient way. Normally, in this case, the parliament benefits from the mechanisms and structures that are willing to express and take into consideration the interests of the minority groups in their decision making process at the parliamentary level.

In a democracy, pluralism is considered and applied as a form of social order and policy. In the field of politics, pluralism implies that a large number of interest groupings and associations that get together freely are reciprocally in a situation of competition to win influence on social and political life. These groupings can be of political, economic, religious, ethnic or of any other nature. A plural society is characterized by respect, acceptation and recognition of all points of view; no matter how different or diverging they can be; and their dissemination, as well as their enforcement should not be faced with any obstacle. Pluralism is based on controversial discussions whose results are often built on compromises which eventually satisfy all the involved groups, or at the very least, are acceptable as a whole. In pluralism, either dialogues, points of view exchanges or discussions, as well as ideas and opinions that are debated

there have a constructive feature within the framework of social processes of expression of ideas and political will of citizens, even if they are either contrary to or opposed to the regime in place or even closer to the opposition.

You may have already noticed that, even in a plural society, some interest groupings are more influential and stronger than others, and that in reality, the competition principle does not apply in the simple, fluid and easy way we have just described it. But it is exactly for this reason that the State has the important role of detecting possible flaws in the competition system, and to find out the necessary palliative measures. There is, for example, the possibility to provide additional aid to the weakest interest associations, to make them more competitive. These state regulation measures are necessary to maintain pluralism in action.

In pluralist societies, in parallel to these interest associations that solicit socio-political or economic influence; there are groupings that directly covet posts: those are the political parties. Like many other citizens, you must already have raved at political parties, because they have, for example, promised to take some measures, and they have not done anything about it afterward. In spite of these criticisms that one can direct to political parties regarding the results of their work, it is necessary to recognize that they constitute nevertheless a necessary and indispensable element to any democracy. People can exercise their sovereignty through these political parties; it is really thanks to them that they can react in an effective way. The alternative would be to elect a representative, as a population, and to take on all the tasks that are the duties of political leaders. But this is just not possible, given their large number and the complexity of the themes. Instead of that, it is necessary to have groupings and political parties, to put people forward as candidates for different government offices, to discuss solutions to problems that come up and to represent the interests of their voters. In this way, they constitute, on the one hand, spokesmen/-women for ideals and political objectives of the population. On the other hand, these political parties take part in a decisive way in the construction of population political will, as they know how to grasp the positions of this population in order to articulate and shape them in the midst

of the discussions. It is not enough to consider the parties as mere messengers that convey information on the people to the leaders. They must also be considered as active groupings that contribute to the construction of political will, because they take as well the role of mediators for instance, when there is a conflict between the point of view of the people and that of the parliament, or between the government's opinion and that of the president.

In general, it is the people who share the same ideals and the same points of view who get together to create political party and to integrate their program proposal in the policy. In a plural society, the creation of political parties is free, which means that every body has the right to create a party. In a general rule, political parties have also a core program that reflects its values and its long term objectives, as well as an electoral program, which is rather a short term oriented one.

Because political parties within pluralist societies must face important tasks, it is important that they be organized in a transparent and democratic way. This implies, on the one hand that each citizen can freely and openly integrate a political party; and on the other hand, it must be stipulated that each member has the right and the possibility to participate in the definition of the party line, at the election of the leader of the party and the appointment of candidates to political and state functions. In addition to their role in the articulation of the population's interests, and the building up of its political will, it is also the political parties that put in place the required personnel to the government offices. As they link the people to their representatives, or the representatives of the people to the leaders, parties are as indispensable in the political scenery of a plural society as the interest groups and associations described earlier.

About 2023

PARIS RIOTS

The rising right in France

Since July of this year, the eyes of the world media have been on the protests that broke out in the country after the killing of a 17-year-old teenager by the police in Paris, France. Although most researchers put forward the idea that the events that took place are a type of "coming to the square", which is a political instrument of the French people, this claim does not change the fact that the French people are dissatisfied with the current government of E. Macron.Of course, the main problem in this matter is the exhaustion of the people's patience against the growing police and official violence. However, the public's view of the process is not always meaningful.

On the other hand, they associate the continuation of these actions and their increasing scale with the rise of far-right ideology in Europe.

More than 6,500 people have been detained in France-wide actions. The fact that the scandals are on such a large scale suggests that the events in France are being financed by foreign forces to distract attention from the event (for example, by Russia).But all this is nothing but unproven theory.

The fact that the hadiths in France became widespread after the mother of the murdered teenager called for justice for her son on the Tiktok platform once again shows the active influence of social media on the role of political life in the modern era.

Although all this brings up the idea that right-wing forces are strengthening in Europe, the fact that the same processes do not occur in countries such as Germany, Italy, etc., or that they are smaller in scale, once again connects the issue with the political culture of the French people.

And comparative

analysis of International

Relations

Diplomacy: A Key Tool in International Politics

It may seem that the basic condition for the extension of diplomatic relations throughout the world was the existence of independent states able to develop political relations among themselves.

Notwithstanding, the history of diplomacy predates considerably that of the modern sovereign nationstate. For that reason, it seems necessary to discuss briefly the circumstances in which a set of practices of public and private communication among different political entities, existing since ancient times, underwent different historical transformations until they became conventionally defined as an exclusive attribute of the sovereign nation-state. Der Derian suggests that it was the attempt to mediate the conditions of estrangement among human beings and social groups since ancient times that created the basis for what we know today as diplomacy. The history of diplomacy would thus reveal the changing conditions of this alienation, as well as the more or less contentious efforts to mediate it through the development of different practices, institutions, and discourses under different systems of thought, power, and law. Surely, it is this communicative dimension which gives diplomacy its enduring and crosscultural relevance, as well as its value as a way of representation, mutual recognition, and negotiated exchange among organized social groups.

Various forms of diplomatic behavior among diverse entities were well known during the Middle Ages in American, Asian, or African civilizations, but the most distinctive institution of modern diplomacy, the exchange of resident ambassadors, did not become a reality until the fifteenth century. This was due to the intensification of diplomatic activity in Europe, and the increasing awareness among the existing monarchies that diplomatic relations were more practical and efficient when establishing, under centralized political control, permanent representation in a foreign country. However, and apart from some interesting precedents from the Italian citystates, it can be said that during the Renaissance, the sixteenth-century French diplomatic system established for the first time some of the basic features of modern diplomacy: (1) the institutionalization of the permanent

diplomatic missions and the definition of diplomatic protocolary and procedural rules; (2) the importance granted to secrecy of negotiation as well as to the personal caution and discretion of diplomats; (3) the extension of some important privileges and immunities for the ambassadors; and (4) the professionalization and administrative centralization of diplomatic services.

Certainly, the completion of a web of ministers of foreign affairs, undoubtedly one of the basic institutions of modern diplomacy, did not appear until the late eighteenth century with the progressive consolidation of the modern nation-state. The great thinkers of the Enlightenment devoted considerable attention to the rational prospects for the establishment of peaceful international relations through the reform of diplomatic methods. Even so, the diplomatic world remained, during this long period, considerably isolated from philosophical discussions. So, it can be said that only after the revision and regulation of existing diplomatic institutions and practices during the Congress of Vienna, under the social and political impact of the French Revolution and its consequences, was modern diplomacy born in 1815. Later, during the classic era of European imperialism, the modern institution of diplomacy would be extended around the world without substantial changes, despite its increasing complexity, until the outbreak of World War I.

Nevertheless, the emergence in this period of numerous international conferences on topics such as industrial standards, intellectual property, international trade, labor legislation, or health, among others, became a way for national governments to explore potential common interests without great political costs. Thus, it can be said that during the second half of the nineteenth century, the old institution of diplomacy was gradually adapted to the growing functional and legitimizing needs of world capitalism.

After World War I, diplomacy experienced a number of important transformations, giving sense to the so-called transition from old diplomacy to new diplomacy. In a context in which states became more and more aware of their

interdependence, and increasingly interested in obtaining popular support, the European and the colonial wars appeared both to politicians and citizens as the clearest expression of the failure of classic diplomacy. The postwar crisis consequently opened a period of social, political, and academic debate about the obsolescence of traditional diplomatic methods and the need for reforms. Public opinion, mobilized first by governments in support of war efforts, would later be one of the principal sources of change. From very diverse political positions, including the peace movement, it would be claimed that diplomacy should be more open to public scrutiny, effectively submitted to international and domestic legal constraints, and specifically directed to the peaceful settlement of conflicts and the prevention of war.

The most prominent result of this new climate of opinion in the critical postwar context was the creation of the League of Nations. Although the experience of the League would fail two decades later with the rise of fascism and the outbreak of a new world war, its relevance for the contemporary transformation of diplomacy is fundamental. The League of Nations established some important limitations on the use of force, institutionalizing different procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and creating a completely new system of collective security with the possibility of international sanctions. Besides the innovations in the field of collective security, the League of Nations was also very important in the gradual institutionalization of multilateral diplomacy over social, economic, and technical issues. Furthermore, the experience of the League of Nations substantially improved the techniques and methods of multilateral diplomatic negotiation, and created the first political basis to end the secrecy of the old diplomacy, in order to restore, as the Enlightenment thinkers had proposed, the duty of making public international treaties.

Certainly, none of these innovations avoided the outbreak of a new war, but this failure would be precisely the starting point for the next changes in diplomacy.

The transformation of diplomacy after World War II was the result of several prominent factors: (1) the repercussions of the institutional innovations introduced by the United Nations on diplomacy, particularly the new system of collective security, and the strengthening of multilateral diplomacy with the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the creation of diverse specialized agencies and other important organizations; (2) the Cold War impact, manifested in the importance, in an ideologically divided world, of new international organizations of security, as well as in the prominent diplomatic role of the Soviet Union and China; (3) the increasing role of modern intelligence and espionage, and the diplomatic management of conflicts in the presence of nuclear weaponry; (4) the impact of the decolonization process and the subsequent denunciation by the new independent states of Africa and Asia of the Western bias of contemporary diplomacy and international law; (5) the broadening and reform of the diplomatic agenda due to growing economic and technological interdependence, and the widespread recognition of the need to promote international cooperation through the creation of international institutions; (6) the growing international relevance of nonstate actors, such as substate governments, multinational corporations, or nongovernmental organizations and the intensification and diversification, impelled by new technologies of communication, of transnational contacts. Certainly, all these realities have, during the last decades, dramatically changed the environment in which diplomatic dialog takes place, imposing the need for rethinking the central role of diplomacy in contemporary international relations. In fact, all this seems to suggest that diplomacy needs to reconsider its methods and role in global governance, even if it is difficult to foresee its disappearance.

For centuries, the most classic form of diplomacy was bilateral relations. However, besides some partial but important precedents, such as the Havana Convention of 1928 for Latin America, it was not until the signing in 1961 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, that the customary rules and practices of international diplomacy were codified. Many of them needed clarification; others required their adaptation to the contemporary conditions of international relations. Moreover, there was a strong feeling among Western states that international law on diplomacy needed the formal acceptance of the new independent states of Africa and Asia, in order to elude possible controversies and political

conflicts in their diplomatic relations. The Cold War political context in which the negotiation took place was revealed with the initial exclusion of China and other communist states. But, finally, the Convention achieved considerable success.

The basic contents of the Vienna Convention can be summarized in four topics related to bilateral diplomatic relations: (1) the procedures for the establishment of permanent diplomatic relations between states based on mutual consent, and the required conditions for their unilateral reprieve or severance; (2) the identification of official representation and the promotion of friendly relations and international cooperation as the basic functions of permanent missions; (3) the protection of the legitimate interests of the sending state, and those of its nationals; (4) the inviolability of the mission's premises, assets, or communications as well as the personal inviolability and jurisdictional immunity of diplomatic agents, as the functional privileges required by diplomatic missions. Furthermore, as a clear expression of fear of foreign interference in domestic affairs, the Convention also detailed the duties which missions must observe toward the receiving state.

As some qualified observers have pointed out, the principal reason for the considerable success of the Vienna Convention in a particularly complex political context was surely its functional and pragmatic approach. Of course, the formal regulation established by the Vienna Convention did not reflect the wide variety of practices associated with contemporary bilateral diplomatic relations nor the real political functions fulfilled by resident embassies' daily work. Certainly, the traditional methods of diplomatic communication and practice have suffered important transformations during the last decades. The spectacular development of transport and telecommunications has taken much significance away from embassies, dramatically transforming the methods of information, and the possibilities of direct personal contact. Nevertheless, some of the most classic diplomatic procedures, such as diplomatic correspondence in the form of letters or memoranda, still play an important role in contemporary international relations. Diplomatic notes, for example, are widely used for a great variety of purposes, ranging from administrative matters to the expression of a formal protest.

The establishment of diplomatic relations among sovereign states is a matter of mutual consent. The correspondent agreement may contain different stipulations, always in accordance with the Vienna Convention, as well as some additional features such as limitations on the number and mobility of personnel at the embassies and consulates. Agreement with a newly independent state on diplomatic relations used to be considered an act of tacit recognition. Similarly, the maintenance of diplomatic relations can be interpreted, unless explicitly indicated to the contrary, as a form of tacit recognition of any change, even unconstitutional changes, in the political system of the receiving state. The severance of diplomatic relations is a discretionary unilateral act by the state that can be an expression of disapproval or dissatisfaction with the other state. Notwithstanding, the ceasing of diplomatic relations does not affect the existing treaty obligations, particularly those related with the legal protection of the citizens of each state in the territory of the other. However, as the citizens of the sending state lose the protection of their home country, a third state, acceptable to both the receiving and the sending states, may be entrusted with their protection.

The main field of change and innovation in contemporary diplomacy during recent decades has not been the old institution and practice of bilateralism, but innovation due to the spread of multilateral and conference diplomacy. Although multilateral diplomacy is far from being an innovation of the present century, its dramatic growth during recent decades merits explanation. Undoubtedly, increasing international awareness of contemporary conditions of interdependence could explain the functional and rational basis for the growing institutionalization of international cooperation. Multilateralism seems to be a tool especially appropriate for dealing with current economic, technological, or ecological problems, through the establishment of diverse international regimes. In fact, the growing importance of international institutions and organizations, and the so-called parliamentary diplomacy, with its deep implications about diplomacy and international law, reveal the progressive institutionalization of international society. Furthermore, it can be said that contemporary

multilateralism serves both the functional and legitimizing needs of global political economy, establishing new forms of international regulation over economic and technological issues, as well as new ways of managing potential social conflicts.

In response to the growing importance of multilateralism and the new challenges posed to diplomacy by the increasing role of international organizations, in 1975 new Vienna Convention tried, without success, to establish a regulation for the multilateral dimensions of diplomacy. The Convention, which did not come into force, covered topics such as those ranging from privileges and immunities of missions to international organizations as well as their diplomatic status. But besides these types of formal problems, key to the understanding of the growing role of international organizations, the most important implications of the rise of multilateralism on diplomatic practice are particularly clear in the domain of international negotiation.

Although the most powerful states have always tried to instrumentalize multilateralism, sometimes with unquestionable success, they are usually much more confident in their diplomatic skills in the bilateral field. Alternatively, weak states usually prefer multilateral methods because of the possibility of building coalitions based on functional, regional, or cultural aspects. For this reason, the growth of consensus and majority voting as forms of collective decision making is probably the most prominent feature of contemporary transformation of diplomacy.

Diplomatic negotiation can be defined as an attempt to explore and reconcile conflicting positions among states in order to reach an acceptable outcome for all the parties in areas of common interest. Although analysts usually identify a number of different sequential stages in diplomatic negotiations, the basic model can be characterized as a process in which parties first agree on the need to negotiate and then establish an agenda and the rules of procedure. Later, different opening positions are outlined and explored; and finally, compromises are sought in order to find a point of convergence, forming the basis for agreement. However, it cannot be assumed that any of the aforementioned stages should be necessarily easier than the rest. At times, states do not recognize the need to

negotiate or are unable to agree on an agenda for talks, due to either its excessive precision or its vagueness, its eventual propagandistic value, or simply because of their preferences in the order of topics to be discussed.

Another question that is equally relevant is the agreement on procedure. Frequently, more than two parties are involved in the talks and the negotiation could require both bilateral and plenary sessions. This can have the effect of making the election of the delegation members more complex according to their level and competence, as well as complicate the decision-making procedures. The procedure by which decisions are made differs considerably depending on negotiation objectives. But, if the parties seek to obtain substantial agreements, it is necessary to clearly establish the rules of procedure. The preparation and discussion of a resolution is usually a lengthy and laborious process. Moreover, the states can sometimes deploy diverse tactical devices of pressure and persuasion, according to their objectives, or even quit the table, breaking the negotiation.

After discussing different drafts, the proposed resolution can be submitted to final approval. Although the adoption of decisions by consensus is very common, the most frequent method is voting. In fact, the unanimity rule might induce paralysis when large numbers of states are involved. There are three particularly relevant aspects of voting. First, the weight of votes, ranging from the classic system of one vote per country, to diverse forms of vote qualification according to some formulas, such as the country's financial contribution to the agreement, or others related to their size or relevance to a particular topic. Second, the specification of quorum requirements in order to elude controversies among the parties during voting. Third, and the most prominent, are majority requirements. Decisions can be made by a single majority or qualified two-thirds majority of those present and voting, but sometimes unanimity can be required, or even the majority of some specified members, as in the United Nations Security Council.

Besides the formal aspects, the parties shall also establish a certain agreement as to the level of discretion required in the negotiation, but it must always be developed in accordance with the rules of diplomatic protocol and the general principles of

international law. As the enduring relevance of the socalled quiet diplomacy shows, the principle of publicity does not impede discretion in diplomatic negotiations but it is incompatible with the adoption of secret international commitments with compulsory content. Nevertheless, due to contemporary requirements of legitimacy in the democratic political process, diplomatic negotiation must sometimes be extended to society, eventually establishing consultative meetings with nongovernmental organizations, pressure groups, and noncentral governments. A sign of the increasing public interest in multilateral diplomacy is also the growing relevance of the international conferences, organized by nongovernmental organizations (NGO), with the objective of achieving influence on the diplomatic agenda, on topics such as development, human rights, peace talks, or environmental issues, among others. This trend is particularly notorious in the field of conflict resolution, as we will briefly discuss later in this work.

Today, a great deal of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy takes place at the level of heads of government. Summitry is certainly as old as any other form of diplomacy, but during the last decades and due to the fast development of transport and communications it has gained considerable prominence. Both serial and ad hoc summits are usually subjected to greater public attention than standard multilateral or bilateral diplomacy. For this reason, without denying its diplomatic relevance, summitry may frequently be used as an excellent tool for foreign or domestic propaganda, as was clearly exhibited during the Cold War. Because of this, unless it has been meticulously prepared, summitry has come to be seen by professional diplomats as a certain intrusion in their daily work, which sometimes creates more inconveniences than advantages.

Probably, the foremost role of diplomacy over its long history has been the peaceful settlement of disputes. Indeed, it can be said that some of the basic contributions of contemporary peace research such as the techniques of mediation and reconciliation were well known from the early beginnings of modern diplomatic practice. Notwithstanding, until the innovations established by the League of Nations, the adoption of different means of peaceful settlement of conflict was certainly a choice but never a legal duty for the states. Later, the Charter of the United Nations established the duty of peaceful settlement of disputes as a general principle of international law, considerably developing its institutional aspects without changing substantially its traditional methods. In fact, one of the more prominent innovations of the United Nations was precisely the possibility of nonpeaceful application of international law, through the coercive competencies of the Security Council. Consequently, the contemporary methods of peaceful settlement of disputes, in spite of their adaptation to contemporary institutional and technological conditions, remain similar to their traditional antecedents. Previously we have referred to negotiation as the most prominent and widespread method for settling international differences and the most characteristic method of diplomatic practice. However, not always it is possible to easily achieve direct discussion among the parties in a dispute.

For this reason, throughout history, the states have developed diverse political and jurisdictional methods of peaceful settlement: (1) 'Good offices' is the participation of a neutral third party in order to facilitate the communication between the parties, but without offering any substantial suggestion on the possible terms of settlement. (2) 'Inquiry' is the process of obtaining evidence by a neutral team of investigators, requested by the parties in conflict. The clarification of facts can be very important in order to avoid misunderstandings and facilitate a political agreement. (3) 'Diplomatic mediation' is another type of third-party intervention that is especially adequate in disputes in which compromise seems to be very hard to achieve, due to the hostility among the parties or the nature of the conflict. Although the mediator ought to be neutral, his or her ability to make substantial proposals in order to see a compromise is particularly important, even if they could be understood by one party as favorable to the other side. (4) 'Conciliation' is another form of mediation in which a particular international institution has been requested by the parties, due to its recognized neutrality and experience in seeking to find an acceptable solution. (5) 'Arbitration' is a method of applying legal principles to a controversy in which the parties have agreed previously on legal principles and procedures, and have chosen the court – permanent or ad hoc – they prefer. In agreeing to

submit the dispute to arbitration the parties are bound by the final decision.

However, it should be noted that the states are usually more willing to negotiate directly, or even to accept mediation rather than to consent in a judicial settlement, the sentence of which is of compulsory compliance. Contemporary international law established the duty of peaceful settlement of disputes, but nothing assures its political success. So, it can be reasonably stressed that a good diplomatic method in dealing with international disputes should be the deployment of different strategies of preventive diplomacy. Those strategies can be of a very different nature, military as well as nonmilitary, according to their diverse objectives, such as crisis prevention, preemptive engagement, or preconflict peace building.

Although diplomacy is generally defined as the conduct of international relations through negotiation and dialogue or by any other means able to encourage peaceful relations among states, it is difficult to deny that threats and coercion have played an important role in international relations. Moreover, despite the contemporary erosion of militarism and the decreasing role of military force in world politics, nothing seems to suggest that coercion will disappear. A possible solution to this apparent contradiction is to reserve the analysis of international coercion to foreign policy analysis, acknowledging its widely accepted incompatibility with diplomacy. Nevertheless, there is also an increasing amount of literature devoted to the study of 'coercive diplomacy'. Coercive diplomacy would be a defensive strategy that is employed to deal with the efforts of an adversary to change a status quo situation. Coercive diplomacy needs to be differentiated from offensive strategies. The latter employs threats in an aggressive manner against target states. It is also quite different from deterrence, the preventive employment of threats to dissuade an adversary from undertaking a damaging action not yet initiated. This was certainly a type of diplomacy particularly prominent and controversial during the Cold War, but has today lost a great deal of its relevance.

According to the proponents of coercive diplomacy, there are three basic types of coercive strategy, which should preferably be used after the failed resort of other more peaceful alternatives, such as a negotiated settlement. The first tries simply to persuade the opponent to stop the hostile action. The second seeks the reversal of the action already accomplished. The third, and undoubtedly the most controversial, seeks to terminate the opponent's hostile behavior through the promotion of change in the adversary's domestic political system. Certainly, the diplomatic nature of coercive diplomacy can be questioned, given that it can be seen as a violation of contemporary international law. However, it is difficult to deny the relevance of these practices for the contemporary understanding of international relations. Precisely for this reason, it must be remembered that the United Nations' system of collective security, in spite of the growing importance given to preventive diplomacy and peace building, is the only contemporary legal expression of coercive but multilateral diplomacy firmly recognized by international law.

Against this trend, which pretends to make compatible diplomacy and coercion, during the last decades different voices have claim for a more active role of diplomacy in peace building, human development, and global environmental sustainability. This is the case of both the so-called citizen diplomacy and sustainable diplomacy approaches. Citizen diplomacy, also called frequently second-track diplomacy, comes to emphasize the importance of ordinary people and unofficial channels of communication between opposing sides in order to increase trust and foster mutual understanding. Sustainable diplomacy advocates, by their side, defend an explicitly normative approach to diplomacy that instead to promote the particular interest of states shall serve to the whole humanity. If the former is largely the result of the growing transnational dimension of social movements and NGOs, the latter appeared within the diplomatic world itself, and is slowly gaining support among the increasing number of disappointed practitioners who refuse the subordination of diplomacy nowadays to economic or strategic interests.

Our brief description of the classic methods of diplomatic settlement of disputes, as well as the short discussion on the importance of preventive and coercive diplomacy, can easily suggest that the theory of diplomacy has invariably considered the relations among states as the source of

international conflicts. Notwithstanding, during the Enlightenment it was suggested by some prominent thinkers, and particularly by Kant, that true peaceful diplomacy would only be possible through the complete abolition of absolute monarchies. This type of examination of the existing relation between domestic political systems and international peace has been extensively reintroduced during the past years by an increasing amount of literature. The common point of departure is the empirical evidence that democracies seem to be much less willing to use violence among themselves than against nondemocracies. There are two prominent explanations to the so-called 'democratic peace'. Some scholars have suggested that the reason may be the intrinsic complexity of the institutional procedures of democratic political process. Others find the source of more peaceful diplomacy in normative constraints imposed by social values of the general public in democratic states. Any thorough analysis of this question considerably exceeds the limits of this article, but its mention can suggest an interesting starting point for the analysis of domestic sources of peaceful diplomacy.

Since the beginnings of modern nation-states, the ability to conduct diplomatic relations was considered one of the basic attributes of state sovereignty. Much more problematic is the associated assumption that it is also an exclusive one. Historical research has unquestionably established that diplomacy considerably predates the modern sovereign nation-state. In fact, the origins of diplomacy were the multiple practices of public and private communication among different political entities existing since ancient times. Certainly, these practices underwent different historical transformations until they became conventionally redefined as an exclusive attribute of the sovereign nation-states. Today, the conventional study of diplomacy tends to exclude a wide range of practices, such as corporate, nongovernmental, and noncentral governmental involvement in international affairs, in spite of their increasing relevance. Notwithstanding, the widely extended consideration of diplomacy as an exclusive attribute of the sovereign state is more an institutionalized political discourse than a corollary of empirical evidence. Beyond this however it is important to note that the foremost role of diplomacy over its long history has been the peaceful settlement of disputes of the most diverse nature. Indeed, it can be said that some of the basic contributions of contemporary peace research such as the techniques of mediation and reconciliation were well known from the early beginnings of diplomatic practice across the world.

Global Crime : Historical Contex and Recent Growth

Despite its recent rise to prominence and traditionally marginal role in International Relations, global crime has a long history.

The use, production and sale of narcotic drugs can be traced back to ancient history. Opiates were common in Ancient Greece (their use is referred to by Homer), marijuana was in use in China over two millennia ago and coca was as much an integral part of life in the Inca civilization as it is in some parts of Andean South America today. The trading of opiates occurred within Asia for many centuries and extended into Europe from the mid-eighteenth century. This was at the time an entirely legal form of commerce, since the use of opiates was not distinguished from the use of medicinal drugs or foodstuffs, and was common among societal elites. When Imperial China did take steps to restrict the legality of opium in the mid-nineteenth century, Great Britain twice took up arms against them (the Opium Wars of 1839–42 and 1856–58) in order to protect their flow of imports from China and exports to China from their colony, India.

The shift in positions of Western governments from fighting wars for drugs to the contemporary fighting of wars against drugs began in the latter part of the nineteenth century. By this time the use of opiates in Western Europe and the USA had begun to spread beyond that of literary and political elite social circles and come to be associated with working-class sloth and crime, prompting moves towards domestic prohibition. An international conference in 1909, held ironically in the Chinese city of Shanghai, initiated attempts to control the trade in opiates, which became codified in the 1912 International Opium Convention. The League of Nations made reference to the problem of narcotics in its charter and in 1920 established the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs.

The menace caused to international commerce by the actions of pirates has, of course, a long and welldocumented history, and illustrates that threats to security from armed non-state actors are not a new phenomenon. Piracy is recorded as being of concern as early as the fourth century AD in the China Seas and gradually spread and grew through the centuries, becoming particularly rife in the Mediterranean from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries.

The motivation for pirates to conduct robberies at sea rather than on land was that it made it harder for states to act against them. As such, piracy represents a classic concern of international law which, traditionally, is focused on tackling problems which do not fall under the direct jurisdiction of states. A series of international conventions were signed from the nineteenth century outlawing robbery on the High Seas, culminating in the 1958 Geneva Convention which permits any state to try the perpetrators of such crimes regardless of the nationality of the criminal. The success of these conventions has produced an unusual twist for International Relations with the uncharacteristic effectiveness of international law enforcement diverting the criminals to take on domestic law enforcers instead. Modern-day pirates tend not to operate on the high seas, where they run the risk of encountering the full might of great naval powers, and prefer to challenge the sovereign authorities of less powerful states in ransacking ships in territorial seas, in anchorage or in the harbour.

International action against the age-old practice of slavery represents the first manifestation of human rights in International Relations, with states acting to outlaw a crime through moral outrage rather than for economic reasons or for the safety of their citizens. The rise of outrage in nineteenth-century Western Europe at the barbarism of using forced human labour, and of profiting from the trade in human cargo, translated itself into the diplomacy of the Concert of Europe.The 1815 Congress of Vienna saw the great powers of Europe acknowledge an obligation to make the international trade in slaves contrary to international law. This obligation became official at the 1885 Treaty of Berlin and was codified in the 1890 Brussels Convention, producing the world's first piece of human rights legislation. Great Britain, on a number of occasions, took the step of enforcing this law by intercepting Arab slave ships off the coast of East Africa and freeing the captives (Robertson 2000: 14). As discussed elsewhere in this volume, humanitarian interventions of this kind are still rare and highly contentious today. The act of slavery itself was made illegal under

international law by the 1926 Slavery Convention which put slaverers in the same category as pirates, subject to the jurisdiction of any state regardless of where the crime took place.

Although it is clear that crime on an international scale or with international repercussions is by no means a new phenomenon, the 1990s witnessed a significant rise in the scale of and political attention given to transnational organized crime. The ending of the Cold War and the onset of greater economic globalization may, in many ways, be seen to have created the conditions for a growing 'global underworld'.

The end of the Cold War may be understood to have facilitated the rise in significance of and priority given to crime in three main ways.

Since the 1990s the term 'failed states' has come to be attributed to those countries where a single government could not be said to be in effective political control within its own borders beyond what could be understood as any sort of period of transition or temporary civil strife. In effect, such territories may be seen to be in a permanent state of insurgency or general lawlessness. The preponderance of failed states increased following the end of the Cold War partly because many such countries lost the patronage of either superpower in a new world order where they ceased to hold such a strong military security attraction.

The classic case of the failed state is that of Afghanistan. Invaded by the USSR in 1979, Afghanistan became the focal point of the second Cold War, with the USA providing substantial financial and military backing to the mujaheddin resistance fighters. The thawing of relations between the USA and USSR saw Soviet Premier Gorbachev announce the withdrawal of troops from the bloody and intractable conflict in 1988. This ended the proxy war between the two superpowers but did not end the conflict in Afghanistan, where rival factions continued to fight out a civil war in the power vacuum created by the sudden uninterest of the world's two most powerful states. The political legacy of this for the USA in terms of the rise of anti-American terrorist groups from the mujaheddin is well documented, but Afghanistan also rose again as a crucial haven for the global heroin industry. Ironically it was the toppling of the Taliban by the US-led invasion of 2001 that served to increase lawlessness in the

country, and a resurgence in the export of opiates to the West, since that government had begun to clamp down on narcotics production.

Failed states are significant in International Relations because they stand in contradiction to conventional notions of the sovereign state system. Sovereignty is traditionally viewed as the cement that holds together the state system and maintains international order. The crucial component of the multi-faceted concept of sovereignty, enshrined in international law in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, is that a sovereign state has a government in 'effective control'. The rise in cases where countries cannot be said to have a sovereign government in effective control – such as in Afghanistan or Colombia – is, of course, a recipe for increased lawlessness in the world.

On the other side of the coin to the failed states argument it is, of course, naïve to suppose that transnational crime, and narcotics trading in particular, did not occur during the Cold War years. As well as increasing in incidence in the 1990s, narcotics trading was able to be given greater priority by governments with the shadow of the Cold War no longer obscuring other political issues. It is incontrovertible that the superpowers were prepared to tolerate corrupt governments being involved with or even directing criminal operations if they were in charge of important military allies or client states.

The clearest illustration of a U-turn in tolerating crooked regimes may be seen with the US invasion of Panama in the dying days of the Cold War in 1989. One of the principal reasons for the breakdown in relations between the two countries, which led to the overthrow of the Panamanian government, was the refusal of President Noriega to yield to US demands to act to curb the flow of cocaine passing through his country to their cities. Noriega's connections to the drugs underworld were well known to the Americans throughout the 1980s, as a military general until 1987 and as President thereafter. At that time this was not viewed in such a negative light, since he had aided the USA in anti-leftist operations in Central America. The USA's security for the major part of the 1980s was construed almost entirely in terms of the Communist threat, against which Noriega stood as a bulwark, rather than in the threat posed

by cocaine addiction and related crime in US cities. By 1989 this was beginning to change.

Similarly, the Soviet Union, while no supporter of narcotics, backed the fiercely conservative Communist regime of Erich Honecker in East Germany, despite surely being aware of the leader's personal involvement in importing and selling cocaine. The Soviets also helped supply Colombian revolutionaries FARC, despite their wellknown links to local cocaine cartels.

One of the most prominent features of the post-Cold War political landscape has been the process of transition of many former Communist countries towards the Western model state with a partially freemarket economy and democratic political system. Welcomed by most Western governments and analysts as reducing the likelihood of military conflict in the world and even signalling 'the end of history', this wave of democratization may also, however, be construed as having brought with it new security threats to the world.

Transition from a one-party state to a multi-party democracy, and from a centrally planned economy to a more diverse mixed economy with private industries and shareholders, is a very difficult process. With help from the West, such as with the EU's PHARE programme, some former Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe such as Poland, Czechoslovakia (which split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993), Hungary and some parts of the former Soviet Union such as Estonia have come through initial economic difficulties to establish stable political systems and successfully orientate themselves with the West. A long-standing desire to be free of Russian influence (whether Tsarist, Soviet or democratic) may be seen as a crucial factor in such countries being prepared to tolerate inevitable economic and social difficulties experienced in undertaking the shock treatment of slashing state support for old industries and encountering mass unemployment for the first time in living memory. Poverty and social upheaval are always favourable conditions in which crime can thrive, and even the successful transition states have witnessed increased problems with black marketeers and illegal traders of various kinds. EU states have helped alleviate this by providing policing advice and training to their eastern neighbours through PHARE and EU accession preparations.

It is the former Communist countries further east which have found most difficulty in making the transition to capitalism and democracy, and where crime has become most prevalent and of greatest concern to the rest of the world. Rapid, wholesale privatization programmes in countries without experienced businessmen, shareholders and private bankers inevitably run the risk of leaving key industries in the hands of black marketeers and inscrutable individuals. Godson and Williams use the term mafiocracies to encapsulate the problem of criminal syndicates buying into crucial aspects of state apparatus and winning political influence . The ownership of most of Russia's economy by a small group of 'oligarchs', able to act as a cartel and exercise leverage over members of the Duma (Parliament) protected by law from criminal prosecution, prompted the politician Yavlinksy to define the fledgling political system of his country as a 'quasi-democratic oligarchy with corporatist-criminal characteristics' (Yavlinsky 1998: 67).

Between a quarter and a third of Russia's economy is black and the murder rate has rocketed since the fall of Communism. Criminal gangs or mafiya are a prominent feature of Russian life, with extortion rackets rife in most cities. Their influence has also extended into operations in many parts of Europe and elsewhere in the world. Gorbachev's policy of glasnost (openness) in the late 1980s, which facilitated the sudden influx of vidyeocassettes (which officially became a Russian word), is sometimes believed to have influenced the development of criminal gangs, owing to the popularity of Hollywood gangster films such as The Godfather.

Perhaps the clearest illustration of a new security threat emerging in international politics with the ending of the Cold War, and souring the toasts being made to global peace, is the rise in black market trading in weapon-grade nuclear material. Nearly 700 incidences of such operations were documented in the 1990s, principally focused in the successor states of the Soviet Union. Here, President Yeltsin had assumed control from Gorbachev of a country shorn not only of 14 of its 15 republics and six colonies but also a large chunk of its huge nuclear arsenal.

The rise of criminal gangs in the former Soviet Union and their diffusion into the Western world encapsulates the dark side of three generally

positive developments in International Relations in the 1990s: the fall of the Iron Curtain, democratization and globalization. Globalization, denoting the increased level of cross-border economic activity and increasingly global political framing of such change, may be seen to have influenced the rise in prominence of global crime in a number of ways.

The opportunities for trading in legal commodities are much greater than ever before in terms of costs, speed and the existence of global regulations favouring free trade over state protectionism. Such opportunities are also, however, present for the trading in illegal commodities. It is easier and cheaper for criminals to operate internationally, and the sheer volume of traded goods makes it difficult for state authorities to detect the movement of drugs, arms shipments and other illicit cargoes.

Drugs traffickers have come to make effective use of that very symbol of globalization, the internet, to boost their operations. Gangs are known to have used encrypted websites to communicate and share information on their activities while employing information technology experts as hackers to alter information held on customs databases and create phantom websites to put state officials off the scent of the real sites. A simple illustration of how modern technological aids to commerce can serve murkier purposes also comes with evidence that Australian drug traffickers have brazenly used the web service offered by legitimate couriers that allows customers to track the location of the goods they are having delivered.

Ever-increasing cross-border financial flows can also present opportunities to international criminals as much as to international businessmen. Large-scale criminal activity is usually accompanied by money laundering as crime groups seek to protect their ill-gotten gains from state authorities by moving the money around or investing it in legitimate businesses. This process is becoming increasingly globalized as criminal organizations learn to exploit the inadequacies of the sovereign state system by moving money from country to country. Investing the proceeds of crime into legitimate businesses in a state other than where the crime took place illustrates the nature of criminal globalization's challenge to the state system. A crucial aspect of acrime may not be

construed as criminal in the country where it occurs and may even be considered to be a beneficial overseas investment.

The global trend towards urban living is a factor behind the rise of crime, since city dwellers are statistically far more violent and lawless than their rural counterparts. The homicide rate in Amsterdam is 4.09 per 100,000 people, while the rate for the whole of the Netherlands is 1.4. This pattern is more pronounced in the Global South where far larger sections of the cities' populations live in poverty than in wealthy Amsterdam. Around one-sixth of the world live in urban slums, the majority of which are in the Global South (UN-Habitat 2003). Deprived urban living is closely associated with the development of criminal gangs and this is a growing phenomenon in many megacities in both the Global North and South. Urban gang culture is nothing new but appears to be globalizing not only via migration routes but also through the global media. Hence the notorious Los Angeles MS-13 has, in recent years, become the biggest gang, and a significant societal and governmental menace, in Honduras and El Salvador.

A key factor in the globalization of crime is the increased tendency for organized criminal groups to follow the lead of transnational corporations and set up operations in a number of other countries. Cheaper international travel costs favour criminals as much as they do other profit-seeking individuals. Godson and Williams describe how transnational criminal organizations can come to utilize a home state from where they direct operations, a host state where they carry out crimes or sell their produce, a transportation state where criminal activities will seek to ensure an unhindered passage of goods to the host state and a service state in countries where favourably secretive banking laws allow for profits to be secured . Hence, a genuinely transnational operation can be established where, for example, a Colombian-based narcotics gang could secure access to markets in the USA by bribing Mexican officials to permit the transit of the drugs and then investing the proceeds in a Cayman Islands offshore bank account.

At the 1994 United Nations Conference on Internationally Organized Crime, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali referred to an 'empire of criminals' to highlight the problem of globally

operating criminal gangs but also to illustrate the fact that many of these organized gangs were cooperating with other, likeminded groups to extend the reach of their operations. There is a long history of criminal gangs extending their influence into other countries but this, traditionally, had been in line with patterns of migration. Hence the mafia's influence in the USA from the 1930s followed large-scale Italian migration and, to a far lesser extent, Jamaican yardies and Hong Kong triads extended operations to the UK from the 1980s. The 1990s, however, witnessed the increased formation of strategic alliances between transnational criminal organizations exploiting changing political rather than demographic circumstances. Phil Williams, the world authority on transnational crime, illustrates this development clearly:

Colombian–Sicilian networks brought together Colombian cocaine suppliers with Sicilian groups possessing local knowledge, well-established heroin distribution networks, extensive bribery and corruption networks, and a fullyfledged capability for money laundering. Italian and Russian criminal networks have also forged cooperative relationships, while Colombian and Russian criminals have been meeting in various Caribbean islands to engage in gunsfor-drugs deals.

International criminal cooperation can sometimes thrive where societal and governmental cooperation is absent. Serbian and Albanian gangsters, for example, are known to have worked together extensively in human trafficking operations in the Balkans.

Politics and Media

ABOUT 2010'S

NETFLIX AND CROWD PSYCHOLOGY

S According to the tracking share and IMD indicators, we can say that 3 out of every 5 people who read this article know the serai mentioned in the poster. One of the important nuances discussed in the world-famous Netflix series La Casa De Papel is mass psychology.Abuse of the power structures of the state and its negative consequences are among the topics that should be brought to the center of attention in this film.In essence, it can be said that such negative situations in each of the democratic states are the center of attention.

BUT WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MASS PSYCHOLOGY AND LA CASA DE PAPELE?

A If we look at the most important events in the world political life during the broadcast period of the series in question, we can see Occupy Wall Street and the Black Matter events among them.These are events that are undoubtedly accompanied by certain levels of crowding.Studies show that the meanings given in serials, movies and movies penetrate into the subconscious.This is skillfully used by world-famous film and music platforms. The principle of financing the process and the interests of the parties is under question.

International Terrorism and World Politics

The international system is not just a collection of independent states. Sovereignty is not a concept that is the property of a single state. It is inherently a relative concept. As James Caporaso phrases constructivist thought stresses, multilateralism as an organizing principle would focus on the constitutive principles of the states system and to draw out its implicit and sometimes hidden sociality. With respect to multilateral activity, institutionalists heavily emphasize the discursive, deliberative, and persuasive aspects of communication and argument.

The modern world as Giddens suggests, has been shaped through the intersection of capitalism, industrialism and the nation state system. Each component, although interrelated with each other, has its own dynamics and history, and they need to be examined in unity).

The international system is anarchic and rational choice is based on maximizing the gain of people or groups. So whatever the purpose is, terrorism is based on this benefit maximization where a group has suffered for a cause and needs a radical solution.

Critical theory, as Adorno stated, treats the scientific and technological developments that define modernization and places progress at the center of it. Thus, the developments of globalization train with modernization.

No single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics. Therefore, we should be more contented with a diverse range of competing ideas rather than a single theory. Competition between theories helps reveal their strengths and weaknesses and drives refinements. In this way, strict and narrowly expressed matters are softened and are open more to advancement. As phrased by Fuat Keyman maintains that theory should not be based on theory but rather on changing practice and empirical-historical study, which are a proving ground for concepts and hypotheses. He says that theory is always for someone and for some purpose and theory always functions in relation to those issues and problems within which it emerges as an explanatory framework. An analytical or abstract theory, which detaches itself from time and space, such as neorealism cannot account for the

interpenetration between state and civil society. For this reason theory should always be time-space bound and be contingent on historical developments. Since terrorism is a complex concept it is not possible to explain and discuss the issue with only one theory of international relations. The lack of a clear universal definition of the subject is effective in this part making the concept open to subjectivity and overt bias.

Growing interdependence between states has rendered popular realist assumptions on international politics increasingly obsolete. Early 20th century saw a dangerous discrepancy between the new reality of worldwide economic interdependence and existing political structures, between increasing global integration and traditional foreign political attitudes and modes of behavior. According to Muir, "we have entered a new era, the era of interdependence; and this interdependent world is threatened with chaos because it has not learnt how to adjust its institutions and its traditions of government to the new conditions.". A problem becomes international when it cannot be dealt with effectively within the boundaries of the nation. The domestic power and pressure are not strong enough. As a result costs and benefits spill over into the external arena . The capacity of multilateralism is necessary. It is not that state sovereignty is losing meaning but the multilevel environment in which it operates is changing the meaning of the concept.

The modern phenomenon of terrorism has become legitimized because it fulfills the task of open warfare, which was once the agency of change in international society. Today, instead of the conventional types of war, unconventional measures including terrorism are increasingly used. All types of nongovernmental entities are involved. Growing economic interdependence of industrial states made war both more costly and more destructive. Norman Angell feared that the combination of advanced economies and backward politics actually made war more likely. This explains the distinction between developed and underdeveloped states, and provides motives for terrorist actions. According to Zimmern, the increasing integration of the world and its component states is a result of technological

innovation in terms of the increasing speed and ease and hence the volume of global communications. This process of integration was inevitable. Interdependence is the rule of the modern life. The increasing fragmentation of the world is a result of the rise of the idea of national selfdetermination and the virulence of national feeling.

Waltz believes that a country with less than half of the economic capability of the leading producer can easily compete militarily if it adopts a status quo policy and a deterrent strategy. This is exemplified in the attacks of September 11th. Although the rival was not a state, the economic capability of the terrorist organization was less than that of the United States. Al-Qaeda used cheaper methods with good intelligence and organization in attacking the super power. The point is, although AlQaeda is not a state, it is competitive with states in regard to facilities and resources. The leading country cannot use its economic superiority to establish military dominance or to gain strategic advantage over its great power rivals (Waltz, 1993:42).

Military force still plays a significant role in relations between states and security still outranks other issues in foreign policy. In many areas, realist assumptions about the dominance of military force and security issues remain valid. For the last four centuries, states have established the political structure within which information flows across borders. Due to globalization, existing security issues have been challenged by the democratic issues of human rights, liberalization and integration, but the attacks against the United States shifted security matters back to the top of the agenda.

Today, the globalization of world markets, the rise of transnational networks and nongovernmental organizations, and the rapid spread of global communications technology are undermining the power of states and shifting attention away from military security toward economics and social welfare. As societies around the globe become entangled in a web of economic and social connections, the costs of disrupting these ties will effectively prevent unilateral state actions, especially the use of force.

As Kissinger stated:

The traditional agenda of international affairs- the balance among major powers, the security of nations- no longer defines our perils or our possibilities…now we are entering a new era. Old international patterns are crumbling, old slogans are uninformative, old solutions are unavailing. The world has become interdependent in economics, in communications, in human aspirations.

The question is how profound the changes are. A modernist school sees telecommunications and jet travel as creating a global village and believes that burgeoning social and economic transactions are creating a world without borders. To an extent, a number of scholars see the era as one in which the state, which has been dominant in world politics for the four centuries since feudal times ended, is being overshadowed by nonterritorial actors such as multinational corporations, transnational social movements, and international organizations. As Keohane and Nye put it, "As one economist put it, the state is about through as an economic unit" (1989:3). We are still in the early stages of the information revolution. That revolution has changed the complex interdependent world, in which security and force matter less and countries are connected by multiple social and political relationships. Some aspects of the information revolution help the small, but some help the already large and powerful. The states, international organizations and also the terrorists benefit from this.

It is a familiar tactic of the privileged to throw moral discredit on the under privileged by depicting them as disturbers of the peace; and this tactic is as readily applied internationally as within the national community . This realist tactic contradicts the critical theory. Critical theorists believe realism leads to quietism and an unquestioning acceptance of existing power relations. They think world politics can change and progress. There is no one reality. Contextual understanding is their main contribution to International Relations theory. The Marxist idea that humans make their own history but not under the conditions of their own choosing influenced them (Lecture Notes on International Relations Theory, 1998). Critical theorists believe there is a connection between knowledge and interest. Critical social theory represents an understanding

of the world in which meaning and purpose are given by the subject within which this knowledge is concretized and put into practice. Taken from Robert Cox's views, critical theory contains a normative element in favor of a social and political order different from the prevailing order. So it is possible to take the control in one's own hands and to change the current situation with international cooperation and unity. If you do not like the environment you are in or disturbed by certain acts, it is up to you to decide and do what you can.

According to E. H. Carr, the inner meaning of the modern international crisis pertaining to the interwar years is the collapse of the whole structure of utopianism based on the concept of the harmony of interests. The international morality of the interwar years merely justified the interests of the dominant English-speaking status quo powers, the "haves" against the "have-nots". Carr, as a pragmatist, took utopians and realists to task. He saw that whereas the utopians ignore the lessons of history, the realists often read history too pessimistically. Whereas the idealist exaggerates freedom of choice, the realist exaggerates fixed causality and slips into determinism. While the idealist may confuse national selfinterest with universal moral principles, the realist runs the risk of cynicism and fails to provide any ground for purposive and meaningful action. The realist denies that human thought can modify the course of human action. Sound political theories contain elements of utopianism and realism, of power as well as moral values.

Carr stresses, man's behavior is in great part a product of the society in which he lives. Taking the attacks of September 11th as the example, it is possible to argue that the gap between the rich and poor has generated terrorist actions. With globalization and accessibility of almost every part of the world has increased the feeling of vulnerability and hatred among the poor.

The attack of September 11th is the first plunge into war by the poor, illiterate and hopeless parts of the world, namely "the ones at the end of the sheer drop" against the rich world (Örgün, 2001:47). According to Onuf (1989:59), social relations make or construct people into the kind of beings that they are. We make the world what it is from the raw materials that nature provides. It

should be clarified at this point that poverty is not the reason of terrorism. Terrorism is usually the reaction of the unsatisfied groups to the global world since they think the developed countries are self-centered with no interest in creating a fair distribution. Terrorism is one but not the only constructed response to the observed conditions of poverty.

Although there are different types of terrorism like state sponsored, domestic or international the concern in this study is the international aspect. Faruk Örgün believes that terrorism is not a stateoperated activity. It is a sub-state, transnational activity that is like a virus that can easily mutate. There is not just one way to fight terrorism. It cannot be treated as a regular and constant notion. Each time it mutates, the attitudes and the tactics of the fight ought to be reviewed. The terrorists are numerous. A state might be using terrorism for its own goals, while an individual might be involved in such an act for personal reasons. Each entity might be a reason or actor in terrorism. The difficulty today is the huge development in every field of life.

After September 11th, it was widely said that nothing would be the same again. But we are still living in the same world with the same danger and threat and now we are more aware of the consequences and the price of a terrorist act. By this act, terrorism showed its face to the leader of the world, for the first time. As with trade and communication, terrorism also globalized.

Terrorism is no longer a marginal problem, such as a nuisance that can be tolerated. It is a real, important and growing threat to the peace and stability of all legitimate states- that is all those states which live under the rule of law. It is an international threat. In this chapter, the historical progress of terrorism starting from the 1st century will be explained. Then the profile and the socio-cultural environment that terrorists live in will be presented. Next part will be the discussion of the definition of terrorism. Following that, the types of terrorism will be discussed with the emphasis on international and transnational terrorism.

Some of the earliest recorded acts of terrorism were perpetrated by the radical Zealots, a Jewish sect active in Judea during the 1st century. The Zealots resisted the Roman Empire's rule through a determined campaign involving assassination.

Zealot fighters attacked their enemies wherever there were people to witness the violence. The Zealots intended their actions to communicate a message to a wider target audience. Later between 1090 and 1272, an Islamic movement known as the Assassins used similar tactics in their struggle against Christian Crusaders. The Assassins embraced the same notions of self-sacrifice and suicidal martyrdom evident in some Islamic terrorist groups as of today. They regarded violence as a sacramental or divine act that ensured that its perpetrators would ascend to a glorious heaven should they perish during the task. As written in the Almanac of Modern Terrorism, (Shafritz, 1991:ix) some authors have attempted to draw similar parallels between modern events and historical precedent by citing the 13th century Islamic Assassins as the forerunners of modern terrorists.

Until the French Revolution, religion in fact provided the main justification for the use of terrorism. Following the execution of King Louis XVI, the Jacobins, led by Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety unleashed the process to which the term Reign of Terror refers. More than 12,000 French citizens lost their lives because they were suspected of opposing the new revolutionary regime. Unlike the mass killing of earlier history, which was carried out mostly for religious reasons, the era after the French Revolution introduced politics to terrorism, and nationalism largely supplanted religious motives. The French Revolution has proved that violence was both morally right and politically efficacious . Before Martin Luther, citizens believed unquestioningly in the supremacy of religion. Greater demand for learning and the search for freedom were pre conditions for the events leading to the French Revolution. But the countries of the Middle East which were still motivated by religious attitudes and values, did not have the chance to make a revolution due to the stasis in their regimes: Terrorist acts originating in those states are still based on religious factors. On the other hand, the French Revolution, motivated by Enlightment ideals, shifted the concern from religion to nationalism and democracy. Class conflict of that era of the rich bourgeoisie supported by the Church and the low level people used by bourgeoisie are similar to that of today's global world between rich and the poor groupings of people.

The situation changed, as nationalism, anarchism, Marxism and other secular political movements emerged during the 1800s to challenge divine rule by monarchs. On the other hand, religious motives were not entirely absent. Most European countries' populations revolted against Church dominated political life and created secular societies. Modern terrorism was initially antimonarchical, embraced by rebels and constitutionalists during the late stages of the French Revolution and in Russia by Narodnoya Volya. It is with left wing movements in mid to late 19th century Russia that we can more accurately attribute the roots of modern terrorism. The Russian Revolutionary group Narodnoya Volya is in many ways the prototype of many 20th century movements. In its brief, but eventful, violent struggle with tsarist authorities in the late 1870s and 1880s, this organization assassinated several government and police officials of the highest rank.

At the turn of the century a successor organization to Norodnaya Volya, the Social Revolution Party, made itself heard. While more avowedly leftist than their predecessors, the Social Revolutionaries also sought to further their agenda through assassinations of high-ranking officials. The revolutionary, antigovernment orientation of the People's Will became the model for future terrorists. The group selected targets that represented the state's oppressive instruments of power, and it embraced "propaganda by the deed," using the terrorist act to instruct. It sought thereby to educate the public about the inequities imposed on them by the state and to rally support for revolution. A member of the People's Will assassinated Tsar Alexander II in March 1881. The assassination of the tsar later inspired a group of political radicals who met in London to discuss how to achieve worldwide revolution. Their idea was to create an Anarchist International, also called the Black International after the black flag they adopted, to coordinate and support a global terrorist campaign that would overthrow both monarchies and elected governments of democratic states. Anarchist elements also became involved in labor unrest in the United States. Sometimes these disputes turned violent as a result of anarchist provocation. In general, the period between 1880 and the outbreak of World War I saw a wave of anarchist inspired terrorist activity.

An act of terrorism involving the assassination of a royal heir is credited with triggering World War I. On June 28, 1914, a Bosnian Serb, in order to free his country from Austrian rule, murdered Austrian archduke Francis Ferdinand, who was on an official visit to Sarajevo, Bosnia. Like many contemporary state sponsors of terrorism, Serbia also provided arms, training, intelligence, and other assistance to a variety of revolutionary movements in neighboring nations. Today, many countries continue to support terrorism as a tool to further their national interests. As realists would argue, what matters is the benefit of the country, not the rights of nations or minorities.

During the 1920s and 1930s, terrorism became associated more with the repressive practices employed by dictatorial regimes. It included the intimidation inflicted by the Nazi, Fascist, and Communist totalitarian regimes that respectively came to power in Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. The repressive means these governments employed against their citizens involved beatings, unlawful detentions, torture, so-called death squads and other forms of intimidation. Systematic terrorism arose in the Middle East in the 1930s and 1940s with the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Irgun and LEHI battling the British in Palestine. Anticolonial terrorism also was waged against the British Empire in Cyprus and Aden and against the French in Algeria by the FLN.

After World War II, terrorism reverted to its previous revolutionary associations. During the 1940s and 1950s, terrorism was used to describe the violence perpetrated by indigenous nationalist, anticolonial organizations that arose throughout Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in opposition to the contemporaneous European rule. Countries such as Israel, Kenya, Cyprus, and Algeria owe their independence at least in part to nationalist movements that used terrorism. The most significant terrorist incident of the anticolonial period was the 1946 bombing of Jerusalem's King David Hotel, by a Jewish underground group known as the Irgun Zvai Le'umi (National Military Organization). After World War II, terrorism began to be shaped to its current outlook. Publicity, the significance on the choice of the target and clearly set motives were introduced.

Since 1960s, acts of international terrorism recur with sufficient frequency for terrorism to have risen steadily on the global agenda. During the late 1960s and 1970s terrorism acquired ideological motivations. Various disenfranchised or exiled nationalist minorities embraced terrorism as a means to draw attention to their plight and generate international support for their cause. The PLO sought to create a state in what was historically known as Palestine: the land that became Israel in 1948 and the West Bank and Gaza Strip—territories occupied by Israel since the Six-Day War of 1967. A Palestinian group was responsible for the incident that is symbolically considered to mark the beginning of the current era of international terrorism. On July 22, 1968, three armed Palestinians belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an Israeli El Al commercial flight en route from Rome, Italy, to Tel Aviv, Israel. Although commercial planes had often been hijacked before, this was the first clearly political hijacking. The act was designed to create an international crisis and generate publicity. As a result, terrorism became globalized in the sense of gaining international attention for an act which crossed boundaries. Two years later, the PFLP staged an even more dramatic international incident, when it hijacked three commercial airliners—two American and one Swiss. The planes were flown to a remote airstrip in Jordan and blown up after the passengers were evacuated, as television cameras recorded the incident for a worldwide audience. This was the first example of a terrorist attack with a transnational character similar to the attack of September 11th. Globalization, with its aspects of communication and the power of media, served the interest of terrorists. The murder of 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games provides one of the most notorious examples of terrorists' ability to elevate their cause onto the world political agenda. Members of a Palestinian group called Black September seized the athletes. The global audience that had tuned in to watch the Olympics found themselves witnessing a grisly hostage situation that ended in a botched rescue attempt by German authorities in which both the terrorists and their captives were killed. The PLO effectively exploited the publicity generated by the Munich hostage taking. In 1974 PLO leader Yasir Arafat received an invitation to address the UN General Assembly and the UN subsequently granted special observer status to the PLO. Within

a decade, the PLO, an entity not formally affiliated with any state, had formal diplomatic relations with more countries than did Israel, an established nation-state. The PLO would likely never have attained such recognition without the attention that its international terrorist campaign focused on the plight of Palestinians in refugee camps.

At a time of growing ethnic and nationalist awareness worldwide, other nationalist groups began to emulate the Palestinian example to increase recognition of their grievances. In Canada, a group of French-Canadian separatists, called the Front de Libération de Québec (FLQ), kidnapped James Cross, the British trade commissioner to Québec, and Pierre LaPorte, Québec's Minister of Labor, in October 1970. Although Cross was released unharmed, LaPorte was brutally murdered. Fearing more widespread unrest, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau invoked the country's War Powers Act in Québec, which suspended civil liberties and accorded the army extraordinary powers to maintain order in the province and uproot the FLQ. The choice of a trade commissioner is significant in this act, possibly showing the reaction of the terrorists to trade and integration.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, political extremists began to form terrorist groups that opposed American intervention in Vietnam and what they claimed were the fundamental social and economic inequities of the modern capitalist liberal-democratic state. These extremists were drawn mostly from radical student organizations and left-wing movements then active in Latin America, Western Europe, and the United States. Terrorist groups such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy received training at Palestinian camps in the Middle East. Among Baader-Meinhof's most famous acts was the 1977 kidnapping and murder of Hanns Martin Schleyer, a wealthy German industrialist. As the choice of a British trade commissioner to Quebec, the choice of an industrialist shows that terrorism had changed motives from religion to those of economic and political ideology. The Red Brigades achieved their greatest notoriety for the kidnapping and execution of former Italian Premier Aldo Moro in 1978.

Right wing, or neo-fascist and neo-Nazi, terrorism movements also arose in many Western European countries and in the United States during the late 1970s in response to the violence perpetrated by leftwing organizations. However, the rightwing groups lacked the numbers and popular support that their left-wing counterparts enjoyed. Thus the violence of these right-wing groups was mostly periodic and shortlived. The three most serious incidents connected to right-wing terrorists occurred in Bologna, Italy; Munich, Germany; and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. A 1980 bombing of a crowded rail station caused the death of 84 people and wounded 180 in Bologna. The date of the bombing coincided with the opening of a trial in Bologna of rightwingers accused of a 1976 train bombing. Also in 1980 a bomb planted by a member of a neo-fascist group exploded at Munich's Oktoberfest celebration, killing 14 and injuring 215. In 1995 white supremacists carried out a truck bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, which resulted in the death of 168 people. Although they have not been as numerous as in the French Revolution, murder and mass killings for radical reasons after 1970s peaked.

Two of the most important developments in international terrorism during the 1980s were the rise in state-sponsored terrorism and the resurgence of religious terrorism. An example of an attack believed to be state-sponsored was the attempted assassination in 1981 of Pope John Paul II by a Turkish citizen who allegedly was working for the Soviet and Bulgarian secret services. Other examples include the Iranianbacked car- and truck-bombings of the American embassy and U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983, and Libya's role in the in-flight bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988.

Although they were very significant and strong in the 1960s, IRA and ETA started to lose their effect after 1980s. On the contrary, Middle Eastern terrorism, especially Hamas, which has existed for decades, survives. But what changed in our time is that terrorism has gained a transnational dimension with different objectives and methods threatening the western countries. This changed the scope and limits of terrorism.

It is well known that one's terrorist is another's freedom fighter. Terrorists can be successfully destroyed only if public opinion, both at home and abroad, supports the authorities in regarding them as criminals rather than heroes. The profile of the terrorist is also important. He fights to change

something, even at the price of ending his own life. Until facing the consequences of the act for the first time, the police, the press, the justice, the masses naming him a murderer does not change his perception and the evaluation of the acts he committed. Whatever the goal is, death seems the best way to achieve the goal. Terrorists usually use codes, not their own names. The terrorist act is symbolic carrying a message. Terror is personal and arbitrary. Terrorists wish to have the acts repeated in a serial consequence and have a violence campaign. Terror does not differentiate between the victims. They are mostly civilians, noncombatants, nonrevolutionary, neutrals, and the ones who have nothing to do with the past lives of the terrorists. The belief in the act committed is so strong that terrorists do not hesitate to kill innocent people. The aim is to shake trust in the government and invalidate its authority by creating disturbance or chaos.

The profile of terrorism has altered with the change in world politics and actors. Lately, small states which adopted war by proxy can deter big states. They can cover their deficiencies by terror when compared to the big states. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequences of the end of Cold War resulted in the availability of surplus arms, the discrediting of socialist ideologies, the disintegration of totalitarian regimes, the withdrawal of superpower support to client regimes (Kaldor, 1999:4).

The fall of communist governments in Eastern Europe has ended the easy passage of terrorists from the Middle East. The Soviet Union's increasing attention to its domestic difficulties has left its Middle East allies like Syria without the assurance of Soviet protection (Beliaev, 1991:48). The new identity politics arises out of the disintegration or erosion of modern state structures, especially centralized, authoritarian states.

Terrorist organizations are not like nation states that can be vanquished in conventional war. There are no quick victories. They need good organization and planning, which take time. They live among us but not as distinct people for us to realize or destroy easily. The socio cultural area where the terrorist act is committed, is effective on the achievement of the goal of terrorism and the personality of the terrorist.

According to a research done by Ergil and Yörükoğlu (cited in Başeren, Lecture on International Terrorism, 2002) on the terrorist profile, people tend to sympathize with terrorism when their expectations are not realized. What hurts most is their continued inability to achieve desired outcomes. Injustice and social depression can lead to mental unbalance, making people open to radical tendencies. This does not mean that psychological stress causes terrorism. But it might be effective in the rationale or the commitment of the terrorist to his group. It is the same for poverty. Although it is not the reason to become terrorist, it is   significant in the attitude of the person or how he perceives the wealthy world, which might result in hatred and reaction.

Lawrence Freedman points out that terrorism is generally a have-nots' strategy, and that reliance on it is often a sign of strategic failure, there being not enough strength to pursue more promising policies (Freedman, 1998:4). However, there is no rule that only the poor are terrorists. Gross Domestic Product per capita of Basques is higher than Spanish Gross Domestic Product per capita, which is a significant indicator (Başeren, 2001). Although this looks like a problem at the individual level, it is at the root of the international problem. When there is dissatisfaction, there is reaction. So no matter what the environment in which we live, developed or underdeveloped, social justice and satisfaction provide us with less crime and less terrorism. This can be done by development, welfare, equality and fair distribution.

Urbanization is part of the modern trend toward aggregation and complexity, which increases the number and accessibility of targets and methods. Modernization brings civilization and thus it provides new targets for terrorism. So there is a correlation. The city creates the audience for the armed propaganda based on fear. Audience is needed for effect. Modernization provides mobility, technological means to realize this effect.

Inequality and injustice are not all related to globalization only. The question is what made those people terrorist. Means and other causes effected the current place terrorism is. Historical reasons are also significant, and all these factors add up to the environment resulting in terrorism.

Terrorism cannot be adequately explained without situating it in its particular political, social, and economic contexts. The context for terrorism does not consist entirely of objective historical factors. An important aspect of terrorism is its social construction, which is relative to time and place, thus to historical context (Crenshaw, 1995:8).

Several factors may be relevant to the motivations behind terrorism, the socialization of the individuals who become terrorists, the quality of terrorism as both responsive and sustained behavior, its representativeness and continuity with nonviolent forms of political action, its purpose, which is to produce social change, and the availability of opportunities. The development of terrorism is related to context because it is systematic, deliberate, and sustained over time, it is not spontaneous or purely expressive, as some other forms of civil violence may be. Users of terrorism may think of themselves as bringing about a better society for all, thus acting in the interest of a collective good (Crenshaw, 1995:15). There are commonalities among instances of terrorism but each case is unique.

Terrorist actors do not just intend to threaten a certain category of people or menace the other side. They also try to deliver a message to their own side, to potential allies, or to the governments that might support, sponsor their actions (Crenshaw, 1995:599). Force, the primary facet of terrorism is not the goal of terrorism but a means. To terrorists, terrorism offers a way to impose their will and gain access to the news media in a world where real and imagined grievances are not easily heard or satisfied. According to Crenshaw, as a method, terrorism is a common form of violence. It is a tool to be employed, a means of reaching a goal, for many different types of political actors. The actor uses terror as a tool and accepts terror as an end in itself.

 Terrorism is group activity involving intimate relationships among a small number of people. Interactions among members of the group may be more important in determining behavior than the psychological predispositions of individuals. The group operates under conditions of stress and isolation.

 Most of the countries cannot see the capability and reach of terrorism, since they have no or little experience with the problem. But states are also guilty of preparing the ground for terrorist acts. Although they might not be supportive, if they do not act against the organizations they might be serving as sympathizers. Underlying motives exist for national benefit when they provide arms, territory, and legitimacy to active terrorist organizations. When a state applauds liberalism and   ignores left wing movements, the latter might become the terrorist of the future. Similarly, the United States helped Afghanistan and Bin Laden for their fight against the Soviet Union, which was also their rival, then they became the target and Afghanistan hit them.

Some states accept terrorist foundations and actions to serve their political interest in the region. On the contrary, some strong and democratic states that are not in need of better status or publicity can give support to terrorism. Conversely, liberal democracies are extremely vulnerable to harassment and disruption by terrorists (Gutteridge, 1986:8). This is due to the relative ease with which the terrorist can exploit liberal democratic freedoms of travel, communication and association. The gravest internal dangers posed by terrorism to liberal democracy are the weakening of national security, the erosion of the rule of law and the undermining of government authority. Mere handfuls of terrorists can cause serious local disruptions and threats to life, and often cause expensive diversions of security forces, sometimes on such a large scale that they disturb delicate military balances.

Existing for ages but still a significant threat to social, political and economic stability, progress and welfare in the world, there is still no one single definition of terrorism. The problem to fight terrorism lies here. Not having a commonly accepted definition helps the terrorist to find weak points in politics and administration of governments, thus getting away with the crime they have committed.

For years, scholars and authors have come up with many definitions of terrorism. One definition

claims that terrorism is a form of political violence that falls somewhere in the middle of a continuum between war and peace. Just like war, terrorism serves a political aim; in this respect, as Clausewitz argues, it is a continuation of politics by other means. The main difference with war is the size of asymmetry, meaning that the inequality of power between two parties is huge. Another definition states that terrorism is an attack against the system and nation to get a favorable response from the system to the needs and aims of the terrorists.

Terrorism is an attempt to disrupt and discredit the processes of government. As a direct attack on the regime, it aims at producing insecurity and demoralization. Terrorism aims at creating either sympathy in a potential constituency or fear and hostility in an audience identified as the enemy.

A third definition holds that terrorism is not a philosophy or a movement, but a method of struggle: terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

Terrorism is where politics and violence intersect in the hope of delivering power. All terrorism involves the quest for power: power to dominate and coerce, to intimidate and control, and ultimately to effect fundamental political change.

Violence or the threat of violence is thus the sine qua non of terrorists, who are unswervingly convinced that only through violence can their cause triumph and their long term political aims be attained.

Terrorism is the tendency to change government's and people's policies and applications by violence and fear. Terrorism is defined as an unconventional war against the governments regarded as legitimate according to the state supported standards of their time. One of the aims of terrorism is to keep this war going. To understand terrorism and the fight against terrorism, two points ought to be clarified:

Terrorism is violating the law of war. Liberal democratic states cannot make a world war against terrorism by suspending democracy.

Terrorist activities are:

Intentional acts, which may seriously damage a country or an international organization, intimidating a population, compelling a Government or an international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.

As written in the Euroforum Study Guide, this is the common definition of terrorism reached by the ministers of justice and home affairs of the EU countries recently in an important piece of the antiterrorism package promoted after the terrorist attacks in the US. Thus the definition of terrorist becomes "a structured group of more than two persons, established over a period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorist acts.".

Terrorism is an attractive strategy to the groups of different ideological persuasions who challenge the state's authority. Groups who want to dramatize a cause, to demoralize the government, to gain popular support, to provoke regime violence, to inspire followers, or to dominate a wider resistance movement, who are weak in regard to the regime, and who are impatient to act, often find terrorism a reasonable choice. This is especially so when conditions are favorable, providing opportunities and making terrorism a simple and rapid option, with immediate and visible payoffs. Technology, communication, and transportation extremely helped in this way in the conditions for terrorists. Terrorism is often described as mindless violence, senseless violence, or irrational violence. If we put aside the actions of a few authentic lunatics, terrorism is seldom mindless or irrational. There is a theory to terrorism, and it often works.

A view argues that terrorism is the violation of principles of human dignity, democracy, freedom and respect of human rights. According to this conceptualization, most popular among the great powers, states recognized by international society have the right to protect their territorial integrity and national sovereignty.

One final definition will be given to clarify the concept for the following parts of this thesis. After these many definitions, author believes that, in its simplistic manner, terrorism is the use of fear with

physical and psychological force to achieve a particular political purpose by reaching a large audience.

After getting a clear idea of what terrorism is, it is necessary to examine the types. Although there exist many categorizations with many variants, the type that will be used and analyzed in this paper will be political terrorism, especially of the international or transnational variant. The focus will be on political terrorism of an international/transnational character, how it interrelates or interacts with globalization and why countries might seek to respond with means ranging from military force to international legal instruments.

That extremist groups resort to terrorism in order to acquire political influence does not mean that all groups have equally precise objectives or that the relationship between means and ends is perfectly clear to an outside observer. Terrorist activity takes on a variety of different forms, and some of them are interdependent. There is no clear distinction between the types because some acts may involve two forms of terrorism. Also some types that are of domestic concern might have international origins or sources as well.

One commonly used distinction is between terrorism from below and terrorism from above, in other words the terrorism of private groups and that of states. Private terrorist groups receiving assistance usually have lives of their own with goals and objectives distinct from those of the foreign governments which are sponsoring or secretly promoting their operations. In the case of terrorism from above, it is mostly a state sponsored terrorism within state borders.

A second widely used distinction in analyzing terrorism is that between its domestic and international varieties. Domestic terrorism refers to situations in which all the relevant participants which are terrorist groups, victims and audience reside in or have grievances focused on the same country. During the 1970s the Italian Red Brigades committed its acts of violence in Italy against other Italians to win support of an audience of working-class Italians for the cause of revolution against the state. International terrorism refers to situations where there is some mix of nationalities in the terrorist group, its victims, the intended audience and the location of its activities.

Terrorism is commonly typed as nationalist, ideological, religious, singleissue oriented, and statesponsored international terrorism. Nationalists seek political self-determination. They may wage their struggle in the territory they seek to liberate and from bases abroad. Groups pursuing ethnic-separatist or nationalist aims have also used terrorism. Terrorists commonly use it, since they lack formal armies and are usually brutally opposed by the state. Their objectives are not revolutionary in the sense discussed above, but instead involve the carving of an independent nation out of a region which is currently part of another. It may sometimes involve the desire to replace the control exercised by one state over a territory with that of another.

Sub-revolutionary terrorism may be defined as the threat and or employment of extra normal forms of political violence, with the objective of effecting various changes in the structural functional aspects of the particular political system. The goal is to bring about certain changes within the body politic, not to abolish it in favor of a complete system change. Primarily, groups or movements indigenous to the particular political system employ such means, though similar elements beyond the system's geographical boundaries may also rely on such means.

Ideological terrorists profess a desire to change the whole nature of the existing political, social and economic system. They have proved less durable than the well-established nationalist groups and are highly prone to internal splits. A particular ideology superior to the other in the evolutionary world generates fundamentalist tendencies among its followers, who seek to propagate their ideas through the medium of terrorist violence.

Revolutionary terrorism may be defined as the threat and or employment of extra normal forms of political violence, in varying degrees, with the objective of successfully effecting a complete revolutionary change within the political system. Such means may be employed by revolutionary elements indigenous to the particular political system or by similar groups acting outside of the geographical boundaries of the system. Terrorism is commonly linked to groups whose aims are revolutionary in the sense they wish to bring about a radical redistribution of wealth, power and status in a society. Such groups usually profess a commitment to Marxism, variously defined, and

seek to bring about an end to capitalism and the advent of a dictatorship of the proletariat. The revolutionary goal is intended to bring an end to the exploitation of one segment of society, the working class and achieve its redemption by pushing that society to a new and more equitable stage of development.

Certain religious groups employ international terrorism to undermine and ultimately overthrow a prevailing religious order which they regard as corrupt and evil. While terrorism can be expressed as the continuation of politics by other means, having mostly political reasons, terrorism can be a by-product of fundamentalism giving rise to different types (Seghal, 1996:14). Religious terrorism emanates from some fanatic groups who take it upon themselves to pronounce the superiority of their religion over all the rest on the earth. The propagators are devoid of logic, rationale or reason and would not listen to it either. They thwart all efforts aimed at objective analysis of world religions, including their own, and promote an extreme form of cult in which religious co-existence on equal basis is ruled out. This form of terrorism seeks to coerce followers of other religions into the acceptance of supremacy of their religion. Any challenge, in any form is not tolerated and terrorist violence resorted to wipe it out. On a smaller scale, single-issue fanatics are obsessed with the desire to change a specific policy or practice within the target society.

In state terrorism, a state may be accused of provoking, equipping directly or indirectly or inspiring groups or organizations to resort to terrorism. The state may itself resort to terrorist behavior to establish and reinforce its authority and suppress an insurgency in the country. This form is alleged to be used by military and communist regimes. Use of extra force and custodial deaths are often cited as examples of state terrorism. State sponsors may use their own directly recruited and controlled terror squads or may choose to work through proxies and client movements. They almost invariably work covertly in such support in order plausibly to deny any involvement.

Establishment terrorism may be defined as the threat and or employment of extra normal forms of political violence, by an established political system, against both external and internal opposition. Specifically such means may be employed by an established political system against other nation states and groups external to the particular political system, as well as internally to repress various forms of domestic opposition and unrest and or to move the populace to comply with programs, goals of the state.

While international terrorism is conducted by people controlled by a sovereign state, transnational terrorism which is terrorism practiced by autonomous nonstate actors but not necessarily with the support of sympathetic states. Transnational terrorism is essentially political in character with an additional dimension of transcending of national boundaries. It is an extremely subtle and most powerful form of terrorism operating with remote controls. The promoters of this terrorism have access to huge funds, weaponry and shelter. Their gangs operate in country A during the night and have their breakfast in country B in the morning and may be in country C to spend the night. Advances in science and technology have made the most sophisticated and fast moving means available for promoting terrorism in any part of the world with controls operating from long distances across the continents. This type of terrorism may have a commercial dimension as well. Narcotic operators have a vast network of terrorism across the borders of different countries to push through their commercial activities. As Paul Wilkinson argued, terrorism is inherently international in character, so that, paradoxically, the more individual states improve their national measures to combat international terrorism, the more it becomes attractive for the terrorist to cross national frontiers. Transnational terrorism comprises those terrorist incidents that have clear international consequences: incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, stay at home but select victims because of their connections to a foreign state or attack international lines of commerce.

According to Freedman, the reason for the increase in international terrorism is because the general geostrategic situation favors unconventional war. The balance of terror and the fact that all major states wish to avoid an escalation of violence that could lead to a possible nuclear conflict are important factors. Most states are afraid of protracted and expensive

conventional conflicts which might escalate. Unconventional war becomes more attractive.

There are senses in which international relations are challenged by transnational terrorism. It violently interrupts or threatens the conduct of international life. It seems to undermine the rule of international society according to which states enjoy the monopoly of the legitimate use of force. When undertaken or sponsored or encouraged by states themselves, it seems to threaten the system of reciprocal restraint which underpins their own existence. Besides separate terrorist groups pursuing their separate purposes there is also coordination among the groups in some kind of "terror international", threatening the security of the system as a whole. As Brian Jenkins has suggested recent technological developments allowing mass travel, instant communication and readily usable weaponry have produced a situation in which complex social systems are more vulnerable to terrorism than in any previous period, and more attention is paid to it because of this vulnerability. Paul Wilkinson maintains that there is general agreement that terrorism measured in numbers of attacks, people killed and the growth of movements around the world is on the increase .

Transnational terrorism is forced to rely on international transport system to reach targets and on global media to provide publicity and communication of political demands. Therefore, we need to turn to an examination of whether globalization supplies not only the means, but also the substantive causes of modern terrorism.

Some western democracies have little or no direct experience of terrorism; thus, they cannot see the importance of the problem. The need for improved international cooperation is growing. Today, mostly terrorism is inherently international and even transnational in character due to technological developments and interdependence. The more individual states improve their national measures, the more it becomes attractive for the terrorists to cross frontiers to escape justice, to secure arms, ammunition and money, and to collaborate with fellow terrorists. Therefore, we need to turn to an examination of whether globalization supplies not only the means, but also the substantive causes of modern terrorism.

Energy Security of the World

Europe is among the world's largest energy-consuming regions. Oil, natural gas, and coal constitute the dominant fuels in Europe's energy mix. In 2009, coal accounted for 17% of Europe's total primary energy demand, oil accounted for 35%, and gas for 25%. That year, Europe represented around 18% of the global demand for oil, some 17% of the global demand for natural gas, and 9% for coal. Nuclear made up 14% and renewables 9% of primary energy use in Europe. Overall, Europe, representing 7% of the world's population, accounted for 15% of the world's primary energy demand.

Europe is also a key supplier of energy. In 2009, it produced 2.6% of global oil output, 5.7% of global gas output, 4.6% of global coal output and 11% of global renewable energy. Still, Europe is crucially relying on energy imports to satisfy its needs. In 2009, the EU imported more than half of its energy from nonEU countries. This number has increased in recent years, rising from less than 40% of gross energy use in 1980 to 55% at present. If the present trends continue, European import dependency is likely to steeply increase in the near future, a function of policies aimed at reducing carbon-intensive fuels such as coal with comparably less carbon-heavy fuels such as gas, but also due to declining domestic production, notably in the North Sea.

European energy imports are dominated by a few producers of energy. Some two-thirds of EU-27 imports of natural gas stem from only three countries: Norway, Algeria, and Russia. Russia is also Europe's dominant supplier of crude oil, accounting for some 30% of the bloc's imports in 2008. Even in hard coal, Russia plays an important role, supplying around 24% of European imports. High European import dependency is not a concern for all fuels. The coal market is relatively small in volume, and global reserves are relatively evenly distributed. The oil market is global, liquid, integrated, and therefore unlikely to give a dominant producer much political leverage over the consumer region supplied. Gas markets, however, still remain by and large regional and bilateralized in nature. Given the predominantly pipeline-bound infrastructure in natural gas, alternative suppliers are hard to find in the short to medium term. In light of this, concerns have been expressed over some European countries' heavy reliance on gas imports from Russia,

Reaching up to 100% of total demand in Central and Eastern Europe, especially the Baltic States. Recent disputes over gas transit between Russia and neighboring Ukraine, and also Belarus, have added to this concern and sparked political initiatives to reduce overall European import dependency on Russia. The degree to which Russian gas actually poses a security problem is, however, disputed. Russia's share of European natural gas imports has in fact declined steadily over the last two decades, from some 75% in 1990 to 31.5% today. Current developments in unconventional gas production coupled with the increasing global capacity in LNG, may possibly also change existing market structures and contribute to a higher integration of regional markets and more gas-to-gas competition in the European market .The planned construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, connecting Russia directly to Germany and Denmark, is intended to diversify gas trade routes and reduce dependency on transit countries.

Still, policy initiatives center on reducing gas import dependency on Russia by promoting diversification strategies, including pipelines in the "southern corridor" aimed at bringing Caspian gas to European households. A key European initiative in this context is the planned Nabucco pipeline, a 31 bcm per year interconnector for Azeri and possibly Turkmen or even Iraqi gas, via Turkey. Since available gas volumes remain uncertain, the pipeline has so far not left the planning stage. Recent Azeri pledges to commit parts of the gas output generated in the Shah-Deniz II field (planned to come on stream in the next years) may constitute a breakthrough for the project.

In addition to import dependency, European energy security challenges may, however, also be of domestic origin. In particular, they may stem from Europe's commitment to pursue low-carbon energy transition. Policy packages such as the EU's 20–20–20 initiative, aimed at reducing emissions of greenhouse gases by 20% by 2020 and flanked by reaching 20% of renewable energy in total energy use, will put demand-side pressure on

European energy generation and systems. Replacing coal in power generation by bridge fuels (notably natural gas) before phasing them out to the benefit of renewables will pose unprecedented challenges with regards to finance, infrastructure, and technology. Adding to this challenge is a rapidly aging infrastructure in European nuclear energy, coupled with stiff public opposition to new nuclear power plants in most European countries.

The North American continent has been endowed with immense energy wealth. The United States is among the world's top ten producers of coal, oil, natural gas, and electricity from nuclear and hydroelectricity.

While Canada is in the top ten for oil, natural gas, and electricity from nuclear and hydroelectricity production, and Mexico ranks in the top ten for oil production. Despite this, each country has its own set of energy security problems.

Probably the most dominant and well known of these problems is that being faced by the United States and its dependence on foreign supplies of crude oil. Every US president, from Nixon to Obama, has set targets, put forward proposals, commissioned reports, and signed legislation in an effort to stem crude oil imports and improve energy security (US DOE, 2010). Today, over 60% of US demand for crude oil is met from imports.

Support for the US transportation system is the driving force behind all energy security legislation put forward in the United States. For example, the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) calls for, amongst other things, reducing vehicular fuel consumption through increased CAFE (Corporate Average Fuel Economy) standards, replacing gasoline with ethanol, and requiring auto manufacturers to develop a new generation of vehicles to operate on electricity.

EISA has had unintended consequences. The push for ethanol from cornstarch means that a significant percentage of US farmland is being diverted from food into fuel production; this has had an impact on world corn supplies, indirectly affecting food security in countries such as Mexico .

The increasing demand for electricity in general, and the inevitable reliance on mains electricity to meet the energy needs of plug-in electric vehicles in particular, will have an impact on (electrical)

energy security. At present, about 50% of the electricity in the United States is produced from domestic coal, followed by natural gas and nuclear (about 20% each), hydroelectricity (5%), and a mix of renewables (2.5%) .Demand pressures are forcing electricity suppliers to plan for new generation capacity and, if climate change is ever addressed seriously by the US Congress, it will be necessary to develop generation facilities that emit little or no carbon. However, the supply mix is only part of the problem – the US electrical grid is showing its age and must be refurbished if it is to meet the expected future reliance on electricity. The costs of new generation facilities (whether or not the United States addresses the issue of climate change) and grid upgrades are estimated in the trillions of dollars – the price of ensuring the availability of the electrical supply.

Until the middle of the last decade, it was assumed that domestic supplies of natural gas in the United States had peaked and, like crude oil before it, would make the United States increasingly reliant on imports of natural gas. To ensure (natural gas) energy security, plans were drawn up for dozens of liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities around the continental United States. Today, things look considerably different – the use of horizontal drilling fracking is making shale gas available as a replacement for declining stocks of conventional natural gas. Shale gas is rich in natural gas liquids (NGLs), meaning it can also improve US energy security by offsetting imports of crude oil . Optimistic reserve projections have industry analysts suggesting that the United States could soon start exporting LNG; this would not appear to be in the long-term energy security interests of the United States. There are also concerns over the environmental impacts associated with the extraction of shale gas; time will tell whether it is considered an acceptable source of natural gas that will improve the energy security of the United States.

Two of the countries on which the United States depends for its energy are its nearest neighbors, Mexico and Canada; both countries are exporters of crude oil and other refined petroleum products to the United States, while Canada also exports natural gas and electricity. The United States' reliance on Mexico and Canada for its energy has politicians and analysts in all three countries

talking about North American, or continental, energy security.

North America's energy security is governed by chapter six of NAFTA, the North America Free Trade Agreement, which outlines the rules and regulations regarding the trade of energy and petrochemicals. NAFTA requires a signatory to maintain its energy exports; short of war, any reduction in exports must be met by a proportional reduction in supply within the exporting nation. Mexico is exempt from this provision; Canada is not.

Mexico is facing energy security challenges of its own. Its most important oil field, Cantarell (in the Gulf of Mexico), is in decline and further exploration is hampered by the Mexican constitution that restricts oil and natural gas development to the state oil company, Pemex.

Canada, unlike Mexico, has few restrictions on international players exploiting its crude oil and natural gas. Despite the availability of these resources, not all Canadians have access to them; for example, although Canada is self-sufficient in crude oil, over 60% of it is exported to the United States, meaning that Canada meets almost 50% of its crude oil needs from imports (Hughes, 2010). Canada is also selfsufficient in natural gas, yet almost 60% is exported to the United States (US EIA, 2011a). Not only is Canada exporting energy that could improve its future energy security, but also it has compounded the problem by failing to develop the pipeline infrastructure to connect parts of eastern Canada with the oil and natural gas fields in western Canada .

Although Canada's production of conventional crude oil and natural gas has peaked, the tar sands (euphemistically referred to as the "oil" sands in the United States) are seen as essential to continental energy security. Canada's current prime minister has gone so far as to call Canada an "energy superpower" with respect to the development of unconventional energy resources such as the tar sands, shale gas, and Arctic oil and natural gas for export to the United States.

Canada is one of the few countries with the capacity to improve its energy security with its own energy resources. Despite this, Canada's trade and energy policies have evolved to the point where much of the energy that could be used for its own energy security is, instead, contributing to the improvement of energy security in the United States.

Asia – meant here to encompass the big four energy consumers of China, India, Japan, and South Korea, as well as the developing economies including Southeast Asia and South Asia – faces a series of daunting energy security challenges that crisscross the three themes of robustness, sovereignty, and resilience.

Growth in energy use, both in terms of per capita use and total use in aggregate, is expected to rise dramatically in the next few decades. As a whole, Asia Pacific's per capita electricity demand was only about 1300 kWh in 2005, compared to the world average of more than 2500 kWh. Under a business-asusual scenario, between 2005 and 2030 energy demand is expected to grow at 2.4%, whereas the world average during the same period will be 1.5%. Net imports of fossil fuels in Asia Pacific are expected to more than double. The region's oil dependency will increase from 57.5% to 66.4%. The region will also need between US$7 trillion and US$9.7 trillion of cumulative investment in the energy sector during this period, of which about two-thirds will be in electricity generation, transmission, and distribution. The 10 countries that comprise the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, for example, will likely experience an annual growth rate in energy demand of 2.5% between 2010 and 2030. If that projection holds true, regional demand for energy will equal the current combined total demand of Japan, Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand. Yet, although Southeast Asia is home to 8.5% of the world population (530 million people), the region possesses about 1% each of the world's oil and coal stocks and less than 4% of total natural gas reserves.

Security of supply has thus become a key economic and political concern. In China, Beijing had to ration its gas supply to shopping malls and supermarkets in January 2010 as a result of extreme winter weather. In 2008, India walked out of the deal to build an Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline – on which discussions were conducted over 13 years – over security issues and the inability of Pakistan to agree to provide penalties for supply disruptions. Japan buys nearly 90% of its oil from the Middle East, making it vulnerable to

disruptions of even a few days on the Strait of Hormuz or through shipping routes from the Middle East.

Threats need not be international or external. Laborers of India's publicsector petroleum company, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC), went on a three-day strike in early 2009, shutting down the Hazira plant that processes oil and gas from offshore operations and threatening to create shortages of compressed natural gas used for public transportation in Gujarat. Large parts of China also had to confront

Energy shortages in 2010 due to a combination of weather and infrastructure factors: the difficulty of transporting coal in the snow, less hydropower output due to freezing temperatures, and reduced coal supplies from Shanxi province due to mine closures. In 2008, shortages of gasoline and diesel occurred in Bali, Indonesia, when oil tankers had trouble accessing the island during a series of storms, and in Kalimantan long lines formed at petrol stations due to a shortfall of 10,000 liters of gasoline. In Jakarta and Java, as well, shortages of premium gasoline and LPG occurred after a refinery had maintenance problems, and disruptions of electricity hit every Indonesian province in both 2007 and 2008.

Trade in energy is another essential challenge. Apart from Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei, all other Asian countries are currently net energy importers. This means that the promotion of trade is instrumental to building energy markets so that countries can improve access to multiple sources of energy. Without such access, buyers must negotiate directly with producing nations such as those in the Middle East. Several "energy-poor" nations are relying on trade to overcome their energy shortages. The Bangladesh Power Development Board is currently holding a road show around the world to encourage foreign investors to help them erect about 3500 MW of new power plants and a terminal for LNG. The country suffers from an acute shortage of power, especially during the hot summer months. Pakistan is also facing severe energy shortages, and searching for private foreign investment by offering incentives related to upstream and downstream hydrocarbon development.

Some countries, such as China, India, and Japan, have begun aggressively investing overseas to then export energy fuels back to their mainland. The China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOC), after a well-publicized yet unsuccessful takeover bid for Unocal in the United States in 2005, took over Canadian-based PetroKazakhstan in 2006, and since then has won contracts in politically volatile places such as Angola and Nigeria and strengthened ties with Sudan, Cuba, Venezuela, Iran, Sudan, Kazakhstan, and Myanmar. India's government aimed to produce 20 million barrels of equity oil and gas abroad by 2010, and the overseas arm of ONGC has already acquired properties in Vietnam, Russia, and Sudan. Japan, in its quest to produce more "Hinomaru" oil (oil developed and imported through domestic producers), has integrated its key oil companies – Inpex and Teikoku Oil – under a joint holding company, to make them more competitive against foreign oil companies.

The Latin America and the Caribbean region (LAC) has considerable energy resources, including oil, natural gas, biomass, and hydro energy, and is a net energy exporter, producing about 8.4% of global energy and consuming about 6.3%. Venezuela and Mexico are among the Top global oil exporters, whereas Brazil is the largest ethanol exporter, accounting for half of the world's bio-ethanol exports. However, these resources are unequally distributed. For example, more

Than 90% of proven oil reserves in LAC are concentrated in three countries: Venezuela (which also holds about two-thirds of the region's natural gas reserves), Brazil, and Mexico.

Moreover, utilization of these resources requires considerable investment and capacities, which can often only be mobilized at the international level. For example, significant investment will be required to develop the giant Lula (Tupi) and other "pre-salt" oil and gas fields recently discovered in Brazil or to implement the ambitious plans for expanding production of hydroelectricity where only 22% of the regional potential is currently used (SESEM-CFT, 2 005) . The current underinvestment in energy infrastructure is sometimes explained by legal and political uncertainty and insecurity, including changing the rules and nationalization of energy assets in several countries.

The region is also diverse with respect to capacities of individual countries, some of which are both too small and poor to address their energy challenges. For example, Nicaragua, one of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, is dependent on imported oil for almost 40% of its primary energy supply, including electricity generation. Ecuador, another low-income country, relies on oil exports for almost half of its total export earnings and one-third of all tax revenues. Despite its large oil production,

Ecuador must still import refined petroleum products due to a lack of sufficient domestic refining capacity. As a result, the country cannot always benefit from high oil prices, which increase its export revenues but also increase its refined product import bill. Almost all of the electricity in Paraguay relies on one hydroelectric plant (Itaipu).

Energy infrastructure in politically unstable LAC countries is often the target of sabotage. Only in 2001, 170 attacks were registered on one of the most important oil pipelines in Colombia, Cano Lim ó n . The TransAndino pipeline connecting Colombia and Ecuador has also occasionally been the target of rebel forces in Colombia, and an attack in March 2008 shut the system down for several days. Similarly, another oil pipeline in Ecuador, Sistema Oleducto Trans-Ecuatoriano (SOTE), has suffered from natural disasters that severely disrupted Ecuador's oil production. In March 2008, landslides damaged SOTE, shutting operations for several days. In 1987, an earthquake destroyed a large section of SOTE, reducing Ecuador's oil production for that year by over 50% .

In LAC, regional integration is often viewed as a means to both redistribute uneven resources and to pool forces for infrastructure development and needed investment. Several energy integration organizations were created in LAC as long ago as the 1960s and 1970s:

- OLADE (Latin America Energy Organization), formed in 1973 by 26 LAC countries as an umbrella organization promoting the political, institutional, and technical integration of energy systems as well as energy efficiency;
- ARPEL (Latin America and Caribbean Regional Association of Oil and Natural Gas Companies), created in 1976 by 27 public and private companies and organizations that account for 90% of total upstream and downstream operations in the region; and
- CIER (Commission for Regional Electricity Integration), created in 1964 and including all South American countries except Surinam and Guyana.

Energy security has received high-level political attention in the last decade. In the Caracas Declaration (made in 2005), energy ministries of South America agreed to seek energy integration and cooperation. In April 2007, the first Presidential Energy Summit in South America resulted in a common energy strategy known as the "Margarita Declaration"), which advocates for a stronger role of the state in energy issues and promotion of renewables, especially biofuels. In November 2008, the Energy Ministers of OLADE member countries issued the Buenos Aires Declaration, which stated that energy security (defined as "safe and reliable energy resources availability") is a priority of the region .

Another regional energy integration effort is Venezuela-backed Petroam é rica, which provides a framework of cooperation initiatives in the areas of oil and gas supply and infrastructure. Petroam é rica is divided into sub-regional frameworks: Petrocaribe, Petroandina, and Petrosur.

Petrocaribe includes 14 Caribbean countries, as well as Venezuela and Surinam. Within Petrocaribe, Venezuela directly sells oil and products to these countries under favorable financing conditions (CEPAL, 2007 ; US EIA, 2008 ; PDVSA, 2009). In 2007, 10 Petrocaribe members signed an energy security agreement that promotes the expansion of refinery capacity, ethanol production, and LNG infrastructure, as well as energy efficiency measures. Many of the Caribbean countries import oil from Mexico and Venezuela under favorable terms. Under the San Jose Pact, Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica receive oil and refined products from those two countries.

Petroandia includes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. It is an alliance of state oil and energy organizations to promote electric and gas interconnection, mutual energy supply, and joint investments. As part of Petroandia, Venezuela

operates joint ventures in oil exploration, production, and capacity with Bolivia and Ecuador. Petrosur is made up by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Activities within Petrosur include the construction of joint Venezuelan-Uruguayan and Venezuelan-Brazilian refineries and the creation of Petrosuram é rica, a joint Venezuelan-Argentinean company . One area of regional energy integration is jointly constructed infrastructure for transporting natural gas. An agreement on joint construction of "the southern gas pipeline" for transporting natural gas from Venezuela to Brazil and Argentina was signed in 2005. However, a later discovery of large oil and gas reserves in Brazil decreased that country's interest in the project. The needed investment (around US$25 billion) could not be secured, and the project was shelved in 2009. A more recent project, called the "Energy Ring," would connect three gas exporters (Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru) to four (potential) importers (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay). However, the project was stopped due to the withdrawal of Bolivia and political differences between Chile and Peru. Instead, such countries as Chile have chosen to expand their LNG infrastructure to increase the diversity of gas import energy and routes.

There are also efforts to integrate electricity infrastructure such as a large integration initiative, the "Mesoamerican Integration and Development Project" .The Electrical Interconnection System for Central America (SIEPAC), a 1,800 km power line that links six countries (Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala), was almost completed at the time of writing and a Regional Electrical Market was being put in place. This infrastructure is complemented by the existing electrical interconnection between Guatemala and Mexico, and a project to interconnect Panama and Colombia.

This section explores energy security conditions in the world with respect to vulnerabilities of primary energy sources at the national and, where appropriate, global level, security of national electricity systems, and vulnerabilities of vital end-use sectors: transport, residential and commercial, industrial, and energy export revenues.

It shows that all primary energy sources have vulnerabilities from the robustness, sovereignty,

and resilience perspectives. Globally, oil stands out as the most vulnerable in all three aspects among the internationally traded fuels, although natural gas may develop equally strong vulnerabilities in the near future. Rising demand plays as strong a role as supply limitations. Although the vulnerabilities of nuclear and hydro energy are not directly comparable to those of fossil fuels, they still affect hundreds of millions of people in dozens of countries.

Many countries using nuclear power experience aging of the reactor fleet and workforce as well as difficulties in accessing capital and technologies to renew, expand, or launch new nuclear programs. Of the 31 countries with nuclear power programs, 20 have not started constructing a new reactor in the last 20 years, and 19 countries have nuclear power plants with an average age of over 25 years. Large-scale enrichment, reactor manufacturing, and reprocessing technologies and capacities are currently concentrated in just a few countries. The transfer of these technologies and capacities to a larger number of countries is constrained by serious concerns over nuclear weapons, which is one of the main controversies and risks associated with nuclear energy.

Hydroelectric power production, especially from major dams located on internationally shared rivers, is often perceived as insecure, particularly in light of climate change affecting seasonal water availability. Over 700 million people live in 31 countries that derive a significant proportion of their electricity from just one or two major dams, and are thus vulnerable to failures of these dams.

The analysis also identifies vulnerabilities of national electricity systems. First of all, electricity systems inherit the vulnerabilities of energy sources used for electricity generation described above. For example, power plants relying on imported fossil fuels currently provide over 50% of electricity in some 39 countries with 600 million people. Some 450 million people in 35 countries primarily rely on just one source of energy for generating electricity, which is a concern from the resilience perspective.

In addition, electricity systems in developed countries often bear risks associated with aging power plants (especially pronounced in the case of nuclear reactors, which have not been renewed in

most industrialized countries in the last 25 years) and other infrastructure. In developing and emerging economies, electricity systems are under strong demandside pressures. The majority of the world population – some 4.2 billion people – lives in 53 countries that will need to massively expand the capacity of their electricity systems in the near future because they either have less than 60% access to electricity or demand growth averaging 6% or more over the last decade. Both fuels and infrastructure for such an expansion will need to be provided without further compromising the sovereignty or resilience of national electricity systems.

Finally, reliability of electricity supply is a serious concern, especially in developing countries. In almost three-quarters of low-income countries blackouts are on average for more than 24 hours per month, and in about one-sixth of low-income countries blackouts average over 144 hours (six days) a month. In over one-half of low-income countries blackouts occur at least 10 times a month.

With respect to nationally vital end-use energy services, transport is globally the most vulnerable. The absolute majority of countries rely on oil products for most of their transport energy and, as we have seen, in most of the world this oil has to be imported. Around 4.9 billion people live in 93 countries that import more than one-half of their

transport energy requirements. This supply-side vulnerability is made worse by demand-side pressures: in some 17 developing countries with 1.7 billion people, transport energy use was growing faster than 8% annually from 1998 to 2007.

The energy sector also provides vital export revenues to some 15–20 countries. In the majority of these oil- and gas-exporting countries the revenues are not expected to last for more than one generation, and in several cases they may cease in less than a decade. In addition, poor energy-exporting nations are at a high risk of the resource curse: economic and political instability eventually affects human development and security.

If rapidly growing demand for energy and high risk of resource curse are considered vulnerabilities of energy systems, there will be very few, if any, countries in the world that do not experience significant energy security challenges. The next section considers how national governments and international institutions attempt to deal with such challenges

The rise of environmental issues in global security

Security threats emanating from the 'environment' present humanity with three key political dilemmas:

1 The threats are usually less clear-cut and direct than the other types of threat considered in this study. They are, as Prins describes, 'threats without enemies'. The threat posed by issues such as global warming and ozone depletion may be profound but they are, in the main, still perceived as longer-term creeping emergencies rather than imminent disasters.

2 Countering the threats is usually costly and requires a significant compromising of economic interests.

3 The threats can often only be countered by globally coordinated political action.

The scale of the human security threat posed by environmental change is difficult to quantify but it is undoubtedly significant and, to a large extent, avoidable given the political will. Probably the most 'securitized' issues of environmental change, at different times over the past 40 years, have been resource scarcity due to population growth, ozone depletion and global warming. The fact that the first of these 'crises' never really materialized and the second was partially averted by reasonably effective global political action has served to reinforce the notion that contemporary threats posed by environmental change, such as global warming, are potential rather than actual threats and perhaps exaggerated. As a result, despite gradually becoming more of a feature on the global political agenda, environmental issues have tended not to be placed towards the top of the international political 'intray' of most governments.

However, while it is true to suggest that the chief threats posed by global warming are potential ones which could yet be averted, it is also increasingly apparent that future threats can only be averted by immediate action and that some of the human security impacts are already being felt throughout the world. When UK government Chief Scientist David King announced in a 2004 guest editorial for the journal The Scientist that climate change represented a bigger threat than terrorism,

he attracted considerable media attention and embarrassed his employers for mounting such a thinly veiled attack on their US allies. Even allowing for the lack of certainty in ascribing any given death to global warming, there can be very little doubt that King was stating an obvious truth. The World Health Organization suggests that around 150,000 deaths a year since the early 1970s can be attributed to the gradual rise in temperatures across the world. Even if this is taken to be a wild exaggeration, it must still dwarf the death-toll attributable to terrorism. Indeed, even if we take global warming out of the equation, it has been estimated that between a quarter and a third of all deaths in the world by disease have environmental causes, such as air and water pollution. Environmental threats, thus, are not just theoretical future scenarios of apocalypse, they are a 'clear and present danger'.

Some domestic political systems have evolved to a position where the first and second of the aforementioned dilemmas can be overcome. Pressure group advocacy and government learning have gradually led to long-termist policies being developed mitigating against threats to both human and nonhuman state residents. Environmental policies in Western Europe and North America have seen economic interests compromised to limit uncertain threats posed to human health and to wildlife. The third dilemma is, of course, beyond governments acting in isolation but is slowly coming to be addressed by an evolving global epistemic community and polity. Transnational pressure groups and scientific communities are simultaneously pushing governments to rethink the first and second dilemmas and to provide the means for achieving the third. Central to this process is the slow but inexorable realization by governments that environmental threats are 'real' and the 'national interest' may not always serve their citizens' interests. Political dilemmas can always be resolved when this is understood. The three dilemmas presented here are not, in fact, unique to environmental politics. For most states very similar compromises have been made in the name of military security, since military threats are usually not immediate and require great expense and international diplomatic cooperation to deter. Global, rather than state, political action is

necessary for the enhancement of human security in all of the issues considered in this study but it is most crucial in the realm of environmental security.

Global environmental politics is a relatively 'new' dimension of International Relations, and of politics in general, but this is not to say that problems of environmental change are in any way new. The extinction of certain species of animals due to human recklessness (for example, the Dodo) and the diminution of woodland areas through over-exploitation are centuries-old phenomena. Ecologism emerged as a science in the nineteenth century, bringing recognition of natural systemic phenomena such as food chains, the carbon cycle and evolution, and an understanding of humanity's place within the environment. George Perkins Marsh's Man and Nature in 1864 is widely regarded as the first book to use empirical data to prove the effect of human activity on woodlands and waterways (Marsh 1965). Policies to conserve nature, and pressure groups campaigning for conservation, began to emerge in the USA and Western European states in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Yellowstone became the USA's first National Park in 1872 and the British Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) became the world's first conservation pressure group (and later the first international pressure group when it extended its membership to countries of the British Empire).

The origins of international policy on an issue of environmental change can be traced back as far as 1889 and an international convention to prevent the spread of the disease phylloxera in grapes. This and other agreements such as the 1902 Convention on the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture (the first international instrument on animal conservation) were, however, motivated by economic rather than environmental concerns. Wine and internationally traded food were at issue rather than the flora and fauna. At this stage the more abstract value of conservation for reasons of aesthetics or empathy with animals beginning to be witnessed in the politics of North America and Western Europe could not find its way on to the international political agenda, dominated by issues of military and economic security (and particularly the former).

The 1960s saw a significant rise in prominence of environmental issues in North America and

Western Europe and the emergence of environmental politics, beyond purely economic concerns, on the international political agenda. A major factor in this was the publication of Rachel Carson's hugely influential pollution polemic Silent Spring in 1962 (see Box 6.1). Silent Spring most notably highlighted the effects of the insecticide dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) on wild animals, vegetation and rivers, and quickly influenced US insecticide policy on conservation grounds. The book also, however, considered the implications for human health of indiscriminate insecticide use and this aspect began the process of forcing environmental change on to the global political agenda and securitizing some of the many issues in this area. In the wake of Silent Spring new political concerns began to be voiced, such as the effects of acid rain (rainwater polluted by industrial emissions), and older issues such as oil pollution by tankers were given far more prominence.

Heightened concern with the human health effects of pollution and other forms of environmental change at the global level was confirmed by the convening by the UN of the 1972 Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) at Stockholm. The Conference was boycotted by the USSR and its Eastern Bloc allies but attended by representatives of 113 states. The Stockholm Conference did not directly produce a new body of international law but had a catalytic effect in identifying some key principles which challenged the conventions of state sovereignty and in putting environmental change permanently on the agenda of international politics. 'Principle 21' confirmed that states retained full sovereign authority over resources located in their own territory but charged them with the responsibility to exploit them with regard to the effect of this on the environment of other states. The parties to the Conference also agreed to acknowledge the concept of a 'common heritage of mankind' whereby resources located outside of territorial borders (such as minerals on the deep-sea bed) should be considered as belonging to the international community collectively, rather than being subject to a 'finders keepers/losers weepers' approach to their ownership. Stockholm did have a direct institutional legacy, with the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) giving a degree of permanence to the policy area on the international stage. Overall, the Conference's most significant legacy was in putting

environmental questions firmly on the political agenda by prompting many governments to create new ministers and departments of the environment, and greatly deepening and widening a global network of environmental pressure groups.

Although Stockholm did not securitize environmental change and put it at the top of an international political agenda still, in spite of détente, dominated by the Cold War and impending global recession, some 'high politics' was witnessed at the Conference. Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme used the event to denounce the use of herbicides in war as 'ecocide'. Palme made no explicit reference to the recent American use of the infamous jungle defoliant Agent Orange in Vietnam, but the implied criticism caused grave offence to the Nixon Administration, who responded by withdrawing the US ambassador from Stockholm. Full diplomatic relations between the two countries were suspended for over a year (January 1973 to May 1974).

By the 1970s the appreciation by the international community of two key factors help explain the rise to prominence of an issue area which so challenged the traditional logic of international relations.

Chapter II: .General problems of international politics and areas of interaction

Political Demography as an Object of Influence on International Politics

For much of human history, demographic patterns were reasonably stable; human populations grew slowly, and the age structures, birth rates, and death rates of populations changed only gradually. Epidemics and pandemics had huge effects on populations, but these effects were short-lived and had little bearing on longterm trends.

In the past 50 years, however, this trend of long-term stability has given way to the biggest demographic upheaval in history, an upheaval that is still running its course. In the developed world, a sharp post-war rise in fertility was followed by an equally sharp fall. These changes in fertility transformed age structures through the creation of a 'baby boom' generation. The ageing of this generation and continued declines in fertility and old-age mortality are shifting the population balance in developed countries from young to old. In the meantime, the developing world has experienced a population explosion, the result of improved nutrition, public health infrastructure and medical care.

Even if high fertility – the main underlying cause of rapid population growth – were to suddenly adjust to the long-run replacement level of 2. Children per woman, humanity would continue to experience demographic change for some time. The rapid increase in the global population over the past few decades has resulted in large numbers of people of childbearing age. This creates 'population momentum', in which the populations of most countries, even those with falling birth rates, will grow for many years to come. This is particularly true of developing countries.

Population changes have potentially huge implications for the pace and progress of economic development. For example, an increasing proportion of elderly may act as a drag on economic growth where smaller working populations must provide for a larger number of non-working dependents. Rising life expectancy can also bolster an economy by creating a greater incentive to save and to invest in education,

thereby boosting the financial capital on which investors draw and the human capital that strengthens economies. Where a country has experienced a baby boom followed by a decline in fertility, the relative size of the workforce is increased. Countries that are able to absorb the baby boom generation into productive employment can experience a rapid increase in economic growth. Countries unable to take advantage of this opportunity run the risk of creating large, chronically underemployed and increasingly restive working-age populations.

The global population, which stood at just over 2 billion in 950, is 6.5 billion today. The world is currently gaining new inhabitants at a rate of 76 million people a year (representing the difference, in 2005, between 34 million births and 58 million deaths). Although this growth is slowing, middleground projections suggest the world will have 9. Billion inhabitants by 2050, when growth will be approximately 34 million a year.

These past and projected additions to world population have been, and will increasingly be, distributed unevenly across the world. Today, 95 per cent of population growth occurs in developing countries . The population of the world's 50 least-developed countries is expected to more than double by the middle of this century, with several poor countries tripling their population over the period. By contrast, the population of the developed world is expected to remain steady at around .2 billion, with population declines in some wealthy countries.

The disparity in population growth between developed and developing countries reflects the existence of considerable heterogeneity in birth, death and migration processes, both over time and across national populations, races and ethnic groups. The disparity has coincided with changes in the age-group composition of populations. An overview of these factors illuminates the mechanisms of global population growth and change

Figure 1: World Population

One of the simplest ways to consider population growth is through crude birth and death rates. These are the number of births and deaths per 000 people. On a worldwide basis, the difference between these rates is the rate of population growth. Within regions or countries, population growth is also affected by emigration and immigration. Figure 2 shows that in both developed and developing regions the crude birth rate has decreased by about half over the past 50 years. This implies a much greater absolute reduction in developing regions. The net result of these reductions is a current crude birth rate in developing regions that is similar to that of the developed regions 50 years ago.

Figure 2: Crude Birth Rate
Births per 1 000 population

As Figure 3 shows, crude death rates follow a different pattern. The reduction in mortality in developing countries since 950 has been very rapid – so rapid that the crude death rate in developing countries is now lower than in developed countries. The gradual rise in the crude death rate in developed countries results from the combination of relatively steady infant and child mortality rates and rising death rates due to an ageing population. The figure indicates that a similar rise in the death rate will begin in developing countries in a couple of decades.

Figure 4 demonstrates the combined effect of crude birth and death rates on population growth rates, as modified by migration (primarily from developing to developed regions).

## Figure 3: Crude Death Rate
Deaths per 1 000 population

Less-developed regions

World

More-developed regions

Figure 4: Population Growth Rate
Average annual

World

Less-developed regions

More-developed regions

The total fertility rate, that is the number of children born per woman, fell from about 5 in 950 to a little over 2.5 in 2005 (see Figure 5). This number is projected to fall to about 2 by 2050. This decrease is attributable largely to changes in fertility in the developing world. In 950, the total fertility rate among developed countries was already below 3 children per woman; the rate among developing countries was over 6. Fertility in the latter is now below 3 children per woman. The fertility decline in low-income countries can be ascribed to a number of factors, including declines in infant mortality rates, greater levels of education and increased labour market opportunities among women, and the provision of family planning services.

The developing world has seen significant reductions in infant and child mortality over the past 50 years . Infant mortality (death prior to age) in developing countries has dropped from 80 to about 57 deaths per 000 live births. It is projected to decline further to fewer than 30 deaths per 000 live births by 2050. The past half-century's gains resulted primarily from improved nutrition, public health interventions related to water and sanitation, and medical advances such as the use of vaccines and antibiotics. Infant mortality rates in the developed world have been, and will continue to be, significantly lower those than in the developing world. Developed countries have seen infant mortality decline from 59 to 7 deaths per 000 live births since 950, and this is projected to decline further still, to 4 by 2050. Child mortality (death prior to age 5) has also fallen, in both developed and developing countries.

This section documents some salient facts and trends in population ageing. Overall, major changes have occurred in the world's age and population structure over the last half-century, with the increase in population shares at advanced ages being a prominent feature.

As is evident, the pyramid shape representative in 1950 and 1980 is giving way to a more dome or beehive-like shape, as the population at younger ages shrinks over time. The youth bulge seen in the earlier snapshots, combined with declining fertility and increasing life expectancy, is causing the proportion of the elderly in the population to increase. The elderly population is poised to increase dramatically both in size and share of total population in the first half of the century and is projected to continue to increase, albeit at a slower speed, toward the end of the century.

As a whole, the world's population has grown quickly in the last half-century, more than doubling from around 2.5 billion in 1950 to more than 7 billion today. It is projected to reach more than 9 billion by 2050 and 11 billion by 2100. Population growth at younger ages (0–14) has flattened out over the last few decades. The size and share of the working-age population (15–59) have grown steadily since 1950, but its growth has been fueled mostly by developing countries. In more developed countries, the population share of 15–59-year-olds has been somewhat level and is in fact projected to decrease to around 50 percent by 2100.

In contrast, the 60+ and 80+ age groups are growing rapidly both in absolute numbers and as a share of the total population, and both figures are higher now than at any time in history. The number of people aged 60+ increased from 200 million in 1950 to around 760 million today. By 2020, this number is projected to rise to 1 billion, by 2050 to 2 billion, and by 2100 to 3 billion. The number of people aged 80+, or the "oldest old," grew markedly from 14 million in 1950 to around 108 million today and will be over 900 million by 2100 if current projections prevail. Because the oldest old tend to have higher rates of severe chronic health problems that are costly in terms of both dollar amounts and time, the rapid growth of this cohort has important implications for individuals, families, and governments. Older age cohorts, moreover, are beginning to account for a substantial proportion of the total population, as Figure 2 shows. Indeed, people aged 60+ are expected to constitute a greater population share in all countries between 2000 and 2050.

While the phenomenon of population ageing is taking place throughout the world, considerable heterogeneity exists across nations and among regions. Most developed countries already have large elderly cohorts, with 20 percent of the population aged 60+. This proportion will rise to

more than 30 percent in the next four decades. Among developed countries, Japan currently has the largest proportion of people (30 percent) aged 60+. This distinction is expected to hold in 2050, when the figure will reach 44 percent. In the developing world, only 10 percent of the population is currently aged 60+, but this will soon change. By 2050, this proportion is expected to more than double. While the ageing transition has occurred over at least a century in developed countries, developing countries are projected to reach nearly similar levels of population ageing by the middle of this century.

We now focus on the elderly population in the world's two population superpowers (China and India) and the largest population developing country populations in Latin America (Brazil), and Africa (Nigeria). .İn all four countries, population ageing will be a major demographic trend between now and 2100, but the extent will vary substantially. We pay particular attention to China and India because of their sheer size; their combined population accounts for 40 percent of the world's total population. Population ageing in these two countries has been rapid and will continue in the first half of the next century. By 2050, the 60+ age group is projected to constitute 20 percent of India's population and 36 percent of China's, totaling more than 750 million people. By 2100, these numbers will be 34 percent and 40 percent for India and China respectively. The pace of ageing will be especially rapid in China, where the absolute number of the population aged 60+ grew by 67 percent between 2000 and 2015 and is projected to more than triple to close to 400 million by the end of this century. The projected combined elderly population of these two countries will be close to 1 billion by 2100.

Brazil represents a swiftly developing South American country, where the large and rapid decline in fertility and increase in longevity of the past several decades will propel its elderly population to more than triple from less than 20 million in 2010 to close to 70 million in 2050. Nigeria provides a valuable counterpoint from the sub-Saharan African region, where the HIV/AIDS epidemic has played a large role in shaping the demographic structure. As a consequence,

Nigeria's elderly population has grown much more slowly over the last halfcentury. The share of the 60+ population essentially remained flat between 1950 and 2015 at roughly 5 percent, although it is projected to more than double by the end of the century. This contrast is especially stark when compared with other developing countries of a similar size.

Figure 4 depicts the old-age dependency ratio (OADR), which measures the ratio of persons aged 65+ per 100 working-age persons (15–64). This metric, which we express in percent terms, helps gauge the pressure on the productive population to support the elderly and is hence an important indicator for governments and policymakers. For all countries, the old-age dependency ratio is currently at 12.6 percent, meaning there is roughly one elderly person for every eight working-age persons. This ratio is projected to increase to close to 40 percent by the end of the century. In developed countries, the OADR is currently at approximately 25 percent and is expected to increase to 50 percent by 2100. There is approximately one elderly person for every 10 working- age persons in developing countries currently, but this ratio will increase to closer to 1 for 3 by 2100.

Changes in the sex composition of the population will accompany population ageing. Overall, more male than female babies are born, but male mortality rates are higher than female mortality rates at all stages of life. While biology can explain part of this difference, differential behavior and risk factors play larger roles (Rogers et al., 2010; Seifarth et al., 2012). The resulting predominance of women among the elderly has been a longstanding and widely recognized phenomenon. However, this predominance is now diminishing with health improvements at all ages and medical advances in treating cardiovascular disease (which is concentrated among men). Figure 5 depicts the UN's population estimates and the forecast of the male to female ratio for the 60+ population from 1950 to 2100. Among the elderly, females will continue to outnumber males, in both developed and developing countries, although the sex ratio of the elderly in developed regions has increased rapidly since the mid-1980s. In developing regions,

the sex ratio of the elderly has increased slightly since 1965 and is projected to remain roughly level or to increase slightly. Gender imbalance at older ages has policy implications in terms of living arrangements and the financial security of widows, especially in developing countries amid changing norms for the care of the elderly.

The data used in this chapter comprise mainly population data and projections from the United Nations (UN). In addition to the UN estimates, many governments also produce population estimates for their own countries. Several other agencies, including the U.S. Census Bureau and the World Bank, produce global estimates as well. These population projections are important tools for government policymakers and private planners to gauge future demand for various resources and to allocate funds. Demographic forecasts have heightened awareness of population ageing, and increasing concern over adequate funding of pensions and health care systems have led to landmark reforms in these arenas throughout the world. So a peripheral, but important, question is how accurate are population projections?

We focus on the UN population estimates as they are the most widely used. The first thing to note is that UN population projections are not static. They change every two years to reflect new data from censuses, demographic surveys, vital and population registers, and various other sources. In instances when a large amount of new census data become available, updated fertility and mortality data can lead to significant revisions in the estimates of future population size. Table 1 shows that the projections for the 60+ and 80+ populations in absolute numbers and in shares of total population have changed significantly, even in recent years. The greatest percent change occurred for the population aged 80+ by 2050 between the 1994 and 2010 forecasts. The UN estimate of the size of this age group has risen by 20 percent or more since 1994, for the world and across both developed and less developed regions, highlighting the magnitude to which estimates can change within a somewhat short period of time.

While the accuracy of current population projections cannot be assessed, the success of previous projections can be compared with historical or current population figures. Since the 1950s, the UN has provided 12 estimates for the global population in year 2000. Only one of these projections was off by more than 4 percent. Errors in projections have also decreased over time (National Research Council, 2000). However, projections for individual countries and specific age groups have had much more varied levels of success. In particular, producing accurate projections for developing countries and for the youngest and oldest age groups has been challenging for several reasons. First, data for developing countries are somewhat limited and unreliable, and errors in baseline estimates play a dominant role in projection accuracy, especially in shorter forecast horizons (National Research Council, 2000). Second, many developing countries are still undergoing demographic transition, which means fertility and mortality are both still high and changing rapidly, leading to more room for projection error (Lutz, Sanderson, and Scherbov, 2008). Relatedly, UN assumptions about future trends in fertility and mortality rely mainly on empirical regularities in past trends in countries that have already completed the demographic transition; whether these assumptions are appropriate for developing countries that are still undergoing demographic transitions is not clear .

Projections for intermediate age groups between 15 and 64 have in general been fairly precise, with error not exceeding 2 percent. Population projections for the very young and very old, however, have historically been too high and too low, respectively. Projections of total fertility have been too high, leading to upward bias in population projections for the very young. And as mortality improvements continue to be larger than forecasted for most of the world

(exceptions are sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union), the projected population of the 80+ has been consistently underestimated. While almost all demographers agree that the proportion of the 80+ population will increase significantly over the next century, the magnitude of the increase is uncertain as future trends in old-age mortality continue to be highly debated . Further,

because UN population estimates do not incorporate different mortality scenarios, the uncertainty of the elderly population is likely understated. Finally, net migration also tends to be poorly projected, affecting estimates of the size of the working-age population (as migrants tend to be young adults) and the old-age dependency ratio, but for most countries the flow of migration has been slow enough to avoid a major impact on population estimates.

The assumptions used in making population estimates have changed since 2010. For example, prior to the 2010 revision, the assumption was that the total fertility rate in countries adjusting from high to low fertility will eventually approach a fertility floor of 1.85, regardless of their current position in the transition. Similarly, for countries already below replacement fertility levels, the assumption was that fertility would recover at a uniform pace that would converge to the fertility floor of 1.85 children per woman. The new approach does not adopt a set fertility floor and assumes that the projected pace of the decline depends on the country's current level of fertility, country-specific historical trends, and past trends of other countries that have already undergone fertility transitions (United Nations, 2014). As demographers become more proficient in predicting broad fertility and mortality trends—the key determinants of future population size—population estimates will also become more accurate. Regardless, because population projections still rely primarily on past trends and the implicit assumption that the conditions currently influencing fertility, mortality, and migration will persist in the future, population projection data carry substantial uncertainty and should be interpreted with caution.

 While policymakers frequently use population projections, little is known about how uncertainties in these estimates are dealt with. A survey conducted by the European Commission among policy experts who use demographic data found that they tend to ignore the issue of uncertainty even though they were aware of it. In theory, policymakers have several methodological options, as discussed in Lee and Tuljapurkar (1998). The standard method is to use high-, medium-, and lowprobability scenarios, although demographers tend to eschew this approach because of its strong assumptions. Beyond methodological issues, how much, if at all, the alternatives affect policy decisions is unclear. Lack of agreement and knowledge on how to tackle uncertainty in practice seems to be a barrier (Ahn et al, 2005). Future research calls for more studies to understand the impact of past errors on policy adoption and to provide a framework for approaching and incorporating uncertainty in policy planning.

The age structure of the population changes as a natural consequence of the demographic transition, which we briefly overview in this section. The demographic transition comprises three stages. The starting point occurs in a Malthusian world where both mortality and fertility are high and population growth is near zero, as high death rates offset high birth rates. Then, in the first stage of the demographic transition—when mortality begins to decline while fertility remains high—mortality declines most at the youngest ages, causing the proportion of children in the population to increase. Mortality decline thus initially renders populations younger rather than older in a phase that can persist for decades. Second, fertility begins to decline, such that the population growth rate also declines (but remains positive). This second stage may last 40 or 50 years. As fertility declines, the working-age population grows faster than the population as a whole, reducing the total dependency ratio. In the third stage, mortality and fertility both reach low equilibrium levels, and the overall population stops growing and sometimes declines. In this third stage, increasing longevity leads to a rapid rise in the elderly population while low fertility slows the growth of the working-age population. After completion of all three stages of the transition, population growth returns to near zero as fertility and mortality stabilize at low levels. The entire transition typically takes more than a century to complete and results in a much larger population size. The demographic transition is projected to be complete in all countries by 2100 (Lee, 2003).

Although the stages of the demographic transition are the same, the experience of developed nations

is distinct from that of the developing world in its timing, determinants, and economic considerations. We therefore separate our following discussion by level of development.

We now briefly review the historic demographic transition of the developed world. In Western Europe, the first stage of the demographic transition—mortality decline—began around 1800. Population growth in Europe was slow and uneven for centuries, averaging 0.3 percent per year before 1700 (Lee, 2003). In perhaps the most widely studied case, mortality decline in England started around the middle of the eighteenth century. By 1820, life expectancy at birth in England reached 41 years, an increase of six years from the previous century, and remained stable for the next 50 years through the Industrial Revolution. Mortality continued to fall more rapidly after 1870, so that life expectancy had risen to 50 years by the early twentieth century and continued to climb until reaching around 80 years today (Cutler et al., 2006). With some variations in timing, other developed countries experienced similar transitions.

Although considerable debate remains, the fall in mortality has been attributed primarily to three broad reasons. First is the improvement in living standards as a byproduct of economic development as reflected in measures such as higher caloric intake and better access to health care and medicine (Fogel, 1997; Preston, 1975). The second explanation relates to the role of targeted social policy measures, such as the development of public health infrastructures such as water sanitation and vaccination programs (Preston, 1975; Cutler et al., 2006). Finally, education appears to have played an important role in the diffusion of knowledge on good health practices and the increasing acceptance of the germ theory of disease (Lleras-Muney, 2005).

Fogel (1997) argues that nearly all mortality reduction between the late eighteenth century and the late nineteenth century can be attributed to improved nutrition (via increased income). As agricultural yields improved during the eighteenth century, the caloric intake of the average individual and adult height increased significantly as

mortality declined. However, while income growth and caloric availability likely played an important role, the timing of economic growth and the onset of the modern mortality decline did not align consistently (Easterlin, 2004). Further, as Preston notes in his seminal 1975 article, life expectancy has been increasing over time even holding income fixed, and proposes instead that public health measures could explain more of the historical mortality decline. Similarly, Cutler et al. (2006) argue that the crosscountry differences in health stem from institutional ability to implement known technologies and adopt new ideas about personal health, rather than from variations in income.

Consistent with this hypothesis, Murtin (2013) finds that schooling, rather than income per capita, is the primary determinant of the mortality transition using aggregate panel data. Lleras-Muney (2005) exploits compulsory schooling law changes in the United States to account for schooling and finds that education is indeed linked to lower mortality. Of course, these theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive, making precise accounting difficult. But overall, most of the decline in mortality can be attributed to better health technology, higher wealth, and improved education, with varying degrees of importance depending on the time and context. We revisit this topic in Section 4.2, where we discuss in greater depth the specific reasons behind more recent increases in life expectancy.

Population growth is the next stage of the transition, as mortality falls and fertility remains high. The modern expansion of human population began around 1800, rising from around 1 billion to 2.5 billion by 1950.

Then fertility begins to fall following the decline in mortality and subsequent population growth. Most presently developed nations began their fertility transitions in the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, with a median fertility decline of about 40 percent from 1870 to 1930 (Coale and Treadway, 1986). The causes of fertility decline remain hotly debated, but neoclassical economics emphasizes the gradual evolution in the demand for children (Becker 1981; Galor and Weil, 2000). This explanation highlights the rising opportunity

cost of childbearing stemming from factors including increases in female labor force participation and wages, the returns to schooling, and demand for child quality. Other factors that affect the supply of children, such as availability of and advancement in contraceptive technology, also have been shown to have significant impacts on fertility, but are unlikely to be dominant forces.

In the final stage of the transition, mortality and fertility fall to long-run low levels and population growth returns to zero or even falls below zero. Most developed countries have now reached this final stage of their transition. Many Western European countries, such as Spain, Italy, and Germany, currently have birth rates below the population replacement rate of 2.1 births per woman. Some countries, including Russia and Japan, face significant population declines because birth rates and net migration rates have fallen below crude death rates.

Because the demographic transition occurred earlier in developed countries, the phenomenon of population ageing also began earlier there. The 60+ population share was already at 12 percent in 1950 (higher than the current share in less developed regions), has doubled to approximately 24 percent today, and is projected to continue to rise at a similar pace until the middle of this century, when population ageing is expected to slow.

Although separated by roughly a century, the demographic transition in developing countries mirrors that in developed nations, but at a much more rapid pace. The limited available pretransitional data from India and Taiwan indicate that total fertility rates were typically six or higher, and life expectancy was highly variable and averaged in the low 20s (Preston, 1975). While many developing countries did not begin the mortality transition until sometime in the twentieth century, life expectancy gains were quite rapid once their transitions commenced. In China and India, life expectancies have risen by nearly 30 years since 1950. In African countries overall— where economic progress has been slower— life expectancy rose by more than 13 years from the 1950s to 1980s, before stalling in the face of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

For most developing countries, the second stage of the demographic transition—fertility decline— typically began in the post–World War II period or later (Lee, 2003). Fertility transitions in East Asia were particularly early and rapid, while those in South Asia and Latin America have been slower (Casterline, 2001). Below replacement rates are observed not only in the developed world, but also in various emerging countries including Brazil, Taiwan, Korea, and China. We delve into the reasons for fertility and mortality declines in developing countries in the past few decades in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.

From 1950 to 1990, fertility and mortality rates declined roughly in tandem, although the birth rate was still around twice as large as the mortality rate, leading to a large population boom in developing countries. Whereas the population growth rate in Europe has not exceeded 1 percent and exceeded 1.5 percent only briefly in the United States in the modern era, population growth in developing countries reached historically unprecedented rates, attaining a peak of 2.5 percent in the 1960s. Population growth in developing countries has since slowed as fertility continues to decline.

As the youth bulge progresses through the age structure, combined with sustained low levels of fertility and rising longevity, many developing countries are now beginning to witness rapid population ageing. While today's proportions of older people typically are higher in more developed countries, the most rapid increases in older populations are occurring in the less developed world. Whereas the elderly population share took more than a century to double in developed countries such as France, countries such as China and Brazil are expected to achieve the same in around a quarter of the time (Kinsella and Gist, 1995). Between 2015 and 2050, the 60+ population in less developed countries is projected to increase by 177 percent as compared with an increase of 41 percent in more developed countries.

As described in the previous paragraph , the interplay of declining fertility and increasing longevity within the demographic transition is the root cause of population ageing. However, how these factors affect ageing and their implications are different. A fertility decline reduces the numbers of the very young, which translates into smaller cohort sizes of the young and working age population as time goes on and low birth rates continue. Holding longevity constant, lower fertility implies higher OADR and may impose higher resource costs on the population. However, an increase in life expectancy raises the average age of the population and the share of elderly population by increasing the numbers of surviving older people. If rising longevity due to reductions in old-age mortality is associated with improved health and productivity of the elderly, then the economic pressures of population ageing may be less severe.

Of these two forces, fertility decline has played a larger role in population ageing (Weil, 1997; United Nations, 2001). Weil (1997) shows that at least two-thirds of the increase in the U.S. elderly population is due to fertility decline. Bloom et al. (2010b) show that the fertility decline had a much larger impact on the age structure in 1960–2005 using a sample of Asian countries, even in China where life expectancy increased by 31 years (approximately 70 percent) in the same period.

Migration also plays a role in determining the age structure of open economies. Immigrants tend to be young and of working age, so to the extent that population ageing is viewed as a problem to be solved, changes in immigration policy have been touted as a possible solution to ameliorate its effects.

Fertility decline has been the most important demographic driver of population ageing (United Nations, 2001). Figure 6 depicts the total fertility rate (TFR), defined as the average number of children that a woman would bear over her lifetime, in the world, in more developed regions, and in less developed regions from 1950 to 2010 and projected until 2100. Globally, TFR has fallen from five children per women in 1950 to roughly

2.5 today and is forecasted to fall even further in the next few decades. From 2005 to 2010, 50 countries (out of 202) had TFRs of 4.0 or higher. The fertility rate is projected to fall to roughly 2.2 by 2045–2050 even among currently developing countries, and only one country (Niger) is expected to have a TFR higher than 4.0. Current projections show fertility rates across more developed and less developed regions further converging, with TFR at 1.88 and 2 for developed and developing regions by the end of this century, respectively. Figure 1 shows the impact of falling fertility, demonstrating the shrinking base of the population pyramid as the shares of 0 to 14-year-olds worldwide declines and the correspondingly widening top of the pyramid as the population of elderly people grow in both absolute numbers and percent of total population.

Political Economy

Political economy – a discipline that has grown massively in terms of its popularity and importance in recent years – applies the language and techniques of economic theory to political phenomena.

In political economy, as in many other fields of research, the interests of scholars and laymen often differ. Yet there are also problems that both of these parties deem important. These are typically related to major politico-economic events, such as major policy statements, unexpected changes in developmental trends or emergence of new institutions. Thus, few would doubt either the scholarly or lay importance of President Roosevelt's announcement on 8 December 1941 which amounted to the United States joining the Second World War against Germany and Japan. Similarly, the economic policy announcements of Alan Greenspan and Jean-Claude Trichet concerning the monetary policy of Federal Reserve and European Central Bank, respectively, are of obvious interest for both researchers and citizens as are, albeit for different reasons, the decisions of the main actors (primarily the chief executive officer and the chief financial officer) in the course of events that led to one of the largest corporate downfalls in history, the bankruptcy of Enron Corporation in December of 2001.

Also the European Council decision made in Laeken, Belgium in midDecember of 2001 to commence the framing of a constitution for the European Union by setting up a convention was a decision of both academic and practical importance. In 2004 the convention published its proposal for the constitutional treaty of Europe. It outlines the basic rights of the citizens of the European Union, the legal competency of the Union, its basic institutions and their working principles, the financing of the Union and many other more specific regulations. The ratification process began in the member countries in 2005. Some countries decided to subject the treaty proposal to a referendum. In early summer of 2005, the proposal was rejected in two referenda: one in France and one in the Netherlands.

With regard to the decisions and events just described it is natural to ask why they were made or why they took place. Answers to these questions are normally called explanations of the respective decisions or events. Thus, when a historian points to the air force attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the ensuing policy planning discussions in the United States government which, a day later, culminated in the declaration of war against Japan, what she aims to provide is an explanation of the event. Similarly, the accounts reporting the debates in boardrooms of Federal Reserve and European Central Bank are intended as explanations for the decisions announced by the respective chairmen. In a similar vein, the explanation of what caused the nosedive of Enron's stock market value in 2001 is sought in the decisions made by its leadership.

At first sight, the explanations of the same events and decisions may vary from one audience to another. What is a good explanation for a normal 5-year-old child may not convince an adult with university degree and vice versa. There seems to be an inherently subjective element involved in explanations. This is a proper subject for psychology or sociology of science. What philosophy of science, especially its analytic tradition, has attempted to do is to provide objective general criteria for valid explanations. Of particular importance is Carl Hempel's program which aims at setting up general requirements to be fulfilled by any account, presented in any field of inquiry, in order to be considered scientific explanation.

Carl Hempel was one of the leading representatives of the analytic tradition in the philosophy of science. A student of the great names of the famous Vienna Circle – Carnap, Schlick and Waisman – he received his doctorate in Berlin. In 1930s he emigrated first to Belgium and later to the US where he taught at Yale, Princeton and Berkeley. His main works are related to concept formation, confirmation theory and the nature of scientific explanation (Murzi 2001).

The basic idea in Hempel's view is that explanations are arguments. Arguments, in turn, are statement sequences arranged so that some statements – called conclusions or, in the present contexts, explananda (in singular,Explanandum) – can be derived from others – called premises or explanantia (in singular, explanans). Of particular importance is deductive derivation. In his earliest models of explanation Hempel insisted that explananda be derivable from explanantia as in a deductive argument (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948). Deductive arguments are characterized by the property that once their premises are true, their conclusions must also be true. Thus, in a valid explanation the thing to be explained must be linked to statements that are (i) true, and (ii) must logically entail what is to be explained. The essential feature is that, given the information contained in the premises, the event to be explained was to be expected (Hempel 1965: 367–368). In later accounts, Hempel retreats somewhat from the strict deducibility requirement, but not from the desideratum that, given explanantia, the explananda are to be expected.2

In scientific explanation as seen by Hempel, the statements that explain a fact or phenomenon contain universal laws, i.e. statements that maintain some necessary connection between certain types of facts or phenomena. Paramount examples of these statements are laws of nature which connect, for example, volume, pressure and temperature of gases. To explain phenomena amounts to showing that they are in fact instances of a general law that covers these types of phenomena. For this reason Hempel's view is often called the covering law account of explanation.

When applying Hempel's idea to human sciences, the first problem we encounter is that, at least intuitively, much – indeed, most – of our behavior is not subject to law-like regularities. This is, of course, not to say that there are no laws of behavior, but, at least, our present day knowledge does not include them to the extent that one could argue that many – let alone most – social science explanations were based on them.3 Yet, explanations abound in the social sciences, but rather than law-like universal statements they typically invoke more restricted invariances or tendencies which may include exceptions. So, the increase in investment is often explained by the decrease in the interest rates, even though some investors may – for various reasons – decrease their investments. Similarly, a person's higher than average income may be explained by her university degree, although not all persons with degrees make higher than average earnings.

Now, Hempel would undoubtedly argue that the two examples are not genuine explanations, but at best explanation sketches insofar as they do not contain proper laws among their premises. There is no law stating that whenever interest rates are decreased, there will be an increase in investment, or that whoever acquires a university degree will necessarily earn more than she would have done without it. Rather than natural laws we are dealing here with regularities that allow for exceptions, often a large number of them. Nevertheless, many explanations in political economy are precisely of this type. They conform to two basic Hempelian requirements, namely that the explanatory premises are held to be true and that, given the facts stated in those premises, the explanandum was to be expected. But they are not deductive arguments showing that, given the What are we aiming at?

Premises, it was necessary that the explanandum took place. Thereby, the ordinary explanations in political economy do not satisfy the symmetry of explanation and prediction, a hallmark of Hempel's basic explanation model.

Making the event to be explained highly likely is, however, not always enough, in the absence of natural laws. A well-known example is the account that purports to explain a person's recovery from the common cold in a period of a week by stating that she consumed daily amounts of vitamin C, and that there is a regularity which states that anyone taking vitamin C regularly will overcome the common cold within a week.The problem with this account is that even if the premises of the purported explanation were true, they are essentially irrelevant given the fact that most people recover from a cold within a week regardless of their vitamin consumption. So, even

true premises that make the explanandum highly likely may not amount to an acceptable explanation. The regularities included in the explanatory premises have to be relevant to the occurrence of the event explained.

But what do we mean by relevance in the context of explanation? The basic reason for rejecting the just-mentioned explanation is that it points to a mechanism that has nothing to do with the event to be explained. Consuming vitamin C has no effect on recovery from a cold within a week of its inception. The irrelevance is due to the independence of the fact to be explained and the proposed factors: the recovery would ensue even without the vitamin consumption. This independence, in turn, rests on what we currently hold as true mechanisms of human physiology.

In a similar vein, when explaining the fact that the United States declared a war against Japan, we look for acts, factors and phenomena that are true, make the declaration likely and are relevant for the occurrence of the explanandum. Since the latter is a symbolic event, the search for explanatory premises calls for an analysis of perceptions, anticipations, goals and choice opportunities of relevant actors rather than finding a relevant set of natural laws from which an objective state of affairs can be deduced. For within the framework of our knowledge the relevant mechanism resulting in the fact to be explained consists of these types of considerations. The accounts of the war declaration and other examples presented in the beginning of this section differ from the Hempelian one in allowing for mechanisms that are not law-like in the sense of natural laws.

To explain something is, thus, to demonstrate that this something was to be expected, given knowledge of the premises. So, at first sight the only thing that distinguishes explanation from prediction is that in the former the phenomenon we are interested in has already occurred, while in the latter it has not. But we can predict things without really understanding how they come about. For example, on the basis of everyday observations without any knowledge of the celestial mechanics we may predict that night is followed by day. Yet, it would be difficult to call

this an explanation of any particular break of dawn since it gives us no answer to the question of why the sun rises. The description of our solar system provides such an answer, showing once again that in a genuinely scientific explanation predictive accuracy needs to be accompanied with relevant regularities

In the analytic tradition of philosophy of science, explanations are related to theories through laws. Laws play a crucial role in explanations and they are the building blocks of scientific theories. More precisely, theories are hierarchically organized systems of laws. Each law is positioned on a certain level of abstraction which means that it is on the very highest level or derivable from more abstract laws. In either case it allows for less abstract laws and other statements to be derived from itself. To give an example, we might have a general theory of human behavior. From this we should be able to derive the theory of political behavior and economic behavior as specifications of the general theory in restricted environments.

This example is very close to the notion of theory one encounters in political economy. Its highest level consists of the principles of rational choice behavior. From these one then proceeds towards empirical observations via various environmental specifications. Thus, we have the theory of choice under certainty, risk and uncertainty. Postulating a strategic multi-actor environment leads to the theory of games. Various further specifications yield the theory of mechanism design, bargaining and electoral institutions. Most of these will be dealt with in the following chapters. Before going into the details of these and other theories, let us relate them to the basic concept apparatus of philosophy of science.

It is obvious that the theory of choice behavior differs in several important respects from the concept of theory encountered in advanced natural sciences, e.g. in elementary particle physics, mechanics or organic chemistry. Firstly, instead of natural laws determining the behavior of the objects of study, the theory of choice consists of principles of behavior which the objects (human individuals) may choose not to obey. The awareness of the objects of study of the principles

that determine their behavior is a consideration that is absent in natural sciences. Thus, the principles are necessarily of a contingent nature. Secondly, the theory of choice is clearly incomplete in the technical sense of the term. Completeness of a theory means that all statements known to be true of the domain of reality that the theory speaks of are derivable from it. An extensive body of evidence suggests that this is not the case in the theory of choice. In many contexts the choice behavior derivable from the theory blatantly contradicts empirical observations. Thus at best the theory is applicable in restricted rather than universal domains.

As Giere points out, if anything is the goal of scientific activity, scientific theory is. It not only contains a set of established laws, but can also be used in pushing the frontier of knowledge further. Theories together with empirical specifications suggest new hypotheses for empirical work. For example, from decision theory one can derive a number of predictions, i.e. statements describing choice behavior in specified contexts. Confronting these predictions with empirical findings on the choice behavior of real world actors, one is able to evaluate the theory itself. In fact, the hypotheticodeductive method consists of systematically confronting the predictions of a theory with empirical material.

Theories have thus a double role in scholarly work: they present the achieved results (laws) in condensed form and, with the aid of empirical observations, allow for the evaluation of our knowledge. As a caveat, one should add that this view of theories does not cover all usages of the term. Very often 'theory' means no more than a concept apparatus used in describing reality. For example, the diagrammatic description of political systems devised by David Easton does not contain laws organized in hierarchical fashion, but merely a framework for categorizing observations (Figure 2.1). Yet, this framework is often called a systems theory. This is quite legitimate, but confuses two important aspects of scientific work, namely the evaluation of statements or statement systems on the one hand, and using concepts in describing reality on the other. To keep these two aspects separate it would be advisable to employ another

concept for constructs that are mainly descriptive rather than explanatory or predictive tools. An obvious candidate for such a concept is that of a model which, in fact, is used by Easton in outlining Figure 2.1.

Within the toolkit of PE, there are basically two different approaches which are currently used to analyze the relationship between politics and the economy: positive PE (explained in this section) and normative PE (see next section). Using a positive approach, researchers conduct empirical analyses in the form that they describe and explain the relationship between the political and economic sphere (i.e., what is) – but they usually do not make value judgments in the form of normative statements as to what public and private sector actors should do or not do: for instance, positive politico-economic analyses usually do not contain policy recommendations regarding the "right" way for the government to intervene in certain sectors or markets in the economy (i.e., what ought to be). In other words, scholars doing positive PE research first of all describe as precisely as possible the extent to which the state or other political actors intervene in the economic system of a society (or different societies, if a comparative perspective is taken) in a certain investigation period.

Political interventions in different sectors of the economy or particular markets may take various forms, such as government subsidies, taxation, state-owned enterprises, or regulations, and may be done for various reasons, such as eliminating market failures/allocative inefficiencies, redistributing resources from the rich to the poor, or stimulating economic growth and employment (see below). As it is often the case that firms, business associations, trade unions, and other actors within the economic system try to influence the process of economic policymaking via lobbying and other forms of leverage, in many contexts we can observe a mutual interference of the political and the economic sphere. This may also include a possible correlation between (a) the economic situation in a society and (b) the popularity and election results of government, opposition parties, or individual politicians (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013).

Moreover, it has to be taken into account that external factors such as global issues (poverty, climate change, war refugees, etc.), international organizations (e.g., World Trade Organization, European Union, International Monetary Fund, World Bank), developments in international markets, or the activities of foreign governments (e.g., tariff policy, international tax competition, sovereign debt, sovereign defaults) may influence a (sub)national PE understood as the interaction of the political and economic system in a real-world society. The fact that nation states are these days embedded, in various respects, in an international system is analyzed in the literature on "international PE" and "global PE" (see, e.g., Ravenhill 2016). In this context it should also be mentioned that there is a strand of PE research which focuses explicitly on the differences between the national economic systems of the countries in the world including different "Varieties of Capitalism" as well as the remaining more or less socialist "command economies" or "centrally planned economies" such as Cuba and North Korea .

However, many politico-economic analyses within positive PE do not content themselves with describing the relationship between politics and the economy but, moreover, try to explain the observations made in the descriptive phase of research. Which factors can explain why the state intervenes in a particular way in a society's economy? Which explanatory factors may have driven the transformation of the "interventionist state" over time? Why do some countries show a better macroeconomic performance (economic growth, employment, price stability, etc.) than other countries? In this spirit, for example, numerous politico-economic studies have empirically analyzed whether factors such as government ideology, powerful interest groups, fiscal pressure, socioeconomic problems (e.g., deindustrialization, unemployment, economic slump), path dependence, or globalization help explain the observable differences across the member states of the European Union (EU) or the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) with respect to the use of policy instruments such as public

entrepreneurship, regulation, taxation, or subsidization in the decades after World War II.

Similar studies exist for the less-developed world and/or for country groups including countries with "not-so-democratic" political systems. There is, for example, a politico-economic literature that describes and explains different aspects within the relationship between politics and the economy in autocratic regimes. Moreover, there are many studies entitled "The Political Economy of XY" which means that the particular study analyzes the interplay between political and economic factors in the specific context under investigation, for example, the political economy of migration, foreign aid, higher education, terrorism, and so on.

PE research may be done not only in the form of empirical or "positive" analyses (as defined above) but also in the form of a normative analysis. This means that a specific area in the economic system is analyzed in order to come to conclusions as to what "the state" should (not) do in the area under investigation. Should the government intervene in a particular sector of the economy or a particular market by means of regulations or other policy tools? Should public bureaucrats be allowed to control certain activities of private sector firms and households? Should regulatory agencies be mandated to supervise competition in particular sectors and markets? Such questions are addressed in the fundamental and ongoing PE debate over the proper role of the state in the economy (see Boettke and Leeson 2015, for a survey). Contributions to this debate are based, more or less explicitly, on the following major schools of thought.

Political economists in the tradition of Adam Smith (1723–1790), whose seminal book on "the Wealth of Nations" (Smith 1776/1981) is the "bible" for those advocating "economic liberalism" and "market liberalism," basically argue that the state should leave the economy alone. It is assumed that there is some kind of natural tendency to equilibria in markets. That is, if there is an excess demand or excess supply, then such disequilibrium will only persist for a short period of time. According to the economic laws of demand and supply, markets will

find a "marketclearing price" at which demand equals supply. In other words, direct governmental interventions into markets are perceived to be unnecessary (or even harmful) as specific markets and the economy as a whole possess "self-healing powers" in the form of the "market forces": that is, the interplay of demand and supply coordinated via the price mechanism.

However, it should be mentioned that Smith (1776/1981) and other advocates of economic/market liberalism such as Friedrich August von Hayek (1899–1992) and Milton Friedman (1912–2006) acknowledge that society may not be left to markets alone – but that the state has to perform at least some tasks to make markets and society work. For example, political economists in the tradition of Smith (1776/1981), Hayek (1960), and Friedman (1962) consider it to be a government task to ensure that there is a functioning legal system (rule of law, laws, courts, judges, etc.) that can be used, among other things, for enforcing (i) property rights and (ii) the contracts signed by market participants. By contrast, libertarian political economists, who consider the possibility of a stateless society, go a step further: they argue that private governance mechanisms (reputation, nongovernmental courts, etc.) are sufficient to enforce property rights and contractual agreements (see, e.g., Friedman 2014; Leeson 2014; Stringham 2015).

Furthermore, there are two specific variants of economic liberalism which were developed some decades ago but are still influential in the current politico-economic discourse: ordoliberalism and constitutional political economy. Ordoliberals in the tradition of the German economist Walter Eucken (1891–1950) criticize that Smith (1776/1981) and other advocates of classical economic liberalism and its laissez-faire approach have neglected that a market economy does not automatically increase the wealth of a nation. For example, individual markets or whole sectors of the economy may suffer from anticompetitive practices by private and/or public companies (market-entry barriers, cartelization, price collusion, competition-distorting state aid, government monopoly, and so on). Consequently, for ordoliberals it is essential that the state creates

and enforces a legal order and institutions (e.g., a politically independent competition authority) that try to prevent private and governmental restraints of competition and market forces as far as possible.

In a similar vein, constitutional political economists in the tradition of James M. Buchanan (1919–2013) emphasize that markets, competition, and the economy as a whole need "rules of the game" – a "constitution" – which channel the individual self-interests of consumers, firms, and other actors (for more details, see Buchanan 1987; Vanberg 2005). Moreover, constitutional PE points out that creating and enforcing such "rules of the game" is far from trivial. Reading Eucken (1952/2004) one gets the impression that he takes it for granted that there is a benevolent government which realizes that the rules recommended by ordoliberals are beneficial for society and implements these rules. In contrast, constitutional PE assumes that not only firms and consumers but also politicians and public bureaucrats are selfinterested actors. Under these conditions, not only powerful firms and interest groups but also politicians and public bureaucrats may impede the implementation of rules which could be beneficial for citizen-consumers and society as a whole (e.g., the abolition of government monopolies, the abolition of special privileges for state-owned enterprises, better regulations for public utilities, and so on). However, what ordoliberalism and constitutional PE have in common is that both prefer a rule-based economic policy over discretionary government interventions in the economy and market processes.

For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that constitutional PE is part of the broader research program entitled "economic theories of politics" or "public choice theory" established by Downs (1957) and others (see Mueller 2003, for a survey). Public choice theory breaks with the welfare-economic assumption of benevolent governments working in the public interest. Instead, it is assumed that politicians and public bureaucrats (i) are primarily interested in maximizing their individual utility and (ii) "act solely in order to attain the income, prestige, and power which come from being in office" (Downs

1957, p. 28). In other words, it is theoretically assumed that political decision-makers are selfinterested not only when they make private choices (as consumers, investors, landlords, and so on) but also when they make public choices in government, parliamentary committees, and other political contexts. As "older" schools of PE (e.g., classical economic liberalism in the tradition of Smith) did not pay much attention to the motivations of public sector actors and implicitly assumed that the government is primarily interested in maximizing the wealth of a nation, in the politico-economic literature, public choice theory is often denoted as the "New Political Economy" (Frey 1999).

The next step in this area has been taken by scholars working in the field of "behavioral political economy." Therein, it is taken into account that real-world actors often do not behave as rationally and with the self-interest that economists' traditional homo-economicus model predicts; this may lead to other policy implications regarding the "optimal" design of the incentive structures under which certain types of consumers, investors, policymakers, and other individuals make their more or less informed and more or less selfish decisions.

If the economy slips into recession, then hard-core economic liberals may argue that such an economic crisis may have painful consequences for firms and individuals (a drop in orders, bankruptcy, unemployment, poverty, and so on) but does not require government intervention – because thanks to its "self-healing powers" the economy will recover on its own after some time. By contrast, political economists in the tradition of John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946), whose seminal book "The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money" (Keynes 1936) belongs to the most influential critiques of the laissez-faire approach of economic liberalism, consider it to be a government responsibility to stimulate the economy in times of economic slump (i.e., increasing government spending, reducing taxes, and so on). If the government lacks the necessary financial resources to implement an economic stimulus package, then Keynesians recommend (a) government borrowing (so-called deficit spending)

and (b) repaying the debts after the crisis when government tax revenues increase due to economic growth and rising employment.

Critics of deficit-spending object that step (b) is often not conducted by government, which is one reason for the high levels of public debt observable in many countries these days. Keynesians usually respond to such criticism by arguing that costly state interventions to "stimulate," "stabilize," and "steer" the economy are necessary and legitimate as long as there is unemployment in a society (Krugman 2013). Complementary to fiscal stimulus packages, Keynesians propose measures of monetary policy to stimulate the economy (e.g., lower interest rates). If there is a politically independent central bank, then monetary policy is not a tool of government (i.e., politicians have no access to the tools of monetary policy).

While Keynesianism offers a macroeconomic justification for state intervention in the economy, the so-called market failure theory (for a survey, see Stiglitz and Rosengard 2015) has demonstrated that the laissez-faire approach of economic liberalism ignores the fact that different types of market failures offer a potential justification for government action. For example, the behavior of certain firms and consumers (e.g., environmental pollution by coal-fired power plants) may create negative externalities for other society members. The government may implement measures (law, regulations, etc.) that force polluters to reduce or even stop producing negative externalities. Moreover, it can be expected that many society members will not pay for certain goods and services if they can consume these goods and services free of charge. However, if free riding is possible, then private actors have a low or no incentive to supply such goods and services. To secure the provision of public goods in the sense that no one in society can be excluded from consuming such goods, the government may step in: for example, the public good argument offers an economic argument to justify the national defense being provided by the government and financed by taxes (i.e., society members, as potential free riders, are forced to pay for national defense).

Informational asymmetries constitute another type of potential market failure. If suppliers are better informed about certain characteristics of products and services (e.g., the quality of used cars) than potential buyers, then the markets for these products and services may not function well: because it can be expected that many consumers under these circumstances would hesitate to enter a market transaction as they would fear being exploited by the better-informed sellers (e.g., low-quality, highprice products). It is also possible that buyers are the better-informed market party. Imagine, for example, insurance companies that do not know the true health status of people seeking to buy a health insurance. In situations with informational asymmetries, the government may implement measures (governmental provision of quality information, disclosure laws, governmental regulation of product quality, etc.) to mitigate these informational problems and facilitate market transactions. Moreover, the marketfailure framework considers natural monopolies to be a potential justification for government action. Such monopolies occur if for efficiency reasons in certain sectors or markets of the economy only one firm is doing business (e.g., the provider of a rail network, a power supply line or a water line). To avoid allowing this provider to exploit its monopoly power (high prices, bad quality, and so on), the government may regulate this natural monopoly (price regulation, quality regulation, etc.). And, as mentioned above in the context of ordoliberalism, the government may also intervene in some way to tackle the problem that markets and competition do not work properly due to "ordinary" monopolies and other anticompetitive practices.

It should be emphasized that the existence of a market failure does not automatically imply that the government has to solve the problem. For instance, there may be private third parties (e.g., private certification agencies) and market-based mechanisms (e.g., reputation, brand-name capital) that help market participants to overcome their informational problems, so that buyers and sellers are able to enter into mutually beneficial market transactions. In other words, in the politicoeconomic literature, it is not only discussed (a) whether a certain market or sector of the economy really suffers from "market failures" and "allocative inefficiencies" but also (b) which governmental or private governance mechanisms (or a mixture of both) seem to be the most suitable to solve the problem at hand (Ostrom 2010). Moreover, political economists stress that all of these mechanisms are imperfect solutions that work more or less well depending on the specific real-world context in which they are used (Wolf 1993). And it may be the case that government action to solve a market-failure problem may create new problems (for an overview of the politicoeconomic debate on "government failure".

A normative yardstick that is often used by economic liberals to assess whether state activity is necessary to mitigate a certain type of market failure is the so-called subsidiarity principle. According to this principle, government action is only necessary if private market solutions and private governance mechanisms fail. A brief and oft-cited summary of this principle can be found in the book "Principles of Economic Policy" by Eucken (1952/2004, p. 348): "The structure of society should follow a bottom-up approach. What the individuals or the groups can autonomously accomplish should be done on their own initiative and to the best of their abilities. And the state should only intervene in those cases in which its assistance is indispensable" (own translation, K.M.). By contrast, political economists that have a less individualistic and more state-centered view of economy and society may start from the paternalistic, state-interventionist assumption that the state is automatically responsible for solving market-failure problems (for a survey of the politico-economic literature on paternalistic government, see Le Grand and New 2015). In democratic societies, the ultimate decision-maker in this context is the government in power – and this decision-maker is certainly free to ignore the normative (and often conflicting) policy recommendations made by political economists and other experts.

Economic liberalism and its belief in markets and competition have always been the target of criticism. Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) have argued that it is a basic feature of capitalist market economies that the

"working class" (the so-called proletariat) is exploited by business firms and their owners (the "capitalists". The state is seen as an agent of the so-called bourgeoisie (including the capitalists) which constitutes the ruling class in society. Marx and Engels predicted that capitalism will be overthrown through a "proletarian revolution" that leads to socialism and, eventually, to communism (including a classless society). It is beyond the scope of this paper to critically review everything that has been written by Marx, Engels, and their followers under the label "Marxian Political Economy" about imagined and real existing types of capitalism, socialism, and communism. Nor do we discuss the many problems of "command economies" or "centrally planned economies." However, Marx and his followers have repeatedly pointed out a serious problem which many capitalist market economies still have to cope with: it may be the case that an economy consists of a system of well-functioning, efficient markets, but this system produces social problems.

For example, in many countries we observe income and wealth inequality among society members. While hard-core economic liberals may argue that such inequalities have to be accepted and simply reflect individual differences in performance and success on markets, other political economists argue that the state in the name of "social justice" has to tackle distributional problems via redistribution (see Piketty 2014, for an overview of this debate). And even economic liberals that are skeptical of state interventions, such as Hayek (1960) and Friedman (1962), take it for granted that those society members who, for whatever reason (e.g., disease, disability), are not able to earn money in the labor market should receive publicly financed welfare benefit payments ensuring a minimum income needed to exist. Whatever political economists from different schools may think about social problems and their solution – in the end, however, in democratic societies the scope and structure of the welfare state are determined in the political process.

Last but not the least, we have to address the question of what law and economics (LE) as a research program has to do with PE as a

multidisciplinary endeavor. First of all, we can observe that terms, concepts, and tools from the toolkit of PE (market failure, externalities, public goods, efficiency, utility, welfare, constitutional PE, behavioral PE, and so on) are used by LE scholars and in LE textbooks as well. In this context, it should also be mentioned that economists belonging to the LE movement have made important contributions to the research field of PE as sketched above. See, for example, the studies on externalities and public goods by Ronald H. Coase or the contributions by George J. Stigler, Richard A. Posner, and Samuel Peltzman to the economic theory of regulation. In other words, many of the concepts presented above under the label PE, which is mainly used by political scientists, economists, and "political economists," are presented in LE publications under the label LE, which is mainly used by legal scholars, economists, and supporters of the LE movement. And while some may classify Coase, Stigler, Posner, and Peltzman as economists or LE scholars, others may classify them as political economists.

Likewise, Persson and Tabellini and similar studies investigating the interplay of legal institutions and the economy are oft-cited in the PE as well as in the LE literature. In any case, it should be clear now that political economists and LE scholars who are interested in analyzing different aspects of the interplay between the political and economic sphere of society share a common terminology. This offers opportunities for research cooperation and interdisciplinary research – but does not mean that the disciplines participating in the "joint ventures" labeled PE and LE would have lost their idiosyncrasies and specific strengths. For example, as noted above, in the politico-economic works of Hayek, Friedman, Eucken, and Buchanan it is argued that "the state" should provide a legal framework which ensures that markets and competition work well; however, these thinkers do not say much about the fundamental issue of how exactly the specific legal framework for a specific market or economic sector in a particular real-world society should be designed and enforced (contract law, competition law, capital market law, energy law, environmental law, and so on). That is, legal experts are necessary to bridge the gap between normative politicoeconomic theories of

the proper role of the state and practical public policy.

Moreover, it can be observed that in the positive, empirical branch of PE and LE, there seems to be a methodological convergence in the sense that scholars doing empirical research in this area basically use the same toolkit, consisting of various quantitative and qualitative methods. As we have seen above, however, such consensus cannot be observed in the normative branch of PE. Looking through the theoretical – some would say "ideological" – lenses of different schools of PE in many cases brings us to different conclusions regarding the question of what the state should do (or not do) in the particular area of the economy under investigation.

International Trade and International Politics

International trade is referred to as the exchange or trade of goods and services between different nations. This kind of trade contributes and increases the world economy. The most commonly traded commodities are television sets, clothes, machinery, capital goods, food, and raw material, etc.,

International trade has increased exceptionally that includes services such as foreign transportation, travel and tourism, banking, warehousing, communication, advertising, and distribution and advertising. Other equally important developments are the increase in foreign investments and production of foreign goods and services in an international country. This foreign investments and production will help

companies to come closer to their international customers and therefore serve them with goods and services at a very low rate.

All the activities mentioned are a part of international business. It can be concluded by saying that international trade and production are two aspects of international business, growing day by day across the globe.

Foreign trade is exchange of capital, goods, and services across international borders or territories. In most countries, it represents a significant share of gross domestic product (GDP). While international trade has been present throughout much of history, its economic, social, and political importance has been on the rise in recent centuries.

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NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE WEEK
MAY 20-26, 2012

U. S. Foreign Trade in 2011 by Region in Billions of Dollars

2011 Total Trade in Merchandise EXPORTS: 1,480

The main reason why we study trade, especially international trade, in this chapter is that it has a political as well as an economic nature. As a result,

international trade, which is an activity between states, has a wide political content related to it. To understand this, it is necessary to understand how

international trade works in stages.These stages are:

1. International trade takes place on the basis of mutual consent of states or international organizations.
2. The implementation of international trade relies heavily on contracts.
3. Issues such as international trade, exchange of goods, circulation of goods, etc. take place within the borders defined by the states.

Therefore, before talking about international trade, we considered it appropriate to talk about political economy.International political economy studies international trade at the theoretical and practical levels There are two basic approaches to international trade in international political economy.The first of these is the mercantilist approach.This approach essentially contains the provisions of the theory of realism The basis of this approach is the idea that states should direct their international trade activities against other states to ensure their own interests.At this time, my international trading countries have the duty to serve their foreign policy interests.As can be seen from here, the mercantilist approach, which is a power-centered approach, also puts forward the idea that economic activities are related to military activities.So, according to mercantilists, if economic relations between two states are not established, the possibility of military conflict between those states is relatively high.

Of course, as in every field of social sciences, the debate between realism and liberalism manifests itself in approaches to international trade.So, if the mercantilist approach, which is the first approach, contained provisions of realism, it is possible to see more provisions of liberalism in the two views on international trade. According to the liberalist doctrine of international trade, economic relations between states prevent wars between them.According to this concept, states that have economic relations with each other never exchange the benefits of trade for the disasters of war.In this approach to international trade, unlike the mercantilist approach, it is possible to see international organizations as active participants in international trade.

Theory of Comparative Advantage of International Trade: by David Ricardo

The classical theory of international trade is popularly known as the Theory of Comparative Costs or Advantage. It was formulated by David Ricardo in 1815.The classical approach, in terms of comparative cost advantage, as presented by Ricardo, basically seeks to explain how and why countries gain by trading.The idea of comparative costs advantage is drawn in view of deficiencies observed by Ricardo in Adam Smith's principles of absolute cost advantage in explaining territorial specialisation as a basis for international trade.Being dissatisfied with the application of classical labour theory of value in the case of foreign trade,Ricardo developed a theory of comparative cost advantage to explain the basis of international trade as under:

Ricardo's Theorem:

Ricardo stated a theorem that, other things being equal, a country tends to specialise in and export those commodities in the production of which it has maximum comparative cost advantage or minimum comparative disadvantage. Similarly, the country's imports will be of goods having relatively less comparative cost advantage or greater disadvantage.

The Ricardian Model:

To explain his theory of comparative cost advantage, Ricardo constructed a twocountry, twocommodity, but one-factor model with the following assumptions:

1. Labour is the only productive factor.
2. Costs of production are measured in terms of the labour units involved.
3. Labour is perfectly mobile within a country but immobile internationally.
4. Labour is homogeneous.
5. There is unrestricted or free trade
6. There are constant returns to scale.

7. There is full employment equilibrium.

8. There is perfect competition.

Under these assumptions, let us assume that there are two countries A and B and two goods X and Y to be produced. Now, to illustrate and elucidate comparative cost difference, let us take some hypothetical data and examine them as follows.

ADVANTAGES OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE:

The following are the major gains claimed to be emerging from international trade:

1. Optimum Allocation: International specialization and geographical division of labour leads to the optimum allocation of world's resources, making it possible to make the most efficient use of them.

2. Gains of Specialization: Each trading country gains when the total output increases as a result of division of labour and specialization. These gains are in the form of more aggregate production, larger number of varieties and greater diversity of qualities of goods that become available for consumption in each country as a result of international trade.

3. Enhanced Wealth: Increase in the exchangeable value of possessions, means of enjoyment and wealth of each trading country.

4. Larger Output: Enlargement of world's aggregate output.

5. Welfare Contour: Increase in the world's prosperity and economic welfare of each trading nation.

6. Cultural Values: Cultural exchange and ties among different countries develop when they enter into mutual trading.

7. Better International Politics: International trade relations help in harmonizing international political relations.

8. Dealing with Scarcity: A country can easily solve its problem of scarcity of raw materials or food through imports.

9. Advantageous Competition: Competition from foreign goods in the domestic market tends to induce home producers to become more efficient to improve and maintain the quality of their products.

10. Larger size of Market: Because of foreign trade, when a country's size of market expands, domestic producers can operate on a larger scale of production which results in further economies of scale and thus can promote development. Synchronized application of investment to many industries simultaneously become possible. This helps industrialization of the country along with balanced growth.

DISADVANTAGES OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE:

When a country places undue reliance on foreign trade, there is a likelihood of the following disadvantages:

1. Exhaustion of Resources: When a country has larger and continuous exports, her essential raw materials and minerals may get exhausted, unless new resources are tapped or developed (e.g., the near-exhausting oil resources of the oil-producing countries).

2. Blow to Infant Industry: Foreign competition may adversely affect new and developing infant industries at home.

3. Dumping: Dumping tactics resorted to by advanced countries may harm the development of poor countries.

4. Diversification of Savings: A high propensity to import may cause reduction in the domestic savings of a country. This may adversely affect her rate of capital formation and the process of growth.

5. Declining Domestic Employment: Under foreign trade, when a country tends to specialize in a few products, job opportunities available to people are curtailed.

6. Over Interdependence: Foreign trade discourages self-sufficiency and self-reliance in an economy. When countries tend to be interdependent, their economic independence is jeopardized. For instance, for these reasons, there is no free trade in the world. Each country puts some restrictions on its foreign trade under its commercial and political policies.

Major central banks within world economy today

1. US Federal Reserve Bank (USD)
2. European Central Bank (EUR)
3. Bank of England (GBP)
4. Bank of Japan (JPY)
5. Swiss National Bank (CHF)
6. Bank of Canada (CAD)
7. Reserve bank of Australia (AUD)
8. Reserve bank of New Zealand (NZD)

DOLLAR MARKETING (AN OVERVIEW)

Prior to US dollar, Pound sterling was the currency preferred for international trade. US became the largest economy and in 1948 world's advanced economies met in Bretton Woods conference and decided to peg all foreign currencies to the USD. Earlier the major currencies were backed by GOLD. (That means anybody surrendering their currency will get equal value of gold) . At the time of Bretton woods conference, US had the maximum gold and at that time USD was backed by gold. So it became easy for all countries whose currencies were not backed by gold to peg their currencies to USD which is backed by gold.

In 1970, USD also backed out of redeeming its currency for the value of gold. By that time, USD has become virtually in an unassailable position.

Main features of the US dollar

1. The US dollar is generally negatively correlated with gold: Historically, the US dollar price and gold prices have had almost perfectly negative correlations.

This means that when the price of gold goes up, the value of the dollar goes down and vice versa, which is mainly due to the fact that gold is measured or valued in dollars.

2. Several emerging markets have established an exchange rate parity between their currency and the US dollar: This measure was adopted with the idea that the governments of these countries accept that the dollar becomes their reserve currency by offering to buy or sell any amount of their local currency at the established exchange rate.

3. Markets tend to pay close attention to interest rate spreads between US Treasuries and foreign bonds: It is a good indicator of potential fluctuations in currency prices. The US market is one of the largest in the world and investors are very sensitive to changes in US asset returns.

4. The Dollar Index: Professional forex traders closely follow the behavior of the Dollar

Index (USDX) as an indicator of the overall strength or weakness of this currency.

5. Foreign exchange transactions in the United States are influenced by the stock and bond markets: There is a strong correlation between a country's currency and its equity

And fixed-income markets, which is clearly the case in the United States.

Eurodollars are Time deposits denominated in U.S dollar at banks outside the united states, and thus are not under the jurisdiction of the Federal reserve. Consequently, such deposits are subject to much less regulation than similar deposits within the U.S.. The term was originally coined for U.S. dollars in European banks, but it expanded over the years to its present definition—a U.S. dollardenominated deposit in Tokyo or Beijing would be likewise deemed a Eurodollar deposit. There is no connection with the euro currency or the euro zone.

By December 1985 the Euro currency market was estimated by Morgan Guaranty bank to have a net size of 1,668B, of which 75% are likely Euro dollar. However, since the markets are not responsible to any government agency its growth is hard to estimate. The Eurodollar market is by a wide margin the largest source of global finance. In 1997, nearly 90% of all international loans were made this way.

Futures contracts

The Eurodollar futures contract refers to the financial Future contract is based upon these deposits, traded at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange(CME). More specifically, Euro Dollar futures contracts are derivatives on the interest rate paid on those deposits. Eurodollars are cash settled futures contract whose price moves in response to the interest rate offered on US Dollar denominated deposits held in European banks. Eurodollar futures are a way for companies and banks to lock in an interest rate today, for money it intends to borrow or lend in the future. Each CME Eurodollar futures contract has a notional or "face value" of $1,000,000, though the leverage used in futures allows one contract to be traded with a margin of about one thousand dollars.

CME Eurodollar futures prices are determined by the market's forecast of the 3-month USD LIBOR interest rate expected to prevail on the settlement date.. A price of 95.00 implies an interest rate of 100.00 – 95.00, or 5%. The settlement price of a contract is defined to be 100.00 minus the official British Bankers Association fixing of 3-month LIBOR on the day the contract is settled.

A single Eurodollar future is similar to a forward rate agreement to borrow or lend US$1,000,000 for three months starting on the contract settlement date. Buying the contract is equivalent to lending money, and selling the contract short is equivalent to borrowing money.

OTHER FEATURES OF DOLLAR MARKET:

40 quarterly expirations and 4 serial expirations are listed in the Eurodollar contract. This means that on 1 January 2011, the exchange will list 40 quarterly expirations (March, June, September, December for 2011 through 2020), the exchange will also list another four serial (monthly) expirations (January, February, April, May 2011). This extends tradeable contracts over ten years, which provides an excellent picture of the shape of the yield curve. The frontmonth contracts are among the most liquid futures contracts in the world, with liquidity decreasing for the further out contracts. Total open interest for all contracts is typically over 10 million.

International Conflicts

International conflict is a saying that "when there is an individual, peace prevails and where there are two individuals, conflicts arise and when there is more than that, alliances begin." This wisdom refers to the historical law that governs our lives in general whether the national societies or political units at the international level that has the form of human or political unity from the family, the tribe, the nation to the organization and the state which is governed by the law of conflict, a historical basis that does not need to be proven stressfully. As many scholars of international relations see that conflict is a

Natural phenomenon of extremely complex dimensions and very intertwined where the human experience conflict has begun since the emergence of the first human, and these relations are known at different levels: individual or collective, and also in various dimensions: psychological or cultural, political, economic, social, historical, etc .. Also, its forms vary and the results have different ranges that intensity starts of a fine conflict at the family level to the extent of wars and armed conflict.

Conflict is a competitive phenomenon that involves two or more conflicting goals. At the same time, the main element in the definition of conflict is that it involves at least two or more parties with opposing objectives, that means that each party wants to get what the other wants or retains it, and therefore if the demands of one party are met, the demands of the other party will not be realized because the conflict is focused on the same thing. Israel wants to keep it's the occupation of the West Bank while the Palestinians want to extract it from the Israeli occupation.

The phenomenon of international conflict differs from other phenomena of international relations as a very complex dynamic phenomenon, due to its multiple dimensions, the interplay of its causes and sources, the interplay of its direct and indirect effects, and the varying levels that occur in it in terms of scope, intensity and violence. In addition to the radical difference in the nature of the international conflict management strategies

pursued by the parties in these ongoing conflict-related processes, whether with regard to objectives, methods and means, where we are able to recognize the fact that it continues to prevent the development of a general

Theory of international conflict and its causes, as well as ways to confront and encounter it within a framework of comprehensive and logical integration. However, this should not diminish the enormous academic efforts that have been made in order to create the scientific basis for such an integrated theory, which has been crystallized in two basic dimensions:

1. The main theoretical approaches and concepts used in interpreting the international conflict in terms of determining their causes, motivations and the driving forces behind them.
2. The most important theories of confrontation   and containment of this phenomenon in its faculties, in terms of how the international community can deal with it in the context of general international measures aimed at the basic and stable empowerment of international peace.

The theory of conflict in sociology is a term that refers to theories that say most of the community entities are witnessing a state of permanent conflict of those who were mentioned in order to maximize their benefits. This conflict situation contributes mainly to the state of mobility and social development to the maximum extent with the revolutions and the accompanying Political developments.

The theory of conflict within the framework of international relations refers to a set of intellectual theses that may contribute to the interpretation of the external behavior of States. The Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the most prominent types of international conflict.

In fact, the most precise term is the theories of conflict, not the theory of conflict, each characterized by conflict interpretation from one dimension, in the sense that each of them tends to preferentially or specifically on the other dimensions of the phenomenon of conflict. In addition to interpretation, the term theory or theories of conflict includes certain theories (means and strategies) to deal or manage with the international conflict.

The concept of conflict is one of the most prominent concepts on the surface of the hot debate after the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the historic opponent of liberal democracy, and the fever of evangelization at the end of history, according to Francis Fukuyama's theory, following the "resurgence" of the strategic clash of civilizations theory, The Future wars by Samuel Huntington who believes that the clash between "civilizations" is inevitable. There is a saying that: (when there is an individual peace prevails and when there are two individuals conflicts arises and when there are more than two parties , alliances begin). This wisdom refers to the historical law that governs our lives in general, whether it is national societies or at the international level, the laws of conflict governing the universe. Whatever in the form of human unity, family, tribe, nation, it is governed by the law of conflict that is a historical basis... it does not need to be proven stressfully.

Many West thinkers believe that conflict is a natural phenomenon in human life and in the life of all institutions. From the family to the level of humanity through the tribe, the state and the nation, the law of conflict is what governs all institutions. However, the forms of conflict are not the same in these institutions and the results are different, it begins intensity in a form of a fine conflict at the level of the family and continues at the level of humanity until it may reach the level of wars and clashes.

While the liberal school believes that the cause of the conflict is the existence of non-democratic governments and therefore democracy in the eyes of the liberal school means a peaceful and natural solution to the problems of the internal state and thus the disappearance of international conflict.

Most scholars of international relations believe that international conflict is inherent in the nature of state organization, that is, the conflict is the result of the organization of the capitalist state. This organization creates contradictions between the capitalist class and the working class. It also creates economic crises such as overproduction crises. Marxism believes that the main way to mitigate this conflict is to find external markets, leading to international competition among capitalist states, resulting in international wars such as the First World War. Many scholars have agreed that the term "conflict" refers to positions that involve a specific and explicit contradiction in the objectives, values and interests of the conflicting parties, as Joseph Frankel defined it as a position that results from a difference in national interests and objectives. Lewis Kosser defined it as a competition for power, resources and values. A party to compete to liquidate incarnates or harms the other party.

The difference between the conflict and some similar concepts:

There are some concepts that are similar in form of conflict and which are brought about by the historical development of the conflict. They are as follows:

Tension: It is a situation that accompanies the conflict and is not characterized by violence and may lead to the breakdown of relations between the parties.

Crisis: An advanced stage of conflict and a tense confrontation between parties to a conflict that may result in war.

War: The last stage of the international conflict, an armed conflict between two or more parties with a high level of violence.

Means of managing the international conflict:

-Diplomatic means: the process of negotiation and representation between states, that is, each party through its own means to convince his opponent is trying to gain public opinion in his favor.

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Media: is a modern means of communication and media to win public opinion.

Military means: This method is taken after the failure of the previous means (diplomacy) in the management of the conflict, so that the conflict becomes a war and armed conflict.

Political means: This means negotiation, mediation, good offices, investigation and conciliation, legal means, courts of law, and arbitration.

The concept of conflict: its nature and dimensions:

The literature of the conflict reflects a clear richness in its definitions of the concept of conflict. There are also a number of foci of interest and points of emphasis that specialists attach to the importance of the concept of study and analysis. As part of the review of some of the linguistic definitions provided by the knowledge and linguistic dictionaries of the conflict concept, the US Department of Knowledge defines the conflict as usually referring to "a state of discomfort or psychological stress resulting from incompatibility or incompatibility between two or more desires or needs of an individual or Needs ".

As for the Department of Social Sciences, its concern is to highlight the complex nature of the concept of conflict and to define the different meanings and meanings of the concept in its various dimensions. From a psychological perspective, the concept of conflict refers to "a situation in which the individual has a motive to engage or engage in two or more activities of a totally opposite nature." Here, Murray emphasizes the importance of the concept of conflict in understanding issues related to the individual's ability to adapt and to mental disorders as well.

In its political dimension, the conflict refers to a particular competitive position, whose parties or parties are aware of the incompatibility of possible future positions, both of which are either obliged to adopt or take a position incompatible with the potential interests of the second party or parties other. While Lewis Kozer is interested in focusing on the conflict in his social dimension, Laura Nader tends to clarify the anthropological dimension of

the armistice process. Thus, the struggle in its social dimension is "a struggle around values, demands, specific situations, power, or limited or rare resources." The aim here is "not only to win the desired values, but also to neutralize, damage, remove competitors or eliminate them. " We can say that the international conflict is only an international position that is contrary to the interests of the international community, where each party or actor seeks to achieve reconciliation and direction, leading to disagreement between them.

The conflict in such situations, as Kozar puts it, can occur between individuals, between groups, between individuals and groups, between groups and each other, within the group or the groups themselves. The explanation of this is attributed to the fact that conflict itself is one of the basic features of social life. As for the anthropological dimension of conflict, conflict arises or occurs as a result of competition between at least two parties. This party may be an individual, a family, an offspring, a particular human, or a whole society. In addition, the party to the conflict may be a social class, an ideology, a political organization, a tribe, or a religion. Here the conflict is linked to incompatible desires or goals, which are characterized by a degree of continuity and permanence, which distinguish them from conflicts resulting from excess, anger, or that arise as a result of temporary or instantaneous causes. In this direction, the Longman Dictionary goes to define the concept of conflict as "a state of disagreement or disagreement between opposing, conflicting, conflicting, conflicting groups, principles, or ideas." The World Book Dictionary defines the conflict as "a battle or a fight, a struggle or a struggle, especially if the conflict is long or protracted."

In general, the concept of conflict in specialized political literature is seen as "a dynamic phenomenon. The concept, on the one hand, suggests a "certain competitive position, in which each of the participants is aware of the incompatibility of possible future positions, and each of them is also obliged to take a position that is incompatible with the perceived interests of the other party."

Hence, there has been a tendency to focus on the competitive dimension of conflict definition as "one of the forms of competitive behavior between individuals or groups" and that "it usually occurs when two or more individuals or parties compete around incompatible targets, Perceived or limited resources.) In another definition, the concept of conflict is simple and direct, where conflict is described as "a process of apparent or potential competition between its parties." Here the importance of distinguishing between conflict and some types of competition – For example, "In competition, individuals cooperate or compete for fun and a good time." In conflict, "causing or causing physical or moral harm to others is a specific goal of the conflict itself."

The variable "the will" at the parties to the conflict represents a central basis in the definition of conflict in another direction of the book of political literature. Therefore, the concept of conflict is seen as essentially a "conflict of wills" resulting from a difference in the motives, perceptions, goals, aspirations, resources and potentials of their parties, leading them to make decisions or adopt policies that are different from one another. However, "conflict remains below the point of armed conflict".

In addition, there is a third opinion that prefers to focus on the structure of the conflict situation and the interests encountered therein. In this direction, both Lopez and Stoll argue that the concept of conflict represents or reflects "a situation in which two or more objectives, values or interests are incompatible to the extent that one party's decision on this situation is very bad", hence the concept of conflict as "As a result of incompatibility in structures and interests, leading to alternative responses to major political problems." The authors conclude that "conflict in this way is a common feature of all domestic and international political systems."

The conflict in the Kozar concept is crystallized in light of the values and objectives that represent the frame of reference for the parties to the conflict situation. Therefore, Kozar believes that the conflict is determined in the "struggle of values and the demand for rare and distinctive positions,

power and resources, where the objectives of the parties are to neutralize, hurt or eliminate adversaries."

In addition, there are other views that seek to draw attention to the psychological dimensions of the acceptance and rejection relations between the parties to the conflict situation. Hence, these visions tend to define conflict as "that mutual animosity between individuals, groups, peoples or nations among themselves at various levels".

In the light of the previously mentioned definitions of definitions presented by the literature of the conflict in relation to the definition and its various dimensions, the following three dimensions can be emphasized as key dimension in defining the concept of conflict:

1 – The first dimension : It relates to the conflict situation itself: It indicates that the concept of conflict expresses a position with its specific features or conditions: it is a beginning that assumes the contradiction of interests or values between two parties or more, the second is shared awareness of the parties to the situation and awareness of this contradiction. The availability or willingness of a party (or parties) to adopt a position that is not necessarily consistent with the wishes of the other party, or (the other parties), and may even clash with the rest of these positions.

2-The second dimension concerns the situation of the conflict parties. In general, the conflict situation in terms of its parties can be distinguished between three levels: the first level concerns individual conflicts: that is, the parties of the conflict are individuals, and thus the circle and subject of this conflict tend to be limited in nature. In the second level is the conflict between groups: The variety of types of this conflict diversity of parties, and the circle and its fields are usually more extensive and diverse than the counterpart in the circle of individual conflict. The third level concerns the conflict between states, usually also known as the international conflict, and the conflict circle (or circles) is more complex and broader than the previous two levels of conflict.

3-The third dimension : The international conflict: It should be noted that the widening of the circle of the third level of conflicts, through the successive historical stages of international relations, would guide and aggregate a considerable amount of scientific and academic efforts to study and rooting the phenomenon of conflict, Scientific interpretations and theories that facilitate understanding of the causes and determinants, and then provide different alternatives through which to control the phenomenon of armament, or at least to reduce the risks associated with them and the consequent, and identify methods of dealing with them. In this field, these scientific efforts have resulted in rich and original heritage of theories and interpretations, among which may be theories of rational knowledge, theory of power, theories of power, theories of decision making, communication, systems, and many other theories explaining the conflict in its various dimensions: psychological , Biological, cultural, social, economic, political, and recently environmental and civilization .. Etc.

2. Nature of conflict:

The attempt to answer the question "Should the conflict be destructive or destructive in its nature?" The most important of which are the possible existence of positive dimensions or functions of conflict, and the associated relevance of the concept of conflict to other closely related concepts such as conflict, crisis, violence, etc.

In general, it should be pointed out that the conflict is remote and can be distinguished between a negative dimension and a positive one. While it is easy to recognize the negative side of a conflict through its general and stable association with the "attempts to destroy, exploit, or impose a solution on one side or others", the positive dimension of the conflict generally refers to that aspect of " Push towards work or establish contacts, solve problems, and positive exchange between the parties concerned. " From this point of view, it is important to regard conflict as, as Murray states, "including motives for achievement, association, follow-up, and other positive

motives." In other words, the conflict is "a creative element in human relations: it represents a means of change through which Social values related to well-being, justice and opportunities for self-development and development
".

In this direction, it is possible to emphasize some of the basic premises that contribute to support the trend towards maximizing the positive dimensions of the conflict. The most important of these principles can be explained as follows:

The destructive nature is not a necessary aspect of conflict, nor is it an inherent feature of unmanageable human nature. Individuals – and still are – are discovering the possibility of finding different ways of dealing with their differences, disputes among themselves, and managing the conflict in ways that generally lead to better results.

Conflict exists as a feature of life and human relations. In daily interactions, each party seeks to maximize its benefit. In order to achieve it, the benefit of the other party must be reduced. Hence the necessity for the parties to reach a mutually satisfactory exchange that achieves certain rules and limits, in order to achieve harmony and stability rather than confrontation and conflict.

It is also related to the above that the parties or parties to the conflict in a conflict position, and by choosing channels of communication between them, usually choose between one of two main forms: either the establishment of a pattern of a relationship between them, in which one of the acts to the benefit of one of the parties or actors at the expense of the other , Or choose to establish a pattern for a reciprocal relationship of means and ends. Hence, the movement between them benefits both sides significantly.

In light of the above, it can be emphasized that the conflict has some important functions which allow, in its entirety, and throughout its life cycle, its levels and its multiple types, the possibility of transforming it from a destructive conflict into a positive conflict. Its role and function are effective and closely linked to social change issues. One of the most important areas of these functions is the

role of conflict as facilitator of social change, integration and integration, restoring balance and stability, and increasing the efficiency of coordination among its parties. This is in addition to the traditional function of conflict, which in most cases revolves around supporting and confirming the control of limited or desirable resources by one party to the conflict.

The concept of conflict and other concepts:

Attention to maximizing the positive aspects or functions of conflict requires that researchers and specialists pay increased attention to negotiation, mediation and problem-solving as alternative means of conflict resolution. While the success of such means undoubtedly leads to the development of opportunities for cooperation and coordination between the parties to the armistice relationship, on the other hand, it highlights the need to distinguish between the concept of conflict and the other concepts associated with it or overlapping with it so that a correct understanding of the situation Conflict, and thus choose the appropriate tools and mechanisms to deal with it on the other.

1. Difference, disagreement, and problem:

There are some other concepts such as differences, disagreement, and problem. Although they are related to the concept of conflict and are distinct in terms of diversity and diffusion, they are generally characterized by their modest content of conflict compared to the concept of conflict.

Differences indicate a human nature among people where they are different by birth. Hence, differences are seen as a matter of ordinary life, if not seen as things that are characterized by a special flavor and taste of life that provides some vitality and effectiveness that would not have been achieved if individuals everything between them. Hence, the difference in itself is not a cause of conflict, but as a source. With regard to disagreement, its occurrence is related to the expression of preferences and priorities of individuals over those of others. It should be noted here that the lack of agreement cannot

limited for any kind of harm, damage or any specific outcome. Finally, the problem occurs when the disagreement or disagreement causes at least some of the results to one of the parties. Although the problem can be avoided, they are usually annoying, expensive, or both in that one. In general, individuals often face many problems in their daily lives, and the existence of problems is itself a potential source of escalation6 and therefore crises or decisions that may result in the development of one or another conflict.

2. The Dispute:

The conflict in the linguistic resource community is defined as "giving reasons or facts to support or oppose something", or "discussion," arguing, or arguing about something or about it. "The conflict also revolves around, on, or with something, especially when the conflict is angry and prolonged, and the conflict is also known as "controversy or quarrel – especially of an official nature – between a group or an organization and between another group or organization." In specialized literature, the conflict is defined as " A conflict of legal rights may be settled by reaching legal and political solutions. "It also assumes that two or more parties recognize the existence of differences and problems on the one hand and that at least one of these parties shows willingness and willingness to resolve the problem. This is why it is vital to search for a framework for analyzing and solving the problem in question. In this case, the concept of conflict here refers to the method or method used by specialists of Social sciences when talking about legal, quasi-legal and institutional procedures relating to settlement or resolution of conflict on the one hand, and the perspective of conflict in this sense distracts attention from structures and from formal norms to conflict operations, manifestations and actions.

A comparison of the concept of conflict with the concept of conflict makes it clear that the concept of the former refers to a less intense and less comprehensive degree of difference than the latter, and that it can be encountered and controlled by a conflict of values or interests so that the parties to the conflict feel that their

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objectives are incompatible. Both parties to the conflict are not only involved in one way or another in the conflict situation, but they are also interested in investing this conflict position through escalation, with the aim of winning and winning, or at least not losing and that it may be encountered, controlled and prevented from spreading.

3. The Crisis:

The concept of crisis, as James Robinson put it, has a particular problem of being "a general concept that seeks definition, and a specialized scientific meaning." Some treat it as synonymous with pressure, collapse, disaster, violence or latency. In the framework of the school's medical practices, the use of the concept of crisis by its members is a sign of "a turning point between the lucky and unlucky transformation of the organism", between life and death. The peculiarity of the crisis becomes more difficult given the fact that the concept is frequently used by many specialists in psychology, sociology, politics, history, and other fields of social sciences, which leads to the lack of usefulness of the concept in building a knowledge system on the crisis as a social phenomenon. In this light, Robinson sees a general tendency to use the concept to demonstrate "a turning point that characterizes the outcome of an event, desirable or undesirable, between life and death, violence or non-violence, solution or the continuous conflict that is prolonged.

Therefore, in order to arrive at more accurate and specific indications of the crisis, the general trend is to distinguish between fundamental and procedural aspects in defining the crisis. The crisis is also distinguished as a decision-making position. While the core definition of the crisis is based on determining the content of the policy, problem, or situation, the procedural definition emphasizes the essential core features of the situation without regard to whether a particular case includes, for example, an internal, political or even individual crisis. The definition of the crisis as a decision position requires identifying three basic elements: the origin of the event for the decision-maker, whether internal or external, the time available for

decision-making or response, and here the distinction is made between three levels: short, medium, long, of the values at risk for participants in terms of being high or low.

In light of this, some standard applications can be referred to in the definition of the crisis. There are those who tend to define it as "an act or a human reaction aimed at stopping, disrupting activity or destabilizing a situation, with the aim of bringing about a change in this activity or situation in favor of its master." The crisis is also defined as a "sudden shift from normal behavior" in the sense that a series of interactions is lost resulting in a sudden situation involving a direct threat to the core values or interests of a party to the conflict (individuals, groups, states) and in circumstances of uncertainty, it is necessary to take decisions in a short time so as not to explode the crisis in the form of clash or confrontation (especially the military confrontation in case the parties to the crisis are countries). The crisis is usually confronted by managing it or manipulating its constituent elements and its parties with the aim of maximizing their benefit in the interest of national security.

Socially, the crisis is defined as the cessation of regular, predictable and disruptive events, which necessitates rapid change to restore balance and to create new and more appropriate habits.

In general, the general nature of the concept of crisis is determined in five key features, which are summarized as follows:

1. The administrative origins of the crisis: This means that the crisis is rooted in an administrative perception where a problem arises in one of the conflict areas on the decision – making, but the routine means available to make a decision on this problem is insufficient, and thus increase the pressure for change.
2. The Elite Dimension: It is related to the elite in the sense that any change in the environment may lead to the emergence of a political problem, depending on the group affected by the change, the closer those groups closer to the channels of

central communication, and more organized, The probability of the problem becoming a political crisis has increased, due to the emergence of the crisis within the elite rather than outside it.

3. Institutional Framework: It indicates that the likelihood that any problem will develop into a crisis depends on the organizational flexibility of the existing institutions. This means that the regime should adopt innovative administrative behavior by the elite, leading to a change in the institutional pattern of the society; otherwise it would be necessary to replace the elite.

4. The positional situation: In the sense that successive crises do not involve a continuous upward movement in the direction of increasing the capacity of the political system, not all crises are resolved by innovative innovation decisions, some may lead to the collapse of one institution or another of the institutions of the political system,

5. The Renewable Mechanism: It points out that successive crises and their interferences are likely to leave a general impression that they are a renewed mechanism that implies continuity and communication. This mechanism produces the possibilities awaiting any crisis.

Theoretical Approaches of the phenomenon of international conflict.

There are a number of approaches and theoretical premises that try to explain the phenomenon of international conflict in international relations in relation to the following:

1. Psychological Approach: This approach occupies a prominent position in various studies dealing with analysis and treatment of the phenomenon of international conflict. Psychologists focus their interpretation on the motivations of conflict and international conflict within

the scope of what they call the human tendency to destroy, domination, and the drive for revenge, expansion, risk, and conflict provide the best opportunity to satisfy such impulses.

We also find the theory of failure or frustration which claims that the motivation for international conflict is the result of the psychological frustration that reaches the peak of its impact in crisis conditions, especially when the national plans of the state fail, where the basic needs of the people are less psychologically prepared for conflict and war by those who control their peoples dissatisfaction, as we find the theory of the national character that is based on the belief in the existence of the aggressive nature of some of the national nature of the public and constitutes such an aggressive national psychology in its perception as the main force driving conflicts and international wars.

2. Ideological Approach: The pioneers of this trend consider the ideological contradictions between the great powers are behind international conflicts and the advocates of this approach in particular focuses on Marxism and is at the core of the conflict platform and considers this ideological conflict is more dangerous in content far beyond the time of any image or other images of international conflict that history has known in the past.

3. The national Interests Approach: This approach assumes that the main driving force of the policies of foreign countries is the continuous pursuit of the protection and development of national interests through the multiplication of states of their resources of power or as defined by Hans Morgenthau "The motive that drives man is the struggle for power for Staying and meeting the challenge and self-affirmation. So the interest is only synonymous with power.

4. Arms Race Approach: According to this approach , superiority in armaments leads to the tendency to show strength even in international disputes whose conditions dictate the means of diplomatic

settlement, which leads to the shipment of conflicts with more tension and violence and the framework of secrecy associated with the context of armaments creates an atmosphere of Uncertainty, fear and uncertainty among the various parties of the conflict, which does not help them resolve political disputes, but may be the cause of pushing towards conflict.

5. An Approach related to the nature of the international political system: This approach stems from the assumption that the international political system based on the principle of national sovereignty which is the main source of all forms of chaos and international conflicts and also believes that the conflict does not stem from human nature, conflict with the legitimate interests of various States and peoples and whose elimination can only be achieved through the establishment of a strong world Government that has its authority over the national sovereignty of States.

6. Geopolitical Approach: Most of the theories of this approach converge on a central axis of the pressures generated by natural conditions on the process of conflict for survival and growth, and can be referred to the theory of Ratzl, who believes that the border often lead to the establishment of international wars for a natural reason which is the boundary, if viewed as final and permanent, is thus an obstacle to the growth of the state. We also find Kellen's theory, which focused on the nature of the state as a living being and believed that the most important attribute of the state is power and considered it the most important in the existence of the state of law because the law cannot be implemented only by force.

7. The political Approach: This approach considers that the existence of competing international blocs and alliances comes at the top of the factors that lead to war or accelerate the occurrence of coalitions

are the cornerstone of the for the implementation of power politics and any change in the composition or the general international structure, which interact within the framework must result in imbalances that vary due to conditions but remain the main source of all causes of tension and conflict.

8. The nature of the political system Approach: The advocates view of this approach is based on the premise that the existence of a relationship of dictatorship and conflict, which supporters of this logic that the systems of totalitarian government by virtue of its ideology and the motives and goals that drive is the main reason for the intensification of conflict in the international community.

9. The approach that focuses on the imbalances resulting from the increasing entry of newly independent States into the international community.

This approach is related to the increase in the number of modern countries in the international system leads them to a bloc in which they can face other international forces such as this bloc by threatening their target forces to lose their former influence within the international system and hence find themselves motivated to implement many of measures and countermeasures to thwart the potential effects of such a bloc and is in itself a factor of tension and conflict.

10. Demographic theories: including the theory of the French sociologist Paul Rib Ault, who believes that modern warfare is of a biological nature in the first place and decides that the violence of these wars is directly proportional to the human surplus, which is the main forces pressing in the direction of the war and the theory of demographic cycles that every country is going through three stages of the development of the population is the stage of slow growth and then the stage of explosion and then the stage of stability and balance and if the population growth rates remain high and in the last two stages the population pressure of

these countries to wage wars to obtain a vital enough.

11. The Military Industrial Dimension Theory: This theory states that the major forces driving conflicts and international tensions are the various interest groups benefiting from the circumstances of the conflict, which constitute a significant pressure force on the most dangerous decision-making centers within the political system. Heads of this compressive force are industrial forces and militaries.

Causes and roots of conflict:

Approaches or theories that explain the phenomenon of conflict generally are characterized by diversity and richness. Some of them are interested in interpreting the conflict as a general phenomenon, including one that tends to limit its attention to the circle of international conflict in particular. Here, it can be said that whatever the theoretical interest in the interpretation of the phenomenon of conflict, the conflict as a phenomenon is very complex to overlap the variables associated with and intertwined on the one hand, the variety of types and circles, then levels of analysis and study on the other. Hence, the objective interpretation of the phenomenon of conflict should be based on the full utilization of the possibilities provided by those approaches and theories combined, taking into account the specific characteristics of each case.

In this regard, it should be noted here that specialized literature in interpreting the emergence and development of conflict in general offers enormous potential for discrimination in the approaches of theorizing between multiple approaches, for example: psychological or psychological input, ideological input, The arms race approach , the approach of the political system, the geopolitical approach, the sociological approach, the environmental approach and within the general reference to the totality of these theories, whether they relate to the conflict in general or the international conflict in particular, attention will be directed in particular to the so-

Circle of conflict "as an analytical tool through which a set of theories – at integrated levels – is used to interpret conflict behavior and to identify its roots and causes.

First: The theories explaining the conflict in the public and international dimension

The Psychological approach:

The psychological approach to the interpretation of the phenomenon of conflict depends on a number of general psychological or psychological trends that are interested in providing psychological interpretation of the phenomenon of conflict at the individual and international levels.

Psychological interpretations of the conflict at the individual level:

In general, conflict – according to this approach – may occur at the declared or overt level of behavior when one has a motive to approach, or to move away from forbidden things at the same time. It is also on a verbal level when one wishes to speak frankly but is afraid to offend others. Also at the symbolic level, ideas may collide and produce some kind of intellectual imbalance. Thus, the conflict from a psychological perspective is a function of the antagonist between the required responses – verbal, symbolic, emotional or otherwise – to satisfy a particular motive with those required to satisfy another motive.

In general, the inputs of the psychological approach are represented in presenting a good number of variables or psychological factors that are used as a basis or as psychological factors for the occurrence of the conflict in its individual level. These psychological causes can be referred to as follows:

The desire for self-fulfillment, the need for appreciation and the search for status, the desire to subjugate and control, the motivation to sacrifice, the sense of the performance of a message .At the level of ordinary people, as part of their general attempts to explain the causes of the conflict, they often tend to attribute the conflict to human nature. This trend is usually reflected by a famous comment commentator, which is often

frequented by people, or this is their way. Then one withdraws the meaning to restore his calculations in a new way to defeat a rival or opponent in a next round. Although such a comment may contain relative validity, the persistence of such trends in controlling the human interpretation of the phenomenon of conflict, and thus limiting it to the human nature, is likely to diminish the opportunity of the person interested in achieving a fundamental change in respect conflicts that he could not win, or in other words, which he conquered, and then. It's potential to understand the conflict, its ability to analyze its dimensions, and to take appropriate decisions to confront it which will remain deficient.

B – Psychological interpretations of the conflict at the international level:

In general, psychological explanations of the conflict phenomenon at the international level are based on a set of psychological factors. The most important of which can be identified in the following four directions:

The first trend: connects the aggressive tendency with the human nature. Among the most prominent advocates of this approach are the famous psychologist Sigmund Freud, and the known professor of international relations Kenneth Waltz.

In this regard, Freud goes on to say that "the motivations of the process of conflict and struggle are due to the instinct of love of domination and control, as well as the motive for revenge, expansion and risk." On the basis of this, Freud saw that conflicts and wars represent an ideal opportunity to satisfy such motives and tendencies inherent in the depths of human nature itself.

On the other hand, the conflicts and wars in his conception are caused by "feelings of selfishness and human stupidity" on the one hand, and by "misdirection of aggressive tendencies" on the other. "Except for a secondary factor, it should only be seen in the light of this fundamental psychological truth," Waltz said.

The phenomenon of conflict, it did not prevent the emergence of some basic criticisms of the use of

aggressive tendencies as a determinant of the interpretation of the conflict, the most important of which are as follows:

The argument that conflicts are caused by an instinctive tendency to aggression does not apply to both conflict situations. International conflicts, for example, do not cause such "instinctive aggression" but arise because of the accumulation of hatred and hatred left by extremist propaganda. Moreover, the reliance on "instinctive aggression" does not apply in many conflict situations where the leaders of many countries have been forced to resort to armed conflict after exhausting all other means and alternatives, failing to protect the national interests of their States, to settle the dispute situation in an acceptable manner.

Aggression, as Linz says, is based on the existence of aggressive instincts ...., due to the habit and that the aggression is getting used to the attack.

The second trend: represents the so-called failure or frustration theory:

This tendency is to view the conflict as a result of the frustration factor and its impact in crisis conditions experienced by its parties, especially when their plans fail. One of the most prominent advocates of this trend is the psychologist Vogel and Eric Fromm.

In interpreting the conflict, Vogel says that countries that reasonably meet the basic needs of their people are less psychologically prepared for conflict and war than those whose populations are dominated by dissatisfaction or distress. "Violence and the tendency to destroy are the automatic and inevitable outcome of the frustration created by the trauma of disappointing one's hopes and aspirations for one reason or another," said Eric From.

In turn, the tendency to interpret the conflict as a result of the factors of failure and frustration has in turn provoked some criticism, which was in the absence of objectivity and realism in this direction, since most of the aggressive countries in history were not poor countries, on the contrary, the most affluent and well-off country, and therefore the

focus on frustration alone as the driving force of international conflicts is unrealistic and objective.

The third trend: the focus on national personality:

This trend explains the phenomenon of conflict on the basis of the existence of the so-called "aggressive national psychology" or "the aggressive nature of certain nationalities and general characteristics", which in the perception of those who call this trend "the main driving force of conflicts and international wars." This trend therefore sees "the need to confront and besiege those nations as an effective means of preventing the outbreak of war itself."

This trend is being criticized on the grounds that it cannot be said that there is general agreement on the characterization of some national figures by the tendency of aggression. It all depends on the ideological, political or national orientation of those who classify nations into aggressive and peaceloving groups.

The fourth trend: national beliefs as a cause of conflict: This trend is based on the distinction between patterns of national beliefs and their relationship to the phenomenon of international conflict as follows:

Negative Mode: This pattern maintains negative attitudes towards other countries. The main factor behind this trend is to reorient the feeling of internal frustration to some countries that are viewed as hostile and try to empty it, which leads to the mutual relations of these parties to a higher level of tension Conflict.

Stable pattern: this trend is resulting from continuing to maintain a stereotypical idea of other nations, without attempting to change the attributes or content of this view to fit reality. It is natural that this unrealistic perception leads to a doubling of the possibilities of misunderstanding, bias and the generation of hostile feelings that are not based on objective reasons or facts.

The situation is very simplistic: it refers to an exaggerated perception of the nature of the causes of international tension and possible solutions to confront them. This is usually the result of the disregard for the complex structure of

international relations, the tendency to blame tensions for bad intentions, or the actions attributed to a particular foreign state, and then to engage in war instead of the problems of real solutions to internal problems.

In light of the foregoing, it can also be concluded that the true strength of the psychological interpretation of conflict lies in the predictability of the multiple outcomes of conflict situations on the basis of knowledge of the factors that are supposed to have an impact on the strength of competing responses and their impact on the responses of the parties to the conflict by responding and get away.

The ideological approach:

The ideological approach derives its ideological foundations from Marxist ideological approaches, since its approach is at the core of the conflict. This approach is aimed at proving and demonstrating the power of a region on the one hand, and proving the danger of ideological conflict on the other. In this regard, the ideological approach to the phenomenon of conflict, especially at the international level, is based on the ideological contradictions between states. War, as advocates of this approach, sees the peak point in the interaction of any conflict, and that the correct understanding of its dimensions can only be achieved through the class classification of its forces and parties, and by determining the relations of class forces between them, and thus determines the motives of the conflict on the one hand. On the other hand, from this point of view, the occurrence of the conflict according to this approach is the result of the contradiction in ideological visions and the associated results, which make it impossible to resolve these conflicts through the bargaining process. It is even more difficult when the situation is concerned with conflicts of interest linked to the divergence of ideological differences between the parties of the conflict. The ideological dimension adds a special situation to the conflict, which makes it more complex and difficult to reach satisfactory solutions for both sides.

Thus, the proponents of this approach conclude that any contemporary theory of conflict must be

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based on its fundamental tools to the idea of ideological conflict, from which all dimensions of analysis can be directed to the phenomenon of conflict in general, and the international conflict in particular.

The Interests approach:

In his definition of conflict using the input of the interest, Professor Manning, a former dean of the Stanford University School of Law, believes that "conflict of interest concerns only two interests: the interest of the individual as a public servant responsible for the performance of his duty, and his own economic interest as an individual or an ordinary citizen." Thus, the rules governing conflict of interest seek to prevent or entice such situations. In this sense, the introduction of interests tends to distinguish between different forms and areas of conflict of interest. It may occur in or between any of the three "legislative, executive, and judicial authorities, which may result in arousing confidence in the government in a country, and a vital area for such conflicts is the government sector, the bureaucracy, major corporations, As the conflict of interests between each of these and each other.

In general, two general levels of conflict of interest can be distinguished. In its individual sphere, the conflict of interest in essence is generally about answering the question of how a party can perform its duties properly, while negatively affecting its interests. That is, it refers to a conflict situation in which the individual finds that his interests and loyalty are in contradiction and conflict with his interests and loyalty in another position. The importance of this type of conflict is further linked to the issue of an individual's moral obligation when the individual interests as an individual or citizen conflicts with the public interests that he represents as a public servant. In this situation, the individual may take advantage of his general situation and his functional powers and for a variety of reasons – such as greed, competition, greed, opportunism, uncertainty, weak moral, religious or other reasons – to achieve private or subjective interests at the expense of the public interest. Hence, the importance and necessity of safeguarding public interests were the

result of this conflict. In this context, the approach of interest in the study of conflict emphasizes the seriousness of this type of conflict due to multiple considerations, all of which lead to increasing the chances of this conflict in public life as a result of one of the following considerations:

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- The tendency of governments to rely on the skills of specialists in the fields of science and technology.
- The increasing role of the government and its growing role in the accumulation of wealth.
- Increasing the role of individuals and the growth of their interests with the private sector in its various fields and activities, and thus increased opportunities and prospects of conflict between the public and private in relation to those interests.
- Increasing overlap and complexity in the network of government relations in the private sector, and the growing dependence of governments on this sector in financing and participation in various development projects.
- The magnitude of the capacities and requirements of government

consumption and dependence on the private sector to meet a good part of those requirements.

- In the light of this ever-increasing potential for conflict between public and private interests, proposing solutions to this potential contradiction in the individual circle of conflict of interests can be made in the light of the following rules

- The government employee should not participate in government work that would affect his own economic interests.

- Prevent public employees from accepting transfers of economic value from the sector or private sources (gifts, donations, etc.).

- The public or government employee should not be allowed to overlook the functional and professional requirements of his role and function in the context of his relations with individuals, bodies or organizations that fall within the scope of his transactions and his functional relations.

- Setting up time and objective controls and restrictions that regulate the transition of the public employee to the private sector, in particular to areas where there is a link in one way or another with his previous job.

- Setting the rules and regulations governing the relationship of the public employee to what he possesses in his functional capacity as information, and should not be allowed to use them to achieve a special benefit or return.

In the conflict of interest between states, the main premise of this approach is that "the main driving force of the policies of foreign countries is the continuous pursuit of the protection and development of national interests" and that the way to do so is to "multiply the State's resources by force." It is worth mentioning here that the concept of interest here, as defined by Morgana in this regard, "becomes synonymous with strength" and that the force here includes – in addition to military tools – international political influence, as well as the strength of economic pressure, psychological and propaganda warfare methods, Diplomatic, etc. ".

"The struggle for power as the basis of national interest is a constant truth that transcends individual beliefs, sects, political parties, and rulers," say the authors of this entry, notably Kenneth Thomson, Frederick Schumann and Raymond Aaron. Thus, "conflict, not cooperation, is the distinctive character of international relations, and the state derives its ability to

survive from its own power or from the protection that others provide to it if it is unable to ensure its own right to self-preservation."

In general, contributing to the success of attempts to resolve conflicts of interest between States leads to efforts to resolve and compromise towards the possibility and how to bring about a change in the intellectual or mental process that is interested in reaching agreements. In this direction, it may be useful to focus more on creative thinking rather than analytical thinking on the one hand, and adopt a "problem-solving" approach rather than a "competitive approach" in discussing differences between the parties to the conflict.

Conflict Circle: Levels and Types

The concept of the conflict circle refers to an analytical tool whereby the roots and causes of conflict behavior are studied and analyzed. Using a conflict circle, conflict is examined and assessed according to five sets of variables (relationships, information, interests, structure, and values). In the light of these variables, conflicts are divided into fundamental or necessary conflicts, and others that are not essential or unnecessary. The first type includes conflicts of interests, values, and structural conflicts. Non-core conflicts include information conflicts and conflicts of relations. In addition, in light of these five variables, the causes of conflict or conflict and the relative role and weight of each conflict can be identified, regardless of its levels (personal, collective, intra-group, inter-communal, national or community) Or driving, and therefore it is possible to take the appropriate decision on the strategy of dealing with this conflict.

In addition to its complexity, the concept of conflict is marked by reference everywhere in society around us. Wherever one looks, there is usually one picture or circles of conflict, or a level of conflict. On the one hand, the picture of the conflict may be hidden, or in the process of development and emergence, and may be blatant. On the other hand, its circles or levels may be determined at one or more levels as follows:

In an individual or personal circle there is usually conflict between peers, spouses, children, friends, and neighbors. It is noted that the characteristic of conflict and conflict at this level is that it often results in types of loss of personal or individual relationships to the parties that may extend over the long term.

(B) At the societal level, conflicts may occur within more than one circle: social organizations by their very nature represent an arena or area of friction of a high emotional nature. For example, churches, clubs, associations of landlords and neighbors, professional associations and the like are all examples of conflict between individuals and groups, as well as in the workplace where disputes arise between workers, managers, supervisors, employees and employers. May evolve and expand to higher levels among senior managers or board members. In this context, many companies are forced to shoulder heavy financial burdens in their attempts to settle lawsuits against them from other companies or parties within them.

C. In the public sector, conflict also occurs regularly among industrialists, members of public interest protection groups and government bodies, but also between multiple levels of authority or national government. Of course, many of these conflicts may have serious and devastating effects, ranging from the psychological and health problems of the parties involved, to the financial and material losses of financial and human resources, the time spent and the depletion of individuals.

In addition, there is an international level where patterns of international conflicts are more pronounced in their forms and levels, but often characterized by extreme complexity and overlap.

On the subject of conflict and the diversity of its mechanisms, it may be a political, economic, doctrinal, social or even technological conflict. The instruments of conflict can range from the most effective to the most negative. Examples include pressure, siege, containment, threats and punishment negotiation, compromise, seduction, compromise, alliances, incitement, subversion, and conspiracy. War is the actual clash of armed

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violence, in the form of radical contradictions that can no longer be resolved by the more lenient or less extreme methods. Therefore, war is the endpoint of some international conflicts.

The different divisions of distinction between conflicts vary according to the number of criteria or indicators used by researchers. In this regard, a set of criteria for distinguishing between different types of conflict can be mentioned below. From the perspective of the source of conflict, a structural conflict and a conscious conflict can be distinguished. With regard to the causes of conflict, conflicts are divided into the following reasons:

- Conflicts resulting from individuals relations or people's relations
- Conflicts resulting from information problems.
- Conflicts caused by interests •
    Structural or structural conflicts
- Conflicts over values.
- Conflict of relations:

These conflicts arise because of strong negative emotions, whether due to misunderstanding, stereotyping, poor communication or poverty, or repetition of negative behavioral patterns. These problems often lead to so-called unrealistic or unnecessary conflicts, because they can occur when the objective conditions of the conflict exist, such as lack of limited resources or inadequate mutual objectives. Thus, conflicts of relations, as mentioned above, often ignite conflicts and unnecessarily lead to the escalation of destructive conflicts.

These conflicts occur when the parties lack the necessary information to make wise decisions, when they are provided with incorrect information, when they disagree about the

importance of information, the difference in interpretation, or when individuals reach radically different assessments of the same information. It should be noted here that the occurrence of information conflicts may not be necessary because they occur as a result of poor communication or lack thereof between the parties to the conflict. Other information conflicts may be real and powerful conflicts because information or procedures used by individuals in their collection, or both information and immigration may be inconsistent.

Brickman sees the conflict of interest as referring to "a difference or disruptions in the preferred results of self, self, and others."

Conflict of interest often occurs when one or more parties adopt a position that allows one solution to meet their needs. In order to satisfy their needs it happens that the party of the conflict position believes that the interests of others must be sacrificed. Thus, these interrelated conflicts take place around: substantive issues (money, natural resources, time, etc.), procedural issues (such as conflict resolution), or psychological issues (perceptions or perceptions of trust, justice, Respect, etc.), and it becomes more complicated when the interests or gains of a person are relative to the loss of another person, which is sometimes referred to as gain or loss, that is, the gain of a party is a loss to the other party. The opposite situation here is equal returns for both parties, which is referred to as the positive yield or output between these two models. There are many models in which there are elements of competition and cooperation, which are referred to as mixed motives.

In general, conflicts of interest can usually be achieved or satisfied in many ways. The resolution of the conflict of interests requires that a significant and important number of the interests of the parties concerned be discussed and achieved or reach common points in the three previous areas (substantive, procedural, psychological).

Thus, this kind of conflict is caused by competition over incompatible interests and needs, whether those interests or needs are real or perceived.

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Often, a person's image takes the form of competing for valuable resources or prizes, and his solution is in many ways that crystallize in essence on how to make a change in the mental process of the parties to the conflict situation and help to reach agreement between them. Perhaps one of the most important means in this direction is to focus on creative thinking rather than on analytical thinking, and adopting a method of solving problems rather than a competitive solution in the discussions of parties to the conflict position of their differences.

(D) Structural Conflicts:

This kind of conflict occurs because of the models of oppression in human relations and, therefore, it relates to the impact of those structures and social structures on conflicts, and the role of conflict in influencing it.

In general, models of these influences are usually shaped by external forces from individuals in conflict. Limited natural resources, geographical constraints (eg distance or proximity), time (in terms of being specific or expansive), organizational structures, and the like variables often drive toward, or pave the way to conflict behavior. Also, the influence of these forces varies from one society to another according to the structure of the group or the nature of society itself, so that the following patterns can be distinguished:

- In societies with loose or wide structures – as in open societies and pluralism – a conflict aimed at resolving tension between conflicting parties is likely to have stabilizing functions, i.e., to support stability.
- In specific social structures and closed communities, the impact of conflict is likely to be different. The more closed the group, the greater the involvement of the parties in the conflict, and the greater the impact of the conflict on them. E. Conflict of values:

These are conflicts that are linked to values and are caused by perceived or actual beliefs of value or systems because of their incompatibility or incompatibility. Since values are beliefs used by individuals to give meaning to their lives, they explain what is good or bad, right or wrong, just or unjust. It should be noted that different values do not constitute conflict; individuals can live together in harmony with the existence of different value systems. While value conflicts arise when one of the parties to a conflict tries to impose a specific set of values on other parties or calls for a specific value system that does not allow for the differences of opinion.

Hence, conflicts of values are important to make them one of the most important conflicts of the twentieth century. They have also acquired a great deal of interest in psychology and mental processes in order to link the magnitude of conflict and behavior related to conflict resolution. In this regard, deconstructing or dissolving the link between values and interests, working together to discover value and ideological differences, and focusing on finding, using conciliatory forms and compromises is one of the most important ways to solve value conflicts.

4. Types of conflict in terms of degree of appearance:

This is meant to distinguish between types of conflict on the basis of overt behavioral manifestations by the parties to the conflict, and therefore a function of its existence on the one hand and of its type on the other. In this regard, some specialists tend to distinguish between blatant, latent, oppressed or oppressed conflicts. The most important features of each are as follows:

(A) The apparent or blatant conflict:

It refers to the type of conflict that has been produced, or   has been linked to, behavioral manifestations by its parties (or parties) such as acts of violence, threats of force, or the declaration of specific demands in relation to the conflict. Thus, such manifestations reflect a sophisticated and advanced stage of conflict, and therefore these conflict-related aspects are used as a basis for describing it as a visible or blatant conflict that distinguishes it from the following types: latent and oppressed.

(B) The underlying or hidden conflict.

This type of conflict, although it is shared with its predecessor in the existence of an objective basis or basis for conflict between the parties (or parties), the characteristic of it is not to crystallize any tangible or tangible behavioral manifestations that can be referred to as a sign of the existence of conflict. In other words, this type is considered as a less mature and evolving conflict than the previous type.

Conflicted or repressed conflicts:

This type of conflict is shared with its predecessors in the crystallization of an objective basis for contention and rivalry between parties . It is similar to the conflict inherent in the non-crystallization of behavioral manifestations, but its main character is that there is a clear imbalance in power relations between parties at the expense of the other party, and the stronger party does not have to use its power to achieve its objectives in the conflict, as the threat of using it becomes sufficient to generate the desired response or desired by the other party.

In a country whose regime is based on a high level of repression and severe repression of citizens in general, it is expected, for example, to suppress forms of political protest and demonstrations with varying degrees of demonstrations and even revolution. Thus, citizens – even if they have sufficient justifications for differences and clashes with the ruling authority – they do not perform specific collective action against them and therefore, there are no behavioral manifestations associated with this conflict. The interpretation of this is due to the recognition by the citizens of the power and brutality of the state, their fear of retaliation and the arbitrary measures of repression and official violence. Thus, it is only limited that the State's explicit or implicit threat to use its force will be sufficient to suppress and suppress the resistance capabilities of the citizens, hence the name of the suppressed or oppressed conflict.

It should be noted that there is some similarity with the circle of international conflict, specifically with the effect of deterrence, which is the reluctance or reluctance of one of the parties to the conflict to resort to the use of force to achieve their interests, for reasons related to the power of the opponent or the other party, It will not be in his favor.

In the light of the above comparative review of a number of general theoretical approaches to the phenomenon of conflict and its concept, it is possible to conclude two important conclusions because they have special significance in studying, analyzing and understanding of the phenomenon of conflict, and therefore dealing with them and choosing the appropriate mechanism for each conflict position.   These results are as follows:

First: The need to distinguish in the study of the conflict between studying it as a concept, as a phenomenon, or as a process: The conflict as a concept has a complex nature derived from the characteristics of the conflict itself, and the nature and relations of forces governing the parties and the subject. The conflict as a phenomenon is very complex. While the phenomenon of conflict is combining at least, both latently and potentially, between a combination of both positive and negative dimensions, the final adjustment of the conflict phenomenon depends largely on the set of variables:

First, they are formed according to the perception variable of the parties to the conflict.

Secondly, according to available alternatives, subject and other environmental variables that contributes in an indirect way with time to determine the extent and intensity of the phenomenon. Finally, conflict as a process finds its roots in multiple tributaries, and its forms, manifestations are intertwined and intersect to reflect a fair amount of interdependence between the origins and manifestations of the armistice process.

Second: The role of cognition in the understanding of the phenomenon of conflict: It falls under that set of variables for the cognitive process, and the specific impact of the importance of perception does not stop only when the understanding and

characterization of the phenomenon of armament, but beyond that to the careful analysis of their causes, and choose the appropriate solution or settlement mechanism. It is also important to note the cultural variables in understanding the positions of conflict and its importance to overcome the dimensions that may be associated with the dimensions of positive or negative impact of understanding the phenomenon of conflict, and therefore in choosing the mechanism of the appropriate solution.

The conflict and peace are not random. They are two phenomena that can be interpreted, understood, and can be influenced. Conflict and peace are not static, they are characterized by dynamism. In order to be effective and to take measures to prevent any conflict and effective settlement, it is necessary to implement policies, programs and mechanisms that commensurate with the type and level reached in light of the above comparative review of a number of general theoretical approaches to the phenomenon of conflict and its concept, because they have special significance in the study, analysis and understanding of the phenomenon of conflict, and therefore in dealing with them and choose the appropriate mechanism for each conflict situation. These results are as follows:

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Process: The conflict as a concept has a complex nature derived from the characteristics of the conflict itself, and   the nature and relations of forces governing the parties and the subject. The conflict as a phenomenon is very complex. The phenomenon of conflict, while combining – at least both latently and potentially – between a combination of both positive and negative dimensions, the final adjustment of the conflict phenomenon depends largely on the set of variables that are first formed according to the perception variable of the parties to the conflict , And secondly with time, subject, available alternatives, and other environmental variables that contribute in an indirect way to determining the extent and intensity of the phenomenon.

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It can also be concluded that it is important to emphasize the three dimensions that constitute the main dimension in the definition of the concept of conflict:

The first dimension relates to the conflict situation itself: It indicates that the concept of conflict expresses a position with its specific characteristics or conditions. It is a beginning that presupposes conflicting interests or values between two or more parties.

So, the parties recognize the awareness of this position and contradiction. The willingness of a party (or parties) to adopt a position that does not necessarily coincide with the wishes of the other party's needs. This position may clash with the rest of these positions.

The second dimension relates to the parties to the conflict situation: through three levels: the first level concerns individual conflicts: that is, the parties to the conflict are individuals, and thus the circle and subject of such a conflict tend to be limited in nature. In the second level, the conflict is between groups: The variety of types of this conflict, diversity of parties, the circle and its fields

are usually more extensive and diverse than the counterpart in the circle of individual conflict. The third level concerns the conflict between states, which is usually also known as the international conflict, and the conflict circle (or circles) is more complex and broader than the previous two levels of conflict.

The third dimension concerns the international conflict: It should be noted here that the widening of the circle of the

Third level of conflicts, through the successive historical stages of international relations, would have directed and accumulated a considerable amount of scientific and academic efforts to study the phenomenon of conflict as well as scientific theories that facilitate understanding of the causes and determinants, and then provide various alternatives to control the phenomenon of armament, or at least to reduce the risks associated with them and their consequents by identify methods of dealing with them. In this field, these scientific efforts have resulted in a rich and original heritage of theories and interpretations. The theories of rational knowledge, theorist theory, power theories, decisionmaking theories, communications, systems, etc. Are many theories that explain the conflict in its different dimensions: Biological, cultural, social, economic, political, and recently environmental and civilization.

Since the phenomenon of conflict has been linked to the human race since the beginning of creation, the continued desire to possess and develop the causes of power has been a major component of human interactions among individuals, an influential focus and a fundamental pillar of relations between States. With the development of human history, the rise of empires and the emergence of the nation-state after the Westphalia of 1648, the "military power" and the will to use it became the most important elements of internal power and decisive factor in achieving the goals and objectives of the foreign policy of the great Powers and the crystallization of the realistic theories continue to emphasize that the state is the only major factor in international relations and therefore its unit of study is the growing importance of military power despite the growing

importance of diplomatic mechanisms as one of the foreign policy tools of countries after the signing of the Vienna Treaty in 1916 to regulate diplomatic relations among the countries, where the military force has been at the forefront of the foreign policy instruments of countries and means to achieve its goals and objectives, to consolidate the proposition, promoted by the school of realism in the study of international relations and control of the human mind for centuries and considering military strength as the basis of the overall strength of the state, which has had an impact on conflict resolution.

However, the development of the international system has brought about various changes at all levels, including the ranking and classification of the main actors in the international arena and the nature of the power relations among them. Thus, influential international actors emerged above the level of states such as international organizations, and others below this level, The organization, often referred to by the West as "extremist" and "terrorist", has had such international organizations as well as international multinational companies or even groups and organizations with extensions and internationalizations play a pivotal and influential role in the international arena, In order to formulate a new theory that accommodates such developments and takes into account the role of these new international actors.

The failure of the international and regional powers to achieve their goals and objectives, to resolve their internal conflicts, and to reap the fruits of their foreign intervention by relying primarily on military power, was one of the motivations that led international relations experts to reassess the importance of relying solely on military force as an effective mechanism for resolving conflicts, the success of interventions, and the achievement of the foreign policy objectives of States. It is no longer possible for the major Powers to develop their military capabilities and destructive capabilities in order to ensure that they remain in a position superior to that of the international powers or their ability to achieve their objectives as required.

The American situation inspires us for re-evaluating the status of military power and its role in resolving conflicts and achieving the objectives of foreign policy of States. The American policy has relied on military force and conflict as instruments of expansion, hegemony and depletion of the world's resources. The American administrations have not stopped military intervention abroad to achieve these ends, even exceeded the American military intervention in the world three hundred times, but has not been very successful but only for few of them and failure is the dominant feature of all of them to varying degrees, so few has succeeded in the political, economic and human costs outweighed the successes of limited impact.

The resulting failure of US military power in various parts of the world, notably Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, through Somalia in the early 1990s, and in Afghanistan and Iraq recently, led to the same question: Is it still the military force that is the effective tool to resolve conflicts and achieve the objectives of foreign policy of States? We consider this question worthy of dealing with it and ask us diligence in its presentation and this is why we tried our best effort to answer it.

International organizations

In today's interconnected and interdependent world, international organizations (IOs) have emerged as key players in promoting global cooperation, addressing global challenges, and advancing collective goals. These organizations serve as vital platforms for multilateral engagement, fostering dialogue, and facilitating collaboration among nations. This comprehensive article explores the significance, functions, and impact of international organizations on various aspects of global governance, including peace and security, human rights, economic development, environmental sustainability, and public health. It also delves into the challenges faced by IOs and discusses potential strategies for enhancing their effectiveness and relevance in an evolving global landscape.

International organizations come in various forms and serve different purposes. Here are some common types of international organizations:

Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs):

United Nations (UN): The most prominent global organization, composed of member states working together on various issues, including peace and security, human rights, and development.

World Trade Organization (WTO): Facilitates international trade and promotes fair and equitable rules for global commerce.

International Monetary Fund (IMF): Focuses on monetary cooperation, financial stability, and economic development.

World Bank Group: Comprises five institutions working towards reducing poverty and fostering sustainable economic growth.

Regional Organizations:

European Union (EU): Promotes political and economic integration among European countries.

African Union (AU): Aims to enhance cooperation, integration, and development across the African continent.

Organization of American States (OAS): Facilitates dialogue and cooperation among countries in the Americas.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Fosters regional cooperation, economic integration, and political dialogue among Southeast Asian countries.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs):

Amnesty International: Focuses on human rights advocacy and combating injustices globally.

Doctors Without Borders (MSF): Provides medical aid and humanitarian assistance in crisis situations.

Greenpeace: Works on environmental issues and advocates for sustainable development.

Transparency International: Combats corruption and promotes transparency in governance.

Technical and Specialized Agencies:

World Health Organization (WHO): Focuses on global health issues, disease prevention, and promoting healthcare access.

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO): Sets standards and regulations for international aviation safety and security.

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO): Promotes education, cultural understanding, and scientific cooperation.

Trade and Economic Alliances:

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): A military alliance among North American and European countries for collective defense.

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): Coordinates oil production policies and safeguards member states' interests in the oil market.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): Facilitates economic cooperation and trade liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region.

Professional Associations:

International Bar Association (IBA): Promotes the development and practice of law globally.

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC):
Supports humanitarian assistance and disaster response efforts worldwide.

International Federation of Journalists (IFJ): Represents journalists' interests and advocates for press freedom.

These are just a few examples of the diverse range of international organizations that exist. Each type serves a unique purpose, addressing specific global challenges and fostering cooperation among nations and other stakeholders.

The historical evolution of international organizations (IOs) can be traced back to the efforts made by states to establish mechanisms for cooperation and collective action. Here is an overview of the historical evolution of IOs:

Peace Treaties: IOs can be traced back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War and established the principle of state sovereignty. Subsequent peace treaties, such as the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) and the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815), laid the groundwork for diplomatic cooperation among states.

International Postal Union: Established in 1874, this was the first specialized international organization. It aimed to facilitate postal services and improve communication among nations.

The Hague Conferences: Held in 1899 and 1907, these conferences sought to establish rules and principles for peaceful settlement of disputes and limitations on warfare.

League of Nations (LN): Created after World War I, the LN aimed to maintain international peace and security. It focused on disarmament, collective security, and resolving disputes through arbitration and negotiation. However, it faced challenges and was unable to prevent the outbreak of World War II.

United Nations (UN): Founded in 1945, the UN succeeded the LN and aimed to prevent future conflicts. It expanded the scope of international cooperation to include human rights, economic development, and social welfare. The UN Charter, signed in San Francisco in 1945, established the foundational principles of the Organisation

Regional Organizations: Following World War II, regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (1948), the Arab League (1945), and the Organization of African Unity (1963) emerged to address regional challenges and promote cooperation among neighboring countries.

Specialized Agencies: The UN created numerous specialized agencies to address specific issues, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1948 and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 1945.

Expansion of Regional Organizations: The end of the Cold War led to the establishment of new regional organizations, including the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), focusing on economic integration and regional security.

Humanitarian and Development Organizations: NGOs such as Doctors Without Borders (MSF) and Oxfam gained prominence, playing significant roles in providing humanitarian aid and advancing development goals.

Global Governance and Sustainable Development: IOs have increasingly focused on global governance and sustainable development, as reflected in the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by the UN in 2015.

Non-State Actors: IOs are now engaging with non-state actors, including NGOs, civil society organizations, and the private sector, to address complex global challenges.

Throughout history, IOs have evolved to adapt to changing global dynamics, expanding their mandates and engaging in a broader range of issues. From peace and security to human rights, economic development, and environmental sustainability, IOs continue to play a crucial role in promoting global cooperation and addressing the complex challenges of the modern world.

Politics and NATO

NATO'S TURKEY PROBLEM

SWEDEN'S JOURNEY TO NATO

Continue Against the backdrop of Russia's illegal military operations in Ukraine, Russia-phobia, which has started again in Europe, has brought the EU countries closer than they have ever been.The most effective way to ensure collective security was the joining of the countries of the continent that are not members of NATO and have important geopolitical importance.For this purpose, even the Scandinavian countries Sweden and Finland, whose neutrality has been known for years, had to apply for membership in this organization.However, the biggest obstacle to NATO membership of the mentioned countries was the decisive position of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.Thus, Turkey vetoed Sweden and Finland's membership of the mentioned countries due to their open financing of terrorist groups that Turkey is currently fighting.

SUCCESSFUL STEPS TOWARDS PROBLEM SOLVING.

Write it In this part of the article, the important topic that we will deal with is related to political maneuvers. The actions of both states to solve the discussed problems are quite exemplary . Finland, which successfully fulfilled the conditions requested by Turkey, was soon accepted into NATO. In this process, the constitutional law adopted by the young Prime Minister of Finland, Mrs. Sanna Mari, against terrorism in the country, and other activities are a perfect example of political behavior. On the other hand, Sweden's delay in the process and the unproductive political language it used delayed its accession to the union by almost a year. As a result, in July 2023, at NATO's summit in Vilnius, Turkey announced its approval for Sweden's admission to the alliance.It should be noted that according to the NATO charter, admission of a new member to the alliance is possible only with the unanimous consent of all members.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

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Chapter III: Foreign policies of states
Part I : Foreign policies of the countries of the world: in a modern perspective

China's Foreign Policy

Our strategic watch started on September 22 with the analysis of China's President Xi Jinping's speech on the 75th session of the UN General Assembly (via a video link). In this speech, China was claimed to be the guardian of multilateralism, an absolute supporter of all multilateral formats of cooperation, especially UN institutions, and the champion of environmental global policy. Xi Jinping also positioned China as the major friend of developing, especially African, countries, advanced the necessity for all international community to join efforts in order to overcome the consequences of the pandemic and help the countries the most in need, as well as promised to make Chinese vaccine "a global public good" that will be provided to developing countries on a priority. In opposition to Chinese "openness", Xi Jinping criticized the unilateral approach to international relations, together with protectionism and building blocks, indirectly criticizing the US, and more specifically the Trump administration's policy. Xi Jinping also delivered an ambitious promise to reach the peak in Chinese carbon emissions before 2030, earlier than it had been planned previously, and make China carbon neutral by 2060.

Those statements provoked different reactions from the international community. While some actors were praising the Chinese willingness to assist the developing countries and its new goals in terms of environmental protection, others were doubting the Chinese real intentions. Many claimed that China's rhetoric does not always match the facts on the ground, where China's market remains one of the most difficult to access for foreign companies and where Chinese environmental policy remains one of the most controversial. In addition, the use of "nice phrases" in order to create a positive image of Chinese policy on the world stage was seen as an aspiration to remedy the spoiled perception of China among international society after the pandemic outbreak. The most prominent accusations came from the US, blaming China on the lack of transparency, growing militarism, and an attempt to assert China's dominance at international bodies like the UN.

Practically, this first piece of analysis set the tone for the rest of the strategic watch. On the one hand, the ChinaUS standoff lasted during the whole monitoring period with almost the same accusations from both sides. On the other hand, China's rhetoric advancing multilateralism, "win-win cooperation", help to developing countries, environmental protection, vaccines as "global public good", has been used by Chinese officials during all the period of the watch in all forums for international cooperation. To illustrate, four months later after the mentioned address, on January 25, 2021, the delivered Xi Jinping's speech at the Davos International Economic Forum (via a video link), showed one more time a reiteration of Beijing's usual stance.

What is more, China's relations with international institutions can also be demonstrated by its relation with WHO. Thus, while China has been officially supporting the organization on multiple occasions, WHO met difficulties to finally arrive in China in order to conduct the second phase of the investigation of the Covid-19 pandemic's origins. First of all, in the first half of 2020, China refused under different reasons, mostly under virus concerns, to allow WHO experts to undertake the investigation on the ground and conducted its first investigation phase by itself. Meanwhile, during the observed period, China and WHO maintained negotiations on the frameworks of the second phase of the investigation, which was finally decided to be conducted in January 2021. However, on January 5, the head of WHO, Tedros Adhanom Hebreyesus, adopted a firm stance towards China for the first time and expressed its disappointment that China had not authorized the entry of the WHO team for the investigation since it had not yet finalized the necessary entry permissions. China responded by saying that there was not only a visa problem, but also organizational issues linked to difficulties posed by the pandemic, and affirming that China will always adopt an open, transparent, and responsible attitude towards the organization. On Thursday, 13 January 2021, the WHO-led expert team finally arrived in Wuhan in order to conduct its scientific research. After two weeks of isolation, they undertook two weeks of visits to different sites important for the investigation such as the Wuhan Seafood Market, Wuhan Institute of Virology, or Wuhan hospitals having treated the first Covid19 patients. Nevertheless, advancing strict rules of

visiting under virus concerns, the head of WHO announced that the team would not meet representatives of the local population, while the latter was claiming this right and accused China of silencing them. On top of that, at the end of the mission, it was revealed that China refused to get the WHO experts access to raw data on the first identified cases of the Covid-19 in December 2020 by providing only official summaries and analyses on this information. The act raised further questions on the transparency of China towards the world community on the matter.

Chinese diplomacy around the Covid-19 pandemic
The proclaimed solidarity with the world fighting the Covid-19 pandemic, and especially with developing countries, during Xi Jinping's speech at the UN General Assembly was reflected in practice by shipments of medical aid to other countries. This move is described by many scholars and political experts as a way for China to improve its reputation harmed by the pandemic outbreak, but also as a tool to reinforce its ties with beneficiaries of the aid.
To start with, considering itself as a country where the pandemic was under control, China concentrated much of its political and diplomatic efforts in assisting other countries, especially developing and the poorest ones, mainly on the African continent, while conducting phase III trials of its vaccines in other states. Thus, in the Septemberearly December period, the assistance consisted mainly of sending or donating medical equipment, Covid-19 tests, and medical expert groups to primarily African, ASEAN, Latin American countries, but also to some European ones, such as Serbia. While assisting others, China has continuously emphasized its success in dealing with the pandemic by putting in advance the effectiveness of its state model. Besides, on October 10, China officially joined the UN-led initiative for fair vaccine distribution, COVAX, the move seen as a way for China to gain trust from other countries regarding its homemade vaccines and to promote them on the global market. Another way for China to help lower-income countries in the context of the pandemic was the decision to join the international initiative of debt freezing.

Chinese Sinopharm vaccine, including for public use, followed shortly by Bahrain. Subsequently, the so-called "vaccine diplomacy" became the main

tool of Chinese medical assistance to other countries in fighting the pandemic. The first countries to receive the jabs were the ones having conducted the phase III trials on their territory, being mainly Middle East countries (UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, etc.). Noteworthy, Chinese vaccines, provided at "fair" or sometimes at "friendly" price, have an advantage of requiring storage at the standard 2C-8C, in contrast to the new mRNA vaccines developed by Western countries, facilitating logistics in particular for lower- and middle-income countries. Thus, even amid questioning in the efficiency of the Chinese vaccines, especially after different and sometimes law phase III trial results for the Sinovac jabs, millions of doses of the two most advanced Chinese vaccines developed by Sinopharm and Sinovac groups are being sent around the world to ASEAN, Latin American, and other Middle East countries. In addition, at the beginning of February, Mexico authorized and received 2 million of the first CanSino doses, the third Chinese vaccine on the global market, which has been previously tested in Mexico and Pakistan.

Meanwhile, China is not the only actor that is eager to fill the void left by Western countries, more concentrated on vaccination of their own population. Starting from January 2021, India supplied millions of doses of its homegrown vaccines to its neighboring and some ASEAN countries by boosting its regional presence and then going further by donating some countries with its vaccines for free. Following those steps, in late January, China also started to donate its vaccines to some countries beginning with Pakistan, the country being at the crossroads of the China-India competition. The Chinese government promised to provide vaccine donations to 13 countries during February and to further help 38 countries, the promise, which is already under action. It is obvious that despite joining the Covax initiative, the main tool for China to distribute its vaccines is bilateral contracts while only 40 000 doses were sent once to serve the Covax ambition.

In the meantime, Chinese vaccines are also gaining their ground in Europe, where in mid-January Serbia became the first European country to authorize and receive the first batch of one million doses of Sinopharm's vaccine. Two weeks later, on January 29, Hungary became the first country of the European Union to approve China's Sinopharm

vaccine expecting to receive the first doses in late February. The two countries already had developed ties with China, which were further deepened during the pandemic due to China's foreign policy efforts in this field.

China and Europe

China develops its relations with Europe through different tracks: bilateral ties with European countries, cooperation with the European Union as a block, but also by initiating new formats for cooperation such as the "17+1" format, also called the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (ChinaCEEC). Launched in 2012, the format consists of 17 European countries, among which are twelve EU member states and five non-member states. Speaking about the CEEC, also considered as a tool to increase Chinese influence within the EU, we observed during our strategic watch how China was actively promoting this format of cooperation in all other interactions with the members of the group – bilateral phone calls, high-ranking meetings within other formats, or meetings with countries' diplomatic representatives, and so on. Finally, on February 9, Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted a virtual summit with presidents of the CEEC countries, the initiative which has been delayed for nearly a year due to the pandemic. The topics discussed during the meeting were particularly articulated around enhancing cooperation in terms of the pandemic response, including in terms of vaccine, where China promised to provide more support to the CEEC countries in their efforts of combating the pandemic, as well as pointed out the importance of further deepening of trade ties, especially amid the health crisis. In addition, Xi Jinping advanced the positive effects that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), according to China, brought to the countries' economic development.

These two topics – the Belt and Road Initiative and cooperation amid the pandemic – were among the main in China's bilateral relations with European countries. This is especially obvious by taking the example of Serbia, the European country that deepened the most its ties with China in the course of the last year. During the observed period, among all the other countries of the region, Serbia had the most interactions with China and received the most of Chinese pandemic aid among European countries to a great concern of the

European Union, which is in talks with Serbia on its membership in the EU, but also of Russia that considers Serbia its main European ally. Serbian president on multiple occasions praised China's pandemic assistance, but also its investments in and constructions of Serbian roads, plants, factories, etc. İn the frameworks of the BRI, which continued despite the world health crisis. Assuring the Chinese "brother" in its absolute friendship, Serbia emphasized that it will not succumb to the US pressure of splitting with China.

This attempt to prevent European countries from further developing their ties with China was insistently made by the US during the last months of the Trump presidency. In its last months at the Office, Pompeo conducted several tours to European countries (September and November tours) alerting them about the pitfalls of China's growing influence in Europe and pushing them to renounce the use of Chinese 5G technologies. Therefore, Britain and France decided to eliminate progressively and Sweden banned the use of 5G equipment provided by Chinese firms such as Huawei or ZTE. Meanwhile, Italy, being the first developed country participating in the Belt and Road, refused a complete ban on Huawei's technologies. Moreover, despite strongly manifested US opposition.

November, Pope Francis needed to make an official statement acknowledging for the first time that China's Muslim Uighurs were "persecuted people". However, China's bilateral relation with a European country that deteriorated the most was the one with the UK, being the main US ally in Europe, due to China's imposition of the security laws in Hong Kong (a former British colony), its policy in Xinjiang region, which the UK considers persecution of Uighurs, mutual accusations of misinformation, and the latest mutual bans on national broadcasters – Chinese CGTN in the UK and British BBC in China – that came one after another in the early February.

Meanwhile, amid the controversial achievements of China's diplomatic efforts towards European countries individually, the main event of the Chinese foreign policy in the European direction was probably sealing the investment deal with the European Union on December 30. With this agreement, Beijing promised to provide unprecedented access to European business while reinforcing its efforts against forced labor that happened to stall investment deal talks with the EU. The two sides endorsed the "in principle" conclusion during a video link and the official signature is supposed to come later, after legal and technical finalization, which could take months. However, according to analysts, this investment deal will give Beijing "much-needed diplomatic breathing space" as Joe Biden prepares to forge stronger ties with European partners to counter Chinese growing influence.

Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang: between China's "domestic" and foreign policy
Hong Kong, according to the principle "one country, two systems", is officially a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China which is supposed to have its political autonomy. Chinese Xinjiang, officially known as Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, is home to about 12 million Uighur Muslim minority which China considers extremists or terrorists. Tibet Autonomous Region became a Chinese province (which is seen in Tibet and in Western countries as an annexation) in 1951 while having its government-in-exile headquartered in North India. The three regions, as well as Taiwan, whose proclaimed in 1949 independence China does not recognize, were, during our strategic watch, at the crossroads of China's relations with other actors often contributing to the escalation of tensions between China and other states.
For instance, while Western countries, especially US main allies, under the US pressure were openly accusing China of committing human rights violations in the Xinjiang region by detaining the Uighur population in what they called "concentration camps" and using them as forced labor, China denied all the accusations by saying that there are only "re-education camps" necessary for preventing terrorism and eradicating Islamist extremism from the region. Besides, in October, at the General Debate of the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, China managed to receive praises from 70 countries, including the ones being members of the Arab League, that stated their support to China on Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and human rights issues by highlighting China's achievement in this field and expressed their judgment to other countries of using those pretexts in order to interfere in Chinese internal affairs. Nevertheless, later in October, a Canadian parliamentary committee

concluded that China was perpetrating "genocide" against ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang and called for sanctions. This move deteriorated further the China-Canada relations being already under tension since the 2018 detention of Huawei's Financial Director, Meng Wanzhou. Then, in January 2021, the former US State Secretary Mike Pompeo also determined that China has committed "genocide and crimes against humanity" and banned all cotton and tomato products coming from Xinjiang following the allegations that they were made using forced labor. China strongly opposed that move, calling all the allegations "lie of the century" and naming Pompeo "Mr. Liar" while, in its champion-of-multilateralism posture, accusing the USA of violating market principles by the ban introduction.

In the meantime, Beijing's imposition of the security law in Hong Kong and what was described in Western media as a "crackdown on Hong Kong democracy", also deteriorated China's relations with other states. Numerous detentions of Hong Kong democratic protesters and revoking licenses of lawyers defending them provoked calls from other countries to release the detained, as well as sanctions, mainly from the US, on Hong Kong officials that participated in the adoption of the security law. China was responding with the same arguments by reiterating that Hong Kong affairs were purely Chinese internal affairs and also imposed sanctions on four Americans who have acted "viciously" on issues related to Hong Kong. However, Hong Kong events were the most deteriorating for China's relations with the UK, which is especially due to the increased number of issued British National Overseas (BNO) passports from the UK government to Hong Kong citizens giving them rights to obtain residence privileges in the UK. Therefore, China accused Britain of interfering in Chinese internal affairs by repeatedly violating its commitments according to the Sino-British 1984 Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong. Starting from January 31, China announced that it would no longer recognize BNO passports as a valid traveling document while advancing the possibility of taking further countermeasures.

Speaking about Tibet and Taiwan, Beijing is especially concerned about the growing number of interactions between representatives of these territories with the US officials. One of the most important Chinese reactions came after the first in six decades visit of the Tibetan Government-in-exile to Washington on November 20. The two sides expressed their willingness to further formalize the meeting format in the coming years. China denounced this action by saying that the US was using Tibet to promote "splittism" in China. On top of that, on January 28, the leaving Trump administration adopted the 2.3 trillion "pandemic aid and spending package" containing special clauses on Taiwan, Tibet, and Hong Kong with a view to reinforce US support for these territories. Regarding Tibet, Trump has also signed an act that will put sanctions on Chinese officials who interfere in the selection of the Dalai Lama's successor. China firmly opposed both acts reiterating that the territories are purely China's internal affairs.

In addition, we noticed that the necessity to follow the "one-China policy" is a constant Chinese narrative used to denounce mainly US actions towards Taiwan (arms sales, economic cooperation, cooperation in the military field, etc.) and present in Beijing's diplomatic interactions with other actors. What is more, on January 10, the US decided to lift the self-imposed restrictions limiting the communication between American diplomats and their Taiwanese counterparts which practically signified the disruption with the "one-China policy" officially followed by the US since the establishment of diplomatic relations with China in 1979. Together with these far-going US actions towards Taiwan, China's mainland rhetoric also toughened, moving to warn of consequences and further to announcing on January 28 that "'Taiwan independence' means war". All those warnings were happening in parallel with multiple passages of warships one after another through the Taiwan Strait undertaken by both the USA and Beijing in the late months, as well as Chinese military planes being constantly detected in the Taiwan air-identification zone with an unusually big number of more than 20 identified planes in a couple of days difference at the end of January. The move was described by Beijing as a "solemn warning to external forces" and came the same week as the official entry into powers of the new US President Joe Biden, whose stance on China and China-related issues, while yet to be dressed, seems to be tough.

China and the United States

US-China relations highly deteriorated during the whole period of monitoring. After three years of steady decline under the Trump administration, Beijing and Washington continued to exchange blame regarding the coronavirus pandemic, remained locked in a trade war, competed over 5G networks and other technologies, as well as clashed over human rights violations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, among other concerns. Thus, US President-elect Joe Biden was likely to deal with all of these challenges from his first day in the office.

It seemed for many scholars that one of the objectives of the Trump administration's strategy over China was to establish as many policies at the last minute to ensure that the Biden administration will be left with a small corridor of actions and thus forcing him to continue Trump's approach toward China. Therefore, during the whole period of presidential transition starting from November 2020 until late January 2021, it is not surprising to observe how the US was putting in place new sanctions and new restrictions almost every day. At the beginning of November 2020, the tension was more likely around the media field where the US designated six Chinese media outlets as agents of China's government, followed by the US decision to offer only a three-month visa extension for Chinese reporters where during this period of extension's application, Chinese reporters were banned from conducting reporting activities. In response to these restrictions, Beijing's reactions were limited to a simple warning where China announced to apply countermeasures to restrict American reporter's activities in Hongkong. In December 2020, the frequency for the US to put in place new measures became more intensified. The new orders were ranging from limiting visa validity for Chinese Communist Party members and their immediate families, designating Chinese companies as "controlled by China's military", cutting five cultural exchanges, to sanctioning officials and companies suspected of human rights abuses in Xinjiang. What is more, the Trump administration was appeared to strengthen its presence in the Pacific region by on the one side, deploying frequently its warships and vessels to the South China Sea, while on the other side, contributing to reviving the Quadrilateral Dialogue with Australia, India, and Japan. The US also seemed to reinforce its bilateral ties with Taiwan where this move has been accused by Beijing as interference to China's national interest. However, despite the Trump administration's sanctions tool, China appears to be more reluctant to participate in the sanctions game, but it doesn't necessarily mean that Beijing didn't start developing tools to fight back. One of the most important measures taken by China was the sanctions imposed on the day of Joe Biden's inauguration to 28 US individuals, including former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo who, according to Beijing, have seriously violated China's sovereignty, and thus, mainly responsible for a series of anti-China actions taken by the Trump administration. The move is considered to be a sign from Beijing to the new US administration for not following the same path as its predecessor.

Another important issue that shaped China-US relations is the escalation in the technology competition, especially concerning the US campaign against Huawei, a Chinese company that is the largest provider of telecommunications equipment, in particular the 5G wireless network. The US accuses Huawei's products of purposely containing security holes that China's government could use for spying purposes. Thus, the US carried on different strategies to convince other countries, especially in Europe, to not use Huawei. In addition, the Trump administration decided to ban Chinese-owned apps like WeChat and is trying to do the same with TikTok for national security reasons, which would mark the first time the US widely blocks foreign information technology. At the same time, the coronavirus pandemic has also exposed further deterioration in China-US ties. Washington always adopted the same discourse calling China to be held "accountable" for the pandemic and accusing the World Health Organization of being Beijing's puppet. Moreover, conspiracy theories about the origins of the outbreak, which were encouraged by disinformation and misinformation efforts from both sides, exacerbated mistrust between China and the US.

Therefore, the election of Joe Biden is believed to bring a new start to China-US relations. Re-joining international institutions and agreements, partnering with European allies, as well as reconstructing the US-China diplomatic framework are likely all on Biden's agenda, which could be able to offer the chance to pause and examine the widespread view adopted by the US over China.

However, even though for now Biden administration's strategy over China is still in preparation, it already appears that Biden is looking forward to forging the US influence, together with its allies, to counter China's rising power. To illustrate, Biden's new cabinet consisted of politicians known for their firm stance toward China. This move thus demonstrated that zero-sum competition will likely continue to dominate the US approach to China.

China and Pacific countries (Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand)

As a part of Beijing's effort to expand its influence across the world, China is currently emerging as an important actor in the Pacific region. However, this move is unsettling for the US and its allies, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, who have been the dominant powers in the Pacific since World War II. Therefore, during the period of monitoring, it is not surprising to observe how the bilateral and multilateral relations between China and these four regional powers were tough and challenging. At the multilateral level, especially with the rising tension in the South China Sea, China must face the reinforcement of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or known as the Quad or Asian NATO. It is an informal strategic forum between the US, Japan, Australia, and India initiated in 2007 that tried to maintain military drills between its member states. In October 2020, we witnessed not only the Quad meeting hosted by Japan but also the naval exercises in the Pacific that deployed one of the world's largest military vessels. It is then followed by the Malabar exercise conducted in November 2020. Initially launched in 1992 as a bilateral military exercise between India and the US, then followed by Japan's participation since 2015, and this year, for the first time in 13 years, Australia decided to join this Malabar military exercise. What is more, the leaders of Australia and Japan made concrete progress in the conclusion of the Reciprocal Access Agreement, a legal framework to allow their troops to visit each other's countries to conduct training and joint operations. All of these military and defensive moves by Pacific regional powers have demonstrated collective fear of Beijing's rising influence. In response to this, China not only increased the number of its military drills in the region but also introduced the Coast Guard Law at the beginning of November 2020 that allowed

Chinese coast guards to attack ships of other countries entering Chinese territorial waters without permission and being considered as a threat to the mainland. This law has definitely provoked reactions from regional actors, in particular from Japan that considered this law targeting Japan's navigation around the disputed Diaoyu Dao/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.

At the bilateral level, the situation is far from ideal. One of the most important issues was definitely the tension between China and Australia. First of all, the whole period of monitoring was marked by a severe trade war between the two countries. It started in September 2020 when China suspended barley imports from Australia, followed by Australia's accusation in October 2020 that said China has instructed buyers to avoid Australian coal supplies, then succeeded by China's decision in November 2020 to impose heavy tariffs, which is up to 212%, on Australian wines, as well as to ban imports of log timber from Victoria. In addition, during the whole autumn period, Beijing also suspended imports of different Australian products such as sugar, timber, lobster, and copper. Thus, Canberra decided to raise the issue of barley imports suspension, judged as "unjustified and aggressive", to the World Trade Organization. Moreover, the economic tension is added by another diplomatic tension related to the tweet posted by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson in November 2020 in which it contained a caricatural image showing an Australian soldier murdering an Afghan child. This action has definitely worsened the bilateral ties while provoked different international reactions at the same time. The rising tension with China also became one of the reasons explaining why Australia finally decided to join the India-backed Malabar exercise.

However, the relations between China and Pacific regional powers have also been characterized by several positive outcomes. The most important achievement was certainly the signature of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) known as the biggest trade bloc history, in which Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea are all signatories of this free trade agreement. Hence, China benefited from the conclusion of the RCEP to advance its economic cooperation with each regional power. For instance, at the end of November 2020, just

several days after the conclusion of the RCEP, China's Foreign Minister made an official trip to Japan and South Korea where a trilateral free trade agreement was one of the priorities of the meetings' agenda given that the RCEP has just been signed and the US was in the middle of a presidential transition. These meetings also became an opportunity for China to express its concern over the rising influence of the Quad in which Japan is highly involved. Finally, in January 2021, it was New Zealand's tour to upgrade their free trade agreement with China.

China and India

The international landscape is currently being shaped by the ongoing rising tension between Asia's two largest nuclear powers, China and India. While the two countries had never agreed on their border, they had largely given each other space around their respective claims for decades until a showdown in June erupted into a deadly clash that left 20 Indian soldiers and an undetermined number of Chinese soldiers dead. Since then, the ill-defined 3,400 kilometers-long borders in eastern Ladakh, in the Himalayan region, also known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC) [Annex 1], became the source of the current ongoing tension, where both countries are competing by building infrastructure along this border. Moreover, the situation became more complicated because different attempts to stabilize the tension never achieved any successful outcomes. During the past five months of monitoring, there were several rounds of corps commander meetings that were being held, where, diplomatically, both sides already expressed their willingness to disengage their respective troops in the border. However, following these meetings, we observed how both countries always adopted opposite concrete actions by continuing to reinforce their military presence on the ground. What is more, we observed how China relies on other regional powers, such as Pakistan, to counter India's influence. For instance, China decided not to oppose Pakistan's decision to accord a provisional provincial status to the Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which is the disputed territory with India. As a result of the rising border dispute, India tried to forge its influence in the region with the help of its closest allies by conducting the Malabar exercise in

November 2020 amidst the increasing tension in the relationship between each of the four member countries of the Malabar exercise and China. It was further interpreted as a demonstration of the joint force in the face of Beijing's increasingly "muscular" foreign policy. Despite that, this ongoing border dispute might actually start to see the light at the end of the tunnel. The ninth round of China-India corps commander level meeting held in late January 2021 has finally been able to reach a consensus where both parties committed to starting a synchronized and organized troops disengagement at the south and north bank of the Pangong Tso Lake.

At the same time, the tension between China and India is not only limited to territorial disputes and military concerns. In order to counter China's influence and, as it is claimed, to protect India's national security and sovereignty, New Delhi decided in January 2021 to ban 59 Chinese apps, including Tik Tok. Also, this move is being described as India's strategy to put in place economic punishments since India has acknowledged that Beijing has an immense military advantage. However, India's limited economic leverage over China has rendered these measures relatively ineffective. On China's side, Beijing only responded by urging the Indian authorities to immediately correct its discriminatory measures and avoid causing further damage to the bilateral cooperation. This narrative matched China's desire already expressed since the beginning of the tension, to not link the border dispute with China-India bilateral relations. For China, cooperation and competition between the two countries must be able to coexist. Therefore, this idea was being translated, for now, at the multilateral level. To cite an instance, both Chinese and Indian heads of State attended the 19tth Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization held in November 2020 that turned out to be the first official meeting between both heads of State since the beginning of tension in June 2020. During this meeting, the necessity to uphold multilateralism and cooperation was expressed by both countries.

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Russian Foreign Policy

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On March 31, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new decree on Russia's 'Foreign Policy Concept.' The 'Foreign Policy Concept' is an official government document that describes Russia's perception of the world and details major national interests, foreign policy goals, and implementation strategies on foreign policy. Russia has continued revising its 'Foreign Policy Concept' when deemed necessary since it was first announced in 1993. This year's 'Foreign Policy Concept' is the sixth version, following revisions in 2000, 2008, 2013, and 2016. The 2023 'Foreign Policy Concept' has especially received much attention given that it is the first official document on diplomacy and national security released by Russia since its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Analysis of the 'Foreign Policy Concept' will provide important insights into Russia's foreign policy and have significant implications for the future of the war in Ukraine and the global order when Putin's Russia is 'irrecoverably' conflicting with Western states. This paper examines the main characteristics of the 2023 'Foreign Policy Concept' in three key aspects.

First, the overall impression of the 2023 'Foreign Policy Concept' is that it is extremely aggressive, ideological, and propagandistic. Various propagandistic terms that the Russian government had not used in official documents appear frequently in this document. This includes the Russian world, Western hegemony, neo-colonialism, the collective West, traditional values, a multipolar world, Anglo-Saxon, Russophobia, and neo-Nazism. These ideological and propagandistic terms have often been used by Russia to justify its invasion of Ukraine. It is noteworthy that they have been codified in an official government document this time.

Much of the contents of the 'Foreign Policy Concept' addresses policies regarding regions and individual states. It categorizes the world according to different regions, as well as the organizations and states within them, and consequently details Russia's policy towards each region and state. The 2016 'Foreign Policy Concept' did not use this categorization. Instead, it stated Russia's position and policies toward regional organizations and individual states based on foreign policy priorities. However, the format of the 2023 'Foreign Policy Concept' has significantly changed when compared to previous versions.

Here, the following points are noteworthy: the categorization of the world into nine regions; the reappearance of the Near Abroad concept that used to describe former Soviet countries; the specific mentions of China and India along with the Eurasian continent; how the Asia-Pacific region is restricted to ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) states; the use of an unfamiliar regional term regarding the Islamic World; and how countries such as the U.S., the U.K., Australia, and Canada are referred to as Anglo-Saxon states and mentioned last, hinting at those countries' decreased diplomatic priorities for Russia. Previous versions of the 'Foreign Policy Concept' have had detailed policies toward North and South Korea as well as Japan when addressing states in the Asia-Pacific. However, mentions of the Korean peninsula were completely omitted from the 2023 version.

These differences observed in the 2023 'Foreign Policy Concept' indicate changes to Russia's perceptions of its own identity and the world. A social atmosphere that emphasizes nationalism and patriotism has intensified in Russia under President Putin's rule. Many experts note that there are strong civilizational and Russocentric sentiments embedded in President Putin's view of the world. But it is highly unusual that phrases, such as "Russia is not a regional state but a unique civilization," "the self-sufficient character of the Russian civilization," and "Russia's mission to unite the Russian world," have been used in an official government document that addresses foreign policy. It can be inferred from the 2023 'Foreign Policy Concept' that Russia not only seeks to define itself as an independent civilization that is separate from both Europe and Asia, but also seeks to stress its intent to interpret and reorganize the international order from the perspective of the Russian civilization.

Competing against the U.S. and the West and Cooperating with the Global South Second, through the 2023 'Foreign Policy Concept,' Russia maintains its combative stance against Western states, particularly the U.S., while also declaring its intent to focus on strengthening cooperation with non-Western states. Russia's distrust and threat perception of Western states were also visible in the 2016 'Foreign Policy Concept.' But the tone of the message directed at the West has considerably toughened in this year's version. Russia defines

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globalization led by the West as imperialism and colonialism and opposes the global imposition of "destructive neoliberal ideological attitudes." Furthermore, the 2023 'Foreign Policy Concept' criticizes that the eventual goal of the West is to destroy Russia and specifies the U.S. as "the main inspirer, organizer, and executor of the aggressive anti-Russian policy of the collective West."

The 2023 'Foreign Policy Concept' argues that with the rise of states in Asia and Africa, the world is transitioning to a 'multipolar world' in which the U.S. and Europe are no longer at the center. It further states that the West, including the U.S. and Europe, is having a 'destructive effect' on the entire world by rejecting this multipolar reality and stubbornly trying to maintain the existing order. In this vein, the West has implemented various policies to weaken Russia as the Kremlin resists Western hegemony. It argues that the attempt to keep Ukraine under Western control is claimed to be a part of these efforts. The 2023 'Foreign Policy Concept' proposes the conspiracy that it is the West and the U.S. in particular that forced Russia into the war in Ukraine. "Viewing Russia as a threat to Western hegemony, the U.S. unleashed a new type of hybrid war. This was not the choice of the Russian Federation."

Within this strategic environment, Russia declares that it will strengthen relations with China and India, as well as countries in the Islamic world, Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia that have not participated in sanctions on Russia. In other words, Russia intends to focus on collaboration and cooperation with the so-called Global South. In particular, India and China are core partner countries that can compensate for Russia's severed ties with the West. They are also great powers that can form an important axis in the multipolar world that Russia envisions. Considerable attention was paid to mentions of China in the new 'Foreign Policy Concept' given how Russia-China relations have been steadfastly maintained despite the war in Ukraine. But contrary to expectations, references to China appear somewhat principled and restrained in the 2023 'Foreign Policy Concept.' Moreover, it almost seems that Russia is placing more emphasis on improving relations with states in Latin America, the Caribbean, the Islamic world, and Africa. This tone may be the intentional result of Russia's attempt to refute the West's view that

Russia is overly dependent on China and that it has become internationally isolated.

It is also alarming that Russia considers nuclear war highly probable in the new 'Foreign Policy Concept.' The 2016 version of the 'Foreign Policy Concept' included a sentence that an all-out war between large nuclear powers was unlikely. But the 2023 version states that the possibility of conflict between nuclear powers is increasing and, as a result, the likelihood of war at a global scale is also rising.

Restoring Russia's Sphere of Influence over the Former Soviet Union Third, changes to Russia's perception of, and response to, former member states of the Soviet Union have been detected. As mentioned above, the use of the term 'Near Abroad' is noteworthy. The term has often been used to refer to former Soviet countries since the 1990s. But the term had disappeared from official government documents since the 2000s because former Soviet countries were not particularly fond of its use due to the Russocentric nature of the term. Therefore, the term 'Near Abroad' had been replaced with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the 2013 and 2016 versions of the 'Foreign Policy Concept.' The return of the term 'Near Abroad' in this year's 'Foreign Policy Concept' indicates how Russia's perception of former Soviet countries has changed. In other words, it represents how this region is viewed from a more Russocentric perspective.

Also worth noting is how the country name of Ukraine appears only once in this year's revised 'Foreign Policy Concept.' Even with that, this single reference was indirect. Ukraine was mentioned in the sentence stating that the U.S. and Europe "unleashed a new type of hybrid war" to respond to "the measures adopted by the Russian Federation in defence of its existential interests in the Ukrainian direction." Statements regarding the war in Ukraine itself are also difficult to find. In contrast, Russia's relationship with Ukraine is stated as follows in the 2016 version. "The Russian Federation is interested in developing political, economic, cultural, and spiritual ties with Ukraine on the basis of mutual respect, and in building partnership while respecting each national interests."

Russia was punished with economic sanctions by Western states for forcibly annexing and seizing the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine in February 2014. The 2016 'Foreign Policy Concept' was announced at a time when Russia was expanding its military intervention into the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, thereby heightening tensions not only with the Ukrainian government but also with the West. However, Russia's acknowledgment and recognition of Ukraine as a sovereign state was still partially visible in the 2016 'Foreign Policy Concept.' But the 2023 version deliberately ignores Ukraine, implying that Russia's perception of, and strategy for, Ukraine has fundamentally changed.

Georgia, a former Soviet country that has anti-Russia and pro-Western tendencies, is also treated similarly. Georgia previously fought a war against Russia in August 2008 after forcibly trying to prevent South Ossetia and Abkhazia from seeking independence from Georgia through the use of force. Russia approved the independence of these two regions, and diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia were severed as a result. The 2016 'Foreign Policy Concept' mentions how Russia was considering normalizing diplomatic relations with Georgia. But Georgia was deleted from the 2023 version, instead replaced by a long description of the need to increase cooperation with both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Recently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has shared his assessment that the political situation in Georgia is unfolding similarly to that in Ukraine. He expressed his concern that Georgia is becoming the next Ukraine after falling for America's conspiracy. Experts in the West have analyzed that Russia might attempt military provocations to restore Russia's sphere of influence over former Soviet states such as Georgia and Moldova.

Outlook and Implications
The 2023 'Foreign Policy Concept' document is 42 pages long and, in addition to the contents examined above, comprehensively addresses almost every issue area related to Russian foreign policy. Evaluating this year's 'Foreign Policy Concept,' President Putin asserted that Russia is not hostile towards any country in the world and that Russia has no intention of isolating itself. He also stressed that Russia hoped to cooperate with every country that wanted an equal relationship. But Russia's newly revised 'Foreign Policy Concept'

highlights Russia's civilized and moral superiority in the competition against the West that began in earnest with the war in Ukraine. This indicates that Russia will not easily back down in the war in Ukraine or the competition with the West. The message is that Russia is only acting in self-defense against the West's conspiracy to achieve hegemony, and that there will only be a victory because justice is on Russia's side. At the same time, however, the 2023 'Foreign Policy Concept' also claims that Russia is neither 'the West's enemy' nor that Russia is hostile towards the West, instead proposing for Russia and the West to merely resume "pragmatic cooperation." However, it is unclear what pragmatic cooperation specifically means. But regardless of whether or not Russia achieves ultimate victory in the ongoing war in Ukraine, it is highly unlikely that the center axis of Russian foreign policy will be westward again. Through the 2023 'Foreign Policy Concept,' Russia has made it clear that it will shape the future of the country eastward and southward.

It appears that Russia will focus on strengthening relations with not only China and India but also third-world developing countries in the so-called Global South to compensate for its severed relations with the West. Moreover, Russia is expected to attempt to not only expand organizations such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), but also enhance Russia's status within these organizations.

But it is uncertain whether Russia's vision for the international order and for its nation will be realized. Even though it is an energy-rich country, pressure on Russia's national economy has increased because the export of energy resources such as oil and natural gas to Europe and the West has been blocked. So far, Russia has been able to avoid a crisis because countries such as China, India, and Turkey that have not participated in sanctions against Russia have imported Russian energy resources at cheap prices. But the West's efforts to maximize the effectiveness of sanctions on Russia have continued, and it will not be easy for Russia to protract the 'energy war.' Moreover, Russia will be unable to avoid harm to its engine for economic development due to a lack of cutting-edge technology and materials precipitated by the mass exodus of Western corporations triggered by

sanctions. There have even been some pessimistic assessments that Russia may become similar to North Korea (Northkoreanization) due to increased dependence on China and a stronger dictatorship by Putin to tighten internal control.

In contrast to previous versions of the 'Foreign Policy Concept' that addressed the North Korean nuclear problem, the situation on the Korean peninsula, and the need for balanced cooperation with both South and North Korea, mentions of the Korean peninsula have been completely omitted from this new version. Not even closer North Korea-Russia relations which have recently received much attention were mentioned. But it appears premature to expect Russia to be indifferent to the Korean peninsula problem. It would be accurate to think that Russia has included South Korea in the 'collective West' that is hostile towards Russia and included North Korea in the 'Global South' which Russia seeks to cooperate with. If North Korea joins the Russia-China coalition competing against the U.S. in Northeast Asia and around the Korean peninsula, the consolidation of the new-Cold War bloc will accelerate. South Korea's security environment will inevitably worsen as a result.

It will be difficult for the governments of South Korea and Russia to restore relations to previous level for the time being because South Korea has participated in sanctions on Russia and Russia has designated South Korea as an unfriendly nation. But Russia is an important partner that needs to be consulted and cooperated with to solve the North Korean nuclear problem and foster a peaceful environment in

Northeast Asia due to its geographical proximity to the Korean peninsula. The South Korean government needs to manage relations with Russia so that bilateral civil exchanges and channels for track 1.5 dialogues are not terminated. Moreover, every diplomatic effort needs to be made to prevent a North Korea-China-Russia coalition from becoming a reality. Communication between South Korea and Russia is more important than ever at a time when the world is being split and Northeast Asia is being divided into two competing blocs.

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U.S.A Foreign Policy

The United States of America is one of the most powerful and influential countries in the world, with a foreign policy that has significant global implications. The country's foreign policy is shaped by a range of factors, including historical events, domestic politics, and economic interests. Historically, the United States has been involved in numerous global conflicts, including both World War I and II, the Cold War, and more recently, the War on Terror. These events have had a significant impact on the country's foreign policy and continue to shape its approach to international relations.

Domestic politics also plays a significant role in shaping US foreign policy decisions. The political climate in the country can influence the direction of foreign policy, with factors such as public opinion, interest groups, and political ideology all playing a role. Finally, economic interests are also a critical driver of American foreign policy. The country's economic interests often influence its decision-making, particularly in relation to trade and investment. In recent years, the Trump administration marked a significant shift in US foreign policy, with an emphasis on "America First" policies and a more unilateral approach to global affairs. However, with the election of Joe Biden as President, there has been a renewed focus on multilateralism and international cooperation, signaling a potential shift in American foreign policy. This research aims to provide a

comprehensive understanding of the key factors that shape American foreign policy, both historically and in the contemporary world, as well as the challenges and opportunities facing US foreign policy under the Biden administration.

The foreign policy of the United States of America has been a topic of interest for scholars, analysts, and policymakers for decades, due to its significant impact on global politics and international relations. America's foreign policy is shaped by a range of factors, including historical events, domestic politics, and economic interests, and is a reflection of the country's position as a global superpower. This article seeks to provide an in-depth analysis of the key elements that shape American foreign policy, including historical factors, domestic politics, and economic interests. Additionally, the article will examine the current state of US foreign policy under the Biden administration and its implications for global affairs. Through this analysis, the article aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the complexities and challenges of American foreign policy in the contemporary world.

One of the most significant factors that shape American foreign policy is historical events. The country has been involved in numerous global conflicts throughout its history, including World War I and II, the Cold War, and more recently, the War on Terror. These events have had a profound impact on the country's foreign policy and continue to shape its approach to international relations. For example, the end of World War II marked the beginning of America's dominance in the international system, and the country played a significant role in the establishment of institutions such as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund. The Cold War, which followed shortly after, saw the US engage in a global struggle against the Soviet Union and its communist allies, with American foreign policy focused on containing the spread of communism. More recently, the War on Terror has shaped America's foreign policy, with the country engaging in conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as pursuing a more aggressive approach to counterterrorism. Historical events have also influenced America's approach to diplomacy, with the country's diplomatic style often characterized by a preference for hard power and the use of force. However, there have been exceptions, such

as the historic agreement between the US and Iran on the country's nuclear program, which relied on diplomatic negotiations rather than military action.

Domestic politics and economic interests

Domestic politics and economic interests also play a significant role in shaping American foreign policy. The political climate in the country can influence the direction of foreign policy, with factors such as public opinion, interest groups, and political ideology all playing a role. For example, the Vietnam War was a deeply divisive issue in American politics, with public opposition to the war eventually leading to the country's withdrawal. Similarly, the Trump administration's "America First" policies were heavily influenced by the President's political ideology, with a focus on protecting American jobs and businesses from foreign competition. Economic interests also play a critical role in American foreign policy. The country's economic interests often influence its decision-making, particularly in relation to trade and investment. For example, the US-China trade war was driven by concerns over China's trade practices and intellectual property theft, as well as a desire to protect American businesses and jobs. However, economic interests can also conflict with other factors, such as human rights concerns, as seen in the case of America's relationship with Saudi Arabia, which has been criticized for its human rights record but remains a key US ally in the Middle East.

International cooperation and alliances

International cooperation and alliances play a critical role in American foreign policy. The country is a member of numerous international organizations, including the United Nations, NATO, and the World Trade Organization, and works closely with its allies to pursue its strategic objectives. The US has long been a key player in the international system, and its alliances with other countries have been critical to maintaining its global influence. For example, the US-Japan alliance has been a cornerstone of American foreign policy in the AsiaPacific region, providing a

strategic counterbalance to China's growing influence in the region.

However, these alliances are not without challenges, and the Trump administration's "America First" policies created significant tension with some of the country's traditional allies, such as Europe and Canada. The Biden administration has sought to repair these relationships and pursue a more multilateral approach to foreign policy.

Two key case studies that illustrate the complexities of American foreign policy are the country's relationships with Russia and China. The US-Russia relationship has been marked by tension and competition since the end of the Cold War, with the two countries engaging in a range of disputes, including over issues such as Syria, Ukraine, and election interference. The Trump administration's relationship with Russia was particularly controversial, with allegations of collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia leading to an investigation by the Mueller Commission. The US-China relationship is also a critical issue in American foreign policy. The two countries are engaged in a range of disputes, including over issues such as trade, human rights, and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The Trump administration pursued a confrontational approach to China, leading to a trade war and increased tension between the two countries.

Overall, American foreign policy is a complex and multifaceted issue, shaped by a range of factors, including historical events, domestic politics, economic interests, and international alliances. The country's position as a global superpower means that its decisions and actions have significant implications for the rest of the world. The Biden administration's approach to foreign policy has signaled a shift towards multilateralism and cooperation with allies, in contrast to the more confrontational approach of the previous administration. However, there are still significant challenges facing American foreign policy, including ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, tensions with Russia and China, and the ongoing threat of terrorism. Moving forward, American foreign policy will need to strike a delicate balance between protecting the country's strategic interests, maintaining its global influence, and pursuing a more collaborative and multilateral approach to international affairs. This will require careful consideration and strategic decision-making by policymakers, as well as a willingness to engage with the rest of the world and work towards shared goals and objectives.

SWOT Analysis

Strengths

• One of the main strengths of American foreign policy is the country's global influence and power. The US is a global superpower, with significant economic, military, and political influence around the world. This gives it a significant advantage in pursuing its strategic objectives and advancing its interests on the international stage.

• Another strength of American foreign policy is its alliances and partnerships with other countries. These relationships provide the US with critical support and help to maintain its global influence and presence.

Weaknesses

• One of the main weaknesses of

American foreign policy is its tendency towards unilateralism and a "go it alone" approach. This approach can lead to tension with other countries and undermine its alliances and partnerships.

• Another weakness is the country's domestic politics, which can often complicate its foreign policy decision-making. Partisan politics and ideological differences can make it difficult for the US to pursue a consistent and cohesive foreign policy.

Opportunities

• One of the main opportunities for American foreign policy is the potential for increased cooperation and collaboration with other countries. The Biden administration has signaled a shift towards multilateralism and engagement with allies, which could lead to new opportunities for cooperation and shared goals.

• Another opportunity is the potential for new

alliances and partnerships in emerging regions such as the Indo-Pacific. The US has been increasingly focused on this region as a strategic priority, and there is potential for new relationships and partnerships to emerge.

Threats

• One of the main threats to American foreign policy is the potential for conflict and competition with other countries, particularly with major powers such as China and Russia. Ongoing disputes and tensions could lead to destabilization and conflict, which could have significant implications for the rest of the world.

• Another threat is the ongoing threat of terrorism and extremist groups, which remains a significant challenge for American foreign policy. The US will need to continue to work with its allies and partners to address this threat and prevent the spread of extremist ideology.

In conclusion, American foreign policy is a complex and multifaceted issue, shaped by a range of factors, including historical events, domestic politics, economic interests, and international alliances. The country's position as a global superpower means that its decisions and actions have significant implications for the rest of the world. The Biden administration's approach to foreign policy has signaled a shift towards multilateralism and cooperation with allies, which could lead to new opportunities for collaboration and shared goals. However, there are still significant challenges facing American foreign policy, including ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, tensions with Russia and China, and the ongoing threat of terrorism. Moving forward, American foreign policy will need to strike a delicate balance between protecting the country's strategic interests, maintaining its global influence, and pursuing a more collaborative and multilateral approach to international affairs. This will require careful consideration and strategic decision-making by policymakers, as well as a willingness to engage with the rest of the world and work towards shared goals and objectives. Ultimately, the success of American foreign policy will depend on its ability to adapt and respond to new challenges and opportunities in the global arena.

United Kingdom"s Foreign Policy

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The Traditions of British Foreign Policy

Domestic politics in Britain has been influenced by a number of different political, cultural, and social scientific traditions, and foreign policy is no different. The most discussed political traditions are the conservative, whig, liberal and socialist ones, all of which contend in British foreign policy (Hall 2012a). The conservative tradition emphasises the need for scepticism and prudence in international affairs, arguing thatthecautiouspursuitofstateinterestsistheprefera blestrategy. The whig tradition is equally suspicious of moralism, but is more confident in the ability of British diplomacy effectively to influence international relations, opening a space for ethical considerations to shape British policy. By contrast, liberals and socialists privilege internationalist themes. The liberal tradition calls for a foreign policy driven by an unflinching devotion to cosmopolitan ethics, economic freedom, strong international law and the institutions to enforce it, and the extension of liberal democratic forms of government. Socialists share the cosmopolitanism and internationalism of liberals, but depart from them on the virtues of free markets and liberal—as opposed to social—democracy. They profess faith in international institutions, but often lament their apparent inadequacy when dealing with international issues of socialist concern.

These political traditions have evolved and changed over time as their inheritors have responded to various dilemmas. Moreover, it has rarely been the case that one tradition alone has shaped a government's foreign policy. Rather, as the New Labour governments demonstrated so well after 1997, the making and conduct of foreign policy is normally shaped by the interaction of different traditions. Under New Labour, inheritors of a more liberal socialism such as Tony Blair vied with social democrats such as Robin Cook, as well as with the whiggish (and occasionally conservative) denizens of the FCO, the wider Civil Service and the military. To varying degrees, they sought to appropriate aspects of those traditions that they saw as useful in particular circumstances, or indeed to redefine what they thought was old-fashioned or inappropriate. Blair's blending of a Gladstonian concern with human rights with a more contemporary account of the transformations wrought to international relations by globalization well illustrates this mode of renegotiating traditions in response to new ideas.

As we shall see, the post-Cold War period saw extensive renegotiations of this kind. For most of the past century, the whig tradition has been dominant in British foreign policy making, held dear by British diplomats in particular. In the 1990s, however, the rise of new ways of thinking about and practising governance began to challenge the whig ascendency and erode the claim that government was best practised by a bureaucratic elite claiming exclusive expertise over their domain. Whiggism was transformed from a narrative of rule to one of resistance. So too was conservatism, which had returned to British foreign policy in a particularly desiccated form during Douglas Hurd's tenure at the FCO (1989–95). The Balkan wars and humanitarian emergencies elsewhere in the world posed multiple dilemmas for the adherents of a tradition that appeared out-dated in the contemporary world, and they struggled to respond effectively as liberals and socialists quickly adapted to the new circumstances.

These political traditions are cross-cut with other prominent cultural traditions. The three most obvious cultural traditions are: Atlanticism, pro-Europeanism, and pro-Commonwealth ideas—traditions that may occur alongside the beliefs of all four political traditions. Where the Atlanticists prefer Britain to lean towards the United States, the pro-Europeans wish for deeper commitment to the EU. The pro-Commonwealth tradition, which calls for British foreign policy to take more seriously its ties to former imperial possessions and dominions, attracts far fewer adherents today than it did in the 1950s and 1960s, but resurfaces periodically, especially among conservatives. As with the political traditions, inheritors of these sets of beliefs vary when it comes to their views on particular issues. Atlanticists, for example, may conceive their proper role—and the proper role for Britain—as standing 'shoulder-to-shoulder' with the United States or as constructive critics (Dunne 2004). Similarly, Europeanists may argue that the preferable strategy is accepting the unpalatable even if it runs counter to short-term interests or they may contend that Europe is better served by British-led opposition to certain initiatives in Brussels.

Finally, there are also those traditions that are derived from social scientific work on international relations and which practitioners inherit either directly (normally in higher education) or indirectly (from think-tanks, NGOs or the media). The major social scientific traditions are realism, internationalism, various kinds of Marxism and post-Marxism, and feminism. These traditions too may be detected in the thought of particular individuals involved with the formulation and implementation of British foreign policy. They underpin and inform a series of more technical aspects of policy making, what we call 'rationalities'. These rationalities are taken up and utilised by practitioners when faced by dilemmas that conventional approaches seem to be unable to solve. The use of networks rather than traditional bureaucracies for resource allocation and service delivery offers one example of a rationality.

Interpreting British Foreign Policy

The articles in this special issue examine aspects of British foreign policy in the post-Cold War period and assess the merits of the interpretive approach. Not all of them agree wholeheartedly that the interpretive approach is the best way forward, but they all engage with what it offers students of international relations. They all focus on the beliefs of policy actors, locating them against the background of different traditions and dilemmas.

The first three articles—by Judi Atkins, Jamie Gaskarth and Oliver Daddow— examine the evolution of key traditions in the beliefs of policymakers. Judi Atkins' opening article examines New Labour's renegotiation of elements of the social democratic tradition in response to the perceived demands of globalization. She argues that New Labour drew upon interdependence theory, neocommunitarianism and democratic peace theory to re-cast social democratic internationalism to confront a series of new dilemmas. While this renegotiation was contested, it helps to explain the apparent contradictions in Tony Blair's foreign policy.

It didn't shrink, but the world got bigger
Britain, GDP, % of world total*
Source: Angus Maddison
*At purchasing-power parity
The Economist

Jamie Gaskarth's focus is also on the beliefs and perceptions of policymakers and the ways in which these are modified in response to new dilemmas. His article draws upon extensive interviews with ten ministers charged with responsibility for foreign policy between 1977 and 2010. His concern is how the interviewees themselves conceived the traditions they believed shaped British foreign policy during that period, how they drew upon the resources they offered to confront ethical dilemmas and how they re-shaped those traditions as a consequence. In particular, his article points to the persistence of the 'whig' tradition, despite the rise of the kind of new thinking Atkins describes.

In his article, Oliver Daddow also takes the longer view, exploring the reformation of Euroscepticism at the hands of Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair. Rather than seeing Euroscepticism as a 'structuring' discourse, as some do, Daddow argues that Blair came to share many of the same beliefs as Thatcher espoused in the latter part of her Prime Ministership.

Ian Hall's article turns from traditions to rationalities. The reform of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) until New Labour is often thought to be driven by ideology, especially socialist hostility to perceived conservatism. Hall tells a more complex story, arguing that the reform process was driven by a number of different sets of beliefs, including demands from within the FCO itself for greater openness and accountability both to its own staff and to external stakeholders. These various demands were met by the introduction of new rationalities drawn especially from 'new public management' (NPM) and network theories, as well as from social scientific ideas concerning

the relationship between identity and policy-making.

The last four articles deal with particular dilemmas in recent British foreign policy: humanitarian intervention, militant Islamist terrorism, Turkey's membership negotiations with the EU, and the challenge posed to the nuclear order by Iran. David McCourt argues that neither the advent of an 'ethical foreign policy' nor the beliefs and mind-set of Tony Blair are sufficient to explain the shift towards a more interventionist foreign policy in the late 1990s. Instead, he argues that a revival and renegotiation of the Atlanticist tradition in New Labour best explains the decision taken to push for intervention in Kosovo in 1998–99 and the abandonment of earlier realist approaches to the break-up of Yugoslavia.

In his article, Steven Kettell seeks to fuse elements of interpretivism and postmodern approaches to examine the discourse used by New Labour—and by Tony Blair in particular—to try to legitimate British involvement in the 'War on Terror'. Kettell's focus is the emergence, use and destabilisation of what he calls 'discursive strategies'—how they develop in response to dilemmas and how they are utilised by political actors to justify political actions.

In his account of the treatment by the British press of the question of Turkish accession to the EU, Ryan Philips turns from the foreign policy making elite to the role played by media. He argues that the election of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2007 prompted a significant renegotiation of inherited beliefs about the possibility of Turkish EU membership, as earlier, positive views were replaced by more sceptical attitudes.

In the last article, Chris Kitchen and Rhiannon Vickers return to the tensions between New Labour's internationalist inheritance and the new dilemmas they faced. They argue that Iran posed a significant challenge to the pursuit of an internationalist foreign policy, confronting successive New Labour governments with problems not easily resolved by internationalist means. Their article tracks the twists and turns of British policy on Iran's nuclear program, showing how policy initiatives were formulated, implemented and tested in practice, as core beliefs

in the minds of policymakers about how international relations ought to work were subjected to the pressures of events.

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European Union Foreign Policy

This article is not an analysis, it is entirely based on the database of the European Parliament

The rise of instability in the world has had direct consequences for the EU.1 Violence in the EU's neighbourhoods, as well as conflicts and natural crises further afield, have triggered massive displacements of people, some making perilous journeys in their attempts to reach the EU. As difficulties coping with temporary spikes of migrant arrivals have shown, it is important that EU and Member States act as one in the face of global challenges. The EU's new ambition is to focus on areas where it can make a difference and on partners with shared interests. The redefinition of the EU as a stronger global actor has been a principal political, organisational and financial objective since 2014. On the political side, the EU Member States and institutions have been involved in a strategic debate. When it comes to the organisational structure, efforts have been made to improve the coordination of policies and stakeholders and to 'break down the silos' in traditional policy areas. On the financial side, setting new priority areas means streamlining financial instruments, something that is currently under debate for the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework.

EU foreign policy strategy is designed primarily to monitor and mitigate the root causes of insecurity through an integrated approach, bringing all the EU stakeholders concerned together, both at headquarters and in the field. To address the impacts of global insecurity on its soil, the EU has undertaken to step up its defence policy and counter terrorism instruments. At the same time, the EU is a fierce advocate of a multilateral approach to the global environmental, economic, and political challenges that are the root causes of instability. This new approach has also inspired changes in development cooperation and humanitarian aid policies, also taking on board international frameworks devised with an active EU contribution, such as the United Nations' sustainable development goals. This briefing presents what has been achieved so far in some areas of EU foreign policy, and highlights the European Parliament's contribution.

Comparative Eurobarometer surveys on citizens' 'perceptions and expectations', conducted for the European Parliament in 2016 and 2018, show that in 2018, 57 % of EU citizens wanted to see increased EU involvement in foreign policy, an increase of seven percentage points compared with 2016. Despite this, there were still nine Member States where only a minority of the population wanted greater EU involvement in foreign policy. The lowest level of support was registered in Denmark (35 %) and the UK (40 %), while the highest was registered in Cyprus (84 %) and Spain (77 %). An increased desire for more EU action in foreign policy was shared by most Member States. In some countries levels even increased by double figures – in Germany (by 18 percentage points), Malta (16), Romania (14), the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Hungary (12, 11, 11 and 10 percentage points respectively). The most significant decrease in the share of citizens hoping for more EU involvement was registered in Italy (from 63 % to 56 %) and Bulgaria (from 55 % to 50 %).

Foreign policy is a broad area and, when asked about particular aspects of it, citizens often express differing opinions. As concerns the diplomatic aspects of foreign policy, detailed answers in Eurobarometer Survey 89.2 show that more than seven out of ten citizens want the EU to speak with one voice in front of other great world powers such as the United States of America (US), Russia or China, or when addressing Middle-Eastern instability. However, other aspects, such as development cooperation or humanitarian aid, are not specifically addressed in the questionnaire. Furthermore, policy areas with a strong 'external' dimension, such as the fight against terrorism, democracy promotion, migration management, border protection, security and defence are dealt with as separate entries in the Eurobarometer.

Foreign policy is one of the areas where more citizens find EU action adequate (41 %) than insufficient (36 %); only 6 % find it excessive. This analysis must be nuanced, however. Citizens find it hard to assess EU foreign policy and the proportion of citizens who 'don't know' if they would like the EU to intervene less or more in this domain is the second largest (12 % in 2018) after industrial policy. The overall improvement in the evaluation of EU involvement in foreign policy is four percentage points. This positive trend is shared by

all Member States but three – Luxembourg (a seven percentage point decrease), the UK (five percentage point decrease) and Germany (two percentage point decrease). The highest improvement in the evaluation of EU involvement in the foreign policy was registered in Romania (an 18 percentage point increase) and Bulgaria (16 percentage point increase). The gap between expectations and evaluations of EU involvement in foreign policy remains small despite a slight increase. The increase is caused by a rise in citizens' expectations, surpassing the improvement in citizens' evaluations of EU involvement.

There are multiple dimensions to what is referred for the sake of ease as 'EU foreign policy'. These are reflected in the Treaties:
   The Treaty on European Union (TEU) includes provisions on 'common foreign and security policy' (CFSP) and 'common security and defence policy' (CSDP): these policies have been designed mainly by the Member States, through the Council (using the intergovernmental method).

   The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) also includes external policies on which the European Parliament and Council share the power to legislate (ordinary legislative procedure). This is the case for development, humanitarian aid and trade agreements. For other international agreements, participation in international fora or sanctions, Parliament is informed or consulted and can influence EU policy making.

 A third level of action relates to the 'external dimension of internal policies' such as migration policy and the fight against terrorism. The close relationship between CFSP, EU external action, and the 'external dimension' has been embodied by the Lisbon Treaty (2009) in the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP).

A large toolbox and a variety of actors are engaged in EU foreign policy. For instance, development cooperation is a major aspect of EU external policy. Its main objective – 'the reduction ... of poverty' – should be a guiding principle for all other EU foreign policies in developing countries (Article 208 TFEU). The EU institutions and Member States share this responsibility and together fund more

than half of global development aid. Humanitarian aid is also a domain where competences are shared between EU institutions and Member States (Article 4 TFEU). Together the world's top donor (€7 billion in 2017), they are committed to respecting the principles of international humanitarian law: 'impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination' (Article 214 TFEU). European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed in 2004, to prevent fault lines from growing too great between the enlarged EU and its closest neighbours. Expressly enforced by the Lisbon Treaty (Article 8 TEU), it consists of tailor-made agreements between the EU and each of 16 countries sharing its external borders, financed by a specific budgetary programme, the European Neighbourhood Instrument. In the framework of its international responsibilities, the EU can also conclude agreements with third countries and international organisations (Article 5 TEU, Articles 2, 3 and 4 TFEU). The European Parliament has enhanced its role in EU external action since its consent is required for most types of international agreement and it also has broad supervisory powers.

Financial instruments outside the EU budget

The European Development Fund (EDF) is the most significant programme outside the EU budget. It is financed through EU Member States' contributions and has specific provisions for its implementation.4 It is the main instrument for providing development aid in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. The 11th EDF (2014-2020) has been allocated €30 506 million. All Member States contribute to the EDF, and its incorporation within the EU budget, long discussed, is envisaged (but not yet decided) for the next multiannual financial framework. Other financial instruments, provided by EU budget, EDF and voluntary contributions from some Members States have also been put in place in recent years (see below 'Budgetary initiatives').

The eighth parliamentary term (2014-2019) was marked by the adoption of two major policy frameworks: the EU global strategy and the revised European consensus on development. The setting

up of these new frameworks has triggered a domino effect on most aspects of EU foreign policy: for sectoral as well as regional strategies.

Global strategy

The EU global strategy represents a complete overhaul of the EU response to global challenges. Reestablishing the EU as a stronger global actor was one of the ten priorities of the Juncker Commission. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and VicePresident of the European Commission (HR/VP) was given a mandate by the Council to engage upon a strategic reflection in collaboration with the Member States.

The resulting EU global strategy was endorsed by the European Council in June 2016. The approach was also supported by the European Parliament, which has often highlighted the need for proactive action to prevent crises. Parliament stressed that 'development is not possible without security, and security is not possible without development' and insisted that preventive policies be put in place, such as de-radicalisation programmes. Within a year of its launch, many of the global strategy's principles had been translated into actionable programmes, such as the strategic approach to resilience in EU external action, the implementation plan on security and defence, or the new partnership framework on migration. Sectoral (development, humanitarian aid) and geographical (neighbourhood and beyond) policies were also reviewed in line with the global strategy.

The document that resulted from the strategic reflection 'Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe' has become the new blueprint for EU external action. Acknowledging that global disorders are threatening the Union's own security, the global strategy calls for better coordination and the strengthening of all EU external policies and policies with an external dimension, with the clear aim of protecting the EU's interests. First, the global strategy calls upon the EU institutions and Member states to step up their cooperation on defence and counterterrorism. Ensuring EU security also means helping third countries, especially in the neighbourhood, to address and adapt to shocks such as food insecurity, violent conflicts or political

instability; in other words: building 'resilience'. To this end, the EU needs to build on its institutions' and Member States' expertise and combine a series of tools, such as: security and defence missions, development aid, humanitarian assistance and trust funds. This includes support for border control and the fight against migrant smugglers, as the aim is also to address the root causes of migration and develop a more effective migration policy. As regards the global order, the document advocates for support for regional organisations and action to strengthen global governance.

On the global stage, the UN adopted its 2030 agenda in September 2015, setting 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs), each with several measurable targets. This comprehensive policy framework addresses all aspects of human development – economic, social, political, and environmental – and commits all countries and stakeholders, stepping away from the donor/recipient relationship. It is the result of a long process, in which the EU played an active role.

The EU also committed to mainstream the SDGs into its policies. This commitment led to the revision of the consensus on development, a memorandum of understanding between the EU institutions and the Member States. The new consensus primarily targets fragile and conflict-affected countries, with a view to using development cooperation as an instrument to prevent violent conflicts or mitigate their consequences. It builds on the concept of 'resilience' outlined in the global strategy, and developed in the EU resilience policy framework, which promotes increased cooperation between the EU, the Member States, other donors and stakeholders.

The European Parliament called in particular for the fight against poverty to remain central to EU development policy; it insisted that migration-related development aid be focused on promoting inclusive and well-administered, democratic policies. Parliament also requested a binding regulation to improve coordination between the EU and Member States in the development field, but the Commission has yet to follow up on the proposal.

International trade
International trade is an exclusive competence of the EU. EU institutions are entrusted by Member States to conclude trade agreements with third countries and to legislate on trade and investment (under Article 207 TFEU). The 'Trade for All' strategy commits the EU to conduct an effective and transparent trade policy, based on values such as promoting sustainable rights and workers' rights. More than 70 trade agreements with third countries or groups of countries are currently in place or under negotiation.

When it comes to development-related trade issues,6 the EU grants unilateral tariff reductions to developing countries (under the generalised scheme of preferences, GSP) with incentives for vulnerable countries that commit to international conventions on human and social rights, environmental protection and good governance (GSP+), and up to duty-free, quota-free trade on 'everything but arms' (EBA) for the least developed countries. Specific trade agreements with African, Caribbean or Pacific groups of countries are also geared towards the development of the countries concerned and their integration into world markets. During the 2014-2019 term, Parliament pushed for initiatives to prevent EU-based companies operating in third countries from importing or producing goods if their supply chains generate negative impacts on the environment, human rights or working conditions.

This led to a regulation imposing due diligence on importers of minerals from conflictaffected countries.   Parliament also called on the Commission to propose a binding legislation on due diligence for supply chains in the clothing sector, a call that has not yet won the approval of the Commission and Council.   Parliament also called for the monitoring of and a ban on imports of goods produced through slavery, forced labour or child labour.

During the 2014-2019 mandate, the EU responded to several serious humanitarian crises. Humanitarian effectiveness was high on the agenda, with the EU advocating for a better exchange of information on risks, needs, capacities and available funding. This is all the more necessary since, while the EU and Member States together are the world's main humanitarian donor, funding remains far below needs.

At EU and Member State level, effectiveness is based on the coordination of all stakeholders. The European Parliament called for the principles laid down in the EU consensus on humanitarian aid – coordination of EU Member States and institutions and respect for humanitarian principles (humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence) – to be effectively implemented in the field and followed-up.

Humanitarian crises have had a direct impact on the EU, in the form of subsequent surges of people seeking asylum on its soil. The European Parliament often calls for efforts to 'avoid any contradiction between development aims and security, humanitarian and migration policies'.

Conflicts often aggravate the effects of natural catastrophes. The challenge is to ensure a better transition from emergency assistance to sustainable development aid, while maintaining their distinct characteristics: humanitarian response is based only on the assessment of needs; development and security policies are sensitive to the political context of recipients, as well as the EU's own interests. In the context of the migration 'crisis', the European Parliament also warned that the proposed Union resettlement framework should be based on humanitarian principles and not be used as a migration management tool.

New impetus in neighbourhood and enlargement policies
The Arab Spring uprisings triggered the evolution of the Union's relations with neighbouring countries towards a 'more for more' approach, aimed at strengthening relations with those countries engaging democratic reforms. However, spillovers of the Syrian civil war, the collapse of the Libyan state, the Ukraine crisis, the impact of the eastern frozen conflicts and other crises in the EU's neighbouring countries and their own neighbourhoods are challenging the EU's own security.

A radical review of the European neighbourhood policy (ENP), focused on the stabilisation of neighbour countries, became necessary. In November 2015, the revised ENP was published, taking into account Parliament's call for a 'more strategic, focused, flexible and coherent, and

politically driven' strategy. The revised policy now better differentiates southward and eastward approaches, including Russia's geostrategic interests in the latter. Its granularity allows a country by country approach, taking into account the actual aspirations of partner countries. The European Parliament approved the main aspects of the reform, but insisted on keeping democracy support and human rights at the centre of the new policy; it also called for increased funding for the ENP, in order to leverage the EU's influence in the regions concerned.

In the Western Balkans, the EU has helped to stabilise economies, but acknowledges that respect for the rule of law has not been achieved. In 2018, to reinforce its leverage in the region, the EU launched a new Western Balkan strategy, to give a 'credible enlargement perspective' to the candidate and potential candidate countries (Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo*),7 provided they strengthen the rule of law, improve the competitiveness of their economies, and solve disputes with neighbours. In return for real social and political willingness to belong to the Union, the new strategy sets out clear benchmarks for accession.

Neighbourhood policy is not just about migration and security, as evidenced by the ambitious 2018-2028 'PRIMA' research partnership focused on sustainable management of water resources and food production in the Mediterranean basin.

Revised regional strategies
A major innovation in EU foreign policy, clearly highlighted in the global strategy, is the will to break down EU 'policy silos', be they geographical or topical. This also enables better account to be taken of each partner's needs (differentiation).

Clear examples are provided by the revised regional strategies, such as those for the Sahel and for the Horn of Africa. These strategies bring together most stakeholders (EU, Member States, regional partners) and tools (CSDP missions, humanitarian aid, trade and development programmes) with integrated programming and common goals: climate action, better migration policy, and the fight against terrorism. While both

regional strategies promote similar objectives – such as preventing and countering radicalisation, fighting against human trafficking, creating better opportunities for youth – they provide for flexibility and differentiation between partner countries. Specific actions for each country are detailed in the 2015-2020 regional action plans for the Sahel and for the Horn of Africa.

Differentiation has also led to the 2015 EU regional strategy for Syria, Iraq and the ISIL/Da'esh threat being complemented with two specific strategies, taking into account the new circumstances of each country. The 2017 Syria strategy pledges immediate humanitarian aid and for support for a political transition in the country. The 2017 Iraq strategy is aimed at addressing the post-ISIL/Da'esh challenges in the country: assistance to over 3 million displaced Iraqis; reconstruction of the areas freed from the terrorist group; and support for the establishment of an inclusive society. For both strategies the European Parliament has called for respect for minority rights and has raised concerns about the risks of territorial fragmentation.

The EU also shares strategies with other partners on topics of common interest. One example is the Northern Dimension (ND) in the Baltic Sea and Barents region, a joint policy of the EU, Norway, Iceland and Russia. The ND Parliamentary Forum, which last met in November 2017, helps to maintain an EU dialogue with Russia, despite tense relations.

Similarly, the Joint African EU Strategy (JAES) has proven to be a key platform for the EUAfrican Union dialogue, even on contentious issues such as migration management.

Migration is also likely to be at the core of negotiations concerning the renewal of the EU partnership with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). But there is much more to it: the renegotiation of the Cotonou Agreement offers the opportunity to streamline relations between the ACP countries and the Union, taking into account the UN sustainable development goals, new EU strategies and new ambitions of the partner countries concerned. The European Parliament has

advocated reinforcing the role given to civil society and parliaments.

As concerns the various global arenas in which it is involved, the EU has continued to lend its strong support to multilateral organisations against attacks, in particular from the new US government. The EU was an active broker of the Iran Nuclear deal and is still fully committed to it, despite US withdrawal from the agreement.

The new comprehensive foreign policy and limited availability of budgetary resources translate into the redistribution of current budget lines and the implementation of innovative financing tools as a leverage for extra-budgetary resources.

More flexibility in budget use: the mid-term revision of the 2014-2020 MFF brought more flexibility in the use of the budget's global margin for special instruments. This made it possible to mobilise funds for a quick humanitarian response or for civil crisis management (Emergency Aid Reserve) and to cover unexpected expenses arising from developments in the global context (the Flexibility Instrument).

Funding the security dimension of development: insecurity often hampers development.8 The EU's global strategy considers that proper development policy involves responding to instability. Until 2017, however, the EU rules for funding security actors excluded direct financing of a third country's military. A 2016 revision of the OECD criterion for official development assistance allowed the EU to review its policy in the area: it is now possible (Regulation 2017/2306) to use funds from the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) to channel assistance to all security sector actors, including the military.

New financial instruments: the ambitious targets set by the sustainable development goals would cost 'from billions to trillions' of dollars. Traditional official development assistance (ODA) would not suffice: other resources have to be mobilised. During the

Last parliamentary mandate, the EU contributed to the new agenda on financing for development, and launched innovative financing tools. New EU Trust Funds were designed as a way to circumvent the lack of resources and flexibility of the EU budget:

they blend commitments from the EU budget with voluntary contributions from Member States. Three of them are aimed mainly at addressing the root causes of irregular migration.

As well as providing direct funding for programmes and projects in third countries, the EU can help raise private and public investment by providing guarantees and technical assistance. To this end, the EU designed a European External Investment Plan (EIP). The objectives are mainly to address the root causes of migration in the Southern Neighbourhood and Africa, by endeavouring to boost growth and jobs. Focused on priority areas such as agriculture and agroindustry, energy and connectivity, and SMEs, the EIP is an umbrella for several initiatives, based on three pillars: mobilising financing, providing technical assistance, and developing a favourable investment climate and business environment.

The proposed MFF for the 2021-2027 period plans to merge eight existing EU budget sources9 into a Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), worth €79.2 billion (in constant prices).10 NDICI would also include most part of the European Development Fund (EDF), which is currently financed outside the EU budget. This new structure is meant to allow for greater flexibility in the use of funds. Other budgetary instruments would complement the NDICI: the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (€12.8 billion); the Humanitarian Aid Instrument (€9.7 billion); the European Instrument for Nuclear Safety; funds for overseas countries and territories (€0.44 billion, also including part of the EDF); and a common foreign and security budget (€2.6 billion). According to Parliament's Committee on Budgets this corresponds to a 13 % increase of the budget for this policy area.11 In addition, the High Representative is proposing to create a European Peace Facility, worth €9.2 billion, to be financed by Member States' contributions outside the EU budget (it would include the African Peace Facility, currently part of the EDF).

External action projects and policies implemented in the 2014-2019 term are already fruitful, but there are still many challenges ahead. Experts predict that global insecurity will continue to grow and the global level of governments' security and defence spending confirms this hypothesis.12 Containing the spread of violence in the Middle

East, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa will still call for considerable efforts from the EU and other powers. Migration management will remain a core challenge, as humanitarian crises, conflicts and dire economic conditions will keep pushing men, women, and children to leave their homes to search for better living conditions. Efforts to bridge staff and resources operating in the areas of humanitarian aid, development, migration management, security and counterterrorism continue with a view to harnessing and reinforcing the efficiency of the global strategy.

The President of the European Commission evoked new ways forward in his 2018 State of the Union address. He proposed a new Africa-Europe alliance for sustainable investment and jobs. This proposal builds on the existing EU external investment plan (see above). Several projects have already begun under this banner.

On the institutional side, President Juncker has proposed that more foreign and security policy decisions be made by qualified majority as opposed to unanimity. This would make it easier to reach compromises on sensitive issues. However, the Council has so far not shared this vision (such a change in the voting rules itself depends on a unanimous Council decision).

Iran's Foreign Policy

Iran's foreign policy is a product of overlapping, and sometimes contradictory, motivations. In describing the tension between some of these motivations, one expert has said that Iran faces constant decisions about whether it is a "nation or a cause." Iranian leaders appear to constantly weigh the relative imperatives of their government's revolutionary and religious ideology against the demands of Iran's interests as a country. Some of the factors that affect Iran's foreign policy actions are discussed below.

Iran's leaders are apparently motivated, at least to some extent, by the perception of threat to their regime and their national interests posed by the United States and its allies.

• In spite of statements by U.S. officials that the United States does not seek regime change in Iran, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i has repeatedly stated that the United States has never accepted the Islamic revolution and seeks to overturn it through various actions such as support for domestic opposition to the regime, imposition of economic sanctions, and support for armed or other action by Iran's regional adversaries. He frequently warns that improved relations with the United States and the West in general will open Iran to "cultural influence"—Western social behavior that he asserts does not comport with Iran's Islamic values.

- Iran's leaders assert that the U.S. maintenance of a large military presence in the Persian Gulf region and in other countries around Iran could reflect U.S.

İntention to attack Iran if Iran pursues policies the United States finds inimical, or could cause military miscalculation that leads to conflict.

- Some Iranian official and semi-official media have asserted that the United States not only supports Sunni Arab regimes and movements that oppose Iran, but that the United States has created or empowered radical Sunni Islamist extremist factions such as the Islamic State organization.

The ideology of Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution continues to influence Iran's foreign policy. The revolution overthrew a secular authoritarian leader, the Shah of Iran, who the leaders of the revolution asserted had suppressed Islam and its clergy. It established a clerical regime in which ultimate power is invested in a "Supreme Guide," or "Supreme Leader," who combines political and religious authority.

- In the early years after the revolution, Iran attempted to "export" its revolution to nearby Muslim states. As of the late 1990s, Iran apparently has abandoned that goal because promoting it succeeded only in producing resistance to Iran in the region.

- Iran's leaders assert that the political and economic structures of the Middle East are heavily weighted against "oppressed" peoples and in favor of the United States and its allies, particularly Israel. Iranian leaders generally include in their definition of the oppressed the Palestinians, who do not have a recognized state of their own, and Shiite Muslims, who are underrepresented and economically disadvantaged minorities in many countries of the region.

- ran claims that the region's politics and economics have been distorted by Western intervention and economic domination, and that this perceived domination must be ended. Iranian officials typically cite the creation of Israel as a manifestation of Western intervention that, according to Iran, deprived the Palestinians of legitimate rights.

National Interests

Iran's national interests also shape its foreign policy, sometimes intersecting with and complicating Iran's ideology.

- Iran's leaders, stressing Iran's well-

developed civilization and historic independence, claim a right to be recognized as a major power in the region. They often contrast Iran's history with that of the six Persian Gulf monarchy states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman) that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), several of which gained independence in the early 1970s. On this point, the leaders of the Islamic .

Republic of Iran make many of the foreign policy assertions and undertake many of the same actions that were undertaken by the former Shah of Iran and Iranian dynasties prior to that.

- In some cases, Iran has appeared willing to temper its commitment to aid other

Shiites to promote its geopolitical interests. For example, it has supported mostly Christian-inhabited Armenia, rather than Shiite-inhabited Azerbaijan, in part to thwart cross-border Azeri nationalism among Iran's large Azeri minority. Iran also has generally refrained from backing Islamist movements in the Central Asian countries, reportedly in part to avoid offending Russia, its most important arms and technology supplier and an ally in support of Syrian President Bashar Al Asad.

- Even though Iranian leaders accuse U.S. allies of contributing to U.S. efforts to structure the Middle East to the advantage of the United States and Israel, Iranian officials have sought to engage with and

benefit from transactions with U.S.

Iran's foreign policy often appears to reflect differing approaches and outlooks among key players and interests groups.

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- According to Iran's constitution and in practice, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, has final say over all major foreign policy decisions. Khamene'i is widely considered an ideological hardliner who expresses deepseated mistrust of U.S. intentions toward Iran. His consistent refrain, and the title of his book widely available in Iran, is "I am a revolutionary, not a diplomat." Leaders of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a military and internal security institution created after the Islamic revolution, consistently express support for Khamene'i and ideology-based foreign policy decisions.
- Khamene'i tacitly backed the JCPOA—if only by not openly opposing it. He has stated on several occasions since it was finalized that neither Iran's foreign policy nor its commitment to opposing U.S. policy in the region will change as a result of the JCPOA. He has stated that U.S.-Iran

relations are to remain confined to nuclear issues, and not expand to regional or bilateral issues. The IRGC leadership criticized the accord and has made statements similar to those of Khamene'i with regard to future Iranian foreign policy.

• More moderate Iranian leaders and factions, led by President Hassan Rouhani, argue that Iran should not have any "permanent enemies" and that a pragmatic foreign policy is not only resulting in easing of international sanctions under the JCPOA but can also increase worldwide support for Iran's views. Clearly differentiating his views from those of Khamene'i and the hardliners, Rouhani said on September 13, 2015, that the JCPOA is "a beginning for creating an atmosphere of friendship and co-operation with various countries." Those leaders who advocate a pragmatic approach have drawn support from Iran's

Youth and intellectuals, who say they want greater integration with the international community.

• Some Iranian figures, including the elected president during 1997-2005,

Mohammad Khatemi, are considered reformists. Reformists have tended to focus more on promoting domestic reform than on a dramatically altered foreign policy. However, most of Iran's leading reformist figures have become sidelined without being able to achieve significant change either domestically or in foreign policy.

Iran employs a number of different methods and mechanisms to implement its foreign policy, some of which involve supporting armed factions that engage in international acts of terrorism.

As an instrument of its foreign policy, Iran provides arms, training, and military advisers in support of allied governments as well as armed factions. Iran was placed on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism ("terrorism list") in January 1984, and two of the governments Iran has supported—Syria and Sudan—are the two countries still on that list. Many of the groups Iran supports are named as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) by the United States.

The State Department report on international terrorism for 2014, released June 19, 2015, stated that in 2014 Iran "continued its terrorist-related activity, including for Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza, Lebanese Hezbollah, and various groups in Iraq and throughout the Middle East." Iran's operations in support of its allies—which generally include arms shipments, provision of advisers, training, and funding—are carried out by the Qods (Jerusalem) Force of the IRGC (IRGC-QF). The IRGC-QF is headed by IRGC Major General Qasem Soleimani, who is said to report directly to Khamene'i. Some IRGC-QF advisers have been reported to sometimes engage in direct combat, particularly in the Syrian civil conflict.

The JCPOA might eventually enable Iran to increase its military support for its regional allies

and proxies. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which will supersede prior resolutions when the provisions of the JCPOA are implemented (likely in early 2016), will end the ban on Iran's importation and exportation of arms in a maximum of five years. Much of the weaponry Iran supplies to its allies (in violation of existing Resolution 1747) include, in particular, specialized anti-tank systems, artillery rockets, mortars, and short-range missiles.

The range of armed factions that Iran supports is discussed in the regional sections below.

- Some Iranian-supported factions are opposition movements, while others are militia forces supporting governments that are allied to Iran. The governments that Iran-assisted militias support include those of President Bashar Al Asad of Syria and Prime Minister Haydar Al Abbadi of Iraq.

- Some regional armed factions that Iran supports have not been named as FTOs and have no record of committing acts of international terrorism. Such groups include the Houthi ("Ansar Allah") movement in Yemen (composed of Zaidi Shiite Muslims) and some underground Shiite opposition factions in Bahrain.

- Iran opposes—or declines to actively support—Islamist armed groups that work against Iran's core interests. For example, Al Qaeda

and the Islamic State organization are orthodox Sunni Muslim organizations that Iran apparently perceives as significant threats. Over the past few years, Iran has expelled some Al Qaeda activists who sought refuge there after the September 11, 2001, attacks against the United States. Iran is actively working against the Islamic State organization, which opposes Asad of Syria and the Abbadi government in Iraq.

- Iran supports some Sunni Muslim groups that further Tehran's interests. Two Sunni Palestinian FTOs, Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad—Shiqaqi Faction, have received Iranian support in part because they are antagonists of Israel.

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Major Iran or Iran-Related Terrorism Attacks or Plots

1. November 4, 1979   U.S. Embassy in Tehran seized and 66 U.S. diplomats held for 444 days (until January 21, 1981).   Hardline Iranian regime elements

2. April 18, 1983   Truck bombing of U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. 63 dead, including 17 U.S. citizens. Factions that

eventually formed Lebanese Hezbollah claimed responsibility.

3. October 23, 1983   Truck bombing of U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. 241 Marines killed.

4. December 12, 1983   Bombings of U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait

5. City. 5 fatalities.   Da'wa Party of Iraq—Iransupported Iraqi Shiite militant group. 17 Da'wa activists charged and imprisoned in Kuwait

6. March 16, 1984   U.S. Embassy Beirut Political Officer William Buckley taken hostage in Beirut—first in a series of kidnappings there. Last hostage released December 1991. Factions that eventually formed Hezbollah.

7. September 20, 1984   Truck bombing of U.S. embassy annex in Beirut. 23 killed.   Factions that eventually formed Hezbollah

8. May 25, 1985   Bombing of Amir of Kuwait's motorcade   Da'wa Party of Iraq

9. June 14, 1985   Hijacking of TWA Flight 847. One fatality, Navy diver Robert Stetham   Lebanese Hezbollah

10. February 17, 1988   Col. William Higgins, serving with the a U.N. peacekeeping operation, was kidnapped in southern Lebanon; video of his corpse was released 18 months later.
          Lebanese Hezbollah

11. April 5, 1988   Hijacking of Kuwait Air passenger plane. Two killed.
          Lebanese Hezbollah, seeking release of 17 Da'wa prisoners in Kuwait.

12. March 17, 1992   Bombing of Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires. 29 killed.
          Lebanese Hezbollah, assisted by Iranian intelligence/diplomats.

13. July 18, 1994   Bombing of Argentine-Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires.   Same as above

14. June 25, 1996   Bombing of Khobar Towers housing complex near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. 19 U.S. Air Force personnel killed.   Saudi Hezbollah, a Saudi Shiite organization active in eastern Saudi Arabia and supported by Iran. Some assessments point to involvement of Al Qaeda.

15. October 11, 2011   U.S. Justice Dept. Unveiled discovery of alleged plot involving at least one IRGC-QF officer, to assassinate Saudi Ambassador in Washington, DC.   IRGC-QF reportedly working with U.S.-based confederate

16. February 13, 2012   Wife of Israeli diplomat wounded in Delhi, India
          Lebanese Hezbollah

17. July 19, 2012   Bombing in Bulgaria killed five Israeli tourists.   Lebanese Hezbollah

Diplomacy

At the same time that it funds and trains armed factions in the region, Iran also uses traditional diplomatic tools.

- Iran has an active Foreign Ministry and

maintains embassies or representation in all countries with which it has diplomatic relations. Iran's Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i rarely travels outside Iran, but Iran's elected presidents, including the current President Hassan Rouhani, travel frequently, not only within Iran's immediate neighborhood.

• Iran actively participates in or seeks to join many different international organizations, including those that are dominated by members opposed to Iran's ideology and/or critical of its domestic human rights practices. For example, Iran has sought to join the U.S. and Europe-dominated World Trade Organization (WTO). It has also sought to join such regional organizations as the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) that groups Central Asian states with Russia and China. Iran is an observer in the SCO, and SCO officials say that implementation of the JCPOA could pave the way for Iran to obtain full membership in the body.

• Iran participates actively in multilateral organizations that tend to support some aspects of Iranian ideology, such as its criticism of great power influence over developing states. From August 2012 until August 2015, Iran held the presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which has about 120 member states and 17 observer countries. Iran hosted a summit of the movement in August 2012, when it took over the rotating leadership.

• The JCPOA represented an attempt to ensure that Iran's nuclear program is purely peaceful, demonstrating evident lack of international trust in Iran's nuclear intentions. Iran is a party to all major nonproliferation conventions, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and insists that it has adhered to all its commitments under these conventions.

• During 2003-2005, Iran negotiated limits on its nuclear program with three European Union countries—Britain, France, and Germany ("EU-3"). In 2006, the negotiating powers expanded to include the United States and the two other Permanent Members of the U.N. Security

Council, Russia and China, to form the

Relations between Iran and some regional states and groups:

In Iraq, the U.S. military ousting of Saddam Hussein in 2003 benefitted Iran strategically by removing a long-time antagonist and producing governments led by Shiite Islamists who have long-standing ties to Iran. Iran was a strong backer of the government of Prime Minister Nuri alMaliki, a Shiite Islamist who Tehran reportedly viewed as loyal and pliable. Maliki supported most of Iran's regional goals, for example by allowing Iran to overfly Iraqi airspace to supply the Asad regime. The June 2014 offensive led by the Islamic State organization threatened Iraq's government and at one point brought Islamic State forces to within 50 miles of the Iranian border. Iran responded quickly by supplying the Baghdad government as well as the peshmerga force of the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) with IRGC-QF advisers, intelligence drone surveillance, weapons shipments, and other direct military assistance.

Iranian leaders also reportedly acquiesced to U.S. insistence that Iran's longtime ally Maliki be replaced, helping engineer his replacement by the more inclusive Abbadi. U.S. officials, including Secretary of State John Kerry, have said that Iran's targeting of the Islamic State generally contributes positively to U.S. efforts to assist the Iraqi government. Still, many aspects of Iranian policy in Iraq complicate the anti-Islamic State effort. Iran helped establish many of the Shiite militias that fought the United States during 2003-2011, and, in 2014, Iran helped reactivate and empower some of them to support the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) against the Islamic State. The militias that Iran works most closely with in Iraq include As'aib Ahl Al Haq (League of the Righteous), Kata'ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades), and the Badr Organization. The Mahdi Army of Moqtada Al Sadr (renamed the Peace Brigades in 2014) was supported extensively by Iran during the 2003-2011 U.S. intervention in Iraq but has sought to distance itself from Iran in the more recent campaigns against the Islamic State. Kata'ib Hezbollah is designated a Foreign

Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United tensions with some of Iraq's Sunnis—and possibly fueled support for the Islamic State—by carrying out reprisals against Sunnis after recapturing Sunni-inhabited territory from the Islamic State.

In late 2014, news reports citing Iranian elite figures, reported that Iran had spent more than $1 billion in military aid to Iraq in the approximately six months after the June 2014 Islamic State offensive.35 That figure presumably also includes weapons transferred to the Shiite militias as well as the ISF. CRS has no way to independently confirm any of the estimates on Iranian aid to Iraqi forces.

Syria
On Syria, the United States asserts that President Bashar Al Asad should eventually leave office as part of a negotiated political solution to the conflict, such as that envisioned in a communique of an international contact group following meetings in Vienna on October 30 and November 14, 2015. Even though Iran attended the Vienna meetings and did not publicly dissent from the communiques, Iran reportedly insists that Asad's fate be determined only by the Syrian people as part of the envisioned transition process. According to a wide range of experts, Iran seeks to try to keep Asad in power despite his secular ideology, because: (1) his regime centers around his Alawite community, which practices a version of Islam akin to Shiism; (2) he has been Iran's closest Arab ally; (3) Syria's cooperation is key to the arming and protection of Iran's arguably most cherished ally in the Middle East, Lebanon's Hezbollah; and (4) Iran apparently fears that the Islamic State and other Sunni Islamic extremists will come to power if Asad falls. Iran eeks to ensure that Sunni extremist groups cannot easily attack Hezbollah in Lebanon from across the Syria border. Both Iran and Syria have used Hezbollah as leverage against Israel to try to achieve regional and territorial aims.

U.S. officials and reports assert that Iran is providing substantial amounts of material support to the Syrian regime. It is directly providing to the Asad regime funds, weapons, and IRGC-QF advisors, and recruitment of Hezbollah and other non-Syrian Shiite militia fighters. Iran is estimated to have deployed about 1,300 – 1,800 IRGC-QF and

other IRGC personnel to Syria, although exact numbers might fluctuate somewhat. Some experts say that the IRGC personnel, which Iran asserts are "advisers," are performing ground combat as well on some fronts. The IRGC-QF has helped organize Asad's forces, including by establishing the National Defense Forces (NDF), a militia, modeled on Iran's Basij force, to assist Syria's army. In June 2015, the office of the U.N. Special Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura stated that the envoy estimates Iran's aid to Syria, including military and economic aid, to total about $6 billion per year. Other estimates vary, and CRS has no way to independently corroborate any particular estimate. Iranian officials, including IRGC commanders, have affirmed that Iran is helping Asad militarily, and admitted that some highly level IRGC commanders have died in Syria, including one of its leading commanders, Brig. Gen. Hossein Hamadani, who died in mid-2015. Estimates vary, but the IRGC-QF has lost an estimated 50 – 200 personnel in Syria, but in October 2015 the deputy commander of the IRGC, Hossein Salami, described IRGC-QF losses in Syria as "not high."

Syrian force. Most notably, Iran urged and facilitated the deployment to Syria of an estimated 2,000 – 4,000 Hezbollah militiamen—a sizeable proportion of Hezbollah's total force. Iran also has helped some Iraqi Shiite militia forces deploy to Syria, and subsequently advise and command those forces. Iran also reportedly has recruited Shiite fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some estimates indicate there might be as many as 20,000 total foreign Shiite fighters in Syria, including those from Hezbollah.

At the same time, Iran has not forsworn diplomacy to try to achieve at least some of its goals in Syria. Some experts assert that Iranian casualties and financial costs incurred in Syria might be unsustainable, and that Iran might be willing to abandon Asad if doing so can salvage Iran's core goals in Syria, particularly the protection of Hezbollah. In December 2012, and again in July 2015, Iran announced proposals for a peaceful transition in Syria that would culminate in free, multiparty elections. As noted, Iran is participating in the Vienna process that began in October 2015; Iran was invited after the United States, in the wake of the JCPOA and the perception that Iran could be key to a political solution in Syria, dropped its objections to Iran's participation. If the political process leads to Asad's ouster, Iran would likely try to engineer the accession of another Alawite leader who would be likely to accommodate Iran's interests. Iran would almost certainly undertake extensive efforts to prevent the accession of a Sunni-led regime in Syria that would seek to deny the use of Syria as a base for Iran to supply and protect Hezbollah.

Iran asserts that Israel is an illegitimate creation of the West and an oppressor of the Palestinian people and other Arab Muslims. The position of Iran's current regime differs dramatically from that of the pre-1979 regime of the Shah of Iran. Israel and the Shah's regime had relatively normal relations, including embassies in each other's capitals and an extensive network of economic ties.

Supreme Leader Khamene'i has repeatedly described Israel as a "cancerous tumor"—or similar formulation—that should be removed from the region. In a September 2015 speech, Khamene'i stated that Israel will likely not exist in 25 years— the timeframe for the last of the specific JCPOA restrictions on Iran's nuclear program to expire. Iran's open hostility to Israel— manifested in part by its support for groups that undertake armed action against Israel—fuels assertions by Israeli leaders that a nuclear armed Iran would constitute an "existential threat" to the State of Israel and fuel Iran's support for armed factions on Israel's borders such as Hamas and Hezbollah. More broadly, Iran might be attempting to disrupt prosperity, morale, and perceptions of security among Israel's population in a way that undermines the country's appeal to those who have options to live elsewhere. The formal position of the Iranian Foreign Ministry is that Iran would not seek to block an Israeli-Palestinian settlement but that the process is too weighted toward Israel to yield a fair result.

Iran's leaders routinely state that Israel presents a serious threat to Iran and that the international community applies a "double standard" to Iran as compared to Israel's presumed nuclear arsenal. Iranian diplomats point out in international meetings that, despite apparently being the only

Middle Eastern country to possess nuclear weapons and not being a party to the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, Israel has not faced any

internationally-imposed penalties as a consequence. Iran's leaders assert Israel is a nuclear threat to Iran, citing e Israeli official statements that Israel retains the option to unilaterally strike Iran's nuclear facilities. Iran also asserts that Israel's purported nuclear arsenal is a main obstacle to achieving support for a weapons-of-massdestruction (WMD) free zone in the Middle East.

Iran's material support for militant anti-Israel groups has long concerned U.S. Administrations. For at least a decade, the annual State Department report on international terrorism has repeated its claim that Iran provides funding, weapons, and training to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad— Shiqaqi Faction (PIJ), the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (a militant offshoot of the dominant .

Palestinian faction Fatah), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General . Command (PFLP-GC). All are named as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) by the State Department. Iran has long supported Lebanese Hezbollah, which is an FTO and which portrays itself as the vanguard of resistance to Israel. In November 2014, a senior IRGC commander said that Iran had provided Hezbollah and Hamas with training and Fateh-class missiles, which enable the groups to attack targets in Israel.

Hamas
Successive annual State Department reports on terrorism have stated that Iran gives Hamas funds, weapons, and training. Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip in 2007 and now administers that territory. Although it formally ceded authority over Gaza in June 2014 to a consensus Palestinian Authority government, Hamas retains de-facto security control over that territory. Its terrorist attacks using operatives within Israel have significantly diminished in number since 2005, but Hamas continues to occasionally engage in armed action against Israel, using rockets and other weaponry supplied by Iran. Israel and Hamas came into conflict in late 2008-early 2009; in November 2012; and during July-August 2014. Iran's financial support (not including weapons provided) has ranged from about $300 million per year during periods of substantial Iran-Hamas collaboration, to much smaller amounts during periods of tension

between the two, such as those discussed below. CRS has no way to corroborate the levels of Iranian funding to Hamas.

The Iran-Hamas relationship was forged in the 1990s as part of an apparent attempt to disrupt the Israeli-Palestinian peace process through Hamas's suicide bombings and other attacks on buses, restaurants, and other civilian targets inside Israel. However, in 2012, their differing positions on the ongoing Syria conflict caused the Iran-Hamas relationship to falter. Largely out of sectarian sympathy with the mostly Sunni rebels in Syria, Hamas opposed the efforts by Asad to defeat the rebellion militarily. The rift apparently contributed to a lessening of Iran's support to Hamas in its 2014 conflict with Israel as compared to previous Hamas-Israel conflicts in which Iran backed Hamas extensively. Since the 2014, Hamas-Israel conflict, Iran has apparently sought to rebuild the relationship with Hamas by providing missile technology that Hamas used to construct its own rockets and by helping it rebuild tunnels destroyed in the conflict with Israel. Some Hamas leaders have reportedly welcomed rebuilding the group's relations with Iran, perhaps because of financial difficulties the organization has faced since the military leadership in Egypt began closing smuggling tunnels at the Gaza-Sinai border in 2013.

Hezbollah
Lebanese Hezbollah, which Iranian leaders assert is a tangible and significant outgrowth of the 1979 Iranian revolution itself, is arguably Iran's most significant ally in the region. Hezbollah has acted in support of its own as well as Iranian interests on numerous occasions and in many forms, including through acts of terrorism and other armed action. The Iran-Hezbollah relationship began when Lebanese Shiite clerics of the pro-Iranian Lebanese Da'wa (Islamic Call) Party began to organize in 1982 into what later was unveiled in 1985 as Hezbollah. As Hezbollah was forming, the IRGC sent advisory forces to help develop Hezbollah's military wing, and these IRGC forces subsequently became the core of what is now the IRGC-QF. The 2010 congressionally mandated Department of Defense report on Iran's military power asserts Iranian aid levels to Hezbollah are "roughly $100-$200 million per year."53 That estimate is consistent with figures cited in past years' State

Department reports on international terrorism. Still, CRS has no way to independently corroborate any such estimates.

The 2014 U.S. intelligence community worldwide threat assessment stated that Hezbollah "has increased its global terrorist activity in recent years to a level that we have not seen since the 1990s," but the 2015 worldwide threat assessment, delivered in February 2015, did not repeat that assertion.

Iran's political, financial, and military aid to Hezbollah has helped it become a major force in Lebanon's politics. Hezbollah now plays a major role in decision-making and leadership selections in Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) rarely acts against Hezbollah's forces or interests. However, there has been vocal criticism of Hezbollah within and outside Lebanon for its active support for its other key patron, Asad, against the Sunni-led rebellion in Syria. That involvement, which might include about 4,000 Hezbollah fighters on various battlefields in Syria at a given time, and who are assisted by Iran, has diluted Hezbollah's image as a steadfast opponent of Israel by embroiling it in a war against fellow Muslims.

Earlier, Hezbollah's attacks on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon contributed to an Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, and Hezbollah subsequently maintained military forces along the border. Hezbollah fired Iranian-supplied rockets on Israel's northern towns during a July-August 2006 war with Israel, including at the Israeli city of Haifa (30 miles from the border) and in July 2006 hit an Israeli warship with a C-802 sea-skimming missile. Iran bought significant quantities of C-802s from China in the 1990s and Iran almost certainly was the supplier of the weapon to Hezbollah. Hezbollah was perceived in the Arab world as a victor in the war for holding out against Israel. Since that conflict, Iran has resupplied Hezbollah to the point where it has, according to Israeli sources, as many as 100,000 rockets and missiles, some capable of reaching Tel Aviv from south Lebanon, as well as upgraded artillery, anti-ship, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft capabilities. In the context of the conflict in Syria, Israel has carried out occasional air strikes inside Syria against Hezbollah commanders and purported arms shipments via Syria to Hezbollah. In January 2015, Hezbollah attacked an Israeli military convoy near the LebanonIsrael-Syria tri-

border area, killing two Israeli soldiers and making it the deadliest Hezbollah attack on Israeli territory since 2006. However, these incidents have not, to date, escalated into a broader Israel-Hezbollah conflict.

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The Politica
Prortret of last 100
years

And comparative
analysis of International
Relations

Part II: .Contemporary political conflicts and controversial issues

The Taiwan Crisis

Taiwan and the United States have had a good relationship for many years, but this warm relationship has created new tensions with China, posing a new challenge to global peace. Among the debates and questions that arose because of this issue's implications, the United States' position in this political contestation became the tensest.

Since the escalation of tensions between China and Taiwan, the US has kept the situation ambiguous by maintaining diplomatic relations with China while also developing non-diplomatic relations with Taiwan. On the one hand, the US strategy has succeeded in maintaining the status quo for the time being, but the rest of the world has begun to question the entire situation. "Until this issue causes a stalemate" However, some experts believe that maintaining the status quo is not a bad alternative for keeping the peace. By analyzing the historical context, explaining each state relationship, and comparing the multiple scenarios, this article aims to demonstrate that maintaining the status quo is the most visible way to protect peace and stability in the East Asia region.

Keywords: China, Taiwan, the United States of America, Geopolitics, Regional Status Quo

In the 16th Century, Jan Huygen van Linschoten, a Dutch Navigator on a Portuguese ship discovered and called the island as "ilha Formosa '' or "beautiful island" because of the natural environment of the area. After that, the Dutch created a post in the southwest area of the island where they established a fortress called Tayouwan, which means "terrace bay". Hence the said fortress name was to be the name of the whole island, Taiwan. 1662 a Chinese pirate, Koxinga drives the Dutch off the island and is later defeated by the Manchurian that took control of the western part of Taiwan. Hence, it became part of the Qing Empire until the 19th Century. The reign of the Qing ended in Taiwan when French forces invaded and occupied northern Taiwan in August 1884 but were unsuccessful in controlling the whole island. Taiwan ceded to Imperial Japan in April 1895 under the Shimonoseki Treaty, when the Sino-Japanese War ended in Chinese defeat.

After Japan's defeat in World War II in August 1945, China was ruled by the Nationalist Party or The Kuomintang (KMT) under General Chiang Kai-Shek. But everything went differently in December 1949, the Communist forces led by Mao Zedong successfully defeating the Nationalist Forces on Mainland China in the civil war. Chiang Kai-shek and his one million supporters fled to the island of Taiwan in hope to return to mainland China and restore the party power. At first, the US and the United Nations still recognized the Republic of China or ROC (official name of Taiwan) as the legitimate government and rejected the recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC). However, it was changed when the Korean War happened in June 1950. Dreading a retaliation from the PRC in Mainland China, the US sent the Seventh Fleet of the US Navy consisting of an aircraft carrier, heavy cruisers, and eight destroyers into Taiwan Straits to do a show of force against the Communist forces. This prevented the PRC from attacking the island, but it also hampered the Kuomintang efforts to retake Mainland China. Despite the hampered efforts, the US created a defense command in Taipei and sent a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to Taiwan. This advisory group was entrusted to provide logistics, weaponry, and training to ROC military forces to develop it into a modern military force. In later years, it became the largest US military advisory group ever deployed in the world and transformed the ROC military into one of the most competent forces in Asia.

In August 1954, the PRC launched several military operations against ROC forces along the Taiwan straits and mainland coast of China. PRC military personnel thought that attacking the small offshore islands near Taiwan could drive the US forces away, hence separating the ROC and US forces and setting the final plan to invade Taiwan. This crisis led President Eisenhower to cement a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan on March 3, 1955. The US Congress also approved the Eisenhower Administration to conduct special power for the defense of Taiwan called Formosa Resolution, strengthening the defense of Taiwan and its straits, and enhancing Taiwan as the US deterrence against PRC until today. B. Geopolitics Background

Located 120 miles from the east Chinese coast, Taiwan holds a strategic position. Economic and security wise, Taiwan is highly critical to maintain the region's peace and economic flow. On the assumption that in the possible future there will be a unification between People's Republic and China and Republic of China, would have discontinued America's once unbroken defense which extended from Alaska to Japan, entering Taiwan, then through the Philippines. Second, numerous goods and oil imports that are going to be shipped to South Korea and Japan regularly landed on Taiwan first then shipped to their country. Unification of Beijing and Taipei would raise the power of China and increase tension in eastern Asia and the Pacific. In political terms, Taipei is a base for the Chinese military to show off their power in the Western Pacific that will irritate a long-standing historical contestation between China and Japan, resulting in a regional arms race between Japan and China. Third, losing Taipei to Beijing would give them strategic benefits of the maritime region and would give Beijing more power to extend its influence on Manila. Also, the decision of the US to not do a renewal of 10-year security agreement with Manilla in 2016 raises the possibility of Manilla leaning more into the rising Asian dominator, China.

As an independent sovereign state of Taiwan might lead to peace in the region. The island plays a role in eliminating the People's Republic of China's force protection capability in the Pacific, also acting as the intermediary between Japan and China and easing tension with the US to not take sides on either one of these countries. Through Taiwan Relation Act and Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act, Washington tightened their relationship with Taipei by increasing economic collaboration and promotion in terms of building relations with Taiwan. Supplying arms and helping Taiwan to increase their military capability is helpful for Taipei's economic sustainability. One of the reasons is, it ensures potential investors by making sure the local safeness to invest their capital in Taiwan and drives their economic ecosystem.

Despite the complex historical background, in this modern day, Taiwan as a state has managed to become one of the "Asian Tigers" alongside Singapore, South Korea, and Hong Kong. Globally, Taiwan ranked 21st in largest GDP which is also 7th

largest in Asia. Throughout the Covid-19 pandemic era, with a proactive act of government, Taiwan was the only Asian Tigers country that managed to have a positive GDP growth of 3.1% making them ranked first place in the Asia-Pacific region. From mid-1950 until mid-1980 Taiwan's economy received a rapid economic growth by being one of the first Asian countries to implement the industrialization and market economy. Taiwan has a trade-based economy, with globally known strengths such as semiconductor manufacturing, consumer goods manufacturing, production of plastic products, petrochemical and metal refining. Sitting on around the top 20 largest economies, in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) Taipei holds around 1.300 billion USD.

Taiwanese government play an important role in maneuvering Taiwan's economy. Despite the pressure, Taipei managed to maintain a stable cross-trait relation with China, attracting international investors to their manufacturing industry, taking an important part in the technology supply chain, and showing its will to have a transition of energy resources. The government has also adopted an economic diversification policy which invites bigger investments through bilateral and regional multilateral, education and research development in South Asia, Australia, and New Zealand, also ASEAN. In the second term of Tsai Ing-Wen presidency, Taiwan introduced a six-core industry, which includes cybersecurity, green and renewable energy, biotech and medical technology, national defense, and information and digital technology.

Since 1979, the relation between the United States and the Republic of China or Taiwan has been unofficial and non-diplomatic. The United States has chosen to swift diplomatic relations by giving recognition toward The People's Republic of China as the only one China under the One China policy. However, in the same year, The United States Administration approved the Taiwan Relations Act which became the framework of Taiwan and The United States' nonofficial relations until today. The Taiwan Relations Act requires the United States to assist Taiwan's defensive military system by providing arms and trading weapons. In addition, it also specifies that any kind of non-peaceful movement toward Taiwan will be considered as a

"threat" to Western Pacific Area means the United States requires Taiwan's future in a peaceful manner. But with the existence of the One China Policy resulted in the high tension between the People's Republic of China and the United States with Taiwan. The one-China policy allows China to outcast Taiwan from international diplomatic relations with other countries, but surprisingly Taiwan still can

compete and maintain economic and cultural relations with other countries including The United States. However, it cannot be ignored that for decades the tension of relation between the United States and Taiwan remained unpredictable and kept changing based on each presidency and policy. For instance, in the Obama era, the relation between Taiwan and The United States has a more interactive agenda which was proven by the increase of international visits and meetings compared to the previous presidency. While in the Trump administration, the economic relation becomes more intense as proven in 2019 Taiwan has become the United States 14th biggest export market with $85 billion worth. The question now is how about in the Biden presidency? Will the relation between The United States and Taiwan grow even closer or will it be abolished due to China pressure?

Despite several issues occurring during the Trump presidency period, Trump has successfully maintained a great relationship between the United States and Taiwan during his presidency in the economic, social, cultural, and institutional sectors. The Trump administration has raised the

United States' support toward Taiwan bigger compared to any previous era of the United States. Taiwan became one of the largest trading partners and one of the best destinations for agricultural export. Not to mention that it is regulated under the Taiwan Relation Act in 1979 that the United States should assist Taiwan with its Military defense system which has been implemented very well in the Trump presidential era. The United States has sold arms and weapons for $5.1 billion worth to Taiwan in 2020. However, the relation between the United States and Taiwan seems like growing closer in the Trump Era. In 2018, the Trump administration signed the Taiwan Travel Bill which allows the representative of Taiwan to have a sort of formal visit to the United States and vice versa. This phenomenon has raised the anger of the People's Republic of China. "It violates the One China principle, the political foundation of The United States and China political relationship," the Chinese embassy said after Trump signed the legislation bill. Obviously, China opposes the treaty adding that The United States should not establish any kind of further relation and ties with Taiwan. On the other hand, Taiwan welcomed the "friendly" movement by the Trump administration and said that they would like to continue the partnership with The United States on any level.

As a Result of the Taiwan Travel Bill which was signed in the Trump presidential era, the relationship between Taiwan and The United States grew even closer. Representatives from both countries have visited each other in a great number of meetings. Even in 2018, The President of Taiwan Tsai Ing-Wen made the first visit to the United States which obviously sparked the anger of China. China stated that Taiwan is a Chinese province with no right to have state relations, especially with the United States. However, the visiting agenda continues in the Trump presidency. Alex Azar, the Health, and Human Services Secretary visiting Taipei in August 2020 and five-month later, The Secretary of State Pompeo removed all the restrictions for government interactions between Taiwan and America. The close relation between Taiwan and America has triggered some of the political issues between China and the United States which later became a question for the Biden administration to answer. How would Biden take this relationship to?

Nothing has changed much regarding the relationship between The United States with Taiwan and China in the Biden Presidential. The central focus of the Biden presidency is to create a balance for the United States relation with Taiwan and China. The Biden administration stated that the United States still has the commitment to assist Taiwan in maintaining military selfdefense. "Our commitment to Taiwan is rock solid" stated by the Biden administration. In addition, Biden personally has stated that The United States will defend Taiwan if China decides to attack the island. However, Biden never stated how far the United States will defend the island if China comes to attack. Furthermore, some experts stated that it was only to prevent any further radical movement by the China government because even though China has gathered more power now both economically and militarily, it still takes years to successfully take down Taiwan with United States support. According to what Biden has stated, it seems like the United States will still hold the strategic ambiguity where it still has the diplomatic and formal relation with China while supporting Taiwan non-formally to prevent any crisis from escalating.

Over decades of massive political transformation and exponential economic growth, the Taiwanese government and its people demanded to have an active role in the international scene. This act of Taiwan followed threats and objections from the People's Republic of China (PRC) with an assertion stating, "Taiwan is an integral part of China''. Other than its rhetoric claims over Taiwan, People's Republic of China, ever since 1949 haven't extended the jurisdictions over Taiwan. As an independent nation, Taiwan has a fundamentally different political, economic, social, and cultural system to China. Thus, ever since the separation, Taiwan's present and possible future is not a part of China's internal affairs.

As an independent sovereign state, Taiwan has every inquiry to be a sovereign country, including government, citizenship, and territorial jurisdiction. However, in exchange for having a role in the international realm, a sovereign state must have international recognition. Taiwan has been recognized as an independent democratic government by 15 countries under the name of the Republic of China, due to the "One-Country" policy that was proposed by Beijing. However, the United

Nations presumed the People's Republic of China as a speaking land of Taiwan. Resulting its citizens, which hold one of the strongest and most accepted passports worldwide able to travel around the world yet banned from entering the UN buildings.

The reason why Taiwan has been persistent over the years to gain the United Nation membership status is to be able to coordinate action to maintain international peace, ability to develop friendly dialogue and negotiation, and to attain international coordination in addressing political, social, economic, and humanitarian problems, also to actively promoting and implementing human rights. The already mentioned benefits of a United Nation membership would favor Taiwan to have more international recognition and be involved in a wider spectrum of international affairs. Both China and Taiwan apprehend the United Nation membership is crucial for Taiwan's sovereignty status. Within the process of gaining the credential of being a member, as one of the procedures, Taiwan must gain 9 out of 15 affirmative votes from the United Nation Security Council members and not a single member of countries with veto rights – People's Republic of China, United States, Russia, United Kingdom, and French – voted against the membership. Thus, regarding China's power over this means, they are able to influence the entire organization and claim Taiwan as China's rebel province. Thus far, China has been bold and successfully planted its stance on the international community.

Not only the United Nation, has one of Taiwan's closest allies, the United States also not admitted the Republic of China as an independent state. Leaving aside the United States' recognition over Taiwan, they still hold a steady relationship with one another due to the already explained interest of the United States over the region. In 1979, the US stopped its diplomatic ties with Taiwan in exchange for building diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Washington has acknowledged, but not promoted Beijing's claim over the possession of Taipei. Bounded with the Taiwan Relation Act, Washington was able to maintain its relationship with both Beijing and Taipei at the same time by defining Washington's means on Taipei as purely substantive and not diplomatic. The United States has also passed the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act to tighten their

relationship with Taipei, increase Taiwan's participation on the international stage by encouraging international communities and organizations to have an official or unofficial relationship with Taipei.

The European Continent, especially the European Union member countries, also has a strong substantial relationship with Taiwan. This relation has some limitations affected by the Chinese policy, and to avoid troubles with Beijing. Through the European Economic and Trade Office, the EU relation to Taiwan is for economic and commercial means. Identical to the US, the EU also supports the "One Country, Two System" resolution, they also encourage peaceful negotiation and disapprove the use of threat and force. However, as individual states, European countries begin to deepen their relationship with Taipei. For instance, the Netherlands has changed its office (not an official embassy) name in Taiwan. By erasing the words ``Trade and Investment" signaling Netherlands interest is significantly more than economic means. This action of course received disapproval and threats from China.

Even in Taiwan's closest region, Asian countries often refused to talk about this matter. China's growing influence, leadership, and economy which is striving for more dominance, pressuring the neighboring countries to take sides. Especially for the developing countries, China is a valuable trading partner. For some countries, this trading relationship is their most crucial to maintain their economy. Siding with Taiwan will harm their relationship with China. Ultimately, every country's official policy in regard to Taiwan's situation is controlled by China.

It is self-evident how Beijing will respond to the situation. The People's Republic of China has stated that it has no intention of allowing Taiwan to become an independent state. Taiwan has undoubtedly been a part of the People's Republic of China since ancient times, and there will be a reunification in the future "by force, if necessary," demonstrating China's strong desire to dominate Taiwan. The Chinese government has done everything it can in terms of military, economic, and political measures to "reunify" Taiwan.

After the end of the Chinese Civil War, the Beijing government intended to occupy the island which

was later called Taiwan. But the Korean War which happened in 1950 and 1954 resulted in the retardation of the plans. However, the effort for reunification continues which can be seen by how China has tried to improve its relationship with the United States in the early 1970s, and fortunately, they succeed by getting the United States formal recognition, but the battle is still not done yet alongside with the non-formally support from the United State for Taiwan. This situation resulted in the whole deadlock situation.

While China and Taiwan are trapped in the deadlock situation, China has developed its military capabilities by increasing its expenses in the military sector. According to the available data, it is estimated that in 2020 the China government will have spent $252.3 billion on military expenses. This is higher than last year's expenditure of $232.53 billion. The rising military expenditure means there is some development that occurred in that sector which might be prepared for some of the conditions including the Taiwan reunification issue. Currently, in October 2021 the China government has sent approximately 150 aircraft to Taiwan's defense zone. Some experts said that these flights could be seen as warnings for Taiwan.

As has been stated before, the movement by China not only in the military sector but also in the economic sector. In March 2021, China banned pineapples imports from Taiwan which resulted in a great impact for Taiwan because originally China was the biggest trade partner for Taiwanese pineapples by buying more than 90 percent of it. This obviously was a political move by China to give another warning for Taiwan and the United States. However, in response to that movement, the president of Taiwan Tsai Ing-wen created a public campaign called "freedom pineapple" that surprisingly went viral and garnered public response and sympathy at that time.

Although the previous economic movement by China government did not clearly bring an expected impact for them, the China government seems still to want to another soft approach that will build sort of dependence of Taiwan toward China economy in the future agenda to reach the main purpose of taking Taiwan under their control. In addition, China is also trying to expand its influence by pushing its economic capabilities to replace the United States' domination.

In political matters, China has done a lot to block all the possible access for Taiwan to gain more power. Using the One-China Policy, the People's Republic of China has succeeded in preventing Taiwan from participating in international bodies. For instance, the World Health Organization and The UN International Civil Aviation Organization. This strategy successfully cut several international accesses for Taiwan and cut several of its diplomatic allies. Overall, the Beijing strategy seems successful in creating more tension in military and international relations with Taiwan, even though there are some obstacles in economics and the risk of being backlashed by international organizations. However, their movement will not stop there if we see the desire that Beijing must take Taiwan. The Beijing future agenda would likely stress out in the military and the international blockade in the future with the tendency to not use any diplomatic manners to bring down the tension.

Taiwan has been one of the core problems in US-China relations since its establishment in the 1950s. Also these past few years have been dramatic in the case of East Asia-Pacific geopolitics where Beijing policies look more assertive than ever in Asia and the decreasing of US supremacy. Militarily, Taiwan lies with inside the United States protection umbrella out of strategic necessity. It is the crucial hyperlink with inside the First Island Chain. If the chain is broken, China could be capable of rolling up U.S. defenses, attacking Japan and the US Allies from their exposed, Pacific-dealing flanks. Moreover, Taiwan is China's maximum probable target, given those geostrategic realities and the risk that Taiwan`s democratic, capitalist regime poses to the Chinese Communist Party. The US does have the manner to guard Taiwan, especially if it chooses to combat ahead and interact with China earlier than it could envelop the island. US submarines and island-primarily based missiles.

The said dynamics of these two major powers will always impact the fragile status quo of Taiwan's position in the region and by extent, the small and middle powers of the Asia-Pacific region because they always have an interdependent relationship toward the two powers. But the crucial points remain, Taiwan's security is directly connected with the US and its conditions with China. Any

significant change will always have a direct impact on the said region. Especially if we see the Trump Administration. It was then President-Elect Trump spoke on the phone with President Tsai Ing-wen in December 2016, this became a reflection on how hasty Trump foreign policy was and how it went decreasing in the matter of US and China relations during his administration. The Trump administration boosted US support for Taiwan to levels not seen in the United States since 1971. It helped to secure the sale of sixty-six F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan in 2020, reversing the Obama administration stance. The administration shifted the responsibility of the deputy assistant secretaries of defense (DASD) to place Taiwan under the DASD for East Asia, which is responsible for US partners and allies in the Pacific, rather than a DASD for mainland China.

Officials from the United States and Taiwan also emerged in significance. In a break from the usual one-day stopover policy, the Trump administration permitted President Tsai to stay for two days each way on her 2019 transit through the United States, and when Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar decided to visit Taiwan in August 2020, he became the highestranking US member of government to visit the area in decades. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo officially lifted all restrictions on US-Taiwan government cooperation. The president furthermore signed the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act, which aimed the secretary of defense to "carry out a program of senior military officer exchanges," as well as the 2018 Taiwan Travel Act, which mentioned that the US encourage the government "visits between officials from the US and Taiwan at all levels". Trump's policies on this left behind dangerous cases as they always sprayed gasoline in the fire of US-China power dynamics.

As the Chinese constantly swarming toward East Asia dominance, The Biden administration attempted to create a new equilibrium in its Taiwan policy straight away. His Administration issued a statement called "PRC Military Pressure against Taiwan Threatens Regional Peace and Stability". The statement urges China to end its military, diplomatic and economic pressure on Taiwan and instead engage in constructive dialogue with democratically elected representatives of Taiwan. It reaffirmed the historic US attitude toward Taiwan with

confidence. "We will deepen our relationship with democratic Taiwan," the Biden administration added. "The commitment to Taiwan is solid and contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the region." This statement is "solid." But the underlying substance of "our commitment" is less clear than it used to be.

The generally accepted definition of American national interest, defined as necessary to protect and improve the survival of Americans in a stable, free, and secure nation, so actions need to be taken in several steps. First, prevent and reduce the threat of lethal terrorist attacks or cyberattacks using conventional weapons, as well as the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, against the United States, foreign troops or its allies. Second, the US must prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, secure nuclear weapons, and materials, and curb the further proliferation of medium and long-range nuclear weapons systems. Third, they must manage the internal resilience of the United States, the projection and influence of the United States international powers, and thus create a balance of global and local status quos that promotes peace, stability and freedom through US local and international power projections and influences. The US also needs to ensure the vitality and stability of crucial global frameworks such as global economy, public health, energy supply, and cyberspace, environmental and maritime freedoms.

The United States' ambiguous attitude on this matter is likely to continue. That is why, the US strategic goal on Taiwan should be to maintain its political and economic autonomy, its dynamism as a free democratic society, and the deterrence of its US allies without causing a Chinese attack on Taiwan. This will depend on US accurate calculations, and the endurance in facing China moves, strength, and commitment towards its claims in Taiwan. That is also why the strategic policies that are pursued by the US must require more quality and in-depth decision making. The diplomacy in the Biden Administration that processes on the international stage requires tactical modifications and sustaining cautiousness in their making.

Taiwan's domestic security and political practices are highly influenced by the regional political

dynamics. With the United States and People's Republic of China as two major power influences, also the emerging power of many other countries in the region can result in a direct impact on Taiwan. Since the first term of Tsai Ing-Wen presidency, in 2016 the administration built up the state's military for the defensive purposes. Raising the assertive force of the PRC's military, making Taiwan have no other option than leaning to the other power, America. In terms of air defense, bought Patriot Advanced Capability-3 and FIM-92 SAMs, 66 F-16C/B Block 70 fighters, as well as funding projects including the Tien-Kung series SAMs and AT-5 advanced trainers/light fighters. This is an investment to improve air defense capability. Having offensive military capabilities is presumably the most ideal and have been proven to have an immediate impact. However, this might lead to numerous labels from the international community. The label of being a "troublemaker" can lead to Taiwan losing trust and support, also risking their ties with the United States.

In addition, Taiwan has progressively modernized their naval equipment. Including a wide spectrum of vessels, such as submarine rescue Ships, submarines, frigates, Tuo Chiang-class stealth corvettes, high-speed minelayers, and mine countermeasure vessels. After these purchases, the international community can identify the purposes behind the upgrading of Taiwanese military. Taipei seems to aim for a balanced sea control and sea denial to counter Chinese possible A2'AD firepower. However, with the Taiwanese short coastline might make it more difficult to survive even with this military equipment. Multiple upgrading for defense proposes also happened on the land military equipment, including AH-64E and AH-1W attack helicopters, onshore Harpoon and Hsiung-Fung series ASCMs, indigenous infantry fighting vehicles, M1A2T main battle tanks (MBT), and UH-60M utility and CH-47D transport helicopters. Helicopter purchases for land military supply is used for transferring soldiers in the most effective way.

With the support of military modernization won't instantly remove all the weaknesses of Taiwan defenses. Security dynamics in the region is not a mere interaction and response of China and Taiwan, but it more likely will involve the closest neighboring country, including Japan and South Korea, as well as Taiwan's closes allies, the United States

Reunification by force if necessary -China but Taiwan have US support and China would likely get international backlash if they were to invade Taiwan. Numerous verbal threats and military warnings have been thrown by Beijing to Taiwan. Beijing would not hesitate to invade Taiwan if they were to formally declare their independence. Taiwan, especially the Tsai Ing-wen administration strongly believe in the long-wanted independent sovereignty and against the annexation proposed by Beijing.

The tension in this region is more intense today than ever. As per usual, the American alliance with Taiwan angered China. The US is occupying a Taiwanese self-ruled island with military equipment and artillery to counter Chinese aggressive military tendencies. Beijing made a serious warning to Washington to pull back their militaries on the land. However, America has made a clear statement regarding its stance in the possible future if a war happened. Through the solidarity bond of democracy, America would do its favor to Taiwan.

China views Taiwan as a rebel province and like a ticking bomb, China will eventually give a lesson to Taiwan.   With the validation of the "one China" policy driving a China reunification is a prerequisite. Possibilities of an invasion is acknowledged by several countries worldwide and both of the cross-strip nations. A former Australian Prime Minister, Tony Abbott speculated the increasing military harassment would ignite the fire of war in the future. As well as the United States' 46th President, Joe Biden also has an identical view with the ongoing situation. Warned by China, in October 2021 Taiwan's prime minister was informed that China would be on the full military capabilities to invade Taiwan. This is the first move of Beijing in telling a straightforward warning of the upcoming war to the public sphere.

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The Political Prortret of last 100 years

And comparative analysis of International Relations

Russian-Ukrainian War

The assertion that the Russian Federation's use of force against Ukraine, which started on February 24, 2022, constitutes a new turning point in the world order is not correct. Rather, Russia's action against Ukraine is an important reminder of the already existing international system. The Russian use of force has led the international community to look at the current world order in a more careful way. In other words, the Russia-Ukraine war directs our attention to a tacit dimension of the international system that has always existed. In this respect, this paper contributes to a definition of the international system and to a clarification of what it may represent.

Russia had already used force against Ukraine in 2014 when it invaded the eastern and southeastern regions of the country. The 2022 Russian use of force against Ukraine expands upon that previous invasion and constitutes a wholesale attack on the sovereignty and the political independence of Ukraine. The West is alarmed by the Russian attitude. Accusations and counter-accusations together with a flurry of comments and statements by governments, international organizations, media outlets and experts have been highly visible since the conflict began. The common thread among these comments is the focus upon international

Law. The Russian military intervention in Ukraine is indeed in direct violation of international law, representing an aggression which is prohibited under international law.

Yet, what if international law should not be the focus at all? What if discussing the international law implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine does not lead us anywhere? Indeed, Russia, through its use of force against Ukraine, showed another dimension of the international system the West carefully abstains from mentioning. The Western anger towards Russia partially stems from Russia's bluntness in disclosing that tacit dimension in international relations which is diligently and deliberately not articulated. That dimension is international comity.

International comity is a term which international lawyers avoid as much as possible since they are not fond of the ambiguities it connotes. International comity is a "grey area" within the international system. It can be argued that international comity is the 'subconscious' of international law. "The invisible college of

international lawyers" wish to suppress it, yet, it comes back again and again. The Russian military intervention in Ukraine has revived that subconscious and has inevitably brought it to the fore. Now, it is difficult for international lawyers to avoid the concept of international comity for long. Russia has compelled the international community into looking at the notion of international comity. In that respect, the constant Western talk of "international law" or the "rules based international order" runs the risk of being sidelined in favor of international comity.

In the 2022-2023 Russo–Ukrainian war, Russia may formally continue to invoke her security concerns, her so-called historical rights, and her interest in the Russianspeaking people in Ukraine. That is, Russia may never openly employ the term "international comity" as such. Actually, Russia need not specifically do that as the Russian attitude de facto culminates in "international comity". Moreover, if the West does not directly deal with Russia's implicit invocation of international comity and continues to insist explicitly upon international law arguments, the disharmony between the West and Russia may continue for a long time.

In that respect, it would be useful to elaborate on international comity. Such elaboration has been postponed for a long time. The Russian aggression against Ukraine now makes that elaboration urgent and necessary. In particular, an examination of international comity would bring three advantages: first, the current miscommunication between the disputing parties in respect to the Russia-Ukraine war would be alleviated. Second, the concept of international comity would be prevented from being abused as regards both the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the future similar cases. Third, one would be able to delineate the limits of international law.

This article argues that international law exists to the extent that international comity is respected. International comity is the unacknowledged backbone of the international system. In this regard, the article, at first,via a discussion of the RussiaUkraine war, highlights international comity as the indispensable element of the international system. Then, the article further examines and defines the notion of international comity.

The Russian use of force against Ukraine, which started on February 24, 2022, is an obvious violation of international law. The Russian use of force is in violation of the principle of territorial sovereignty as well as the political independence of Ukraine and thus breaches the UN Charter. The Russian action violates the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes, which is indicated in Article 2(3) of the UN Charter, and is based neither on any UN Security Council resolution nor on a right to self-defense.5 There is no justification based on international law for the Russian use of force against Ukraine.

Indeed, the West has not found it difficult to react to Russia. They have taken unilateral measures and imposed sanctions against Russia – national air space prohibitions on Russian aircraft, the cutting off of commercial relations, the raising of tariffs on some Russian goods, the cessation of oil imports from Russia, the freezing of Russian state assets and Russian state bank accounts in the Western financial institutions, the freezing of the foreign exchange reserves of the Russian Central Bank held in the Western banks, ending cooperation with Russian banks, preparing to expel Russia from the Council of Europe, which eventually led Russia to leave the Council of Europe, and loud condemnation of Russia. In response, Russia imposed unilateral sanctions on some Western governments and politicians and expelled some Western diplomats. The West and Russia are in a confrontation. While the West condemns the Russian violation of international law, Russia invokes its historical rights, security concerns and the need for the protection of the Russianspeaking people in Ukraine to justify its military intervention in its southern neighbour.

The West and Russia do not seem to speak the same language. This does not necessarily mean that they invoke unintelligible arguments. Rather, the spheres in which they establish themselves are different. While the West (ostensibly) inhabits the sphere of international law, Russia operates in the sphere of international comity. Whereas the West explicitly invokes international law, Russia implicitly invokes international comity. This is thus a clash of international law and international comity.

In essence, Russia argues that the Western world in general, and NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization) in particular, are getting too close to the Russian borders. NATO enlargement is a profound worry for Russia. Indeed, from the disintegration of the Soviet Union onwards, Russian governments have persistently argued that NATO should not expand and aim to include Ukraine. In that respect, Russia, prima facie, invokes international law: arguably, during the dismemberment of the Soviet Union (1989-1991), the West promised Russia not to enlarge NATO membership to the countries neighboring Russia. Yet, this promise was not in the form of a written treaty, but, was, purportedly, merely an oral agreement between Western and Russian leaders.

Although not entirely impossible, proving the existence of an oral agreement blocking Ukraine's entry into NATO is a challenge. Still, the possibility of the existence of such an oral agreement did not stop the West from envisaging Ukraine as a potential member of NATO in 2008, and there has been a certain amount of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO since. Some even claim that Ukraine had become a de facto member of NATO before the 2022 Russian military intervention in the country, though this paper finds that claim exaggerated.

Here emerges international comity. Rather than limiting himself to the discussion of the existence of a putative agreement between Russia and the West under international law, the Russian government invokes an additional argument based on international comity: Russia is a great power – or, at any rate, it regards itself as a great power, and as a great power, Russia should be deemed competent to manage the affairs of its neighborhood, in other words, its geographical sphere of influence, an area in which Russia must enjoy exclusivity in terms of military affairs. Moreover, Russia should be able to have a restraining power on the foreign policy of countries within its geographical sphere of influence.

A great power may deem its neighboring country as the buffer zone where it can confront its potential enemies before the latter attempt to enter into the territory of the great power. In the Russian view, Moscow's consent to international law, encompassing both the West and Russia, exists to the extent that international comity ensures Russia has a certain geographical sphere of influence vis-à-vis the West. According to the Russian government, great powers shall be respectful and courteous toward each other with regard to the management of their geographical spheres of influence. The great powers should keep a certain space among themselves and the West should respect the regional hegemony of Russia.

The Western response to that Russian assertion is based upon international law. The concept of a sphere of influence is now considered by many to be outdated and inimical to international law. The West wishes to exclude definitively the language of sphere of influence from international law as it connotes powers politics rather than legal security. Indeed, in 2014 the then German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared that sphere of influence is an old concept which should be discarded since it is in complete contradiction to international law as the West understands it in the post-Cold War era.

Indeed, the sphere of influence is not a concept in international law, nor is it enforceable. Yet, in the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation", the most important instrument of international law regulating relations between NATO and Russia in the post-Cold War era, there is clear mention of spheres of influence. That agreement, inter alia, states:

 "NATO and Russia will seek the widest possible cooperation among participating States of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) with the aim of creating in Europe a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of any state." (emphasis added)

Thus, the concept of spheres of influence rears its head in the most important international law instrument regulating relations between NATO and Russia. This treaty, the basic concern of which is to reconcile NATO and Russia in terms of security after the end of the Cold War, explicitly sees the concept of sphere of influence as a necessary component of that reconciliation.

However, the concept of "sphere of influence" is not defined in the treaty. Additionally, no dispute settlement mechanism exists in the treaty to settle questions regarding these spheres of influence

between NATO and Russia. In fact, the Founding Act merely provides for political consultations between the two parties to the agreement in the event of a dispute:

"If disagreements arise, NATO and Russia will endeavour to settle them on the basis of goodwill and mutual respect within the framework of political consultations."

Indeed, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, established under this treaty, fulfills the sole function of consultations and exchange of information. The Founding Act did not "legalize" the relationship between NATO and the Russian Federation.

Indeed, the Founding Act has not been ratified by either NATO member countries or Russia in their respective parliaments.The parties intended the Founding Act to be binding without there being any need for national ratifications in the national parliaments of NATO members and the Russian Federation. Indeed, the Act stipulates:"The present Act takes effect upon the date of its signature. NATO and Russia will take the proper steps to ensure its implementation in accordance with their procedures."

There is no mention of national ratifications in the Founding Act, although that is normally the case with the entry of multilateral treaties into effect. Granted, "it is for states to decide how to bring into being legally binding undertakings. It all depends on their will." It is wholly feasible that merely with the signature on a treaty of certain diplomats, government representatives or the heads of state, the treaty, without the ratification of the national parliaments, enters into force because the governments may "deem it advisable to preserve a certain flexibility and latitude of power."14

Indeed, this treaty between NATO and Russia contains flexible provisions – such as the aforementioned one on sphere(s) of influence. The treaty seems to create a modus vivendi in general terms between NATO and Russia. Due to the difficulty of directly executing this treaty as well as its highly flexible outlook, such as the aforementioned provision containing the sphere of influence, state parties to this treaty did not transform the agreement into their national laws.

The level of discretion in implementing the treaty is so high that the treaty has not become a matter for national ratification or for national legislation.

A treaty need not be ratified in national parliaments to be binding upon the state parties. The parties to a treaty may choose how they bind themselves to it. Indeed, as regards the Founding Act between NATO and the Russian Federation, the parties "preferred to bypass national legislatures to preserve a certain flexibility and latitude of power."16 What is necessary is to determine whether the treaty creates certain rights and obligations for state parties, and that is something to be determined through the interpretation of the treaty.

Here is the interpretation: the West and the Russian Federation wished to frame their disputes regarding geographical spheres of influence within a binding treaty. The Founding Act represents an initiative by both to establish international law for the settlement of questions of geographical spheres of influence in Europe. Yet, the Founding Act did not bring any legal procedure or any legal dispute settlement mechanism to such questions. As such, the issues seem to be deadlocked within the realm of diplomacy and political consultations. The mere mention of the term "sphere of influence" in the Founding Act has not resolved said disputes between NATO and Russia. Hence, some argue that the Founding Act is to be regarded as a "political agreement" rather than a treaty.

However, no special category of "political agreement" under international law – as distinct from treaty – exists. Rather, there is a distinction between "political commitment" and treaty. True, at times, it may not be clear "whether a state had entered into an international binding agreement proper, or had instead undertaken only a political commitment."20 Yet, in that respect, the intent of the parties to the Founding Act is clear: NATO and Russia envisaged the Founding Act as a binding legal instrument. This is a treaty. One cannot reduce the Founding Act to a mere political commitment. The Founding Act represents an effort to transform international comity between NATO and Russia with regard to influence on the European continent into international law. The Founding Act represents an initiative to bring the disputes in regard to geographical sphere(s) of

influence between NATO and Russia from the realm of international comity into the realm of international law.

In this respect, the Founding Act – as a binding legal instrument – represents a step forward from the non-binding and loose framework established by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE is more a political and diplomatic forum for the exchange of information among its members – the Western states and the Russian Federation. This is particularly the case with issues of conflict prevention and arms control. The OSCE consists of political commitments by the Western governments and the Russian government but it does not establish a legally binding framework. Flexibility reigns in the operation of the OSCE; the OSCE does not provide for "legal" sanctions for "legal" disputes. In other words, the participating states in the OSCE do not perceive their disputes in legal terms.

The OSCE is not a classical international organization; it does not have international legal personality. Nor is OSCE based upon a binding founding instrument – it has no binding charter. The founding instruments of the OSCE – the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) – are conspicuously non-binding and do not have treaty status. Both are at the level of political commitment.

The Founding Act between NATO and Russia is different. The Founding Act is an international law initiative aiming to deal with the shortcomings of the highly politicized and flexible OSCE. The lack of binding international instruments and the weakness of the institutional structure are evident. The international law dimension of the relationship between Russia and the West in respect to the European continent is conspicuously weak. In that regard, the Founding Act is an initiative to place that relationship within the framework of international law. However, the Founding Act does not seem successful in that respect.

This does not mean that international law may never come back to deal with the relationship between the West and Russia in the light of the 2022-2023 RussiaUkraine war. This particular military conflict may eventually (re-)enter the orbit of international law. In this context, the cooperation between international law and

international comity following the 1999 Western military intervention into Kosovo may set an example. Even though the Western use of force in Kosovo was in violation of international law, it was subsequently brought into the fold of international law through UN Security Council Resolution 1244. The resolution enabled the UN to establish a post-intervention "legal" presence in Kosovo and established the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo. The resolution authorized an international civil and military presence in Kosovo which was, at the time, part of Serbia. Thanks to that resolution, the Western intervention into Kosovo, which had been totally based upon international comity, was "legalized" under international law.

True, by giving post-intervention legal endorsement, the resolution ultimately confirmed the U.S. and Western sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. A subsequent legalization of the military intervention was achieved with UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Yet, importantly, this resolution could be made by the Security Council thanks to Russian cooperation. Russia, who had been opposing the Western military action in Kosovo from the outset, later consented to the passing of this resolution. A similar subsequent international law initiative in respect of the UkraineRussia war may take over from international comity, too. Such an initiative may take place through a UN Security Council resolution or a treaty between Ukraine and Russia endorsed by the West.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that international law does not encompass and does not tame great power disputes on geographical spheres of influence. International law, at most, legalizes and legitimizes the settlement of disputes on geographical spheres of influence after military interventions take place. In particular, as long as the disputing parties cannot be brought together under the roof of an international institution, the risk of use of force inherent in geographical sphere of influence disputes persists.

To date, the West and the Russian Federation have not come together under a specific international institution where their disputes regarding geographical spheres of influence in the European continent would be resolved peacefully and amicably. Neither the OSCE nor the Founding Act between NATO and the Russian Federation have

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created such an international institution. As Russia has not been integrated into an international institution in the European continent, disputes over geographical spheres of influence, rather than an institutional one, are at work. If such an international institution existed, Russia would be able to assert her tacit sphere of influence within the confines of the international institution, and that, arguably, could have prevented the 2022-2023 Russia-Ukraine war.

All in all, international comity plays an important role in the relationship between the West and the Russian Federation. Therefore, a close examination of the notion of international comity is necessary.

Before forming a definition of international comity, a distinction between comity in private international law (conflict of laws) and public international law should be made. Comity in private international law consists of the recognition of a foreign sovereign nation's executive and legislative acts or foreign national judicial decisions. When a domestic court opts to recognize and apply a foreign state's law rather than domestic law, this can be defined as a voluntary restraint on domestic law. This is a voluntary choice made by the domestic court for the sake of a global public interest such as peaceful relations among governments or the efficient functioning of the global market. The extraterritorial effect of foreign law or foreign judicial decision is tolerated by the domestic court, although there is no legal obligation to do so.The domestic court acts due simply to international comity. The latter can be defined as a courteousness and respect of sorts towards foreign law or foreign judicial decisions.

Most of the time, the basis of comity in private international law is international trade. International comity brings utility and convenience to international trade. Put more clearly, international comity responds to the needs of a global market that cannot be managed solely and parochially by national laws, national regulations and national judicial decisions. National laws alone cannot ensure international trade in goods, services and capital. To make up for that inadequacy, it may be necessary for domestic national courts at times to recognize foreign executive acts and foreign judicial decisions. All in all, in theory, while international comity can be defined as voluntary acts of courteousness and respect, it fills a crucial loophole in the international system in practice. That is the logic of international comity being inherent in private international law.

International comity in the context of public international law also involves the recognition of a foreign element without being under the legal obligation to do so. It fills a crucial loophole in the international system, too. Still, comity under public international law is different from that under private international law in that it is concerned rather with the sphere of influence of great powers. On the one hand, governments the world over – in essence, the 'international community' – recognize the sphere of influence of great powers. On the other, great powers observe each other's sphere of influence. Great powers' sphere of influence may be institutional or/and geographical.

The existence of great powers in international institutions helps ensure international peace, security and prosperity. Arguably, the international institutions that include great powers as their members are more sustainable. The League of Nations is a case in point. Due to the absence of the United States of America (U.S.) and the Soviet Union (except for a short period of time) in the League, the latter could not adequately deal with issues within the international system. Indeed, the League of Nations was unsuccessful in that it could neither deal with the global economic crisis of the 1930s nor prevent World War II.

Yet, when great powers become members of international institutions, they make inroads into the principle of the equal sovereignty of nations within those institutions. There are many instances where great powers possess institutional spheres of influence. Great power privileges in international institutions have become a natural phenomenon, although most of the time, they are not openly articulated in the founding documents of those institutions. There exists a certain tacit international agreement among governments as regards the existence of great power privileges within international institutions. A certain institutional practice establishes itself, which satisfies great powers.

A good example for great powers' institutional sphere of influence is the election of a judge to the

International Court of Justice (ICJ) from the nationality of each permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. That is not provided in international law – either in the statute of the ICJ or in the UN Charter. In particular, Article 2 of the Statute of the ICJ stipulates that independent judges "regardless of their nationality" are to be elected to the ICJ. There exists no international legal obligation for always giving a seat on the ICJ to each permanent member of the Security Council. Yet, in practice, it is nominees of the permanent members of the Security Council that are always elected to the ICJ. "Their permanent presence in the ICJ, though not specified in the Statute of the Court, is the norm".30

Interestingly, in the academic literature, always having judges in the ICJ from the nationality of permanent members of the UN Security Council is referred to as "the tradition" , "the long-standing tradition" , "the firm expectation" or "the reality of power politics." In fact, this is international comity. International comity ensures the election of the nationals of the great powers – who currently constitute the permanent members of the UN Security Council – to the ICJ. And, the ICJ is the primary universal court – the 'World Court' – charged with the interpretation and application of international law.

The permanent members' ICJ seats embody the respect and courtesy shown towards the permanent members of the UN Security Council. In the post-1945 era, international comity presupposes the permanent members as the pioneers of the international system, and the ICJ may be regarded as one of the universal institutions representing the international system. In this context, international comity may be defined as a way of reassuring the great powers and integrating them into the international system by assigning them certain privileges in international institutions.

The permanent members of the Security Council do indeed attach importance to their ICJ seat. In the election of judges to the ICJ, permanent members always vote for each other in the Security Council. They observe each other's institutional sphere of influence. That is because if one of the permanent members loses the seat at the ICJ, this may set a precedent which may

challenge the seat of the other permanent members, too. Interestingly, non-permanent members never object to the permanent members' seats in the ICJ. At least, that was the case until 2017.

In 2017, great power privilege at the ICJ was challenged, for the first time, by India. The Indian candidate to the ICJ unexpectedly defeated the British candidate. To see a long established international comity that favored great powers with regard to the election of judges to the ICJ being successfully challenged was unprecedented. An implicit matter in the election of judges to the ICJ – the election of judges from permanent members of the Security Council to the ICJ – suddenly became an explicit matter through the successful contestation of a seat by a country which is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council. This "explicit" violation of the "implicit" international comity in 2017 in regards to the election of judges to the ICJ demonstrated that international comity is susceptible to challenge. Nevertheless, some maintain that it will be very difficult to repeat this successful challenge against a permanent member of the UN Security Council for a long time.39

Judges to the ICJ are elected through separate votes in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council. A candidate needs the absolute majority of votes in both organs to be a judge in the ICJ. The crux of the problem with regard to the 2017 election to the ICJ was that while the General Assembly overwhelmingly supported the Indian nominee, the Security Council supported the British nominee for the post. The stalemate continued for eleven rounds of simultaneous votes in the General Assembly and the Security Council. The British only accepted defeat and withdrew their candidate after eleven consecutive losses in the General Assembly voting, despite always winning the vote in the Security Council.

Under international law the British had the right to go on with further elections, but they saw that with each new round in the General Assembly, India was increasing its vote at the expense of Britain. This was increasing the "democratic" and "explicit" pressure on Britain. Indeed, to halt any new round of voting in the General Assembly, the British floated the "international law" remedy of the establishment of a "Joint Conference" between

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the Security Council and General Assembly, consisting of three members from each organ, to determine the judge. Joint Conference is stipulated in Article 12 of the Statute of the ICJ.

The Joint Conference would be able to elect the judge to the ICJ by four votes. Yet, India strongly objected to suspending voting in the General Assembly to let the tiny Joint Conference elect the judge to the ICJ. Two permanent members of the Security Council – the USA and France – agreed with India that the vote in the General Assembly and the Security Council should continue. As a result, the UK suddenly dropped the idea of a vote in the Security Council for the establishment of a Joint Conference.

The powerful "explicit" and "democratic" support for the Indian candidate in the UN General Assembly , an assertive diplomatic effort by India and India's effective media campaign convinced the British not to further press the formal international law channels under Article 12 of the Statute of the ICJ. The British government was very well aware of the "implicit" international comity inherent in the continuous election of British judges to the ICJ for 72 years and that this did not have a basis in international law.

This explicit democratic support for India in the UN General Assembly and the ensuing international media campaign facilitated the support of the foremost great power – the United States – for India. The U.S. initially supported the British candidate, a typical example of international comity where great powers support each other. Yet, the successful Indian campaign involving the UN General Assembly and the lobbying by Indian diplomats of their U.S. counterparts led the U.S. to change its course48 and this U.S. support for India led to Indian victory. Indeed, many argue that "if you want to be successful in UN politics, it is American support that counts."

This was the first time that a British judge would not sit on the bench of the ICJ and this damaged British standing in the international community. Arguably, the Indian victory was primarily due to the fact that India successfully disclosed the implicit international comity in the election of judges to the ICJ. India deliberately made this implicit contest wholly explicit. India, being aware of the implicit dimension of the international

comity selecting judges from the permanent members of the UN Security Council, did its utmost to disclose this implicit phenomenon to the international community. India attached immense importance to defeating the UK and to placing its judge on the ICJ and knew very well that transparency was the enemy of comity when it came to the great powers' influence in international institutions. Indeed, India publicized the overwhelming – almost two thirds of the General Assembly membership – 'democratic' support for the Indian candidate and this led the British to admit to defeat for the first time as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

All in all, a clash of international comity and international law within the UN – an international institution – was resolved through the friendly withdrawal of Britain from the contest. Yet, friendly withdrawals and an amicable admission of defeat may not be the case when it comes to geographical spheres of influence, in that the latter may dangerously incur uses of force that are in violation of international law. (ii) Geographical sphere of influence.

Geographical spheres of influence concern the close neighborhood of a great power. The national security concerns of great powers lead to the establishment of their spheres of influence. Arguably, great powers who feel secure through geographical sphere of influence arrangements would cooperate in international law and comply with the UN Charter. In this regard, international comity in respect to geographical spheres of influence is essential to the existence of great powers as participants in the international system.

A good example for the geographical sphere of influence is the 1999 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) intervention into Kosovo. The Western powers – namely, NATO under the leadership of the United States – intervened in an area which was not under direct NATO treaty jurisdiction. It was thus an "out of area" intervention by NATO. NATO is a defensive organization yet there had been no Yugoslav (Serbian) attack on NATO countries to trigger NATO's right to selfdefense. In particular, it is difficult to understand why the U.S., the most important member of NATO, suddenly took the political decision to intervene in Kosovo and lead efforts to separate Kosovo from Yugoslavia

(Serbia). The answer lies in the notion of international comity.

In justifying their 1999 military intervention in Kosovo, NATO and the U.S. invoked the term "international community" extensively. They argued, and vociferously too, that they were engaging in Kosovo on behalf of the international community and laid claim to a particular "doctrine of international community." Arguably, what they meant when using the term "international community" was international comity. NATO and the U.S. implied that international comity allowed them to militarily intervene in Kosovo, even though that intervention was in violation of international law – that is, in violation of the prohibition of use of force against the territorial sovereignty and the political independence of a state.60 There was neither a UN Security Council resolution nor a situation of self-defense to justify the Kosovo military intervention under international law.

After the 1999 military intervention, Kosovo, in 2008, declared independence and is now recognized by 117 countries. The map of Europe has therefore changed thanks to a military intervention into Serbia, a sovereign state, with the emergence of a new state on the European continent. Serbia and Russia had always objected to the military intervention in Kosovo and the subsequent independence of Kosovo from Serbia and both invoked international law in support of their objections. In response, the West felt that a bridge had to be made between international law and international comity. Otherwise, the credibility of international law would be jeopardized.

Indeed, that bridge was constructed through the special qualification of the Kosovo intervention: according to the USA, NATO and the Western European states – 'the West' – Kosovo represented "a unique case". NATO members, in defending the military intervention into Kosovo and Kosovo's subsequent secession from Serbia, insisted upon invoking the "uniqueness" of the Kosovo episode. This is an open admission of the exceptionality of the Kosovo intervention in the light of public international law. Indeed, Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. Secretary of State at the time of the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state, declared that Kosovar independence was not a

precedent for other similar cases of declarations of independence.64

In that respect, one notices the difference between international law and international comity. While international law is about creating patterns through precedent, international comity is rather about the sphere of influence. While international law requires consistency and predictability in an explicit way, international comity involves tacit understanding in the international system. The danger is that while operating under international comity, one may harm international law. The West, being fully aware of the damage to international law, while acting for the Western sphere of influence in the Eastern Europe, tried to control that damage through the language of "uniqueness". The West argued that the "unique" and "exceptional" Kosovo intervention would not undermine international law.

Under international comity, the U.S. and NATO deemed themselves in the right in order to resolve a territorial dispute in Europe at the expense of international law. International comity led the West to decide a territorial question on the European continent. NATO and the U.S. proved to the world that, being great powers, they had the final say in the determination of the borders of a country within the Western sphere of influence and the U.S. in particular proved its leadership to the world. No other great power, such as Russia, could challenge NATO and the U.S. in settling European territorial questions.

In the present international system, international comity is the backbone of international law. International comity has returned to the forefront of the international system due to the 2022-2023 Russia-Ukraine war. Under international comity, Russia insists on the establishment and protection of her geographical sphere of influence in Ukraine, a position to which the West objects. There is no international institution which can transform this current dispute over a geographical sphere of influence in Europe into an institutional one. Neither the OSCE nor the Founding Act provide an adequate international institution.

The Russian-Ukraine war may end in an agreement. A treaty or a UN Security Council resolution may formally end the war and establish

peace and security. However, the insufficiency of international law has emerged as a glaring fact. This time, international lawyers cannot skip over the notion of international comity any longer. Arguably, from now on, the sphere of influence of great powers, both in its institutional and geographical aspects, will receive greater recognition in international law circles. Some crucial decisions may well be made for transforming some elements of international comity into international law. That may be the case if a sufficient number of decision makers start to believe that "implicit" international comity does not provide the necessary guarantees for international peace, security and prosperity. The prevailing opinion may well be that international comity will, to a certain extent, have to be made explicit under international law.

The idea that no great power sphere of influence exists under international law is a noble one. That idea represents the belief in the sovereign equality of nationstates the world over. In this regard, whatever differences may exist in the military, economic and political power of nations, they are to be treated in the same way and on an equal basis. No nation should be superior to the other under international law. Yet, that does not reflect the reality on the ground. The great powers have always exerted their sphere of influence and, when necessary, they have done so and continue to do so outside the formal confines of international law.

Dealing with spheres of influence requires us to further discuss the capabilities of international law to accommodate the sensibilities and the demands of the great powers. This is because what ultimately, and unfortunately, prevails in the international system is the will of the great powers. If international law continues to neglect the great power element in both its institutional and geographical dimensions, it may remain ineffective. Confining great power influence to the realm of international comity may continue to weaken the role of international law in the international system.

Syrian Civil War

The Current Situation in Syria

Territory controlled in Syria, by faction (as of 22 October 2019)

--- 'Safe Zone'
- Turkish forces & allies
- Assad regime & pro-government forces
- Syrian/Russian forces
- Kurdish forces
- Syrian rebels
- Others (previously Kurds)
- US-supported rebels
- Islamic State
- Israel

@StatistaCharts   Source: Liveuamap/Handelsblatt

statista

To put it mildly, the Syrian Conflict is extremely convoluted and creates a hard scenario of how the complicated conflict may be resolved. In support of peaceful settlement and discussion, international parties such as the Arab League and the UN have intervened. The war swept across the nation very soon, as people of Deraa city called for the release, as they painted on the walls the famous cry of mass revolts in Egypt and Tunisia, of the fourteen young students detained, cruelly tortured; Reports indicated that in the early protests, 38 civilians had died and the numbers increased as the protests continued, with the regime of Bashar al-Assad in power for 40 years, extremely violently retaliated by assaulting demonstrators, murdering the first civilians of war. Thus, protests expanded throughout Damascus, Hama, Homs, Latakia and other places from the southern city of Deraa.

400,000 people have died in the Syrian civil war and millions have been displaced UN stated at one time that the battlefield turmoil has prevented deaths from being counted but that around half of the population in that nation is displaced generating enormous irregular and chaotic migration. The devastating and degrading impact on the Syrian, financial and socio-political infrastructure has affected, in particular, the entire Middle East, thus helping to facilitate the emergence of a range of jihadist organisations such as the Jabhat-al-Nusra Front, the ISIS, and the conflict resolution. In Syria, there is no measure of the magnitude of humanitarian misery. The fact that the Syrian government blocks international journalists and reporters from entering the country was exceedingly difficult for officials to get the precise death penalty.

In the framework of geopolitics, which are major actors and interests of the war, this report seeks to study closely the Syrian Civil War and in general how the discussions or mediation attempts were made to end it. The paper consists mostly of high quality material such as books, seminars, journals, news clips and articles on the Internet.

The root of the crisis is highly intricate since many non-state and State stakeholders participate in this geopolitical link directly and indirectly at various phases.

Several non-state and state actors participate directly and indirectly and to get an awareness of civil war and counterinsurgency in order to comprehend the conflict. Counterinsurgency efforts are the efforts of a government to preserv law and order against any armed opposition who aim to bring down the government. This was a government's goal, renounced by the autumn of 2012, whereas armed opposition to civil war is muscular and strong enough to stop the government's progress. As a model in Syria, in 2012, the insurgent rule in the northern area and in the Damascus district was turned into a chaotic civil war.

Arab soldiers headed by Emir Feisal seized Damascus in 1918 and helped by British forces thus added 400 years of Ottoman dominance. In July 1920, however, French soldiers seized Damascus and overthrew Feisal. In 1940 Syria was conquered by the Axis during the Second World War as France came down with German troops. In 1946, Syria was independent. The average government time in Syria in 1970, or till 1970, has passed Hafez al-Assad. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has given Syria political stability and built strong ties to Iran and the (USA) Union. On 10 July 2000, following the death of Hafez el-Assad, Bashar al-Assad was elected President of Syria. Initially Bashar al-Assad took the steps towards liberalising Syria, but then he followed the policies of his father, ruled as a dictator who jailed political dissidents and smashed protests and dissent. There were also various incidents that indicated that during his tenure in office, such as domestic media, criticism and economic policies were closely monitored, etc. In addition to rejecting political statements, he prohibited and denied freedom of speech. At that time, Syria's human rights record was not promising at all.

Protests grew and spread across the Syrian country in the spring of 2011. But, on the contrary, this led to armed demonstrators against the regime. Bashar el-Assada tried to stop these protests with the backing of violent forces. This fact is not overlooked because the majority of Syrians are Sunni Muslims with a population of 22,5 million

(74 percent), while the Shia minority of President Assad's

Alawites is ruled. There were extremely clear accusations that Bashar Al-Assad had privileged Alawites, which had a strong effect on Sunni hatred and different organisations opposed to the Alawites. Kurds, Druze, Armenians, Christians and Arabs are also present in Syria. The Sunni group has some essential and fundamental rights denied.

In addition, it is becoming worse. The social and economic conditions of the crisis are also considered accountable. The two major sectors of Syrian oil and tourism, the U.S., Arabian

League and the European Union, were the most successful in implementing the sanctions. The Syrian economy fell by two percent in 2011, according to the IMF study. The unemployment rate was high and there was extremely limited access to the fundamental requirements such water, food, health care and power. It has also been suggested that the US and Russia's challenges in gas and future energy extraction have also triggered the problem.

Water crises in Syria also served as an active factor in stimulating violence in 2011 since, at the beginning of the conflict, Syria experienced also a calamitous drought in 2006, and 1,3 million Syrians had to migrate from rural areas as a consequence, as water crisis had been active in protesting the government. Destroying 85% of the cattle was responsible for the terrible drought and it also forced residents of over 160 to abandon their homes owing to crop failure.

Socio-economic instability was matured by many factors interlinked with each other such as water scarcity due to drought incorporated with internal migration, unemployment and poverty. Subdued feedback by international community and Syrian Government to address the ongoing crisis further instigated and provoked protests against the government. Thus there were various faults and drawbacks of Syrian Government, instead of alleviating the protests tactfully the government mishandled the protests in a very insensitive manner when it started in March 2011. The Syrian police lacked appropriate training to manage internal agitations moreover police force was of only a few thousands. Shabiha, an ill-famed pro-

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Regime militias, was used by Bashar al-Assad in Sunni majority areas to suppress protests, frequently murdering unarmed innocent protesters. At troubled areas tanks were used hence developing mass grievances due to usage of excessive force. Entirely ineffective public relations efforts were developed by government and neither it took any steps in evacuating insurgents out of population centres.

Assad was largely dependent upon the elite and only small and trusted detachments (military unit) were stationed in order to execute counterinsurgency campaigns from regular brigades.

All this had limited the capacity of the government to handle all the instabilities and agitations in Syria and simultaneously to control and defeat the insurgency, thereby converting it into a major civil war.

Politicians found it difficult to conclude an agreement that could fully end the issue between both the opposition and the Syrian Government. In addition to the intricate and interminable battle that has led to many groups in the Syrian Conflict, continuous resolution attempts has been challenged. Syria's crisis shows how the negotiating process might be hard since negotiated settlements are a renowned means of shortening and settling civil wars since the conclusion of the Cold War.

In the Middle East, which was one of the most volatile regions in the world, the country is sealed. The geographical situation of Syria and its distinct demographic characteristics greatly affect the continuing conflict in the nation. It is exceedingly impossible to grasp the whole situation and its impacts, particularly on regional and global issues, without understanding the geopolitics underpinning the Syrian conflict. The nation is located on the east end of the Mediterranean Sea in Southwestern Asia and north of the Arab Peninsula. Syria is surrounded by Lebanon And Israel is bordered by Lebanon, by northern Turkey, eastern Iraq and southern Jordan. It is a decisive factor in the region because of its pivotal position in the area and its connection to several of the world's greatest energy-rich countries. Syria's position makes it a significant player in two of its

core gas pipelines: Iran-Iraq-Syria pipelines ('Islamic Pipeline') and Qatar-Saudi Arabia-Jordan-Syria-Turkey pipeline ('Qatar-Turkey Pipeline').

As indicated before and in a matter of days the situation in Syria was uncontrolled, the southern city Deraa is a site from whence the crisis began in March 2011. When the Free Syrian Army (FSA) was established by sieven defective Syrian officers to "top down the entire system (the Assad administration)," which united opposition forces at the same time, the anti-government rebellion gained a leading influence.

A cooperation against the government in Turkey was established on 23 August 2011 by the Syrian National Council. The FSA was instructed and managed by Turkey quite close to the Syrian border from the southern Hatay province and the field command was within Syria.

In January 2012, in the company of Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, Jabhat-al-Nusra announces his establishment. The organisation also opposed the Assad regime's atrocities. "Conflict extended to the neighbouring nations by the middle of September 2012 and January 2014; the introduction of chemical arms; the influential Kurds and Islamic States".

The major internal groups are Assad and the regime supporters, SDF, Syria Democratic Forces and the FSA, rebel forces opposing the government, and the Kurds, seeking to keep the region autonomous.

During the Syriac war, the main intergovernmental body in the Middle East, the Arab League, took up the very first discussions for conflict management (Masters & Sergie, 2014). The dispute was originally laid out in internal politics Afterwards, however, the violence in Syria did not retreat to an interventionist posture. In the interests of meeting Al-Assyad on numerous occasions and consulting nations in the area, Nabil al-Arabi, Secretary-General was sent for the mediation mission. The Arab Action Plan was a forum to end violent acts and launch a 'Departure from Military Equipment National Dialogue.' The Syrian Government has hesitantly agreed on the initiative on 30 October 2011 but remained very suspicious in the mediation of al-Arabi, regarded the countries actively advocating the overthrow of Al-Assad, the

disappointing Syrian National Council, as a proxy intervention of Saudi Arabia and Qatar condemning the plan, to support the regime's compliance with the end of the regime. The delegation was launched with extraordinary speed, with basic monitoring and monitoring operations around the country. However, the mission lacked enough facilities and was ill-trained and experienced dissension and discord between the Member States in the framework of its purpose and mandate and discussed the fraudulent and unjust offer of the government to contribute to political discourse. The Arab League used coercive tactics in order to obtain cooperation between the government. Because the regime was reluctant to accept cessation of violence, economic penalties were applied and approved as part of the Arab Action Plan on 30 October 2011. Syria was likewise rejected by the Arab League under the Action Plan. The sanctions were meant to be a significant blow, cutting commerce and investment in the Arab world, when the European Union and the United States had already imposed sanctions on Syria.No progress has been accomplished despite great hopes of the negotiations in Syria from 2012 to 2016. During negotiations, the Arab League, Russia, and the United Nations played a key role, but their efforts did not resolve the conflict. The fact that peace processes in Syria have continued to fail raises the question: why did attempts fail? Some claim the fighters were not prepared to quit fighting, and that the mutually-hurt standstill has never been achieved on either side.

"The observation mission stopped operations on 28 January 2012 and marked the failure of the first attempt to negotiate".It should be notified that the negotiations of the Arab League have made other organisations largely non-inclusive, leading to their failure. This has also led to the failure to carry out the discussions conducted by the United Nations.

On 12 June 2012, UN peacekeeping officer Herve Ladsous initially declared that Syria is in a situation of civil war. Although the action group was composed of representatives of the Arab League (UN China, Russia, France, Turkey, the United States, Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, and the European Union) in line with UN 2012, para. 1. The action team was composed of the United Nations.

In the Geneva Communique, the final results of the Geneva Conference showed an acceleration of

requests for change of regime applied by national discussion. In particular, communication centred on constitutional change, the multi-party institutional structure and a transitional government to which opposition and government participation would be mutually acception.

According to (Akpinar 2016), the first Round of Geneva negotiations sought, but the parties could not accept the fate of Assad, the key disadvantage of the negotiations being that the key parties, who are the Syrian and Syrian opposition parties, were not represented on the bargain. It is therefore vital that fighting groups should at least not remain unrepresented to carry out anything..

Both were opposed by two major countries to see if the dictatorship ought to continue in power. America sought the release of Assad while Russia strongly opposed change of regime. Russia's attitude was connected to ensuring national safety interests, since Assad's downfall would lead to terrorist spread and greater radicalisation in the Middle Eas. For the United States, the views of Assad on the correction of the brutality, the promotion of democracy as well as regional stability and their stance were underlined.

The great powers that held over the future of Syria and their contribution to world policy, Geneva underlined the vastly varied perspectives. Kofi Annan therefore failed to address the international community's disputes, which would weaken Russia's support to the government (Lundgren, 2016). And on 2 August 2012, without any lasting peace plan in the Syrian conflict, the official resignation took place.

Brahimi was excused for the tougher work of facing the worst and most hazardous damage of the entire area since the earlier days of the 21st century because of the unwillingness of the world community to address the Syriac conflict.

His career includes efforts to achieve peace in Haiti, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq Lakhdar Brahimi was an Algerian diplomat.

While using a more consultative and careful strategy to convince the parties of the futility of the continuing war and stressing again and again the enormous humanitarian loss that they have imposed on Syria, with American passivities and

Iranian or Russian intransigence he has never been able to bring forward a potential political solution. Brahimi had to fight more and more parties than ever before in a highly escalated battle. "The dispute started extending into neighbouring countries between September 2012 and January 2014; chemical weapons were deployed; and the influence of the Kurds and Islamic State was increased"

He resigned when he realised that both the major causes behind a political resolution, of which Brahimi has always been known, are due to the character and structure of the Syrian regime as they can't implement any persuasive and determined measures unless there are enough pr pr the Syrian President and the anticipated re-election by Bashar Assad. Until international pressure is put in place, Assad will choose to remain in Damascus, no matter whether a single structure is located in a city or in a town or in a single Syria.

Secondly, there is the absence of an international willingness to take crucial steps to revise or restructure the power balance on the ground in Syria. This change would only have led the Syrian regime to embrace a political solution that begins with a transitional period, as well as no other choices.

The transitional system is that, in the absence of the Assad regime, a committee or a government with "full authority" is formed to oversee the country until a new regime is founded to re-establish the country and seize control from a family who controls everything.

Unfortunately, the Syrian president indicated in his declaration in Geneva I essentially rejected the political solution that could have been launched by a transitional period. In the transitional meeting of the Geneva II, attended by representatives of the regime and the opposition, Assad also declined.

The ISI commander, Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi, announced the Islamic State in Iraq and the Leven (ISIL) establishment. He declared that in April 2013 the Islamic State in Iraq was separated from their central authority (ISI) and was consolidated by their soldiers. Bothing was rejected by the commanders Al-Nusra and Al-Qeeda.

In the middle of 2013, in certain regions of Syria on 29 June 2014, ISIL evolving via an absorption of Syria, and al-Nusra forces in eastern and northern Syriza who claimed caliphate. As a result of this conduct of ISIL which bruising and traumatised Syria's already-degenerate state unexpectedly intensified rivalry between Al-Nusra et ISIL.

In the area and around the world, ISIS caused profound anxiety with the killing of minorities, the institutionalisation of sex slavery, the conquest of the military and the execution of opponents in horrific brutality. It has damaged landmarks in the historic town of Palmyra such as temples and fueled worldwide commerce in antiquities.

The whole of international community was spurred in the mid of August 2014 when Syrian Government was claimed to use chemical weapons on civilians, gaining renewed attentiveness to the Conflict. Observatory head Rami Abdul Rahman stated that Regime bombed Eastern Ghouta to pave the way for ground offensive, and the victims which included children and women suffered asphyxiation, dilated pupils, foaming in mouth, eventual loss of consciousness, difficulty in breathing etc. Hundreds of civilians were killed within 24 hours which was the largest single day death toll, this was the deadliest period of time in last three years. Missiles, helicopter gunships, artillery gunfire by troops and warplanes were also being used.

Nasr Harir, the Syrian Negotiation commission also spoke out against Regime's aggressions in Eastern Ghouta which is East of Damascus.

The Syrian activist also stated that the government had launched gas attacks to kill civilians, the worst chemical weapons reported, but the Assad rebels blamed the most deadly attack. In a joint statement from the USA and ten other states, Australia, France, Italy, Japan, Spain, Turkey, UK and Saudi Arabia were called for a well constructed and powerful international response. Federal Foreign Minister, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs said that all red lines were being crossed through Syria, similarly the US President, Obama said that the use of chemical weapons was the Red Line; he also accused Bashar al-Assad of killing 1,429 civilians on the poison-attack incident on 21 August. In the Syrian military doctrine the use of these deadliest chemical weapons was also

integrated, but Assad's regime was denied. The Prime Minister of Turkey stated clearly that there are only chemical weapons in the Syrian government.

Centered chemical attacks also struck the tension between Russia and the USA, as Russia reaffirmed its opposition to every kind of strike. Because of variations between the members of the UN Security Council, the UN could not fully carry out any attempts on atrocities. In addition, Russia and China have vetoed three Security Council resolutions condemning the violence of the regime.

The United States and five Arab allies including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan conducted intensive air strikes and missile assaults and bombings. Military action was carried out against ISIS and terrorist organisations. Another Islamist rebel group was founded in March 2015 with the Army of Conquest, mostly active in Idlib, although other groups were active in the governorates of Latakia and Hama. The coalition consisted of 8 members, including al-Nusra, Ahrar ash-sham, the front, Jayz alSunna, Ajnad al-Sham, Imam Bukharia Jamaat, Sham Legion, the Islamic Party of Turkey, Jund al-Aqsa (former member) and Liwa al-Haqq. Al-Nusra was a member of the group. Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Jabhat al-Nusra Front were actively backed.

This was a pivotal point during Syria's civil war, when Washington provided military training and weaponry to moderate rebel groups fighting against government forces faithful to President Assad. Syrian government formally asked Russia for military involvement.

Russia began its first air attack on 30 September 2015. Russia has been conducting military campaigns in Syria since 2015 to assist Assad's regime in restoring its control of much of the nation following a catastrophic 10-year battle. The Russian jets have striken near the border with Syria's Turkey and claimed to be killing terrorists in Syria during air strikes at the base north-east of Palmyra, which was confirmed by the Ministry of Defense in the declaration that the Russian Aviation Forces have carried out aerial strikes. But the statement did not specify either the date of strik nor the date of the air strike The Russian jets had strikes on a border with Syria

It was claimed by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights that the air strikers went before the Russian forces and the Fifth Syrian Corps in pursuit of cells in the Homs desert of Islamic State terrorists. 26 IS activists were killed by the Observatory. During the whole war, Russia became a key supporter of the Syrian regime and the military involvement of Moscow in 2015, an event that turned the flow of battle completely.

The Global Powers have re-initiated a peace process in Vienna on 30 October 2015 which was known as the negotiations of ISSG. The UAE, Qatar, Jordan, Egypt, China, France, Germany and Italy took part in these peace negotiations for the very first time. The discussions were known as the ISSG. But the participants could not manage to settle on the future of the Syrians regime.

All 20 ISSG members were present and on 14 November 2015 the Superpowers Russia and the United States failed to achieve compatibility with any political transition in Syria with the role of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

On July 2014 he was selected as the international mediator seeking a stop to Syria's civil conflict by UN Secretary General Al Ban Ki-moon to substitute Lakhdar Brahimi.

In May, following a failure in the second Geneva round of negotiations in January and February, his Predecessor as United Nations Top Envoy to Syria, Mr Lakhdar Brahimi resigned. Speaking about the appointment of Mr. De Mistura, Ban Ki-moon declared that the New Special Envoy would "bring all his experience to this very difficult and complicated peace negotiations in Syria." Mr De Mistura serves in his Syria role only as a UN envoy, and not as a joint envoy to the United Nations-Arab League, as Mr Brahimi does. But the fact is that the United Nations Envoy to Syria, Staffan de Mistura, has proved unable to address the consequences of the "grand game" and the difficulties which Syria has embroiled in. He chose to give up his mission after a four-year tour of service in Syria, failing yet again where his two high-profile predecessors Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahi Inmi failed. De Mistura was selected to continue work in the Syrian archive by the United Nations in the context of Russia's monitoring of the Syrian archives through the games played by US

Secretary of State John Kerry and Russia Forestry Minister Lavrov. He focused on making sure that his goal continued and the corners were cut.

He also played with major sides to the Syrian crisis, particularly Russia, which since its huge military intervention in September 2015 has become the number one actor in the Syrian battlefield. De Mistura's work in Syria has not been affected intentionally by the diversity and inconsistencies of the roadmaps pursued by the actors in Syria, particularly following Russia's imposition of the route set for Astana negotiations in 2016. It still remains to be claimed that he relied on a false negotiating strategy which caused him to fail.

The failure cannot be attributed merely to the impotence of the United Nations, because the failure of the United Nations simply reflects the inconsistent stances taken by the global powers, the aspirations of the actors in the area and the need to balance power.

At the end of November, De Mistura departed office. His work has produced meagre, restricted outcomes. The weaknesses of multilateral diplomacy have been shown and the UN Charter on Humanitarian and Peacekeeping's theoretical ideals have not been respected. The last estimated United Nations attempt was made by Staffan de Mistura in 2016, given by the then Special Envoy for Syria.

Indirect discussions were established in Kazakhstan between the Syrian opposition groups and the representatives of government, with Russia now proceeding shockingly as a power broker in the Middle East. The discussions were held in a fancy hotel in the Kazakh capital Astana, intended for widening the cease-fire brokered in the hands of Russia's air Force and Iranian-sponsored militias following the opposition's catastrophic military loss in Aleppo. The negotiations had been anticipated to culminate to a face-to-face conference between opponents and officials of the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Rebels were however not willing to engage in direct negotiations, since the nature of the Syrian conflict has made it difficult for negotiators to develop ideas on which all sides may agree (Greig, 2013).

Currently, most of the United States, the EU, Saudi Arabia and the UN were marginalised. Russia,

Turkey and Iran supported the discussions. Russia is setting new difficulties by suddenly trying to transition from combat participants to peace brokers. On the eve of the Astana discussions, leaders of the Syrian opposition delegation from 12 factions stated that Moscow should really be neutralised but rejected by Iranians and Syrians. A failure by Moscow to apply pressure on Iran and the Syrian Government to put a stop to what the opposition believes are frequent infringements of Turkish-Russian truce was blowing his influence in Syria, said Mohamed Alloush, the leader of the opposition delegation.

This is the true test for Russia's authority. If Russia fails in this position, there will be more pressures on the regime, and Iran as the guarantor of the agreement. "Russia wants to go from the direct party to the neutral, guarantor party and the Syrian regime, which wants it to break out, is blocking this and Iran with its sectarian militias in Syria."

Russland is firmly of the opinion that negotiations can be more fruitful than previous UN efforts, partially due to a military balance, and partly because the negotiations are not with political leaders representing the opposition but often living outside Syria but between the Syrian Government and fighters.

Together, Astana talks had brought together the Syrian opposition, the Assad regime and all three regional players – Turkey, Iran and Russia – on the negotiating table, producing positive outcomes that would hopefully last with a revived dimension of the Syrian Civil War following the battle for Aleppo. The immediate implications of this platform seem to have persuaded the Turkey, Russia, Iran and all the other countries engaged in the negotiations on Astana, at least in larger terms: the united endeavour aims primarily at cementing a more lasting truce in Syria.

Astana's most prominent difference from the ongoing process in Geneva was that the military opposition groups would from now on also participate in peace talks and that the representatives of six years-long conflicting factions in Syria – Assad's regime and political and military opposition groups – united around one table. In this critical stage of crisis, on the other, we can probably take the Astana Platform as a

masterpiece milestone, a functional, parallel and initiative, which can also give the United Nations backed Geneva discussions a solid foundation and framework – a mechanism that still works – and save the Syrian peace process of the United States and the Nations monopoly.

It was an opening door to rework the Astana platform over the next period if necessary, since it showed that a possible peace that would be formed in Syria is built through the trilateral mechanism of Turkey-Russia-Iran. These discussions also show that creating peace in an unsure environment, as many as expectations are, is a long and hard multi-stage process.

It's evident that, with backing from the U.S. and other important governments, the system formed by these three countries will be feasible to guide Syria's peace 'from behind the cord.' We also see Astana as a major juncture since it has de-emphasized a very problematic understanding in the international community and especially in the United States, which prevailed in the post Aleppo period, and which is aimed at reducing the Syrian crisis to fighting radical jihadist—Islamic terrorism, that is, to fight Daesh.

The Syrian civil war gives Russia the finest chance to strengthen its strategic base in the Middle East. As a result of the huge civil conflict, Russia has quickly been encouraged to start a new game through a somewhat direct military involvement in Syria and, in turn, by negotiating to reinforce its patches throughout the region.

Syria and the US will rely on their capacity to undertake genuine pledges to alleviate Syria's crisis (Jafarova, 2014). The Russian government has gained a prominent role in shaping the destiny and future of the Middle East through its reinforcement policy of the Syrian regime. Russia's new role has prevented the US from addressing the degree of participation in asymmetry between the US and Russia and has encouraged the US not just to recognise Russia's new predominant position in Syria and throughout the Middle East. Russian President Vladimir Putin has also made it necessary to find any political solutions in the area. While it is still very early if Russia's new involvement in the Middle East would develop as a cold New East-West conflict, it may well be said to reduce the US predominance in Middle East affairs.

It is also stated that Russia's arms manufacturing is thriving after its military power has demonstrated in Syria during the five-month battle. Arms shipments from Russia established a new high of 14.5 billion US dollars for 2015, while orders rose to 56 billion US dollars. Many safety professionals feel that Syrian weapons and this continuous conflict are utilised as training grounds for the Russian military to experience new, contemporary and extremely powerful arms of great accuracy. It has helped Russia raise and expand its standing as a leading manufacturer and exporter of armaments. Moreover, Russia is now in an excellent position to preserve its dominating role in the European energy market as the major exporting gas of Europe and without prospect for a pipeline delivering the Middle Eastern gas into Syria in the near future.

By 2016 IS ILI had proved virtually uncontrollable some years earlier in North and East Syria, but it was starting to collapse under the strain of simultaneous confrontations with 3 rival coalitions—the Kurdish forces and their American allies, Iran-Russian-supported proAssad Syrian forces and a rebel group-backed Turkish coalition. The northern regions have been steadily strengthened by Kurdish and Turkish-sponsored forces, who deployed ISIL from an important strategic location.

Although, without the head of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, any area in Syria is not kept under its control, it was not completely wiped out as a movement. There are still a large number of combatants and sympathisers who might turn and spiral into revolt and hazardous terrorist acts in Syria or elsewhere. This might be harder than the previous recurrences of the group.

Israeli military targets in Syria in 2018. Following the shelling of the Golan Heights by Iran, Israel launched one of the heaviest attacks in Syria when the civil conflict began. In the face of the uncalculated Iranian military installations, Israel claimed almost all Iranian military infrastructure had been destroyed in Syria.

The Turkish military intervention in support of the rebels contributed to ensuring a hard struggle would be fought against any aggressive government. A border rally was started by both the Syrian Government and Turkey, as its armies were

strengthened within the province, while border villages were bombed by Syrian and Russian airplanes.

By agreeing and executing a buffer zone between the Rebel and the government troops, Russia and Turkey have sought to de-escalate the situation. In the region of 9 to 12 milles (15 to 20km), the buffer zone requires that all heavy armaments and fighters withdraw. At the time, it was uncertain if the pact, a top down agreement, would be observed by all parties. The Syrian government has rapidly taken control the Buffer Zone Convention, and mainstream opposition groups, including the Free Syria Army.

The civil war is still not ended, though, and the north-west Idlib region is not controlled by the government. At the beginning of 2020, a Russo-funded push from the Syrian army to seize Idlib from the last concentrated armed opposition organisations led to conflicts with Turkey's forces in Ankara's customary militias. The skirmishes recalled the fact that although it seemed that the conflict may yet flare up and intensify in its closing phases. The situation in the north-east is especially precarious as a consequence of the evacuation by U.S. troops, alongside proxies and Syrian Kurdish militia, of the Turkish, Syria and Russian soldiers from the border with Turkey. In 2020 a further humanitarian catastrophe emerged from highly intensive fighting in Idlib.

The Representative of Tunisia stated that there can be no military solution to the crisis in Syria; rather, a Syrian-led and -owned political solution under the patronage of the United Nations that includes women. The root causes of conflict should be addressed as it is the the only way forward. He urged relevant parties to overcome the current standstill situation in the Syrian Constitutional Committee's work and hold continuous and regular meetings in Geneva.

The Representative of the United Kingdom, emphasizing that complete implementation of resolution 2254 (2015) is the only sustainable solution to the conflict in Syria, said the elections being held on 26 May are not part of this process and are planned to undergo no the dictatorship of one man and prop up his unrepentant ,unreformed and undemocratic regime. Calling for authentic and constructive participation in the Constitutional

Committee, he stated the cross-border aid mechanism has enabled over 46,000 trucks to carry out assistance to millions of Syrians facing the worst impacts of the terrible conflict.

The Representative of China spoke in his national capacity, stressed the significant role of resolution 2254 (2015) and called on all parties to maintain coordination with the Special Envoy. The Constitutional Committee must work independently, avoiding external interference, he said, to assure that the political procedure is led and owned by Syrians keeping in veiw recent confrontations between armed groups and the presence of foreign troops, he urged all parties to respect Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity and cease attacks against that country.

The Representative of Vietnam, recapitulated the central role of a comprehensive and lasting political settlement, drew concerns on the importance of developing certitude and credibility among concerned parties. Voicing support for the bridging task of the Special Envoy and his team, especially in creating favourable conditions for the continuation of the Constitutional Committee talks, he called on all parties to refrain from any action that could further deteriorate the situation.

The Representative of Mexico stated that the only way out of the conflict in Syria is through broad political dialogue and resolution 2254 (2015) is the only established basis to reach this goal. He expressed concern over the prolonged pause in the work of the Constitutional Committee due to delegates lack of capability to agree on working methods, calling on the Government-appointed delegation to participate constructively in this process.

The Syrian war is the result of several international institutional failures The future of Syria therefore remains unknown, at least as catastrophic as the previous ten years appear. The diplomatic and political processes are practically nonexistent, and not just the territory borders of Syria have become a deadlock for other governments.

It is very crucial to analyse what went wrong in talks. If such difficulties are not addressed, there is a threat to the future of diplomacy. Although talks have been suspended, "multilateral power may, even in the most difficult and divisive crises of the

new multipolar international order, be constructed and rebuilt by effective mediators in civil wars"

The war is not concluded, unfortunately only in a static condition, and the pain is going on in a country so fractured and chaotic that even the top authority on the planet cannot estimate the dead in any meaningful manner. The government will only be able to use further funds for rebuilding, restoring and continuing its security state and use aid as a weapons of war, as the U.N. has shamelessly made possible since day one, even if a restructuring of Assad's regime could be discussed or disregarded.

When the struggle is finally over, supposedly he has employed chemical weapons on his own people, Assad will still face the burden of rebuilding his nation. In addition, according to DeRouen (2015), once a conflict ends, violence can continue owing to the absence of the state to regulate it and become exacerbated by a worsening economy. The three key elements of the peace-building triangle – the level of antagonism, local capability and international commitment – must be recognised to establish effective peace. Who will pay the cost remains an unanswered issue. America and Europe are unwilling to deal with Assad. And the cost of rebuilding, projected at the United Nations in 250 billion dollars, would probably not be met by Moscow. While former US President Donald Trump was keen to remove the US from the crisis in Syria, President Joe Biden still needs to define his attitude to a conflict whose ending appearing hazy on the horizon, nevertheless, is obvious and present in its devastating impact.

South China Sea Dispute

The greater part of the world's freight is being transported through the waters of the South China Sea (SCS), which makes it a vital ocean path for exchange among all landmasses. In any case, the current political improvement in the region is a potential territory for outfitted clash. This would jeopardize worldwide exchange and monetarily affect the total populace. Until the point that the main portion of the twentieth century, there was no much consideration given toward the South China Sea, especially not to the Paracel or Spratly Islands. All things considered, since the 1970's, this region has turned into the epicenter of a political war among Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam, who have been battling for the rich characteristic oil and gas saves around the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Various brutal clashes have happened, and the level headed discussion over the Paracel and Spratly Islands has turned into a wellspring of real strain among these nations. Both hard power and delicate power have been connected on the other hand, to determine the question with little impact. The conflicts have been heightening and ending up more regular. To keep up its interests in the region, non-inquirer countries are likewise getting to be

included. China's expansionist arrangements in the South China Sea are incited by alternate's forces. Nonetheless, China's monetary quality restrains their reaction. Regardless of the strained circumstance in the SCS and the potential monetary effect if any outfitted clash would emit, there is little mindfulness about the issue among a poorly educated gathering of people. This work will endeavor to portray the topographical significance of the SCS, the lawful angles will be clarified, and the center of the issue and improvement of the contention will be examined.

The motivation behind this section is to make the peruser acquainted with the essential topographical parts of the domain. The genuine estimation of the South China Sea will be disclosed to clarify what the states are battling for. İn English and most European dialects, the ocean is known as the South China Sea, in light of the fact that the European exchange courses needed to cross this ocean while in transit to China since the early ages. These days the name inspires that it has a place with China since it conveys its name. In any case, in Asia, particularly in the China's neighboring nations, the South China ocean has numerous different names. Since September 2012, on the activity of the Philippine president, the ocean making a beeline for the west of the Philippines has been called West Philippine Sea.

The South China Sea is a semi-encased negligible ocean that is a piece of the Pacific Ocean. In general the ocean covers the zone around 1,4 million square miles. Long, it extends in excess of 1200 nautical miles and its broadness it shifts from 550 to 650 nautical miles . Toward the south, the ocean is very shallow; the lion's share of its profundity achieves just 1,000 feet. Notwithstanding, toward Luzon, in the Philippines, the ocean profundity is in excess of 13,000 feet. It is circumscribed by terrain China on the north; by Singapore and Vietnam on the west; by Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei on the south; and contacts shores of the Philippines on the east. In width, it reaches out from the Gulf of Tonkin in the west to the Philippine islands in the east and from the Taiwan Strait in the upper east, it goes to the Malacca Strait in the southwest. Altogether, there are around 250 islands, sandbars, reefs, and shores in the South China Sea. Some of them shape a gathering of islands. In any case, the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands assume a significant part since

control over them equivalents to strength over EEZ (clarify EEZ here) and mainland rack encompassing them . The other land arrangements in the South China Sea, which are additionally in an irreconcilable situation, are Pratas Islands, the Scarborough Shoal, that is relatively submerged for the entire year and Macclesfield Bank, which is yearround soaked in the water (Fels, 2016). In the course of the most recent decades, the topography of the South China Sea has been changing because of the monstrous development of simulated islands. China has so far created more than eight million meters square of the human-manufactured land in the SCS what makes it starting here of view the most gainful country in the SCS. By the by, while building the manufactured land, china has not thought about the sentiment of free natural specialists. The development included uncovering a huge number of huge amounts of corals and sand from the base of the ocean which was then scattered over weak coral reefs. In spite of the demonstrated lost mischief the development action has caused, it doesn't appear that the China would plan to facilitate their endeavors.

The Spratly Islands, the biggest questioned archipelago in the South China Sea, lies on the east from southern Vietnam, west from the Philippines and on the north of Borneo. The archipelago is made of in excess of 140 small islands, reefs, and shakes. A few sections of the archipelago are for all time under the water's surface. The biggest isle, Taiping Island/Itu Aba, is the main island of the archipelago that has its own water asset, little airbase, and battalions. Until the 1960's, the boats endeavored to maintain a strategic distance from this zone since vessels drifting there had issues with route and every now and again wrecked. Thus, the encompassing of the

Spratly Islands were not very much investigated. The power asserts over the Spratly Islands is an exceptionally complex issue since six countries are battling for predominance over them: Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The Spratly Islands have no indigenous populace. Nonetheless, there is a nearness of military faculty of a few asserting nations.

The second greatest gathering of islands to be found in the South China Sea waters are the Paracel Islands that aggregate around 45 isles, reefs, rocks and other common structures and are

asserted by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The islands lie on the north of the Spratly Islands, on the east from Vietnam drift and the west from the Philippines. Woody Island, the best and the most edified of the Paracel Islands, has had since 2012 its city named Sasha City which was established by the Chinese. Framework, ocean port, little military airplane terminal, facility, and the mail station can be found there . And in addition on account of the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands don't have a changeless populace, however they are at present settled by scattered Chinese battalions (The World Factbook: Paracel Islands, 2016). Throughout history, the states battled for control over regions that were prolific, rich in characteristic assets, key military targets, or essential transport center points. The South China Sea has each one of those highlights in vast degree.

As the cost of vitality expands all around and normal stores and crude materials diminish, nations are looking for new stores. Since the economy and expectation for everyday comforts in China and the Asian Tigers States has been rising, it is evaluated that until 2025, oil request in Asia will yearly develop by 4%. Half of this is required to be required by China. In the event that the anticipation materializes, Asia would day by day utilize 25 million barrels of oil. It is more than twice of the present utilization. The SCS has been known as the new Persian Gulf. In 2013, the investigation drove in the region evaluated unrefined petroleum stores of 7.7 billion barrels under the seabed. In any case, the specialists figure that there may be 28 billion barrels of oil to be found altogether. Aside from oil, the counts say that 266 trillion cubic feet of gaseous petrol saves are likewise to lie under the ocean floor. With each disclosure of new stores in the South China Sea district, the nations have more inspiration for vieing for the domain, so the pressures among petitioners are mounting .

On the off chance that the Amazon is the lungs of the world, the South China Sea is without a doubt the bosom feeder of the planet. 33% of the entire world's marine biodiversity happens in the South China Sea, the place which assumes a basic part in the world`s biological system (Li, 2015). 76% of the coral species on the Earth and 37% of reef-angle classes have its home in the SCS (Singh, 2016). In mid-1990 the yearly benefit of angling in the zone was ascertained to very nearly three billion U.S. dollar). By the by, over the most recent 20 years,

there have been accounted for illegal instances of angling with the assistance of exploding ropes, cyanide, and explosive. Among the species influenced by illicit chasing have been jeopardized monster mollusks, goliath clams, sharks, eels, ocean turtles and uncommon corals. But being one of the world's most various widely varied vegetation historical centers, the South China Sea has had an existentialist importance for neighborhood fishers and very nearly 300 million individuals living on its coastline. Half of their protein, originates from eating fish got in the South China Sea. As the populace on the ocean outskirt is developing, it is normal that interest for fish will build (Bateman, 2008). From a worldwide perspective, altogether, 55% of world`s calculating vessels are angling in the SCS to meet 12% of the worldwide fish supplies. Immense zones of the SCS remain unregulated. As a result, there is enormous unreported angling in the region. The pattern is aggravating in light of the fact that the fish populace has been diminishing by 70 – 95% since the 1950's and likely will keep declining by 59% by 2035 if the states draining the South China Sea don't begin to participate as opposed to battling.

The domain is urgent for the world group on the grounds that without utilizing the transportation paths in the SCS, the present worldwide exchange would crumple. The SCS makes a connection between the Indian and Pacific Oceans in this manner it is a basic ocean path interfacing Africa, Asia, and Europe. Over 90% of the worldwide transnational exchange is sought after through delivery while 45% of that load is being transported by means of waters of the SCS making it the second all inclusive most utilized universal transportation path. Strait of Malacca is the world's second most utilized transnational ocean path, and together with the Sunda Strait and the Lombok Strait, they yearly let the greater part of the worldwide supertanker cargo to go through. These boats later supply supplies of raw petroleum, condensed gaseous petrol, coal, and iron metal to vast economies of Japan, South Korea, China and Taiwan (Rowan, 2005). As indicated by the examinations, 80% of Japan's and 70% of Taiwan's oil and other crude material imports are transported by means of the SCS. Altogether 25% of the worldwide oil yield is being sent from the Middle East to Japan and the United States through ocean courses in the SCS . On the off chance that the tankers quit moving in the

waters of SCS, nobody contends that in a brief timeframe the power would go down in the nations subject to the oil imported through the South China Sea. For the reasons expressed, obviously any serious clash in the territory would contrarily affect universal exchange. For the most part China, Japan and the USA, the world's most exchanging nations, would be influenced. By and by, additionally European business would be hurt since the SCS is a vital exchange path for a major economy.

It is questionable whether the debated islands are a vital strategical point in the season of furnished clash. The greater part of researchers assert that the Spratly Islands are deliberately important. Japan, amid World War II utilized the Spratly Islands as an army installation from where a portion of the barricades and intrusions were led. Toward the finish of the twentieth century, the Japanese armed force investigators guaranteed that the country, which would in future have power over the Spratly Islands, will in the meantime achieve the territorial matchless quality in the 21st century (Saleem, 2000). Then again, Bill Hayton, the creator of a few productions on the Southeast Asia, says that the debated islands are not a key military point as the lion's share of them could be destroyed by a solitary rocket strike .

The motivation behind this theme in this examination paper is to acquaint the peruser with fundamental ideas of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which delivers to sea law along these lines applies to the SCS. In the wake of perusing the point, it ought to be surely knew to what degree the state can guarantee its power; how this sway prolongs; under what conditions the island can be asserted; how solid and broad sovereign rights the island can deliver if even any; and how to settle covering sea question. This is basic to know while considering what the countries are battling for and how the overlaying cases ought to be settled. Afterward, the paper will clarify what sort of steps the states receive to produce more sovereign rights. The power and ward over a real estate parcel have dependably been upon state's substance living on the specific region. In any case, 70% of the Earth's surface contains the oceans and seas. On account of the oceans and seas, there dependably has been an absence of clearness to whom the domain has a place and how or what law to implement there. To

elucidate the legitimate status of shared zones of the Earth, so the oceans and the seas, the states expected to concur on general rules that would characterize the rights and the commitments of each state. The principal report examining the issue was called Freedom of the Seas and goes back to the seventeenth century. The report asserted that the beach front states were permitted to drag out its power advance in the ocean yet just to the separation to which they would have the capacity to control it adequately. By and by, it implied that the waterfront states controlled the ocean so far as the group ball could run. The most as a rule, it was no longer than three miles toward the ocean . In any case, with the innovative advance in the twentieth century, it was apparent that the states could successfully oversee control of the encompassing oceans out there that was longer than three miles.

Island: is a non-human made real estate parcel that remaining parts above ocean level amid high tide. The island is eligible to generate all maritime zones, including extended continental shelf .

Rock: Rock differs from the island by size and structure, however with island, it has in like manner that it isn't submerged amid high tide. For the situation the stone can't safeguard human residence, it is subtitled just 12 miles of regional ocean. For the situation it creates monetary action, it can likewise appreciate Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf.

Low Tide Elevation: A naturally created piece of land that is encompassed by or more water at low tide yet stays sunk amid high tide. It has a place with the state in whose continental shelf it is situated. For the situation it is situated in the regional waters of the state, it is conceivable to measure territorial waters from the benchmark of the low-water line .

Normal Baseline: The baseline is the low-water line along the shore and can be located in both, the mainland and natural islands. The baseline serves as a fixed land point from which the state's territorial sovereignty prolongs further in the sea. Any point lying on the baseline is called base point. Under the Article 16 of the UNCLOS, the coastal states are required to issue geographical chart or list with baseline, which was drafted in compliance with the geodetical measurements. The position of

baseline can seriously affect the area of territorial waters, the contiguous zone, and the EEZ because they all are measure from there. This becomes crucial if some island or low tide elevation far from the coast becomes the base point because the state's sovereignty extends significantly and in the case of distant islands also disproportionally. The basepoint for delimiting the maritime zones cannot lie on the artificial island nor at human-built structures such as oil-drilling rig, light tower, offshore docking or oil pumping facility.

Archipelagic Baseline: While delineating the baseline, different rights apply to archipelagic states. The UNCLOS describes the archipelagic state as a country that is composed of a group of islands. Among one of the five world's countries that fall into this category belongs the Philippines, the country playing a role in the South China Sea dispute. The difference in the case of archipelagic states is that the sea between single islands is regarded as the internal waters where the state possesses exclusive sovereignty. The archipelagic country is allowed to connect by straight baselines the outermost points of its furthermost islands under the condition that the largest islands are covered within the baselines. The length of straight baselines shall not surpass 100 nautical miles. The basepoint for the baseline cannot be placed on low-tide elevations unless any object like a lighthouse that is continually above the sea level, has been built there. The internal waters demarcated by straight baselines should not be intended to cut off from the high seas or the maritime zones owned by another state. If this happens, the existing rights of both states should be continuously abode under the agreement .

Territorial Waters: Territorial sea is the maritime zone that is nearest to the land an area, and from the lawful perspective it is comparable to the land an area of the coastal state; in this way the state holds full sway over it. Territorial sea measures up to12 nautical miles offshore from the baseline. Every household laws are substantial and enforceable in territorial waters. Nonetheless, under the rule of innocent passage that bars angling, contaminating, weapons use or seeing, the outside vessels are permitted to explore through territorial waters without earlier authorization in the event that they pass quick and don't stop on the shore.

Contagious Zone: In maximum 24 miles estimated from the benchmark, the contiguous zone expands. In the contiguous zone, the coastal state has some sway also. In any case, the state isn't permitted to utilize this zone to control state's security. The contiguous zone goes under universal waters, and thus, any nation of the world is permitted to utilize the water space and in addition the airspace above with no confinement. This opportunity of development even applies to the route of universal warships and the overflight of military flying machine. By the by, in the coterminous zone, the coastal state is qualified for make essential strides required for counteractive action and discipline of waterfront state's laws disregarded inside state's domain or its territorial waters. Among those laws have a place laws related with tax assessment, traditions, movement, contamination, and whatever other directions that apply inside state's domain or territorial sea .

Exclusive Economic Zone: The Exclusive economic zone (EEZ) had not existed until the second part of the twentieth century. Anyway on demand of the coastal states, the zone of 200 nautical miles from the benchmark, was characterized as EEZ. The delimitation is fundamental for the most part for the seaside expresses whose topographical mainland rack, ordinarily abundant in regular assets, is fragmentary or nonexistent. Inside EEZ the seaside state is ensured the earlier right in investigating, misusing and looking after both, living and non-living common assets of the subsoil, seabed, and waters superjacent to the seabed. The state is qualified for lead there the sea life logical research and can benefit from delivering the water, streams and wind vitality. Subsequently, the state is permitted to put there any development required for mining, assembling the vitality and in addition the counterfeit islands can be worked there. In any case, imperative to specify that no extra oceanic zones reach out around those human-made structures. Alike in the infectious zone, in the EEZ all states are permitted to move uninhibitedly and are allowed to lay submarine links and pipelines there.

Continental Shelf: The continental shelf is a submerged edge of the mainland covering and

contrasting with the untamed sea; it is shallow. On account of its ripeness and wealth in characteristic assets, the continental shelf is surveyed by coastal states however lamentably only one out of every odd nation discards it. Today, if the state's land area is invested with mainland retire, the state views it as a characteristic prolongation of its earthbound domain. To the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone was later characterized, so the beach front states could get earlier appropriate to appreciate the characteristic riches lying up to 200 nautical miles seaward Exceptionally, the states are permitted to drag out their sovereign rights for misuse and investigation in the mainland retire up to 350 nautical miles. In any case, to assert broadened continental shelf, the state needs to exhibit before the Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf (CLCS) that the continental shelf is a characteristic prolongation of the terrain. On the off chance that demonstrated effectively, the state gets assent from the CLCS to draw out its sovereign rights for use of common riches until 350 nautical miles. Past EEZ yet at the same time, inside these 350 nautical miles from the land, the state holds sovereign rights in abusing and investigating the dirt and subsoil of the sea zones of the mainland rack. Be that as it may, not at all like on account of EEZ, the state does not have select rights for investigating water section. This implies each nation on the planet can appreciate angling in this area .

International Waters: Behind the external edge of the EEZ, whatever is left of the ocean or sea broadens, and UNCLOS characterizes the region as international waters, in some cases it is additionally called high seas. This region can be characterized as a region of no man yet the place where there is each man. Universal waters are having a place with everybody, the opportunity of development, investigation, and abuse if ion consistence with worldwide law,

Applies to this region. Any ship cruising inside global waters is obliged to coast under the banner of the state where enrolled else it is considered as an illicit entry. Jurisdiction in the international waters goes under the state where the ship is enlisted . As the SCS is a significant crossing point for global exchange, the non-included nations grade to feel that lion's share of the SCS should hold a status of international waters.

The same tumbler of nations share a seashore, normally in the most cases the territorial sea of the states will cover. On account of flanking states, no state is permitted to draw out its territorial waters past the middle line between the two nations except if the unusual circumstances occur .In the territories where at least two seashore states confront each different under 400 nautical miles, the EEZs cover. Article 74 of UNCLOS recommends that the delimitation ought to be consistent with international law. The ICJ urges to illuminate covering zones by at first illustration middle lines, also to change middle lines regarding conceivable unique conditions and ultimately to guarantee that the outcome is fair for the two states . In any case, as the control of the piece of the ocean conveys to the state riches and influence because of the broadened sovereign rights, it is normal that the nations are endeavoring to pick up a greater piece of the covering sea zone to the detriment of the other state. Another way how the states are attempting to build the zone of their power, is by asserting another island situated in their maritime zone since this island will produce maritime zone. This is the situation of the debated Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands. Six nations are lying a claim over these little archipelagos. The maritime zone stretch out around a portion of these islands, in this manner the express that possesses them, holds more rights for misuse of the normal assets. The petitioners taking an interest in the argument about the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands are legitimizing their claim over the region either by memorable rights or in light of the fact that the islands situate in their EEZ. The accompanying part will dissect in detail the cases of the every one of the all six actors .

The topic describes the historical and territorial ground of each state for claims in the South China Sea. The numbers of occupied islands are covered, including the information on the overlapping claims. Some sections also discuss which maritime zones can the owned territory generate because this increases the value of these islands. The part also refers to the isle construction in the SCS because it has become a very common practice, which increases the value of the reef. Brunei is covered more in depth since it is marginal claimant and later in this work, it will not be further described. Particular attention is also devoted to Indonesia since it has a potential to become the

seventh claimant. In the territorial claim in the SCS, two small archipelagos play a crucial role:

The Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands. The Spratly Islands are claimed by China, Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, at the same time, Brunei's EEZ covers one or two cliffs of the Spratly Islands. The Paracel Islands are disputed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. In the case of Spratly Islands, except Brunei, all claimant nations have its presence there. Among them, Vietnam occupies the highest number of Spratly Islands, in total around twenty out of 200 islands.

China has the most rapidly growing economy, navy and mercantile fleet in the world, promotes massive shipbuilding industry and owns 52 important seaports and 16 important inland river ports. But still its movement on the eastward to the Pacific Ocean can be controlled by a group of three archipelagos, passage to the Indian Ocean Region can be locked at the Straits of SingaporeMalacca, Sunda, and Lombok. Navigation from China towards northeastern Asia Pacific Region can be locked by Osumi, Tsushima, and Tsugaru, these three straits are regulated by Japan. China is by some experts assessed as the most disadvantaged state in the Asia Pacific Region. Nevertheless, China claims the greatest part of the SCS . In its claim, China had recalled to the longest historical records that date back to the year 110 when Han Dynasty disembarked in the area around the Spratlys. The next exploration crew was sent there by Ming Dynasty at the beginning of the 15th century. From the 12th till 17th century many Chinese historical chronicles made notes about Spratlys and even illustrated the level of the elevation above the water level. China made the first official claim over Paracel Islands in 1876. Seven years later, the Chinese expelled the German research team out of the Spratlys. Nevertheless, during the 20th century, China was losing some islands for other countries. In the 1930s, also Japan had a presence in the SCS. In 1947, the highly debated nine-dashed map was released for the first time. The method of demarcation and the meaning of the map has never been explained. In 1996, China issued the baselines around the Paracel Islands but did not refer to the Spratly Islands, but it was promised to resolve the problem later. There has not been another clarification of the map offered so far. China claims the most extended part of the SCS as

well as it performs a lot of policies to enforce its aims. In 2009 the UN Secretary-General received from China Note Verbale asserting indisputable Chinese sovereignty over the islands in the SCS and the respective waters. The map of the nine-dashed line was attached to the Note Verbale. However, a validity of the nine-dashed claim is highly questioned by the international community. From the Chinese mainland, the u-shaped nine-dashed line extends downwards beside Philippine´s and Vietnamese shores and ends down, near Malaysian coast. The nine-dashed line wholly encompasses Taiwan and its adjacent waters. In total, the nine-dashed line covers 90% of the South China Sea's surface

. It is unclear whether China is intending to claim only EEZ around islands located within the nine-dashed line or whether it is claiming the whole area bordered by nine dashes. Some of the legislative documents issued by China state that the Chinese jurisdiction applies not only on the EEZ delimited from the islands but on the whole area inside the nine-dashed line. It is arguable whether China is claiming historical rights over the South China Sea territory. The second Note

Verbale brought by China in 2011 does not contain term historical rights however it hints that China is claiming historical rights to resources found within the ninedashed line. Nevertheless, the direct reference to Chinese historical claims to the South China Sea is included in Article 14 of China's national legislation on the EEZ, arguing that the historic rights of China should not be intervened by the EEZ delimitation. There are also academic documents written by Chinese but also foreign authors that are stating that China has historical rights to fishing, oil and gas exploration and exploitation inside the entire ninedashed line . The international community involved in the conflict expressed objection that under UNCLOS the historical right is not a credible claim. The Philippines and Vietnam have already commented that according to UNCLOS the state can derive the natural resources only around the maritime zones surrounding the land or island territory thus they are not going to acknowledge the Chinese historical right for resources within the nine-dashed line.

Furthermore, it would be difficult for China to prove historical right for fishing as there are requirements for characterizing the species and techniques of fishing to which the historical right relates. To certify the claim China would have to bring evidence of continuous application of such activities within EEZ of other state and also, would have to show that the practice was accepted by the other state by not willfully fishing within its EEZ. Finally, the claim would have to meet consent of the international community. Even impossible seems to prove historical right for extracting oil in the EEZ of another country.

Excluding the Paracel Islands that are wholly controlled by the China, the country has also been occupying seven features in the Spratly Islands. Some sources stated that China had its presence also on Eldad, Whitsun, McKennan, and Gaven South Reef, however, this speculation was later rebutted. However, since Eldad Reef and Whitsun Reef are strategically important, it is expected that one of the claimant states will occupy them soon. It is also very likely that these two reefs have been slowly artificially modified from the low-tide elevations into islands. The sailing maps from the 90's marked these reefs as the low-tide elevations, but today both constitute of dunes that have been growing size. This effect might have been caused by wind and waves that accumulated sand on the coral reefs. But the various sources witnessed that it has been Vietnam and China that are silently building the island to settle it. The majority of the reefs in the SCS are all year long submerged thus under UNCLOS they cannot legally generate any maritime zone. However, the countries with China on the top have been still building the artificial isles. The reason is that such a small ground located far from the mainland serves as a distant supply base for navy or aircraft; therefore, helps to exercise state's control over the wide region including Spratlys, and facilitates further expansion in the EEZ's that by any international law legally belong to other claimants in the SCS. Due to China's massive island building going deeply down to the SCS, the other nations involved in the SCS dispute cannot rely anymore on protection based on the distance from mainland China.

Taiwan claims four islands group: the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and

Pratas Islands. Taiwan was the first state to occupy the Spratly Archipelago. Today, Taiwan has its troops stationed only at Itu Aba, the biggest isle of the Spratlys archipelago. In 1949, after triumphing of Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communist leader, the government in exile was established by Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist leader, who fled to Taiwan, where he established a government in exile. Taiwan entered into a dispute over the SCS in 1949, right after its dissolution from the communist mainland. Taiwan grounds its territorial claim for the same reasons as China. Both Taiwan and China, are recalling to history, discovery, occupation, and extended continental shelf. These two countries also agree that the territory appertains to China. However, both consider themselves to be that China. Considering their hostile relations in the past, it is interesting that China has never contended the territory in the South China Sea ruled by Taiwan. Except for historical claims that are identical with China, the Taiwanese territorial claim has been advocated by the longest-lasting occupation. Taiwan occupied Itu Aba since the 1950's. However, in the 1970's the dominance over the island started being challenged for the first time .

From the 21 reefs held by Vietnam, only 11 reefs can generate EEZ; another seven are less valuable because they can create only territorial sea if UNCLOS is respected. The rest three low-tide elevations cannot provide any zone . Vietnam justifies its dominance over the islands by a combination of continental shelf principle and historical rights. In the 15th century, Vietnam governed the Spratly Islands, and this claim was recorded during the 17th century when the majority of Vietnamese maps covered parts of the Spratly's under Vietnamese rule. Since 1884, Vietnam was under the colonial rule of French, who prolonged its governance also over the Spratly and Paracel archipelago. The second argument is grounded in the prolongation of the continental shelf, which would also encompass the area of the occupied islands. Nevertheless, in 1982, Vietnam defined the straight baselines starting at its coast, but not all of them were consistent with UNCLOS, therefore not accepted by the international community. Together with China, Vietnam has been the nation most often using hard power in the South China Sea dispute. Vietnam believes to possess a right to extend its sovereignty over the whole Spratly Islands, which are according to

Vietnam offshore district of Khanh Hoa Province. Furthermore, Vietnam claims the Paracel islands that have been completely controlled by China since 1976.

The country also has had a significant number of garrisons on the islands to maintain its control. In 1988, the islands were occupied by approximately 350 soldiers, and four years later it was already 1000 troops. The islands are very well fortified, the central unit on Sin Crowe Island is protected by anti-aircraft batteries and coastal artillery. Like China, Vietnam has been accused several times of constructing artificial platforms and airstrips even on the reefs that are usually several feet under water. However, the Vietnamese presence on these reefs has been challenged as due to their geologic structure they cannot be a subject of appropriation .

The Philippines has had permanent control on nine islands. Furthermore, there are speculations that Irving Reef, the tenth natural feature is patrolled by the Philippine Navy vessels arriving regularly to guard the territory. The Philippine's aspirations for sovereignty over these islands meet with the ambitions from China, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam .The Philippines has several arguments to believe in its legitimate sovereignty over several islands found in the Spratly's. By UNCLOS, the islands are located within the adjacent or contiguous zone of the major Philippine islands; the area is commercially and strategically crucial for the state; and the last, the most powerful statement recalls to the historic rights. The claimed islands were abandoned after WWII and later re-discovered by Philippines (Rowan, 2005). In 1947, Tomas Cloma, the Philippine merchant, set up colonies on the eight islands. According to the Philippines, the Spratly Islands were terra nullius when Tomas Cloma made the first step there. Consequently, Ferdinand Marcos, the then president of the Philippines, in 1978 published a decree proclaiming the sea-bed, sub-soil, continental margin, and airspace are to be under the jurisdiction of the Philippines. The proclamation also provided an explanation that these territories do not legally apply under the sovereignty of any country. Nevertheless, due to historical reasons, state's needs and efficient control that is consistent with international law, this land, and respective waters, are a matter of the sovereignty of the Philippines . Even though

many authors are stressing a quite high credibility of the Filipino arguments, it is important to note that there are sources that challenge the Philippine's reasoning. Even if proximity is the reason for considerable demarcation of the maritime jurisdiction, it is not a decisive factor. The Spratly's are not included in the Philippines' continental shelf as there is a trough between the Philippine archipelago and Spratly Islands. Therefore the natural extension of the continental shelf does not apply. The Philippines are allowed to ask for 200 nautical miles of EEZ but if delineated from the Philippines archipelago, the whole area of Spratly claimed by the Philippines would not be encompassed. Also, the statement about abandoned land is invalid since the other states had a presence on the features at the time the Philippines laid its claim .

Malaysia occupies five reefs, and claims another six, which are settled by the other claimants. Malaysia's claims clash with the interests of China, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. If evaluating the geographical aspects of the islands and other structures disputed by Malaysia, the only formations that could attribute all maritime zones are the Shallow Reef, Amboyna Cay, Barque Canada Reef, and Commodore Reef/Rizal Reef. From rocks, it would be Erica Reef, Investigator Shoal, and Mariveles Reef that could generate territorial sea. The other structures claimed by Malaysia are low tide elevation, submerged during low tide or further than 12 nautical miles from mainland or island, thus unable to have the maritime zone. Malaysia is the only claimant nation that has not recalled to the historical rights but bases its claim on its EEZ, continental shelf extension, and the effective occupation of the Spratly Islands . Except this, the country has been proving its effective control by extracting petroleum and natural gas in the waters around the occupied islands . In 1957, Malaysia got its independence from the UK, and since that time it has applied policies to ensure sustainable economic grow. The British colonials left reliable infrastructure, efficient bureaucracy and a very profitable export sector with a capacity to expand. To successfully export it was indispensable to maintain relations with the neighboring countries . Malaysia for the first time expressed its interest in the Spratly's in 1979, right after the Philippines had laid its claim over part of Spratly's. Malaysia's responded by announcing a map describing its

continental shelf, which was also covering Amboyna Cay, Commodore Reef and Swallow Reef.

The most notable reef under Malaysian control is the Swallow Reef. It has been called the Swallow Island since Malaysia, except having research station there, also scattered on soil from its mainland. On the part of the reef, Malaysia has created a 50-acre artificial island with a hotel, diving resort, and small air-strip what was not aimed only to fortify Malaysia's claim but also to boost economic activity and consequently to claim EEZ around the island .Swallow Reef has been known as the first artificial island in Spratly's, and today Malaysia defends its position on the island by more than 70 soldiers based there. The island is regulated only by Malaysia, but the dominance over the island has been challenged by China and Vietnam.

Brunei is a minor actor in the SCS dispute. Brunei's claims are principally based on its 200 nautical miles of EEZ measured from its coastline. However, its EEZ is crossing with the Chinese ninedashed line, Taiwan, Malaysia and marginally also with Philippine's EEZ. Unlike the other claimants, Brunei has not built any structures on the reefs nor stationed its troops on the disputed territory. However, Brunei has claimed the Louisa Reef and Rifleman Bank (Rowan, 2005). Louisa Reef is a marginal coral reef whose capability to generate EEZ is highly questionable since very few rocks stay dry during low tide, and some sources even claim that it is yearround submerged. Brunei lays its claim on the fact that the Louisa Reef is found within Brunei's EEZ. At this moment it is also claimed by China, which supports its claim by the nine-dashed line. Regardless the clash of claims between China and Brunei in the South China Sea, the current relations between both countries can be described laid-back; both countries admit that they have claim over Louisa Reef, but further incidents did not arise. In 2009 Brunei sent to CLCS a prior information about delimitation of the outer limits of its continental shelf over 200 nm from the coast and China did not comment it (Shicun, 2013). It is Important to note that Louisa Reef was claimed by Malaysia until an agreement was signed with Brunei in 2009. Malaysia has annulled its claim under the condition that the petroleum extracted in the areas of the earlier overlap would be shared . Since Vietnam claims all Spratly's, eventually it may include the Louisa Reef into its

zone of interest. Nevertheless, Vietnam has never given due publicity to the geographical demarcation of the archipelago. Brunei did not further comment the Vietnam's claim. The Brunei's claim on the Rifleman Bank is based on a document from 1954 where Britain partially affirmed boundaries of Isle Borneo. Nevertheless, later in 1988, Brunei prolonged its continental shelf to 350 nautical miles what also covers Rifleman Bank. In this case, Brunei's claim for extended continental shelf seems to not being consistent with UNCLOS, which does not allow the natural prolongation of the continental shelf to be discontinuous (Rowan, 2005). The Brunei's natural extension of the continental shelf is interrupted by East Palawan Trough. Furthermore, Brunei has not attempted to expel foreign fishing vessels from the territory it claims). To epitomize, Brunei's role in the South China Sea is restrained not only due to the marginal part of the sea territory coming under the Brunei's administration but also because of the improbability that the Louisa Reef and the Rifleman Bank could generate any maritime zone due to their geological predisposition. The Louisa Reef dispute with Malaysia was bilaterally solved, but the relations with the other claimants remain on the mutual acknowledgment of the overlapping maritime zones, but any noticeable conflict between Brunei and the other claimants happened. So far Brunei does not seem to be concerned about reinforcing its position in the area.

Indonesia should be mentioned if evaluating conflict in the SCS because it is probable that in the future it could be the seventh claimant in the SCS dispute. For a long time, Indonesia has held position of a mediator in the South China Sea dispute, but this is uncertain now because of overlapping maritime boundaries with China and Vietnam. Despite the fact that Indonesia does not claim any of the Paracel nor Spratly Island, Indonesian EEZ does extend into the South China Sea. In 2010, the tensions between Indonesia and China had been surging due to the infringement of Indonesian EEZ by Chinese fishers. In the beginning, it seemed that Indonesia was firmly refusing the Chinese ninedashed line. Nonetheless, according to the newest events, there is a sign that Indonesia has reconsidered its intermediate position in the conflict and rather started to recognize the excessive Chinese claims in the South China Sea. Except escalated relations with

China, there is pending EEZ between Indonesia and Vietnam what potentially could increase Indonesian engagement in the South China Sea Maritime dispute if undecided . Indonesia has been responsibly engaged while delimiting maritime boundaries with its neighbors. Dozens of sea boundaries were enclosed between Indonesia and its neighbors, and it was agreed with Malaysia and Vietnam on two baselines surrounding waters of Natuna Islands.

These agreements were intended to delimit continental shelf. On the other hand, the question of EEZ between these countries is still pending. In 2003 Indonesia and Vietnam after twenty-five years finally concluded agreement defining their continental shelf boundary. However, it assigns only to the seabed. The division of their EEZ remains unsolved. Indonesia did set unilateral limits of its EEZ in the area, but Indonesian delimitation is not consistent with seabed agreement signed between both nations in 2003. Therefore it might cause that in the future the EEZ would be under the jurisdiction of Indonesia while the seabed under the water column would be administrated by Vietnam. Since the seabed and water column are coincident, it will not be easy to conduct conflictfree exploration and exploitation of the marine resources . However, the 2003 agreement on the seabed boundaries in the South China Sea that Indonesia enclosed with Malaysia and Vietnam is challenging the nine-dashed line claimed by China. So far there have not been objections raised or diplomatic notes sent from China relating to the demarcation.

Chinese and Indonesian maritime border overlap still stays here in the case China would claim EEZ and continental shelf from the Spratly's that remain above water during high tide. It is highly questionable how many features from the Spratly Islands deserve to have EEZ and continental shelf, but in 2011 China argued that the Spratly's claimed by them are capable of generating EEZ and continental shelf. The diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China have been developing above-standard if omitting incidents in 1967 when Indonesia feared the advancement of communism. In 1993, China gave publicity to the new maps that claimed historical rights over waters that were covering EEZ of Indonesian Natuna Islands. In reaction, the

Indonesian Foreign Minister sent a diplomatic note to express disagreement and later, in 1995 the Beijing was asked to justify its claim. In response, Indonesia was informed that China does not oppose Indonesia and is open for negotiations. Indonesia has rejected China's offer for negotiations and in 1996 to demonstrate its sovereignty, Indonesia answered by exercising its army forces in Natuna Island .The relations between China and Indonesia got colder again in

EEZ in the South China Sea. China objected that those fishermen were detained in the area where China has traditionally been fishing and therefore asked for an instant release of its citizens and their vessels. After negotiations, 59 out of 75 fishers were liberated. The Indonesian Ambassador to China informed that Indonesia is considering punishment for these Chinese Fishermen for infringing the Indonesian EEZ. Nonetheless, the same incident reoccurred twice in 2010. Subsequent these critical events, the Indonesian ex-ambassador to China expressed that the corresponding maritime border between these two countries needs to be discussed. Later, the more specific proposal by Agus Suhartono, the Indonesia's Navy Chief of Staff, stated that China and Indonesia should define their overlapping maritime boundaries. These two proclamations signify that there are overlaying maritime claims between these two countries in the South China Sea thus the maritime boundary would be needed. Even though it is unclear whether these statements represent the opinion of the Indonesian government's authorities, still there is a possibility that these utterances reflect how the Indonesia's attitude towards Chinese claims in the South China

Sea is changing in the course of time. The development of the Indonesian view on the China as a player in the South China Sea dispute is attributable to the economic partnership between both countries. The reciprocal trade has increased notably from $1.18 billion in 1990 to $7.464 billion in 2000. For Indonesia, China is the 5th biggest trade ally, but Indonesia is only 17th for China. The news from 2014 reveals that Jakarta is worried about aggressive Chinese expansionism even if Indonesia declares no sovereignty discord with China in the South China

Sea, including Natuna Islands. General Moeldeko, the chief of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), has revealed that Indonesia is reinforcing its military capacity in the Natuna Islands to be prepared for any threat resulting from unpredictable changes in relations between South China Sea claimant nations. Although the TNI officials are not allowed to release any shifts in the presumptions of the state´s civil servants, the high-ranking officers have disclosed that Indonesia has been disturbed by the latest Chinese movements in the South China Sea.

Second Libyan Civil War

Areas of Control: Libya
22 January 2020

Libyan National Army under Khalifa Haftar
GNA and allied militias
Other militias

Since the fall of the Qaddafi regime in 2011, the stabilization expected for the post-conflict transition in Libya has not been achieved yet. On the contrary, the country is now divided into two main political centers of power and has been sinking into an endemic civil war ever since. Eight years after the revolution, Libya remains in a chaotic state, home to armed groups, terrorists, and criminal networks. After the expiration of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in December 2017, any effort to find a political compromise between Tripoli and Tobruk have been constantly undermined both by the political fragmentation on the ground and by detrimental foreign proxies. Moreover, a solution for the East-West division seems now even further out of reach with tensions reaching their peak in 2014 and have been deteriorating since. Following the recent offensive on Tripoli launched on April 4 by forces from the country's East and coming only 10 days ahead of a UN-sponsored peace conference that was supposed to finally break through the political gridlock and schedule new general elections, the

long-hoped-for stabilization of the country remains a long way off. Still, with the possibility of a third full-scale civil war in less than ten years becoming increasingly likely, a solution to the conflict is needed now more than ever.

The ultimate scope of this conflict analysis is therefore to propose recommendations for a swift interruption of violence and to set the stage for the creation of those sine qua non conditions for a national reconciliation and stabilization process. In other words, following a comprehensive analysis of the conflict, the most proximate causes of the conflict will be specifically addressed to find a near-term solution for the achievement of a functional "negative peace", leaving future analyses the onerous task of addressing more deeply rooted problems for a long-lasting stability. In order to re-build the profoundly fractured Libyan society, the first step is to reach a permanent truce between the two blocs in order to achieve a sufficient stability to disarm and demobilize the several armed groups active in the

country and therefore allow the formation of a national unity government. This conflict analysis precisely aims to address these very last points. Conflict's Causes

The deep-rooted tensions within Libyan society, substantially deriving from the unequal distribution of power and wealth, date back to the birth of the post-colonial state but re-emerged only in 2011 with the removal of Qaddafi after 42 years of authoritarian regime. More proximate vulnerabilities, on the other hand, have crippled the post-revolution political system since its earliest days until when, at the beginning of 2014, rising tensions between increa singly polarized factions eventually resulted into widespread outbreaks of violence across the country.1 The Libyan conflict is ultimately driven by the desire for power and resources rather than competing ideologies.

The most obvious reason behind the ongoing crisis is the absence of a strong central authority that could fill the vacuum of power left by the Qaddafi regime and the consequential political fragmentation. Since the 2011 overthrow of the regime, no political faction has ever enjoyed sufficient support to rule the country and an overabundance of actors have consequently crowded the national political landscape due to a total lack of political consensus.2 This situation resulted in conflict in 2014 and is now the main reason for the ongoing political stalemate. As an immediate consequence of the absence of a central government with the resulting monopoly of violence, the most compelling problem in Libya is the extremely volatile security environment. The two competing political authorities both rely upon different power arrangements to encounter their security needs, but none of them has firm control over each actor within their security complexes. Therefore, neither in Tripoli nor in the East, there is anything that could possibly be construed as a stable, legitimate security authority.

The resource accounts for 82% of Libyan export earnings and 60% of the GDP.5 It is self-evident why the control of the oil industry lies at the heart of the quest for power and legitimacy between East and West.6 Not for nothing, with the split of the national institutions between the Tripoli and the Tobruk-al-Bayda's authorities, the NOC, the Libyan state-owned oil company, also got split into two parallel institutions respectively based in Tripoli and Benghazi, with the former operating under international recognition and the latter exporting the crude illicitly.7 While keeping on calling for the dissolution of its counterpart in Benghazi, the Tripoli-based NOC has recently suspended operations at the country's largest oil field due to an "unlawful" closure of a pipeline valve linking the El Sharara oilfield to the port of Zawiya, on the Mediterranean coast.8 Albeit in control of the El Sharara oil field, Haftar's forces do not exercise full control of its pipeline's route which runs partially through territories held by militias allied with the Tripoli government.9 This shows, on the one hand, the fragility of the Libyan oil production – at its lowest levels in the last five months – and, on the other hand, how the ability to control or disrupt it plays a pivotal role in the conflict.

Finally, all the above is compounded by detrimental foreign proxies. As pinpointed by the human rights activist and former Vice-Chairman of the National Transitional Council of Libya during the 2011 revolution, Abdul Hafiz Ghoga, "there will be no peace and stability in Libya unless the international community reaches consensus." Mr. Ghoga touched the heart of the issue here as competing interests from various global and regional powers have significantly crippled the efforts of the UN to find a political compromise between Tripoli and Tobruk, with the former supported, among the others, by Qatar, Turkey, Italy, and the United States and the latter mainly backed by Egypt, United Arab Emirates (UAE), France, and Russia.11 Among them, France, Italy, Egypt, the UAE, and the United States have called in a recently issued rare joint statement for an immediate end of hostilities around Tripoli warning how "terrorist groups" are exploiting the country's security vacuum and "there can be no military solution in Libya".12 Still, the disunity so far exposed at the international level is far from being replaced by a more robust international approach to resolving the conflict as seeking a simple cease-fire is likely to merely give Haftar and the GNAaligned forces the opportunity to rearm, reorganize, and re-entrench themselves on offensive positions.

There are several destabilizing elements contributing to further complicate the precarious situation on the ground. Among them,

radicalization and violent extremism play a critical role. Libya's chaos, insecurity, and abundance of hydrocarbon resources have been attracting jihadist groups and various terrorist organizations that infiltrated every major coastal city or found "safe haven" in the vast ungoverned territories of the south. These groups, while representing a serious security threat per se, substantially disrupt and undermine any attempts of dialogue with local communities significantly contributing to further destabilize the situation by perpetuating the status quo.

Tied hand in glove with the lack of control over territory and resources, organized crime proliferates giving rise to an incredibly lucrative war economy. Profitable illicit trafficking and smuggling of migrants are a constant occurrence in Libya. As the war economy intensifies, the chances of restoring a national central governance drastically diminish, since armed groups and local militias are among the major beneficiaries of these illegal lucrative networks.14 Criminal and terrorist organizations are the biggest spoilers of the conflict. The two, present in both the GNA and LNA-controlled territories and enabled to sustain themselves by the remunerative incentives offered by the Libyan war economy, represent a serious impediment to peace as short-term gains get prioritized at the group level over wider national stability and security.

On top of the above, and partially due to both the absence of government and the presence of lucrative networks, the instability in Libya has awakened ancient tribal feuds throughout the country. This is the case, for instance, in Tripolitania between the Zintan and the Wershefana's Tribes, in Fezzan between the Tuaregs and the Tebus, and in Cyrenaica where the Awaqeer, Magharbeh and Obaidat tribes have been growing resentful towards the Haftar's leadership.15 Further complicating this situation, historical rivalries are also inflamed by the aforementioned opportunities offered by the war economy, especially with regard to the smuggling business that has been benefitting some groups over others, as in the case of the Tebu who dominate smuggling routes through Libya's southern borders. Addressing the tribal question is therefore crucial since, not only tribal wars contribute to the instability of the conflict, but also because tribal power dynamics historically

represents a central element in national cohesion and identity.

The situation in Libya is complex, chaotic, and extremely dynamic due to the highly fragmented political landscape characterized by rapidly shifting alliances and to the maze of armed groups pursuing different agendas in different parts of the country. On the political level, two main centers of power compete for power, legitimacy, and everything that goes along with it, above all, the control over financial institutions and resources. The main political actors are therefore split between the capital Tripoli, the western stronghold, and the eastern bloc of Torbuk and al-Bayda. Originally, the competing centers of power were three, with Tripoli having a second claimant, the Government of National Salvation (GNS). Headed by Prime Minister Khalifa al-Ghawi until March 2016, the GNS is today no longer in control of any relevant institution.16 The quest for legitimacy is therefore a two-horse race between the UN-backed government in Tripoli and the parliament in Tobruk.

Since March 2016 the capital has been officially governed by two institutions deriving their legitimacy from the agreement, the Presidential Council (PC) and the Government of National Accord (GNA), holding respectively the supervisory and executive powers of the country. The two are both headed by Fayez al-Sarraj, who's leadership is weak and constantly crippled by the necessity to lean on a complex of several different security actors to exert control over the capital.17 Still, the control of Tripoli gives Al-Sarraj and his GNA a considerable advantage, namely the control over strategic infrastructure such as ports and airports and over strategic financial assets such as the Libyan Central Bank (LCB), the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), and (only partially) the National Oil Corporation (NOC).

Two main blocs built around the two competing political authorities of Tripoli and eastern Libya, and a plethora of autonomous and semi-autonomous militias, crowd the Libyan scenario, while spoilers have been almost equally distributed across the two blocs and as autonomous third parties.

In eastern Libya, the armed wing of the Tobruk-Al Bayda bloc is substantially represented by the

Libyan National Army (LNA) alone. The LNA is an assorted army and a discreet military force composed by soldiers, former police officers, special forces, armed civilians, brigades of militias (including units from Misrata), tribal militiamen, foreign mercenaries (mainly Chadian and Sudanese forces), and other military groups such as the eastern and central branches of the Petroleum Facilities Guard, led by general commander Khalifa Haftar and that controls the east and the south of the country and a portion of the western border.20 Lined up among Haftar's troops feature also the Salafist Tariq Ibn Ziyad Brigade and the recently formed 73rd Infantry Brigade. Both have joined the ongoing battle for Tripoli.21 All in all, the LNA's core militia is made up of around 7,000 military troops coupled by some 18,000 auxiliary units and supported by a limited air force counting approximately eight combat-ready aircraft and by a naval force seemingly restricted to coastal patrol vessels.

On the other hand, the analysis of the armed groups active in western Libya shows an entirely different picture. The antiHaftar alliance, significantly less integrated than its eastern counterpart, is a conglomerate of official and semi-official armed forces, more or less-radicalized Islamist groups, and tribal militias. The Presidential Guard, of which the Supreme Commander is the Chairman of the Presidential Council (PC) Fayez Al-Sarraj, together with the weak Libyan Navy, is the only regular military force serving under the GNA. Its establishment, is indeed the attempt by the latter to form a unified Libyan national army loyal to, and under the control of, the authorities based in Tripoli. Yet, its function is perhaps more symbolic than with the burden of the conflict mostly divided up among the powerful allied city-states and the control of the capital entrusted to local armed groups. Among them, Misrata's Brigades are unquestionably the most powerful militia. Originally part of the Libya Dawn coalition and particularly active against the Zintan's militias, the brigades from Misrata, a city-state situated 187 km to the east of Tripoli, are run independently but still linked to the GNA and are now reconciled with their former Zintan enemy. The latter, the second most powerful armed force in Libya after Misrata, is based in the Nafusa mountains 144km southwest of Tripoli and established across much of southwest Tripoli. The militias from the small but powerful town of Zintan were pushed out from

the capital by the Dawn Coalition in 2014 with which members they subsequently aligned while distancing themselves from Haftar. Another important component of the anti-LNA coalition is represented by the Zawiya's Militias. Nominally on Haftar' side following a recent agreement between the general and local leaders to enter the city peacefully on his march to Tripoli, the militias instead ambushed Haftar's fighters and captured several LNA forces as soon as they rolled into town while sending troops to the capital in support of the GNA.23 Finally, as mentioned above, a central part of the GNA's territorial control passes through the role of Tripoli's Security Forces, a highly fragmented conglomerate of armed groups (with different official or semi-official roles within the security aparatus of the capital) among which the dominant players of the Rada Special Detterence Force(SDF), The Navasi Brigade, The Abu-Salim Brigade and the Tripoli Revolutioners Brigade.

A federalist militia that controls a number of oil and gas infrastructure in eastern Libya, the PFG has separated from the Tripoli-based armed forces but officially still operates under the Ministry of Defense of the unity government. Yet, as a matter of fact, the militia acts mostly independently, and some units even aligned with the LNA.25 Even in the "stabilized" east under Haftar' strong military rule a series of militias are active against the LNADignity campaign, the so-called Benghazi Armed Groups. Among them, the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council (BRSC) and the Benghazi Defence Brigade (BDB).26 Moreover, as listed among the drivers of violence, the presence of independent militias is compounded by the threat of jihadist groups and tribal disputes both in the easternast and the western side. The main jihadist groups active in Libya are Daesh and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, with other minor Salafi-jihadi factions like the Madkhali-Salafis further enriching the intolerant, radical, and anti-democratic compound spoiling Libyan civil society and of which growing influence across key armed groups and religious institutions makes them central actors in the Libyan crisis.27 On the other hand, especially in the south of the country, tribes such as the Tuaregs, the Tebus and, to a lesser extent, the Awaqeer, Magharbeh and Obaidat tribes are deeply involved in the conflict in some cases conducting parallel tribal wars against each other.

After the capture of almost the entire Fezzan with all its oil wells and major clusters of populations, the LNA had already ensured the control of about two-thirds of Libya. By strengthening his position in the south Haftar had also strengthened his position in the wider national framework, making the possibility of a military solution to the conflict increasingly plausible. Indeed, this scenario eventually materialized on April 4, when the head of the LNA declared his intention to take over Tripoli through military means. Yet, with the fighting flaring at the gates of the capital, paradoxically, Haftar's position has never been weaker. If, by taking the south, the LNA had secured an important strategic area while at the same time reinforcing its legitimacy in the eyes of the national public, the assault on Tripoli is bringing to light weaknesses and internal tensions.29 Haftar's domestic and international support has substantially decreased, with foreign leaders condemning the action and some local allies on the ground turning to the opposition.30 Moreover, after the initial surprise, the LNA's advance became bogged down and it is now evident how the battle for Tripoli will not be over any time soon. With the first attack, Haftar's forces had quickly seized control of the strategic outpost of Gharyan, a small town about 80 kilometers away from the capital taking up positions in Tripoli's suburbs 11 km circa south of the center.31 Yet, in June, the GNA forces launched a surprise counter-attack taking back control over Gharyan, which had become the main supply base for Haftar's offensive by then. Following the setback, by now, Haftar's way to the city is fiercely opposed by the GNA-aligned militias as the General is now facing better-armed and better-trained combatants than the ones he defeated in the south and the east.

On the opposite side, the GNA that had seen its position constantly weakening since its initial appointment, is now regaining strength. The LNA's operations in Fezzan further marginalized the presence of Tripoli in the south, while Al-Serraji was clearly more concerned with substantiating his uncertain control over the capital.32 Yet, Haftar's offensive is now giving momentum to the anti-LNA coalition. The government, quickly after Haftar's lightning assault, had announced a counteroffensive to reclaim all areas seized by the enemy retaking control over strategic areas and outposts such as the aforementioned Gharyan and the Mitiga airport, the capital's only functional airport that had initially fallen into enemy hands. Troops from Misrata, Zintan, and Zawiya have been constantly flooding into the capital and, albeit not under the GNA's direct control, are actively assisting the government in its counteroffensive.33 However, the now blatant inability of both factions to make significant military progress is pushing both the GNA and the LNA to rethink their tactics now mainly consisting in targeting each other's bases and supply centers with air-raids and drone-strikes. The situation is substantially the same in Tripoli's southern suburbs, where front lines might shift daily, but where the two sides have been locked in a standoff since last May. Despite the growing number of casualties on both sides and among civilians, by now, neither party seems willing to accept a ceasefire as both still believe they can achieve their goals through military means. Against this backdrop, the war around Tripoli will likely drag on bringing further stalemate and greater destruction until a diplomatic solution is found.

With the window for opportunity that was opened by the Abu Dhabi Agreement now inevitably close, it is hard to imagine a gradual conciliatory mediation as a solution for the conflict.34 With Tripoli's precarious peace now fatally gone and with the third full-scale civil war spreading around the capital, the priority, as of this moment, must be to bring back to the negotiating table the opposing leaderships by proposing an alternative political process. Haftar's move is a gambit, and potentially a tactical and strategic trap. Hence, his military campaign against Tripoli means primarily one thing: there is no political future for him in the new Libya, or at least not in the one that formal negotiations were leading towards. Haftar, confident in his strength, opted for the military solution just as Salamé's political reconciliation efforts have started paying off, most likely with the intent of getting a better deal by disrupting the pro-GNA coalition. Therefore, a new political solution must be created in light of the new balance of power in place while it cannot retreat from the decisive action of the international community, perhaps coalesced around the concerted leadership of a neutral power as the two parties will likely try to prolong the fight if each sustained by its own regional allies.

Given the above, a peace conference is urgently needed.35 As soon as conditions permit,

international key-players should work to broker a sustained ceasefire between the two factions and allow the conference to take place. An immediate de-escalation of the conflict is of paramount importance. To this end, a window of opportunity may be offered by the fact that Haftar's march on the capital is not exactly working out as planned. By pivoting on the now crystal-clear military deadlock around Tripoli, Haftar's international allies should increase their pressure on the General to get him back to the negotiating table. International actors, the US and the EU in the first place, should persuade regional proxies in Libya to abandon the unrealistic belief that either side can achieve its own political goals without first reaching a settlement with the other. In other words, the international community must convince Abu Dhabi, Riyadh and Cairo, on the one hand, and Doha and Ankara on the other, that neither side will likely obtain any swift, significant military victory in the pursuit of their independent political road map and that both the LNA and the GNA should abandon their zero-sum logic.

Once in place, the conference should be centered around the disarmament of combatants, perhaps by providing incentives and promising inclusion to all forces that put down their arms, restrain from future clashes, and distance themselves from hard-line radicalized or particularly aggressive leaderships. Secondly, the role of Haftar in the future Libyan state should be re-discussed by compromising between a necessary engagement and justifiable concerns while avoiding a harmful and dangerous appeasement. The Abu Dhabi agreement was rather opaque and ambiguous on this particularly delicate point that should instead be made clearer. In light of the latest developments, the increased importance of the LNA at the strategic level cannot be ignored, but any compromise must be made while bearing in mind the necessity of assuring the continuation of an unconditionally civilian state after the war.

The political constituencies of Tripoli and Tobruk should agree on the path towards a new constitution and on the eventual electoral procedures. Moreover, unrelenting diplomatic efforts must be undertaken by both parties to gather all the influential actors within their respective spheres of influence in a joint effort to ensure the most inclusive cooperation towards this common goal. Finally, inter and intra-bloc dialogue

is necessary to assure the restoration of a sufficiently safe environment aimed at guaranteeing the holding of free and fair elections.

The two blocs should collaborate in fighting the several conflict spoilers and restore the control of the territory through the empowerment of local authorities and municipalities. Especially in the south, explicit arrangements must be taken with tribal leaders to stem the proliferation of impeding criminal activities. Divided national Institutions such as the Central Bank and the NOC should be reassembled to restore the oil export and restart a virtuous circle of production and investment as soon as possible. These guiding lines, if supported by major regional actors, properly coordinated by the EU and the UN, not hampered by conflicting bilateral initiatives, and with the necessary blessing from the United States, might finally translate into a significant push towards a substantial stabilization of the country.

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